

# SAṂŚAYAGHŪ

A Commentary on Śāṅkara Bhāṣya of  
Māṅduky'opaniṣad with Kārikā



## UPANISHAD

### (1 to 4) Mangalaślokas

1. *Bhāṣyakāra* has written two *mangalaślokas* for the *Bhāṣya* of *Māṅdukyā*. The first is this: *prajñānāṃśupratānaiḥ sthiracaranikaravyāpibhirvyāpya lokān bhuktvā bhogān sthaviṣṭhān punarapi dhiṣaṇodbhāsītān kāmajanyān/ pītvā sarvān viśeṣān svapiti madhurabhūṅ māyayā bhojayanno māyāsaṅkhyāturīyaṃ paramamṛtamajaṃ brahma yattannato'smi/1/* प्रज्ञानांशुप्रतानैः स्थिरचरनिकरव्यापिभिव्याप्य लोकान् भुक्त्वा भोगान् स्थविष्ठान् पुनरपि धिषणोद्भासितान् कामजन्यान् । पीत्वा सर्वान् विशेषान् स्वपिति मधुरभुङ् मायया भोजयन्तो मायासंख्यातुरीयं परममृतमजं ब्रह्म यत्तन्नतोऽस्मि ॥१॥ - I bow to that *Brahman* which, with its spread over rays of knowledge in the multiplicity of the movable and the immovables (*jīvas*), is present extensively in the universe; which experiences the pleasures born out of desire and projected by the buddhi; which after sucking all the qualified pleasures, procures for us enjoyment through its *Māyā* and sleeps; which is deathless, birthless and is the fourth with respect to *Māyā*.

2. The content of the above *śloka* will now be elaborated. *Brahman* is pure consciousness and bliss. These two appear correspondingly as qualified knowledges-qualified pleasures in animals through their intellect and the senses. The rays of consciousness are indeed these qualified knowledges. The pleasures and the knowledges are both the features of the body. In this way, *Brahman* is spread in all the animals. But the *jīva* in the body has superimposition – that is, he thinks wrongly

that he is himself the body. So, following the knowledges and the pleasures which occur in the body, he feels that he is the knower and the enjoyer. Though he does not know that he is *Brahman*, he is indeed *Brahman*. Not only that; the body is also *Brahman*. The *jīva* gets knowledges in the wakeful state in contact with external objects and in dreams from their impressions in the mind. Similarly, he gets gross pleasures in wakefulness and subtle pleasures in dreams. In deep sleep when he is disconnected from the mind and the senses, he experiences the unqualified consciousness and unqualified bliss of *Brahman*. This implies that the three states and the knowledges and the pleasures are the effects of *Brahmamāyā*. Further, *Brahman* is neither the knower nor the enjoyer. But the *śruti* wants the *jīva* finally to understand that he is *Brahman*. So, this *Brahman* is described to the *jīva* by superposing these two in *Brahman*. *Brahman* is indeed different from all these, it is unborn and deathless. Salutations to it.

3. The second *mangalaśloka* is this: yo viśvātmā vidhaviṣayān prāśya bhogān sthaviṣṭhān paścāccānyān svamativibhavān jyotiṣā svena sūkṣmān/ sarvānetān punarapi śanaiḥ svātmanisthāpayitvā hitvā sarvān viśeṣān vigataguṇagaṇaḥ pātvasau nasturīyaḥ/2/ यो विश्वात्मा विधविषयान् प्राश्य भोगान् स्थविष्ठान् पश्चाच्चान्यान् स्वमतिविभवान् ज्योतिषा स्वेन सूक्ष्मान् । सर्वनेतान् पुनरपि शनैः स्वात्मनिस्थापयित्वा हित्वा सर्वान् विशेषान् विगतगुणगणः पात्वसौ नस्तुरीयः ॥२॥ - May that *Brahman* which is the *Turīya* that is the support of *Virāt* that experiences the mighty results of ignorance and attachment and then also the subtle ones called into being by the internal organ of knowledge and enlightened by its own light; and which appears to draw all variety within itself even by being one, limitless, nondual and attributeless, protect us.

4. Its explanation: the mental thoughts, bodily activity and the pleasures – are all features of the body. They are all produced by *Brahman's Māyā* and not by the *jīva*. However, he

feels that he is the knower, the doer and the enjoyer because of his superimposition with the body and the mind which is wrong. It is not possible to free him from this superimposition in one straight step and give him the knowledge that he is *Brahman*. So the *śāstra* moves step by step. It first distributes this activity among the three devatās corresponding to the three states of wakefulness, dream and deep sleep and superposes his knowledges and pleasures on them. (The *ślokas* superpose only the pleasures). The three devatās of the three states are respectively *Vaiśvānara*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. The three forms of the *jīva* namely extrovert knower, introvert knower and covert knower are superposed respectively on these three devatās. When the *jīva* introspects himself sitting in these positions, his ignorance is lost and he realizes that he is indeed *Turīya*.

In this way, the superposition of the multiplicity of the enjoyed, the enjoyer and the enjoyment is made in the first *śloka*. The second *śloka* withdraws this superposition and the *ātman* is shown to be the unitary *Brahman*. Therefore, the real intent of the *ślokas* is the message '*tat tvam asi*'. Salutation to this *Turīya*.

### (5) *Anubandha Chatuṣṭaya*

5. The *Kārikās* of *Goudapāda* to *Māndukyopaniṣad* are in four sections. As in any *Vedānta* treatise, this too contains the four topics: *viśaya* – the subject, *saṃbandha* – the connection, *prayojana* – the benefit, and *adhikāri* – the one who is competent for its study. The benefit of studying this *Bhāṣya* is the following: the duality perceived by the ignorant that he is the knower and the world is the known is basically responsible for his grief. Here, this duality is imagined because of his ignorance, 'How is it his imagination?' It is because the knower and the known are both indeed the *ātman* which does not have anything second to it. Therefore, *ātmavidyā*, that is, - the knowledge that world is not different from himself, destroys his grief totally. This is the benefit. After getting this knowledge, he does not experience that he is a doer. '*yatra*

*dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaraṃ paśyati ..... yatra sarvamatmaivābhūt tatkena kaṃ paśyēt* यत्र द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति ..... यत्र सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत्। – Where there is a feeling of duality one sees another .... Where there is the knowledge that everything is *ātman*, who sees what?’ (Br.2.2.14). Therefore, the subject which is to be understood for the removal of grief is *ātman* himself. Next, one who has an intense desire to get freed from grief is the *adhikāri*. Further, the removal of ignorance of duality is the connection between the *adhikāri* and the benefit. *Omkāra* is a device to understand this *ātmatattva*. *Āgama Prakaraṇa* determines this with the help of the *śruti* only. Further, the knowledge of the world understood as different from himself is an illusion, like the knowledge of the serpent seen as different from the rope. In this way, *Vaitathya Prakaraṇa* demonstrates the illusoriness of the world understood as different from *ātman*. ‘Like the world, could *ātman* also be illusory?’ Answering this question, *Advaita Prakaraṇa* demonstrates that nonduality is not illusory. In the last *Ālātaśānti Prakaraṇa* the *Kārikākāra* refutes the arguments of the *Dvaitavādi*, *Śūnyavādi* and *Vijnānavādi* who deny the existence of nonduality.

### (6) Ātmajñāna through Omkāra

6. *om ityetaḍakṣaram idaṃ sarvaṃ tasyopavyākhyānaṃ bhūtaṃ bhavad bhaviṣyaditi sarvatomkāra eva/ yaccānyat trikālātitaṃ tadapyomkāra eva*, ॐ इत्येतदक्षरम् इदं सर्वं तस्योपव्याख्यानं भूतं भवद् भविष्यदिति सर्वमोकार एव । यच्चान्यत् त्रिकालातीतं तदप्योकार एव - *Om* is this letter; all this is its expression; all past, present and future is *Omkāra* alone. Even the other that is beyond the three times is also *Omkāra* (Mā.m.1).

To know *ātmatattva*, *Omkāra* is a device. This is said by *śruti* in several places ‘*Om ityetaḍ*, ओमत्येतत् – this is what is *Om*’ (K.1.2.15), ‘*etaḍ alambanam* एतदालम्बनम् – this is the support’ (K.1.2.17), ‘*etaḍvai satyakāma param chāparam*, एतद्वै सत्यकाम परं चापरम् – *Satyakāma*, this is *Parabrahman* and also *aparabrahman*’ (Pr.5.2),

‘*Om iti brahma*, ओम् इति ब्रह्मम् – *Om* is *Brahman*’ (T.1.8), ‘*Omkāra evedam sarvam*, ओंकार एवेद् सर्वम् – All this is *Omkāra*’ (Ch.2.23.3) etc. In the last *mantra*, ‘*sarva*’ means all that is directly seen like the objects of the world and those which are understood by *śāstra* like *prāna*, *avyakta* etc. which are the causes of the world. The base of all this is *ātman* and all these things are thoughts conceived by us in *ātman*. Here, thought – *vikalpa* is explained by this example (Sec 44): Suddenly what is conceived as snake is indeed only the rope and the conceived snake is different from the rope. Therefore, the conception of snake is the wrong knowledge of the rope and that snake is nonexistent. However, after the examination of the rope one gets its right knowledge – namely, ‘rope appearing like snake’. This snake-appearance is not different from the rope and so it is existent. In a similar way, the world understood as world only (independent of *ātman*) is indeed *ātman* but it is understood different from *ātman*. Since *ātman* alone is existent, the misunderstood world is nonexistent. But when it is examined with the help of the *śāstra*, one comes to know that ‘it is *ātman* which appears like *jagat*’. This is the right knowledge of *ātman*. These wrong-right knowledges of *ātman* are called *vikalpa* done in *ātman*. This world which is nondifferent from *ātman* is existent. That is to say, the base of the illusory world is the world in front of us and the *ātman* is the support of the world in front of us. In this way, the effects like *prāna* etc. are also existent and all the words for which *prāna* etc. are the subjects are also *Omkāra*. This *Omkāra* is nothing but *ātman*. Throughout the *Kārikās* where *prāna* etc. are referred to as *ātmavikalpas* are existent when understood rightly that they are not different from *ātman*. This should never be forgotten. When understood wrongly as different from *ātman*, they are nonexistent.

### (7) Abhidhāna – Abhidheya

7. *Abhidheya* is the object and *abhidhāna* is its name. For example, the object *prāna* is *abhidheya* and the word *prāna* is its *abhidhāna*. The name is not different from the corresponding

object; if it were different, it cannot be understood through its name. Further, the name is not different from *Omkāra*. Therefore, starting from the first creation of *prāna* up to the last creation of *rūpa* – form, everything is *Omkāra*. There is importance for the name in the sentence ‘All this is the letter *Om*’. Further, giving importance to the object, *śruti* tells that all the objects are *Omkāra* only. That is, the effects bound by time namely, those that appear in the past, the present, the future and those that are beyond time like their causes (*avyākṛta* etc.) are also *Omkāra*. Though *Omkāra* as the name conveys all the objects, the experience of the object is, really, beyond both name and the object. It can be experienced, but not conveyed by name; that is, experience cannot be objectified (it cannot be grasped by the intellect). For example, ghee is the object and the word ghee is its name. But, experience of the taste of ghee is beyond both. That is, it is not communicable through words. The experience arises by submerging both the name and the object together. (In the example of ghee, however, its taste is grasped by the intellect). The experience of *Brahman* is like that. Therefore, in later *mantras*, the *śruti* adopts this scheme to teach the *Turiyātman*, who even though is beyond the names and the objects, through the names of the gross world, the subtle world and *Māyā* via the corresponding names *Vaiśvānara*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*.

### (8) Ātman’s Four Pādās

8. *sarvaṃ hyetad brahmāyamātmā brahma so’yamātmā catuspāt*, सर्वं ह्येतद् ब्रह्मायमात्मा ब्रह्म सोऽयमात्मा चतुष्पात् - All this is *Brahman*; this *ātman* is *Brahman*; he is this *ātman* having four steps (*pādās*) (Mā.m.2)

By saying ‘All this is *Omkāra*’ the *śruti* communicates indirectly the *Brahman* to be known. In order to bring it to direct experience, it further says ‘This *ātman* is *Brahman*’ by showing by gesture the *pratyagātman* who is inside the body. Who is this *pratyagātman*? Every *jīva* has three forms. (1) form of knowing the outside objects in wakefulness, this form is

familiar, (2) form of knowing the internal objects in dreams and he too is familiar, (3) form of not knowing anything in deep sleep and no one knows him; he is the innermost form – *pratyagātman*. Though, no one knows who he is, everyone knows that he has no relation whatsoever with the body, senses or the mind. Therefore, if he is reminded of it, he can easily understand that his knowledge in wakefulness about himself that he is related to the the body, senses or the mind is his wrong knowledge.

It is this wrong knowledge which is the root cause of all the miseries experienced by the *jīva*. The only way to get rid of all of them at once is by knowing that he is *Brahman*. This lesson is taught in four steps which are the four steps of *Turiya*. The first step is *Vaiśvānara* who is responsible for all the activities in all the gross bodies of animals and also the rest of the world. If the *jīva* in wakefulness is *vyāṣṭi* – individual, then *Vaiśvānara* is the *samaṣṭi* – the collective. In the first step, *śāstra* lifts up the *jīva* and places him in this collective *devatā Vaiśvānara* and removes his wrong knowledge in the wakeful state. In the same way, it removes the wrong knowledge in the next two levels of dreams and deep sleep. The details are discussed in the corresponding sections.

The features of *Vaiśvānara*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are as follows: Each *pāda* has causal relation with the next *pāda*, that is, each *pāda* is the effect and the next *pāda* is its cause. Therefore, just as we get the knowledge of gold by negating the features of the gold ornament, the negation of the features of *Vaiśvānara* gives the knowledge of *Taijasa*. Similarly, the negation of the features of *Taijasa* gives the knowledge of *Prājña* and finally, the negation of the features of *Prājña* gives the knowledge of *Turiya*. The nature of the four *pādās* will now be described by an example. By merging 25 paise in 50 paise, 50 paise in 75 paise, etc. one can finally obtain the rupee. Similarly, by merging *Vaiśvānara* in *Taijasa*, *Taijasa* in *Prājña* and *Prājña* in *Turiya* step by step, we obtain the *Turiya*. Therefore, the four

*pādās* of *Turīya* are not like the four *pādās* of a cow; they are like 25, 50, 75 and 100 paisa of the rupee. Here, by ‘merging’ we mean the following: obtainment of the knowledge that *Vaiśvānara* is not different from *Taijasa*, *Vaiśvānara* and *Taijasa* are not different from *Prājña* and *Vaiśvānara*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are not different from *Turīya*. This *Turīya* which is without multiplicity is myself. Further, the *mantra* describes the first step like this:

### (9) Wakeful State – *Vaiśvānara*

9. *jāgaritasthāno bahisprajñāḥ saptāṅga ekonaviṃśatimukhaḥ sthūlabhugvaiśvānaraḥ prathamah pādah*, जागरितस्थानो बहिष्प्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः स्थूलभुग्वैश्वानरः प्रथमः पादः - The first quarter is *Vaiśvānara* whose arena is the waking state, who cognizes the outside world, who has seven limbs and nineteen mouths and who enjoys the gross. (Mā.m.3)

Wakefulness of the *jīvas* is the arena of *Vaiśvānara*'s activities. Therefore, he is *jāgaritasthāna*. It means, he is the performer of all the activities in the body and the senses of all the *jīvas* in their wakefulness. During this period, the *jīva* obtains the knowledges of the objects outside his body and so he is the extrovert knower. As a result of a complex activity of *Vaiśvānara* performed in the body of *jīva*, he obtains the knowledge of the outside objects. He is *saptāṅga* – of seven limbs. The top heavens are his head, the sun is his eyes, the wind is his *prāna*, the sky is his waist, water is his bladder and the earth is his two feet. This information is from another *Upaniṣad* (Ch.5.18.2). In order to obtain the knowledge of outside objects, the five motor organs, the five senses, the five *pranas* and the mind, the intellect, the faculty of memory and the ego of the *jīva* act as nineteen doors. Therefore, he is *ekonaviṃśatimukha* – the nineteen faced. He experiences the gross sound, touch, sight, taste and smell. Therefore, he is *sthūlabhuk* – gross enjoyer. The whole *Viśva*, that is the *naras* – humans, are linked to their corresponding fruits of action by

him. Therefore, he is *Vaiśvānara*. Just as the big tree is the *samaṣṭi* - collective and its leaves, the flowers etc. are the *vyasṭi* – the individuals, the *vyasṭi jīvas* are extrovert knowers and their corresponding *samaṣṭi* is *Vaiśvānara*. The second *pāda* of the *ātman* is to be understood only through him. Therefore, he is the *prathamapāda* – the first *pāda* of *ātman*.

### (10 to 11) *Vaiśvānara* is *Saptāṅga*

10. After listening to this description of *Vaiśvānara*, a question arises: ‘He is seven limbed and his limbs span the whole world. So, for him, there is nothing like outside, nothing that is different from him. Therefore, he cannot be the knower of outside things. On the other hand, *jīva* has things outside his body which are being known by him. So, *jīva* is the knower of outside things, not *Vaiśvānara*. Similarly, since *Vaiśvānara* is the whole world there is nothing different from him which is to be enjoyed by him. Therefore, he cannot be the gross enjoyer either. But *jīva* has things to be enjoyed. So, only he is the enjoyer. In this situation, what is the meaning of *Vaiśvānara* being called as the knower of outside things and gross enjoyer?’

The answer to this question is the following. True. *Vaiśvānara* by himself is neither the knower nor enjoyer but *śāstra* does superposition of both on him. Why? It wants to place him (*Bahisprajña*) in *Vaiśvānara* and remove his wrong knowledge about himself. The scheme to achieve this is the following: During wakefulness, *jīva* obtains the knowledges of the outside objects and the enjoyment of the gross objects as a result of a very complicated activity in his body and *Vaiśvānara* is responsible for this activity in the bodies of all the *jīvas*. It is for this reason he is called *jāgaritasthāna*. In this way, both the activity and its results of knowing and enjoying are features of the body; they are not features of the *pratyagātman*. He is entirely different from the gross and subtle bodies as experienced in his deep sleep (Sec 8). But by the force of the wrong knowledge about himself, the *jīva* feels doership, knowership and enjoyership as his features. That is to say, he

feels he is the extrovert knower and gross enjoyer. In order to free him from this wrong knowledge of himself, *śāstra* adopts the following device: first it reminds him that he is not the doer on the basis of his experience of deep sleep where he has no connection with the body. For example, it is known that it is *Vaiśvānara* who digests the food eaten by the *jīva* and not the *jīva* himself (G.15.14). After being reminded of this, the *jīva* understands it also. Nevertheless, he does not know who he is. *Śruti* teaches him step by step who he is. In the first step, the individual *jīva* is placed in the collective *Vaiśvānara* who is the performer of all the activities. Since the individual is not different from the collective, the *jīva* can identify himself with *Vaiśvānara* and look around. When he does it, he realizes that nothing is different from him in the world. Then he understands that he is neither the knower nor the enjoyer. (However, *Vaiśvānara*'s doership sticks to him. This is lost in the final step where he is made to sit one with *Turīya*. This is discussed in sec 21). In the first step, his wrong identification with gross body is lost. In order to help him in this way, *śāstra* does superposition of knowership and enjoyership of the individual *jīva* in the collective - *Vaiśvānara*.

11. The same question is posed by the *Bhāṣyakāra* in the following manner: by saying '*ayam ātma Brahma* – this *ātman* is *Brahman*' (Mā.m.2), *śruti* points out the *pratyagātman* inside the body of the *jīva*. How can his first step be the *Vaiśvānara* who is the entire world? In order to understand the intent of this question, the meaning of the word *pratyagātman* has to be made clear. The *jīva* has three forms: extrovert knower, introvert knower and the covert knower. The last one is *pratyagātman* – the inside *ātman*. The extrovert knower knows himself and also the introvert knower. But what he knows about them is wrong knowledge because he does not know who the *Prājña* is though he is himself. When he comes to know who he is, his wrong knowledge about himself in wakefulness and dream is removed. Therefore, the purpose of all *Vedānta* is to teach who

he is. '*etas mācca pratyagātman brahnavijñānāt saṁsārabhījamajñānaṁ kāmākarmapravṛttikāraṇam aśeṣato nīvartate* - एतस्माच्च प्रत्यगात्मब्रह्मविज्ञानात् संसारबीजमज्ञानं कामकर्मप्रवृत्तिकारणम् अशेषतो निवर्तते - By the knowledge of this *pratyagātma-Brahman*, ignorance which is responsible for the continuation of the *saṁsāra* of desire, action and motivation is destroyed without a trace' (Ke.bh.avatar.). This *pratyagātma-Brahman* is both *pratyagātman* and also *Brahman* but the *jīva* does not know this. From his own personal experience of deep sleep he knows that there are no forms or activities in him. No one has any doubt about it. When this is so, 'How can his *pāda* be the limbs of *Vaiśvānara* which is the whole world? This question is raised by the *Bhāṣyakāra* himself and he answers it in the following way: the extrovert knower has the ignorance of his own nature as experienced in deep sleep. Without knowing that his nature in deep sleep is attributeless, he superimposes the features of the body etc. on him in wakefulness and understands himself only in that way. He has been limiting himself to the body and he is submerged in the activities based on duality. But actually he is *Brahman* who is spread over in everything starting from *avyākṛta* up to the last creations of name and form. Had something existed different from this *Brahman*, it could have had transaction. Since there is nothing different from it, it is transactionless. That *Brahman* is the *pratyagātman* who is himself. This statement of the *śāstra* is not difficult to understand, because, all the features of *Brahman* namely, changelessness, limitlessness and bliss and oneness are also clearly existing in *pratyagātman*. He too is unchanging, limitless and bliss even in the absence of objects. Lastly, this *pratyagātman* is the same in the deep sleep of everybody. That is to say, *pratyagātman* is not many like wakeful *ātmas* or dream *ātmas*. Therefore, he is also transactionless.

In this way, since all the characteristics of *Brahman* are existing also in himself, it is not difficult to understand that the *pratyagātma-Brahman* is *Brahman*. With this knowledge that

he is indeed *Brahman*, he also understands that the entire world is himself. This knowledge is called *prapanchavilaya – dissolution of the world*. Through this knowledge, he can also understand that he is transactionless. That is why even from the first step onwards, *sāstra* identifies the *jīva* with *Vaiśvānara* who is the entire universe. This is indeed attainment of nonduality. On the other hand, if one understands himself only as the *pratyagātman* who is the witness of everything, it amounts to the duality of *Sāṅkhya*; it will not be the nonduality that the *śruti* proclaims (Mā.bh.3). This nonduality is attained when the *jīva* identifies himself in steps with the collective *ātmas Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, and Prājna* and finally with *Turīya*. Next, we go to *Taijasa* - the second *pāda*.

### (12) Dream – *Taijasa*

12. *svapnasthāno'ntahprajñah saptāṅga ekonaviṃśatimukhaḥ praviviktabhuktaijaso dvitīyah pādaḥ* ॥4॥ स्वप्नस्थानोऽन्तःप्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः प्रविविक्तभुक्तैजसो द्वितीयः पादः- The second *pāda* is *Taijasa* whose arena is the dream state, who cognizes the inside world, who has seven limbs and nineteen mouths and who enjoys the dream objects. (Mā.m.4)

Just as the collection of extroverts is *Vaiśvānara*, the collection of the introverts is *Taijasa*. *Vaiśvānara* is his evolved form. This *Taijasa* is *svapnasthāna*, that is to say, the one who handles the dream activity of the *jīvas*. Dream is generated from the impressions of the activity in the wakeful state; so dream creation is by *jīva* himself (Br.4.3.10). Nevertheless, he does not decide what dream he should see; this is decided by *Taijasa*. What is dream? '*indriyāṅām uparame manonuparatam yadi/ sevate viṣayāneva tadvidyāt svapnadarśanam* - इन्द्रियाणामुपरमे मनोनुपरतं यदि। सेवते विषयानेव तद्विद्यात् स्वप्नदर्शनम् – When the senses are resting and the mind continues to experience the objects without resting, it is dream experience' (Mo.dh.275.24).

The objects seen in dreams have the following feature: In wakeful state, the outside objects illuminated by outside lights

are being known. Though the outside objects and outside lights are absent in dreams, the mind continues with the known-knower activity from the impressions of the wakeful experience. Since only the impressions of the inside mind are being known as objects in dreams, *Taijasa* is called the introvert knower. He is also *seven-limbed* and *nineteen-faced*. However, his limbs are the subtle causes of the gross limbs of *Vaiśvānara*. Since he gets illuminated knowledges even in the absence of objects, he is called *Taijasa*. 'What is the source of illumination in a sleeping person'? Answer to this question is obtained by the following analysis: Light is that in the presence of which one gets the knowledge of an object and cannot get in its absence. Next, we ask 'what is that in the presence of which we get the knowledge of the light source and in its absence, we cannot get it?' Obviously, it is the eye. So, the light of the light source is the eye. In the same way, the light of the eye is the mind, the light of the mind is the intellect and the light of the intellect is the *pratyagātman*. It is only by his light that the impressions of the mind are illuminated during dreams and the knowledge of the illuminated impressions is obtained.

Though the producer of these impressions is the *jīva* himself, it is *Hiranyagarbha*- that is *Taijasa*, who decides which impression is to be seen by the *jīva* and illuminates it. These 'impression objects' are his enjoyables and not the gross objects. Therefore, he is *praviviktabhuk – enjoyer of subtle objects*. *Taijasa* is also seven-limbed and spread over the whole world through his subtle limbs. So, the question arising about *activity* (as in section 10) also arises in the case of *Taijasa*. The answer is also identical. *Taijasa* is neither the introvert nor the enjoyer of subtle objects. But *sāstra* does their superposition on him. When *jīva* identifies with *Taijasa* and looks at himself, he realizes their absence in him. This means that they were imagined to be his features only due to ignorance. However, the activity of *Taijasa* sticks to him. Afterwards, when he identifies with *Prājna* that too drops out. Hereafter, we are going to consider the details of the third *pāda*.

## (13 to 14) Deep Sleep – Prājna

13. *yatra supto na kañcana kāmam kāmāyate na kañcana svapnam paśyati tat suṣuptam/ suṣuptasthāna ekībhūtaḥ prajñānaghana evānandamayo hyānandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prājñāstrīyaḥ pādah* - यत्र सुप्तो न कञ्चन कामं कामयते न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति तत् सुषुप्तम्। सुषुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयो ह्यानन्दभुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञस्तृतीयः पादः - The third *pāda* is called *Prājna* whose arena is deep sleep state where there are neither desires nor dreams; in whom all melts into one; who is a mass of qualified knowledges; who is the enjoyer of *bliss*; who is the opening of *chetas*. (Mā.m.5)

In this *mantra*, deep sleep is distinguished from dream in the following way: Both are sleep only. But the one in which there is the action of seeing is dream where he gets desires, and the other devoid of the action of seeing and desiring is deep sleep. The covert knower has no desires, does not see dreams. Here, the arena of *Prājñā* is the deep sleep of the *jīvas* and he is the collective of all the individual covert knowers. Here arises a **question**: *Vaiśvānara* and *Taijasa* handle the activity of the world and of dreams respectively of the individual *jīvas* and therefore their arenas were wakefulness and dreams. But there is no activity in deep sleep. So, what does it mean to say that the arena of *Prājna* is deep sleep?

**Answer**: There is no activity in deep sleep. But the absence of activity in him is the result of the activity done by the collective *Prājna*. This activity is the following: *purītat* is a sheath of *nādis* called *hitā* and the sheath covers the heart. *Hitā nādis*, 72000 in number, contain *tejas* – a *stuff* related to the Sun. They proceed from the heart and spread over the entire body. The intellect spread over in them grasps the objects of sound, touch, sight, taste and smell. But actually, its place is the heart. Therefore, when the intellect reaches the heart, *jīva* gets deep sleep (Br.2.1.19). The activity of sending the intellect to the heart is done by the *udāna vāyu*. This is a limb of *prakṛti* which is

under the control of *Prājna*. Therefore, it is this activity of the collective *Prājna* which causes deep sleep to the *vyasṭi jīva*. The arena of *Prājna* is fixed to be deep sleep for this reason.

Further, *Prājna* is **ekībhūta** and **prajñānaghana**. Their details are as follow: the dual world of the knower and the known and the qualified knowledge are only in the imagination of the ignorant person. These two are defined mutually- that is, the known world exists because there is qualified knowledge and this arises because there is the known world. This fault of mutual determination is an unavoidable lacuna in the dual world. This mutual determination happens in the wakeful state (its details are discussed in sec 85). Further, though the dual world does not exist in dreams, it exists in his understanding. While awake, he acts on the basis of accepting the dual world and in accordance with it, he has developed impressions over a long chain of lives and these impressions themselves constitute the dual world in sleep. Further, both (dual world and its impressions), are present in deep sleep also. 'How do you say that?' Though, they appear to be absent, both reappear in him when he returns to the wakeful state. Therefore, we have to conclude that in deep sleep also the dual world and its impressions exist. 'In what form?' Just as the world during night appears as one mass of darkness, the dual world of variety becomes one mass **ekībhūta** in deep sleep and the qualified knowledges are all frozen without scope for expression and therefore *Prājna* is called **prajñānaghana**. Further, he is **ānadamaya**: In this state of deep sleep, the mind gives up the strenuous activity of oscillation between the object and its knower. Therefore, it is free from grief of any kind. Therefore, he is **ānadamaya** that is, his **ānanda** is full to the brim.

**Question**: 'Taittirīya also speaks of *ānadamayātma*. Is this *ānadamaya* the same or different from the one told in *Taittirīya*?'

**Answer**: They are different. The *ānadamayātma* of *Taittirīya* has *priyā*, *moda*, and *promoda* of increasing degrees of happiness which are his parts. They are experienced in wakefulness and



dreams. But they are absent in *Prājña*. Therefore, the two are different (S.bh.1.adhikarana.6)

He is **ānandabhuk** also. Its meaning: one has to strain himself to experience *ānanda* – bliss in wakeful state but here it is experienced without any strain that is, effortlessly. Therefore, he is *ānandabhuk*. He is also **chetomukha**. Its meaning is this: In deep sleep there is no action of knowing something else. In wakefulness and dreams there is the action of knowing. The *śāstra* refers to these knowledges as *chetas*. As *Prājña* is the *mukha* – the opening for this *chetas*, he is called *chetomukha*. He is the knower. The covert knower is called *Prājña* for another reason also; he is *prajñaptimātra*. *Prajñapti* means unqualified knowledge (See Sec 67). He has no qualified knowledge. This is his uncommon feature.

**Question:** ‘One whose inherent feature is only unqualified knowledge cannot get qualified knowledge at all. Therefore, he can never be a knower. How is it possible for such a one to be the knower and also *prajñaptimātra* at the same time?’

**Answer:** It is not like that. That there is no qualified knowledge is common to both the individual and the collective. Further, individual *jīva* is knower without the activity of knowing whereas, the collective *Prājña* is *prajñaptimātra*. He is not a knower inherently. Here, the individual’s wrongly imagined knowership is superposed on the collective. For otherwise it is not possible to show the individual’s oneness with the collective *Īśvara*. Previously, the individual *jīva*’s extrovert knowership and introvert knowership were superposed on *Vaiśvānara* and *Taijasa* respectively for the same purpose. This device is followed throughout *śāstra*. For example, in order to show nondifference of the world with *Brahman* as told by *śruti*, *śāstra* superposes the efficient cause of *Hiranyagarbha* and the material cause of the *prakṛiti* on *Brahman*. Similarly, here. This apart, *Prājña* is the third *pāda* of the *pratyagātman*.

14. *eṣa sarveśvara eṣa sarvajña eṣo’ntaryāmyeṣa yoniḥ sarvasya prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām* - एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् – This has overlodship over all; this is all-knowing; this pervades all; this is the source of all, origin and final resort of all living beings (Mā.m 6)

This *Prājña* is *sarveśvara* – he rules the entire universe of multiplicity. He is *sarvajña* – knows everything. He is *antaryāmi* – controls all living beings by staying within them. This universe of multiplicity is created by him. He is the *prabhava* – creator of the *bhūtas* and the *apyaya* – the place where all get dissolved. In other words, he is the efficient and the material cause of the world.



## KĀRIKĀ – ĀGAMA PRAKARAṆA

### (15 to 17) Vaiśvānara etc. are One

15. Kārikās of āgama prakaraṇa start from here. What is said by śruti about Vaiśvānara is being more clearly explained by logic in these Kārikās. 'What is not clear in the mantras?' Vaiśvānara etc. are related to three different states and so they appear different. It would not be correct to understand them as different. Actually, all the three are three different forms of only one. It is just like the same Prājña appearing as extrovert knower and introvert knower in wakeful state and dreams respectively. The oneness of the three is now established by logic.

*bahisprajño vibhuroviśvo hyantaḥprajñastu taijasaḥ/  
ghanaprajñastathā prājña eka eva tridhā smṛtaḥ//1.1//*

बहिष्प्रज्ञो विभुर्विश्वो ह्यन्तःप्रज्ञस्तु तैजसः।

घनप्रज्ञस्तथा प्राज्ञ एक एव त्रिधा स्मृतः //Kā.1.1//

*Viśva* is all-pervading *Bahisprajña* – the knower of *jāgrat* world; *Taijasa* is *Antaḥprajña* – the knower of dream world; *Prājña* is *prajñānaḥghana* – concentration of all knowingness without the activity of knowing; It is only one that is conditioned into the three: *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* (Kā.1.1).

It is already in the experience of the individual *jīva* that all the three states are coming and going and only he exists in all the three states. If one remembers this point, it becomes clear to him that he is different from all the three states and he remains untarnished, without getting affected by them. He is himself *Viśva* when knowing outside objects, *Taijasa* when he

is observing his mental impressions and *Prājña* when he is not observing anything. Next, he further explains that all the three experiences are possible in the wakeful state itself.

16. '*dakṣiṇākṣimukhe viśvo manasyantastu taijasaḥ / ākāśe ca hṛdi prājñastridhā dehe vyavasthitaḥ* - दक्षिणाक्षमुखे विश्वो मनस्यन्तस्तु तैजसः। आकाशे च हृदि प्राज्ञत्रिधा देहे व्यवस्थितिः। - *Viśva* stays in the right eye which is the opening for knowledges (Sec 10), *Taijasa* stays in the mind (Sec 12) and *Prājña* stays in *hridayākāśa* – the space of the heart (Sec 13). All these three are one and the same *deva* appearing in three forms (Kā 1.2).

Now we deal with the details of the *śloka*. One can easily know through the listener's eyes if he is understanding what is being told or not. That is why the opening for knowledge is referred to as the eye. However, *śruti* specially mentions the right eye as the opening for knowledge. The secret of this statement of the *śruti* is now fully known through science. It is the following: In the act of knowing things, the brain performs a very complicated action. The left and right parts of the brain look very similar and there is no perceptible difference. On deeper examination, a great difference is noticed in the functioning of the two parts. All activities are controlled by the left side and deeper thinking is handled by the right side. Though both these performances are generally existing in all, it is specially noticed that the left side is stronger in women and the right side in men. *Puranās* also describe this asymmetry in *Ardhanārīśvara*. According to *Vedānta*, the place of *Indra* is the right eye whereas the place of *Indrāni* – his wife, is the left eye (Br.4.2.2-3). This *Indra* is indeed *Vaiśvānara*. Though his place is sun, he functions in the individuals staying in their right eye and *Indrāni*'s place is the left eye.

**Question:** Are not *Vaiśvānara* and *kṣetrajña* in the body who is controlling the eyes, different?

**Answer:** No. *kṣetrajña* appears to be different from *Vaiśvānara*, but is not different. Though several machines fixed

at different places perform different actions, it is known that only one electrical power is responsible for all these activities. In the body, the functions of different organs are being performed by one single *ātman* (Ai.1.3.11). Similarly, the activities happening in different bodies are all performed by one and the same *deva*. This has been discussed already. *Bhagavān* also says the same thing: ‘In all *kṣetras*, know that *kṣetrajñā* is myself – *kṣetrajñam cāpi māṃ viddhi* - क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि (G.13.2).’ Therefore, in the first step of obtaining *advaitajñanam* the *kṣetrajñā* has to give up his separateness and achieve oneness with *Vaiśvānara*.

17. After answering the contextual question, we now come back to the *Kārikā śloka*. *Kārikākāra* now establishes by logic that *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājñā* are the three forms of only one *deva*. It is like this: While awake when the outside objects are being known using the senses and the mind, the *jīva* is *Viśva*. Even while awake, if the senses are restrained and objects are remembered in the mind, that is equivalent to dream; therefore, at that time, he is himself *Taijasa*. Again, in wakeful state itself, if the mental activity is also restrained, it is equivalent to deep sleep; then he is *Prājñā*. During that time the actionless mind stays in the *prāṇarūpa Prājñā*. In this way, the experience of all the three can take place in *jāgrat* itself.

**Question:** ‘Though the mind is dissolved in *Prājñā* during deep sleep, the five *prāṇas* are differently working in the gross body as in wakefulness i.e., they are not dissolved in *Prājñā*. Therefore, how can it be said that the mind is seated in ‘*prāṇarūpa Prājñā*’ – during deep sleep?’

**Answer:** The word ‘*prāṇarūpa*’ here is not referring to the five *prāṇas* working differently in the gross body. It is referring only to the *prāṇa* in the seed form which exists in *Īśvara* before creation i.e., ‘*prāṇarūpa*’ is the adjective for *Prājñā*. In other words, mind becomes one with *Īśvara* who is the supporter of the *prāṇa* in the seed form before creation. When *jīva* is awake with attachment to the *prāṇas*, they are certainly different. But

when he is not attached to them in deep sleep, they are not different in his experience. Whether the *prāṇas*, or the rest of the world, they appear as one mass like the world in the darkness of night. That is why during deep sleep, though the external world is with differences, *śruti* calls *Prājñā* as *ekībhūta*. Therefore, it is quite right to say that the mind is dissolved in ‘*prāṇarūpa Prājñā*’.

### (18) Enjoyer is One, Enjoyed is Also One

18. *triṣu dhāmasu yadbhojyaṃ bhoktā yaśca prakīrtitaḥ / vedaitadubhayaṃ yastu sa bhujñāno na lipyate* त्रिषु धामसु यद्भोज्यं भोक्ता यश्च प्रकीर्तितः। वेदैतदुभयं यस्तु स भुञ्जानो न लिप्यते - In the three places (namely wakefulness, dreams and deep sleep), there is (only) one enjoyed and (only) one enjoyer. One who understands this, remains unaffected (even) when he enjoys. // *Kā* 1.5 //

*Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājñā* are respectively the enjoyers during wakefulness, dreams and deep sleep and the gross objects (Sec 9), subtle objects – the impressions of gross objects (Sec 12) and bliss (Sec 13) are respectively their enjoyed items. All the three are experienceable in wakefulness itself. It means that all the three are knowables for the self. Therefore, the self is certainly different from all the three. It implies that the three enjoyed items belong to the knowable world and are not in the self. One who understands this is unaffected by their enjoyment.

### (19) *Viśva* etc. are Existent

19. *prabhavaḥ sarvabhāvānām satāmiti viniścayaḥ / sarvaṃ janayati prāṇaścetom’śūnpuruṣaḥ pṛthak* - प्रभवः सर्वभावानां सतामिति विनिश्चयः। सर्वं जनयति प्राणश्चेतोऽशून्यपुरुषः पृथक् - It is very clear that all beings manifest from the unmanifest existence; *puruṣa*, in the form of *prāṇa*, causes the birth of all separately. // *Kā* 1.6 //

Now the question arises: ‘Throughout the above analysis, it is asserted that there is only one *deva* and he is himself

appearing in three different forms and still he alone exists. Does it mean that all the different forms are nonexistent? If so, how do they come into existence?’

By way of answer to these questions *Kārikākāra* says: what is appearing is existent; it is an existing object. If it is asserted as nonexistent, it would imply that the world in the form of *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* is nonexistent. Then one cannot understand existent *ātman* through the nonexistent. Therefore, if it is nonexistent there would be no way at all to understand that one *deva*. ‘*yadi hi nāmarūpe na vyākriyete tadā asyātmano nirupādhiḥ rūpaṃ prajñānaghanākhyāṇi na pratikhyāyeta*// यदि हि नामरूपे न व्याक्रियेते तदा अस्यात्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिख्यायेत। - Had not the *nāmarūpas* been created, there would have been no way at all to know the *nirupadhika rūpa* of the *ātman* who is *prajñānaghana*’ (Br.bh.2.5.19). But it is not so. One has to understand him only through the world and it is also possible to understand through it. Therefore, this world has to be existent. Before creation it was in seed form in *Brahman*. *Brahman* in this *Kārikā* is called *prāṇa*. With its *Māyāśakti*, it creates the three different forms of *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*, different devatās, the humans and the animals. Since all these emerge from *Brahman*’s *Māyāśakti*, all of them are nondifferent from *Brahman*. But the ignorant person views them as different from *Brahman*, i.e. the world in their view, is a result of their ignorance. So, *Bhāṣyakāra* calls this world as ‘*avidyākṛta māyābījotpanna*’ taking both the right and the wrong knowledges into account.

‘If so, both the world and *Brahman* exist. Then how to say there is only one *deva*?’

Yes, there is only one *deva*. He himself appears in different forms as known through *indriyās* just like gold alone appears as different ornaments. This oneness of *Brahman* is understood after one gets *brahmavidya*. Till then, the existent world is viewed by the ignorant person as different from *Brahman*. *Bhāṣyakāra* describes the world understood by them as

imagined due to ‘ignorance’. The *śāstra* gives rope-snake example to explain this. Not understanding the existing rope as rope, someone understands it as serpent. This serpent which is different from the rope is imagined due to ignorance. On the other hand, after the examination of the rope, the right understanding namely, ‘This is not a serpent, this is a rope appearing as serpent’ arises. This serpent-form of the rope is existent.

‘Then, what is the meaning of saying that the world is created? After all, the snake is not created.’

It is true. It cannot be described as the creation of world, because there is no causal connection between the *deva* and the world (See 41). Therefore, some thinkers call this creation as *Īśvara*’s desire alone. Some other thinkers say that it is due to time only, some others say this is for *jīva*’s enjoyment or just for play of the *deva* etc. *Brahma Sūtras* have discussed all these explanations. Therefore, **we cannot disregard the world as nonexistent, we cannot also say that it is created. Therefore, *Kārikākāra* says that the periodic appearance of the world is the nature of that *deva* and closes the discussion (Kā.1.7-9)**. If so, why does the *śruti* give the examples of clay-pot etc. and describe the creation of the world? *Kārikākāra* answers this question later (See 42, 43).

## Upaniṣad

### (20) *Turīya* is not Vacuous

20. Through the three states of wakefulness, dreams and deep sleep, *pratyagātman* thinks of himself wrongly as extrovert knower, introvert knower and covert knower; that is, these three understandings about himself are wrong imaginations about his *pratyagātman*. Therefore, in order to show his true nature, *śruti* says ‘*neti neti – not this, not this*’, rejecting all the wrong imaginations and showing him the fourth *pāda*.

If all the experiences of oneself are rejected, does not the fourth *pāda*, *Turīya* becomes vacuous?’

No, it does not happen like that. For example, when the rope is misunderstood as a snake or something else, the knower of the rope describes it to him as 'this is not snake', 'not a crack in the ground', etc. While all the wrong imaginations are rejected, the rope remains. Similarly, when all the imaginations about *ātman* are rejected, *Turīya* remains.

'In that case, could *Turīya* be described as the support of all the imaginations?'

That is not possible. The appearance is nonexistent and so it has no connection with *Turīya*. Therefore, *Turīya* cannot be described as the support of the appearances – *na hi sadasatoḡ saṃbandhaḡ śabdapraoṛttinimittabhāḡ avastutoāt/न हि सदसतोः संबन्धः शब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभाक् अवस्तुत्वात्। (Mā.m.7.avataranika)*. Not only that. In the example, the serpent etc. are object-like for direct sense perception and the rope also is an object for it. Therefore, examining the rope by perception, it can be known as rope. Then the support of the seen serpent is determined to be the rope. Therefore, the rope can be described as the support of the wrong imaginations like serpent etc. But, *Turīya* is not sense-perceptible like the rope. Therefore, he cannot be described as the support of the imaginations. In other words, by saying that the world is superimposed and *Turīya* is its support, *Turīya* cannot be taught.

'Can we determine *Turīya* by inference, analogy or presumption?'

No, because the validity of these *pramāṇas* is based again on sense perception. Since *Turīya* is not an object for it, this also is not possible.

'But is it not true that *Turīya* is certainly an object for *śruti pramāṇa*?'

It is not so. Even *śruti* describes him by saying what he is not; it cannot say what he is. Therefore, *Turīya* is not an object for *śruti* either.

'If so, how does the validity of these negative statements get verified?'

It is like this. *Turīya* is not of a different category from the *ātman*s in wakefulness, dreams and deep sleep. In all the three states, only *pratyagātman* is there. But by the force of superimpositions of the extrovert knower, he appears wrongly. In other words, the body, the mind etc. are superimposed and *pratyagātman* is the support of this superimposition. Therefore, if the intellect is turned away from these wrong ideas he comes to know that he is *Turīya* himself. Then the validity of the negative statements of the *śruti* is established. *Ātmajñāna* does not need another effort besides negating the wrong imaginations. For example, a log of wood splits into two by the single effort of breaking it. This breaking does not involve two efforts - one effort for each piece; in one and the same effort the pieces are separated. Similarly, following the *śruti pramāṇa* if *Turīya* is separated from the wrong impressions, his knowledge is obtained. It does not need another different effort; that is, one effort for separating from illusory *vikalpās* and another effort to know him. Just by separating from the impressions, he is known. Therefore, this knowledge is not the result of *śruti pramāṇa*.

'But it is very difficult to turn the intellect away from these wrong impressions. What does one gain by knowing one is *Turīya* with such a great effort?'

It is not so. 'When it is clearly known that it is only a shell, the desire for the silver seen in it is lost. Similarly, here, when one is thinking of himself as extrovert knower, he has ignorance that leads to desiring the second object. Then follows the effort to get it. Then follows grief if it is not obtained. Like this, there is a chain of faults starting from ignorance and ending in grief. But when one comes to know that he is *Turīya* from which nothing is different, there will be no room for grief. This is too big a gain which cannot be obtained in any other way.

### (21) *Turīya*

21. *nāntaḡprajñam na bahiḡprajñam nobhayataḡ prajñam na prajñānaghanaḡ na prajñam nāprajñam/ adṛḡtamavyavahāryama-*

*grāhyamalakṣaṇamacintyamaavyapadeśyamekātmapratyayasāraṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śāntaṃ śivamadvaitaṃ caturthaṃ manyante sa ātmā sa vijñeyaḡ* - नान्तःप्रज्ञं न बहिष्प्रज्ञं नोभयतःप्रज्ञं न प्रज्ञानघनं न प्रज्ञं नाप्रज्ञम् । अदृष्टमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्यमलक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः - The Fourth is that which is not introvert knower, nor extrovert knower, nor *prajñānaghana*, nor *prajña*, nor *aprajña*. It is unseen, transcendent, inapprehensible, uninferable, unthinkable, the truth about self, the resting place of all multiplicity, the ever peaceful, the auspiciousness and the one with no second; this is indeed *ātman* and should be known (Mā.m.7).

By saying that *pratyagātman* is not the introvert, individual *Taijasa* is denied in *Turīya*. By saying 'not the extrovert', individual *Vaiśvānara* is denied. By telling *nobhayataḡprajñam*, the middle state of wakefulness and dream is denied. 'na *prajñānaghanaṃ*' denies individual *Prājña*. 'na *prajñam*' denies knowership in general. *nāprajñam* denies inertia. The reason for these denials is that these features are wrong knowledges about himself – namely, *pratyagātman*, imagined due to the identification with the body and the mind. The three states of wakefulness etc. are changing which appear in *pratyagātman* because of his juxtaposition with the adjuncts of the body and the mind. By himself without these adjuncts, he is unchanging; these three changing states are absent in him. He is pure consciousness.

'Is not consciousness missing during deep sleep?'

No. What is missed in deep sleep is conscious activity and not consciousness. These two are different. Conscious activity of thinking happens in the mind. Just as an iron object in contact with fire also appears like fire, in the presence of the consciousness of *pratyagātman* the conscious activity of thinking is seen in the inert mind during wakefulness and dream. Therefore, this is a feature of the known. '*icchā dveṣassukhaṃ duḡkhaṃ saṃghātaścetanā dhṛtiḡ/ etat kṣetram* – इच्छा द्वेषस्सुखं दुःखं

संघातश्चेतना धृतिः । एतत् क्षेत्रम् - the attributes of the mind, the body, the mental activity like desire, hate, comfort, discomfort, and persistence are observables, they all come under the known (*G.bh.13.6*). But consciousness is the nature of *ātman*; it is never missed at any time (*Br.4.3.30*).

Further, *Turīya* is *adrṣṭa* – not an object for sight. Therefore, it is not available for the activity of motor organs, that is, *Turīya* is actionless. That is *alakṣaṇam* – not an object for inference etc. That is *acintyam* – not an object for the mind; that is, mind cannot understand him by thinking. It is *avyapadeśyam* – It is not describable by words. That is *ekātmapratyayasāraṃ* – to be understood following the thought that self alone exists in all the three states. This has been already described (Sec 15). He is not *pratyayagocara* that is, he is not an object for any qualified knowledge. This is described by *Bhāṣyakāra* in *Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad Bhāṣya* like this: The ignorant person understands himself as intelligent or foolish etc. only through the adjuncts like the mind etc. because, he superimposes the activity of the adjuncts on himself. All these knowledges about himself are *akṛtsna* that is, incomplete. All these are available for words and thought. But in his adjunctless inherent nature, he is *ātman* alone who is not available for words and thought. '*yastu ātmaśabdasya itiparaḡ prayogaḡ sa ātmaśabdapratyayayoḡ ātmatattvasyaparamārthato'viṣayatvajñāpanārthaḡ* / यस्तु आत्मशब्दस्य इतिपरः प्रयोगः स आत्मशब्दप्रत्यययोः आत्मतत्त्वस्यपरमार्थतोऽविषयत्वज्ञापनार्थः । - The word 'iti' is intended to remind that *Turīya* is not an object for either the word or the thought of *ātman* (*Br.bh.1.4.7*). However, the *pratyagātman* in deep sleep is well known to be available for a thought and description like 'I slept well' – *asmatpratyayaviṣayatvāt aparokṣatvāt ca pratyagātmaprasiddheḡ* - अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् अपरोक्षत्वात् च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः - It is the well-known experience that he is an object of I-awareness (*Adhyāśabhāṣya*). Further, *Turīyātman* is *prapañcopaśamaṃ* that is, free from the three collective features of wakefulness, dream, deep sleep and their activities. Though *Turīya* exists in them, they are absent

in *Turīya*. On the other hand, the individual features like introvert knowing etc. are negated in *Turīya*. Collective features are **absent in him** – *prapañcopaśamamiti jāgradādi sthānadharmabhāvaḥ*. But the individual features are **negated** – *antaḥprajnatvadi sthānidharma pratisiddhaḥ*. This means that *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* have transactional reality absent in *Turīya* who is transcendental reality. On the other hand, introvert knowing etc. are denied in *Turīya*. They are wrong knowledges, they do not exist anywhere. That is why, in *jñāni* – *the realized person, introvert knowing* etc. do not exist at all, though the three states continue to show up in the body. Further, since he is *prapañcopaśamam*, *Turīya* is *śānta* - peaceful and *śiva* – auspicious, because there are no imagined differences of nonduality. Difference is the cause for missing peace and auspiciousness. *Turīya* is without this cause. *Turīya* transcends the three *pādās* of *Vaiśvānara*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. With his knowledge, duality ceases to exist. Now we come to the *Kārikās*.

### (22) Nature of *Turīya*

22. *nivṛtteḥ sarvaduḥkḥānāmīśānaḥ prabhuraḥvyayaḥ / advaitaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ devasturyo vibhuḥ smṛtaḥ / निवृत्तेः सर्वदुःखानामीशानः प्रभुरव्ययः। अद्वैतः सर्वभावानां देवस्तुर्यो विभुः स्मृतः॥ - *Turīya* is the remover of all griefs. The prabhu never leaves its inherent nature, the one pervading all objects, shining and spread over. /1.10/*

In *Viśva* and *Taijasa* there is the activity of supporting wakefulness and dreams of the *jīvas* (Sec 11-12). Though there is no activity in the individual *Prājña* (Sec 13), there is the seed of activity namely, the *prakṛti* which is the adjunct for the collective *Prājña*. Therefore, all the three are in grief. But, *Turīya* is capable of removing all grief because it is destroyed by his knowledge. He is *avyaya*, i.e., never deviates from his inherent nature. He is the nonduality of all things. All those things of duality are imaginations done in *ātman*. He is *deva* – that is lustrous. He is *sarvavyāpi* – spread over everywhere. Here,

when it is told *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are in grief, only the respective individuals are to be taken.

### (23) Similarity-Difference Between *Prājña*–*Turīya*

23. *kāryakāraṇabaddhau tāviṣyete viśvataijasaḥ / prājñaḥ kāraṇabaddhastu dvau tau turye na sidhyataḥ / कार्यकारणबद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ। प्राज्ञः कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तौ तुर्ये न सिध्यतः॥ - *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are bound by both cause and effect; *Prājña* is bound by cause alone; however, neither has any relation with *Turīya*. /1.11/*

*nātmānaṃ na parāṃścaiva na satyaṃ nāpi cānṛtam / prājñaḥ kiñcana saṃvetti turyaṃ tatsarvadṛksadā / - नात्मानं न परांश्चैव न सत्यं नापि चानृतम्। प्राज्ञः किञ्चन संवेत्ति तुर्यं तत्सर्वदृक्सदा॥ - *Prājña* does not know self or non-self or *satyam* or *anṛtam*; but *Turīya* is ever all-seeing. /1.12/*

*dvaitasyāgrahaṇaṃ tulyamubhayoḥ prājñaturyayor / bijanidrāyutaḥ prājñaḥ sā ca turye na vidyate / - द्वैतस्याग्रहणं तुल्यमुभयोः प्राज्ञतुर्ययोः। बीजनिद्रायुतः प्राज्ञः सा च तुर्ये न विद्यते – Non-cognition of duality is common to both *Prājña* and *Turīya*. *Nidrā* in the form of cause is associated with *Prājña* but it is not found in *Turīya* at all. /1.13/*

Here *kārya* means what is produced. What is produced? Wrong knowledge about oneself. *Kāraṇa* means that which causes this. What is that? Ignorance about himself. *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are bound by both ignorance and wrong knowledge. But *Prājña* is bound only by ignorance (here also only individuals are to be taken). *Prājña* does not understand others, either unchanging or changing - that is, neither the dual world outside nor himself. *Viśva* and *Taijasa* understand both. They have both ignorance and wrong knowledge in them. There is no wrong knowledge in *Prājña*. Why? Because wrong knowledge gets expressed only in the intellect and *Prājña* has no connection with it. But he has ignorance.

‘Is not ignorance also only in the intellect?’

Yes. But as long as there is wrong knowledge in the

extrovert knower, it must be accepted that *Prājñā* also has ignorance. Ignorance means absence of right understanding. That is, the right knowledge is the antidote of this absence. Further, the presence of wrong knowledge or the rise of the right knowledge is only in the intellect; that is in the extrovert knower. Therefore, ignorance is also only in the extrovert knower. Therefore, covert knower who is disconnected with the intellect has really no ignorance (G.13.2). But, as long as the extrovert knower has not acquired the right knowledge, the *śāstra* accepts ignorance in the covert knower.

Further, about *Turīya*: The power of the *jīvas* to get knowledges in wakefulness and dreams is sight, that is unqualified knowledge. Sight is the inherent nature of *Turīya*. He never misses his sight. Therefore, it is impossible to associate ignorance with him. He is also *sarva* - everything. Therefore, he is called *sarvadṛk*. In this way, not knowing duality is common in both *Prājñā* and *Turīya*. But that there is ignorance in *Prājñā* and not in *Turīya* is the difference between them. Here, ignorance is referred to as *bījanidrā* – seed of sleep. Not knowing one's inherent nature is sleep and that is the seed of wrong knowledge. Therefore, ignorance is seed of sleep. In the same way, dream is wrong knowledge of duality. Therefore, *Viśva* and *Taijasa* are both having sleep and also dream. In *Prājñā*, there is only sleep without dream. On the other hand, there is neither in *brahmajñāni* – in the realized person. Therefore, *brahmajñāni* is one who has destroyed both ignorance and duality on the basis of the knowledge that he himself is *Turīya*.

#### (24) Attainment of *Turīya*

24. anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyate/  
ajamanidramasvapnamadvaitaṃ budhyate tadā// - अनादिमायया  
सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते । अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥ - When the *jīva*  
is awakened from that beginningless *māyā*, then he realizes  
the one that is unborn, ever awake, dreamless and one without  
a second./ *Kā* 1.16/

Here, *bījanidrā* is ignorance and dream is wrong knowledge as said already. Further, ignorance is the reason and wrong knowledge is its result. Both are only sleep. This sleep of *jīva* is beginningless; he has been taking birth and dying since infinite past. This analysis is done by the *śāstra* to remove his ignorance, but factually, he is *Turīya* without ignorance. If he introspects himself following the teaching of the *śāstra*, this can be understood even when he is having ignorance. How? It is like this. Here *jīva* means the covert knower. He recognizes himself as extrovert knower and introvert knower in association with the adjuncts of the body, the senses and the mind. But that he is really different from these adjuncts is universally experienced during deep sleep. All these adjuncts and the universe are knowables to him. Therefore, their knower has to be different from all of them. The one who is different like this is the covert knower (See Preface Sec 3\* end). It is he who is to be understood as *Turīya*. That is why *Bhagavān* says '*kṣetrajñāṃ cāpi māṃ viddhi* - क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि - And know *kṣetrajñā*' also as me (G.13.2). It is not difficult to understand this instruction. Though he is *Turīya* in wakefulness and dream also, he expresses himself clearly in deep sleep with his true inherent nature. His unchangingness, unqualified knowledge, limitlessness, bliss and oneness can all be recognized in deep sleep. For the definition of unqualified knowledge see sec 67. However, without analyzing his own experience on the basis of *śāstra*, the extrovert knower misses this knowledge and continues to be the extrovert knower. In this way, in this sleep of ignorance and wrong knowledge, he continues to see ignorance in the *pratyagātman* of deep sleep. This is due to the *Māyā*. Here, '*Māyā*' cannot mean the *Māyāśakti* of *Īśvara*. That *Māyā* is *Bhagavān*'s exclusive *Śakti* (G.7.14). If it is told that *jīva* is submerged in ignorance because of *Māyā*, it implies that he has cruelty towards the *jīvas*. But this is not correct. '*na karmāṇi na karmāṇi lokasya sṛjati prabhuḥ* - न कर्तृत्वं न कर्माणि लोकस्य सृजति प्रभुः - *prabhu* - *Īśvara* is not creating doership in man nor the



action by him' (G.5.14). Therefore, here *Māyā* means false appearance. If one wakes up from this beginningless *Māyā* sleep, he will understand that he himself is the unborn, without the second, without ignorance and wrong knowledge.

### (25) Ignorance and Superimposition

25. Ignorance etc. described briefly above will now be elaborated. The questions to be answered are the following: Ignorance belongs to whom? What is superimposition? Who does superimposition and in whom? *Bhāṣyakāra* answers them as follows: '*aḡaṃpratyayinam aśeṣasvapracārasākṣiṇi pratyagātmani adhyasya taṃ ca pratyagātmanam sarvasākṣiṇam tadviparyayeṇa antaḡhkarāṇādiṣu adhyasyati/ अहं प्रत्ययिनम् अशेषस्वप्नचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मनि अध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेण अन्तःकरणादिषु अध्यस्यति। - aḡaṃpratyayi superimposes the 'conceited I' on the inner *ātman* which is the witness of all his thoughts and in the reverse way superimposes the all-witnessing inner *ātman* on the mind etc.'*

 (*Adhyāsabhāṣya*).

Here *pracāra* means the continuous flow of thoughts of wrong knowledges like 'I am a man, I am fat, I am deaf, I am blind' etc. These wrong knowledges occur in the intellect of the extrovert knower. Therefore, this is *svapracāra* – his flow of thoughts. Ignorance which is responsible for these wrong knowledges – superimposition - is also only in his intellect. In this way, ignorance and wrong knowledge are only in the extrovert knower and not in the inner *ātman* (G.bh.13.2). Inner *ātman* has no connection with the intellect. Therefore, *aḡaṃpratyayi* – the one having wrong thoughts is the extrovert knower and he is not different from the covert knower that is, *pratyagātman*. *Pratyagātman* coupled with intellect is the extrovert knower. These wrong knowledges of himself go on changing depending on the objects and the situations. However, the 'I' in all these knowledges is only the unchanging *pratyagātman*. This implies that the extrovert knower is superimposing his wrong knowledges on the *pratyagātman*

who is the *sākṣi* – witness of all of them. In other words, the extrovert knower who wrongly feels connected with the body, the senses and the mind is superimposing his wrong feelings on *pratyagātman* who is not connected with them. Therefore, it is only the extrovert knower who has ignorance and who is confused. Not only that. In the reverse direction, he is also superimposing *pratyagātman*'s knowership in the intellect and his bliss in the objects and the body. In this way, *pratyagātman* is totally free from ignorance and wrong knowledge and this foolishness is exclusively of the extrovert knower. As a result of this, the duality of 'you' and 'I' is experienced by him and he is totally merged in grief. In order to lift him up from there, *śāstra* proceeds step by step following his background and using the language of duality understood by him. It conveys the lesson in three steps. In the first step, *Brahman* is the material cause of the world which is in the place of 'you'. In the second step, it shows that the *jīva* without adjuncts is the 'I' in deep sleep. In the third step, it conveys the final message that this 'I' is *Brahman*. The moment this oneness is realized, both the worlds of 'I' and 'you' will get dissolved and *Turīya* is attained. Now grief is totally lost.

### (26) Superimposition in Whom?

26. Some people say that the world is superimposed on *Turīya*. This is plainly wrong. Superimposition happens only when the imposer has some vague knowledge of the substratum in the form 'it is something' on which he superimposes. For doing superimposition, there must also be similarity between superimposed and the substratum. In the case of *pratyagātman* both are present. He is known vaguely to the extrovert from the thought 'I slept well' (Sec 15). Therefore, he has its vague knowledge. Further, similarity is also there. How? The happiness is experienced by himself without adjuncts in deep sleep and also through the body. Therefore, there is similarity between *pratyagātman* and the body. In the case of *Turīya*, there is neither his vague knowledge nor

similarity with the world (See *Br.vākya* in Sec 21). Further, to superimpose on *Turīya*, there is nothing different from him. His *dharma*s cannot also be superimposed since he is without any *dharma*. Therefore, the statement that the world is superimposed on *Turīya* is wrong and confusing.

The same mistake they do in the case of *Brahman* and tell that the world is superimposed on *Brahman*. This statement can be rejected by the foregoing argument itself because the extrovert knower who has to superimpose does not have even vague knowledge of *Brahman* and there is no similarity between the world and *Brahman*. Therefore, this superimposition is impossible. There are other reasons to reject this statement which can be easily understood through an example: Snake is superimposed on rope. Here, though the snake is not present, it is an object for direct perception through memory. Rope is also an object for direct perception. Therefore, by examining the rope by direct perception when the rope is known as rope, the illusoriness of the seen snake and the substratumness of the rope are simultaneously established. **It means that the illusoriness of the superimposed is proved only when both the superimposed and the substratum are directly perceptible; not otherwise.** But in the case of world-*Brahman*, *Brahman* is not directly perceptible and so it cannot be established whether the world is related to *Brahman* or related to something else – ‘*sati hi indriyaviṣayatve brahmaṇaḡ, idaṡ brahmaṇā saṡbaddhaṡ kāryaṡ iti ḡrhyeta/ kāryamātrameva tu ḡrhyamāṇaṡ kiṡ brahmaṇā saṡbaddhaṡ kimanyena kenacidvā saṡbaddham iti na śakyaṡ niścetum* - सति हि इन्द्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः, इदं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं कार्यम् इति गृह्येत। कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह्यमाणं किं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं किमन्येन केनचिद्वा संबद्धम् इति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम् - In the case *jagat-Brahman*, only the world is visible and not *Brahman*. Therefore, it is not possible to ascertain whether the world is causally related to *Brahman* or something else’ (S.bh.1.1.2). Therefore, that the world is superimposed on *Brahman* is a wrong statement. Moreover, the statement that world is illusory is directly

opposed to the *śruti* sentences ‘*ātmaivedaṡ sarvaṡ* – आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् –all this is Atman’, ‘*brahmaivedaṡ sarvaṡ* - ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम् –all this Brahman’ etc.

*Objection:* ‘Just as saying that ‘the illusory snake is rope only’, cannot this *śruti* sentence also be reconciled with illusory world?’

*Rebuttal:* It is not possible. During the time of ignorance of the rope, the snake which is seen is obviously different from the rope and is being seen in its absence. Therefore, the snake is illusory. But, after the knowledge of the rope the statement ‘Rope looking like a snake’ shows the apparent reality of the snake appearance of the rope. It is not illusory. During this right knowledge, the snake-like form of the rope and the rope are simultaneously visible in the same place and the nondifference of the snake-like appearance with the rope is also known. Similarly, earlier to *ātmaḡñāna*, the world which is known as different from *ātman* is illusory. But, after obtaining *ātmaḡñāna*, the world is *ātman* ‘appearing like the world’. In this way, the right understanding establishes the apparent reality of the world seen in wakeful state (Here, this nondifference of the world with *ātman* is without cause-effect relation. That is the reason for giving the rope-snake example.) In this way, illusoriness and apparent reality are different; they are not the same (See sec 65). This discussion also establishes that the world is an appearance of *ātman* projected by *ātman* as the base and so, it is not a result of ignorance of the *jīva*.

### (27) World has *Brahman*, *Brahman* has no World

27. *prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṡśayaḡ / māyāmātramidaṡ dvaitamadvaitaṡ paramārthataḡ/* प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत न संशयः। मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः॥- Had the multiplicity existed, it would certainly go; it is not there at all. In reality, there is only one without a second. / *Kā* 1.17 /

In the previous *śloka*, it was said that *advaita* - unitarity is known when one wakes up from the beginningless *Māyā* sleep.

This implies that multiplicity exists till the realization of nonduality. If so, with the rise of the *advaita* knowledge, does the world go out of sight? The answer is told by the *Kārikākāra*: Had the world existed, it would go; it is not there at all. Duality world is *māyāmātram* and *kalpita* – magic and imagined. Therefore, like a snake seen in a rope, it does not exist. What truly exists is only nonduality.

**Question:** ‘What is this? In 6<sup>th</sup> *Kārikā* (Sec 19), it was said that the world existing in the form of *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* is born from *prāṇa* and now the existence of world is rejected. Is it not contradictory?’

**Answer:** It is not so. Here, what is told as ‘*māyāmātram* - imagined’ is the world of duality, not the world itself. That is, the world divided in the form of the knower and the known is imagined because both the knower and the known are *Turīya*. This is told in *Brihadāraṇyakopaniṣad Bhāṣya* as follows: The question raised is that the objects in the world are perceptibly changing, inert and limited. On the other hand, *Brahman* is unchanging, unqualified and limitless. Therefore, is not the world non-*Brahman*, an illusion born out of ignorance? *Bhāṣyakāra* answers: ‘It is not so, because the world does not go out of sight by acquiring knowledge of *Brahman*. *Brahman*’s knowledge does not remove any object of the observed world or produce it. It removes only ignorance. Similarly, here also the non-*Brahmaness* observed by the senses is removed by *Brahman*’s knowledge. It does not create or produce an object – *avidyākṛtavyatirekeṇa abrahmatvam asarvatvaṃ ca vidyata eveti cet? na/ tasya brahmadevidyayā apohānupapatteḥ .... abrahmatvam asarvatvaṃ ca avidyākṛtameva nivartyatāṃ brahmadevidyayā? na tu pāramārthikaṃ vastu kartuṃ nivartayituṃ vā arhati brahmadevidyā* - अविद्याकृतव्यतिरेकेण अब्रह्मत्वम् असर्वत्वं च विद्यत एवेति चेत्? न। तस्य ब्रह्मविद्यया अपोहानुपपत्तेः .... अब्रह्मत्वम् असर्वत्वं च अविद्याकृतमेव निवर्त्यतां ब्रह्मविद्यया। न तु पारमार्थिकं वस्तु कर्तुं निवर्तयितुं वा अर्हति ब्रह्मविद्या’ (Br.bh.1.4.10). This clearly means that the change, inertia and limitedness seen in the world does not make it non-*Brahman*. It is not nonexistent

because it is *Brahman*. Further he says, ‘the world is of the nature of *Brahman*, but *Brahman* is not of the nature of the world – *brahmasvabhāvo hi prapañco na prapañcasvabhāvaṃ brahma* - ब्रह्मस्वभावो हि प्रपञ्चो न प्रपञ्चस्वभावं ब्रह्म (S.bh.3.2.21).

## Upaniṣad

### (28 to 31) Kārikā Pādās and Mātrās

28. *so’yamātmā’dhyakṣaram omkāro’dhimātraṃ pādā mātrā mātrāsca pādā akāra ukāro makāra iti/ सोऽयमात्माऽध्यक्षरम् ओंकारोऽधिमात्रं पादा मात्रा मात्राश्च पादा अकार उकारो मकार इति ॥* - This Atman is described with the support of *akṣara* – letter. The letter *Om* has three *pādās* ‘A’, ‘U’ and ‘Ma’ /Mā.m.8/

*Ātman* was described through its name *Omkāra* in the beginning (Sec 7). Now the *śruti* describes the same *ātman* taking support of the *akṣara* - letter *Om*. This description is called *adhyakṣara*. The letter *Om* has three *pādās* ‘A’, ‘U’ and ‘Ma’ and their corresponding objects are respectively *Vaiśvānara*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. The description of *ātman* following these *mātras* is called *adhimātra*. In this, the *śruti* describes the similarity between *Vaiśvānara* etc. and their respective *mātras*. This description is meant for the meditation on *ātman*. Meditation means maintaining the uninterrupted thought process related with *ātman*. Thinking of the *mātra* and the *akṣara* keeping in mind the mentioned similarities, if meditation is done with desire, it leads to a great result and if it is done without desire, it helps in getting *ātmañjāna*.

29. *jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro’kāraḥ prathamāmātrā’ pterādimatto’ād vā’’pnoti ha vai sarvān kāmānādiśca bhavati ya evaṃ veda/ जागरितस्थानो वैश्वानरोऽकारः प्रथमा मात्राऽऽपेरादिमत्त्वाद् वाऽऽप्नोति ह वै सर्वान् कामानादिश्च भवति य एवं वेद ॥* - Being all-pervasive or being the first *mātra* of the *Omkāra* namely, ‘A’-kāra, *Vaiśvānara* is *jāgaritasthāna* – waking state. Whoever knows this obtains all desires. /Mā.m.9/

*svapnasthānastaijasa ukāro dviṭīyā mātrotkarṣād*

*ubhayatvādvoṭkarṣati ha vai jñānasantatiṃ samānaśca bhavati nāsyābrahmanvīkule bhavati ya evaṃ veda/* स्वप्नस्थानस्तैजस उकारो द्वितीया मात्रोत्कर्षाद् उभयत्वाद्वोत्कर्षति ह वै ज्ञानसन्ततिं समानश्च भवति नास्याब्रह्मवित्कुले भवति य एवं वेद – Being superior or being the middle *mātra* of *Omkāra* namely, 'U'-*kāra*, *Taijasa* is *svapnasthāna* – dream state. Whoever knows this his knowledge becomes superior, he finds no cause of difference with anyone, nor is anyone born in his family ignorant of *Brahman*. /*Mā.m.10/*

*suṣuptasthānaḥ prājño makārastrīyā mātrā miterapītervā minoti ha vā idam sarvamapitīśca bhavati ya evaṃ veda/* सुषुप्तस्थानः प्राज्ञो मकारस्तृतीया मात्रा मितरेपीतेर्वा मिनोति ह वा इदम् सर्वमपीतिश्च भवति य एवं वेद ॥ - Being lost in identity or being the final *mātra* of *Omkāra* namely, 'Ma'-*kāra*, *Prājña* is *suṣuptasthāna* – deep sleep state. Whoever knows this, he can measure all or comprehend all within himself. /*Mā.m.11/*

*Vaiśvānara* who handles the waking state is represented by the first *mātra* of the *Omkāra* namely, 'A'-*kāra*. Similarity between 'A'-*kāra* and *Vaiśvānara* is the following: 'A'-*kāra* is spread in all speech and *Vaiśvānara* is spread in the whole world (Sec 11). 'A'-*kāra* is first among the *akṣaras* and *Vaiśvānara* is the first step for *ātmañāna*. Thinking about this, the one who does *Omkāra* meditation spreads himself through all desires; that is, he obtains all desires and will always be first among all.

The similarity between the ruler of the dream state *Taijasa* and the second *mātra* of *Omkāra* namely, 'U'-*kāra* is this: 'U' is extracted from 'A'-*kāra* and lies in between 'A'-*kāra* and 'Ma'-*kāra*. In the same way, *Taijasa* is extracted from *Vaiśvānara* and lies between *Vaiśvānara* and *Prājña*. Thinking about this, one who does meditation extracts continuity of growth of knowledge and he will not be disliked by either enemies or friends; no one will be born in his pedigree who will not be knowing *Brahman*.

Lastly, the similarity between the ruler of the deep sleep

state and the third *mātra* of *Omkāra* namely, 'Ma'-*kāra* is the following: This similarity comes from *miti* – measurement. When the utterance of *Omkāra* is over and again when it is uttered, it enters into 'Ma'-*kāra* and comes out. 'A'-*kāra* and 'U'-*kāra* merge in 'Ma'-*kāra*. Similarly, *Vaiśvānara* and *Taijasa* enter into *Prājña* and come out - that is, both get absorbed in *Prājña*. He who does meditation of *Omkāra* in this way, comes to know the inherent nature of the world and becomes absorbed in that nature. The *Kārikā śloka* in this connection is:

*'akāro nayate viśvamukāraścāpi taijasam/ makāraśca punaḥ prājñaṃ nāmātre vidyate gatiḥ-* अकारो नयते विश्वमुकारश्चापि तैजसम् । मकारश्च पुनः प्राज्ञं नामात्रे विद्यते गतिः ॥ - 'A' *kāra* leads to *Vaiśvānara*. 'U' *kāra* to *Taijasa*. 'M' *kāra* to *Prājña*. No action is found in a partless thing.' /*Kā.1.23/*

30. One who does *Omkāra* meditation taking the support of 'A' *kāra*, this 'A' *kāra* takes him to *Vaiśvānara*. Similarly, the 'U' *kāra* meditator and the 'Ma' *kāra* mediators are taken respectively to *Taijasa* and *Prājña*. When one goes to *Taijasa*, 'A' *kāra* becomes absent, when he is taken to *Prājña* both 'A' *kāra* and 'U' *kāra* become absent. Similarly, when taken to *Turīya*, 'Ma' *kāra* also becomes absent – which means that the seed of ignorance is destroyed. That is, with the obtainment of *amātra Omkāra*, one does not go anywhere. The last *mantra* of this *Upaniṣad* teaches it like this:

31. *amātraścaturtho'vyavahāryaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivo'dvaitaḥ/ evamoṃkāra ātmaiva saṃviśatyātmanā'tmānaṃ ya evaṃ veda//* अमात्रश्चतुर्थोऽव्यवहार्यः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवोऽद्वैतः । एवमोकार आत्मैव संविशत्यात्मनाऽऽत्मानं य एवं वेद ॥ - The fourth is *amātra*, transactionless, sublator of the universe, auspicious and one. One who understands this, joins himself by himself. /*Mā.m.12/*

*Omkāra* without *mātras* is *amātra* - devoid of *mātras* and that is *chaturtha*, the fourth. He is only *ātman*. One who knows that his self *pratyagāman* is all pervading *Turīya*, will have the experience which transcends the name and the corresponding

object (Sec 7). In him both speech and mind are dissolved. He attains himself by himself. The meaning of this sentence becomes clear in *Kārikā* 3.33 (sec 67). In *Turīya*, there is no trace of ignorance. Therefore, one who knows he is *Turīya* is not born again. All this has been collected in six *ślokas* by *Kārikākāra* in this way: *Omkāra* is *prānava*. It should be understood only through *pādas* and *mātrās*. This is *Parabrahman* and also *aparabrahman*. The creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world which is like the elephant projected by a magician happen only by this *ātman*. This is in the heart of every *jīva*. One who knows this is *muni*.



## VAITATHYA PRAKARAṆA

### (32) Change and Illusoriness

32. The objective of this *prakaraṇa* (section) is to demonstrate by logic that only *Turīya* exists and any duality is illusory.

*vaitathyaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ svapna āhurmanīṣiṇaḥ/ antaḥsthānāntu bhāvānāṃ samvṛtatoena hetunā//* वैतथ्यं सर्वभावानां स्वप्न आहुर्मनीषिणः। अन्तःस्थानात्तु भावानां संवृतत्वेन हेतुना॥ - the wise declare that all the objects seen in the dream have no substantiality because dream world takes place in narrow confines of the body and objects seen in dream are subtle /Kā. 2.1/.

*Vaitathyaṃ* means changing. *vaitathya* for what? For the objects seen in the dream. Doubt: *asatya* means changing as defined by *Bhāṣyakāra* elsewhere: '*yadrūpeṇa niścitaṃ yat tadrūpaṃ vyabhicarat anṛtam ityucyate/* यद्रूपेण निश्चितं यत् तद्रूपं व्यभिचरत् अनृतम् इत्युच्यते। — That which is decided to be once in one form and sometime later gives up that form is changing (T.2.1.1). But here, *vitatha* that is illusory is referred to as *asatya* – changing. How is that?

*Answer:* The world seen in wakeful state is changing and not illusion. This is told in *Munḍaka Bhāṣya* like this: 'The *lokas* obtained by *karmas* taught by the *Veda* are '*tadetat satyam avitatham* तदेतत् सत्यम् अवितथम् – they are transactionally real and not illusory' (Mu.bh.1.2.1). '*satyaṃ cānṛtam ca satyamabhavat* - सत्यं चानृतं च सत्यमभवत् – the transcendently real *Brahman* itself became the transactionally real and the apparently real' (T.2.6). *Vyāsa* says the same thing in the following way: '*brahma satyaṃ tapaḥ satyaṃ satyaṃ caiva prajāpatiḥ/ satyād bhūtāni jātāni satyaṃ*

*bhūtamayaṃ jagat* - ब्रह्म सत्यं तपः सत्यं सत्यं चैव प्रजापतिः। सत्याद् भूतानि जातानि सत्यं भूतमयं जगत् – *Brahman* is *satya* – transcendental reality, *tapas* is transactional reality, so also *Prajāpati*, all the beings and the rest of the world which are born from the transcendental reality, are also transactionally real (Mah. Asvamedha Parva.35.34). Here, *Brahman* is transcendental reality. What is called as reality in *Taittirīya Bhāṣya* is here called transcendental reality and the other two come under transactional reality. Therefore, objects in the wakeful world are *asatya* - changing. Similarly, dream objects are also changing. **But because of one extra feature that is not found in the world of waking state, dream objects become illusory. Till that special feature is not told, dream objects also must be referred to only as changing.** In this way *Bhāṣyakāra* clearly distinguishes changing and illusory. In that case, what is the special feature of the dream objects which make them illusory? It is this: in dream, huge objects like elephants and mountains appear within the body. Obviously, they cannot be actually existing within the body because the place is too narrow. Therefore, they must be illusory. *Jīva* creates them and sees according to his impressions. *Śruti* also endorses this by saying 'na tatra rathā na rathayogā na panthāno bhavantyatha rathān rathayogān pathaḥ srijate/ न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्त्यथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजते। – There are no chariots, no horses, no roads. He creates the chariots, the horses, and the roads' (Br.4.3.10). Further, based on the similarity of the dream world with the wakeful world and, using logic, *Kārikākāra* shows objects therein are also illusory.

### (33) Illusoriness of the Wakeful World

33. *antaḥsthānāntu bhāvānām tasmājjāgarite smṛtam / yathā tatra tathā svapne saṃvṛtatvena bhidyate/ अन्तःस्थानान्तु भावानाम् तस्माज्जागरिते स्मृतम्। यथा तत्र तथा स्वप्ने संवृतत्वेन भिद्यते।। - Therefore, illusoriness is told for the objects of *jāgrat* also. Here also, it is the same as in dreams. But dream (objects) are different because of constriction. /Kā.2.4/*

He proposes the *pratijnā* - **vow (proposition)** that (he is going to demonstrate) the objects seen in the wakeful state are illusory. That these objects are *dr̥śya* – seeable, is the **hetu – ground or reason**. That they are seen (*dr̥śya*) just as objects of the dream is *dr̥ṣṭānta* - **corroboration**. That *dr̥śyatvam* (appearance) is common to the wakeful world and the dream world is *upanaya* - **application**. Therefore, wakeful state objects are also illusory is *nigamana* – **conclusion**. *Samvṛtatva* – narrowness of space is in the dream and not in the wakeful state is the difference between them. That they are *dr̥śya* (seen) and changing are common to both. – *antasthānātsamvṛtatvena ca svapnadṛśyānām bhāvānām jāgraddṛśyebhyo bhedaḥ/ dr̥śyatvam asatyatvam cāvīṣṭamubhayatra// अन्तस्थानात्सम्वृतत्वेन च स्वप्नदृश्यानां भावानां जाग्रद्दृश्येभ्यो भेदः। दृश्यत्वम् असत्यत्वं चाविशिष्टमुभयत्र ।। - On account of being internal and constricted, what is seen in dream state is different from what is seen during the waking state. **Being seen and changing are common to both states** (Kā.bh.2.4).*

### (34) The Five Limbs of Logic

34. This *kārikā* has given rise to too many doubts and therefore, it needs a detailed discussion. This discussion is based on the technical language of logic whose details are briefly mentioned here: This logic has five limbs: *pratijnā* – proposition etc. This is indeed inference only. The logic that is used for one's own knowledge is (*svārtha*) inference. When the same knowledge is to be conveyed to others (*parārtha*), logicians use this language. Illustration: (1) Though fire is not directly seen on the hill, one decides that there is fire. This is *pratijnā* – **proposition**. How is the decision made? (2) Since smoke is seen on the hill top. This is **hetu – reason**. Seeing only smoke, how can we decide that there is fire? (3) Because of the experience of seeing both smoke and fire together in the kitchen. This is *dr̥ṣṭānta* – **example**. How does this experience apply to the hill top? (4) It is because, just as seen in the kitchen, smoke is seen on the hill top. This is called *upanaya* – **application**. Therefore (5) there is fire on hill top. This is called

**nigamana - conclusion.** Conclusion is repeating the proposition at the end of the logic. The words used in inference are the following: smoke is called *vyāpya – pervaded*, fire is *vyāpaka – pervader*, smoke-fire relation of togetherness is *vyāpti – pervasion*. Therefore, seeing the pervaded and remembering the pervasion, deciding about the pervader is inference. All this is briefly displayed in the following table (See Table – 1).

	Five Limbs	Parārtha	Svārtha
1	There is fire on the hill top. How is it decided?	Proposition	Inferential knowledge
2	Since there is smoke on hill top. Seeing smoke, how existence of fire is decided?	Reason	Sight of the pervaded
3	Since smoke & fire are together seen in the kitchen. How does the knowledge of the kitchen smoke apply to the hill top?	Example	Memory of pervasion
4	Hill top also has smoke.	Application	
5	Therefore, there is fire on hill top.	Conclusion	Concluded pervader

Table - 1

Replacing 'hill top', fire, smoke and kitchen in Table – 1 above by wakeful state, illusoriness, seeability and dream respectively, the logic in the example takes the following form. (See Table – 2 on the next page)

		Parārtha	Svārtha
1	Wakeful world objects are illusory. How can you say?	Proposition	Inferential knowledge
2	Since wakeful world objects have seeability (capability of being seen). From seeability, how illusoriness is concluded?	Reason	Sight of the pervaded
3	Since seeability and illusoriness are together noticed in dream. How does seeability in dream apply to wakeful world?	Example	Memory of pervasion
4	Since there is seeability in wakeful world also.	Application	
5	Therefore, wakeful world objects are also illusory.	Conclusion	Concluded pervader

Table - 2

### (35 to 36) Objections to the Illusoriness of the Wakeful World

35. Objections: This conclusion is not correct. Accepting the universal experience of the illusoriness of the dream world, *Bhāṣyakāra* says: *'māyāivasandhye sṛṣṭiḥ, na paramārthagandho'pyasti/ kutaḥ? kārtsnyenānabhivoyakta-svarūpatvāt na hi kārtsnyena paramārtha vastudharmaṇa abhivoyakta-svarūpaḥ svapnaḥ kiṃ punaratra kārtsnyam abhipretam? deśakālanimittasampattiḥ abādhaśca, मायैव संध्ये सृष्टिः, न परमार्थ-गन्धोऽप्यस्ति; कुतः? कात्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् - न हि कात्स्न्येन परमार्थ-वस्तुधर्मेण अभिव्यक्तस्वरूपः स्वप्नः; किं पुनरत्र कात्स्न्यमभिप्रेतम्? देशकाल-*

निमित्तसंपत्तिः अबाधश्च । - The dream creation is false, it does not have even the smell of reality. The objects in dream do not have *kārtsnya* of existing objects. What is *kārtsnya*? It is space-time-causal relation and not going out of sight' (S.bh.3.2.3). During dream itself the objects there appear like transactionally real as in wakeful state . But, the moment the dreamer wakes up they vanish. They are not even apparently real because they do not have any connection whatsoever with the *pañchabhūtas* – five elements. The objects there are only memories. '*pāramārthikastu nāyaṃ sandhyāśrayaḥ sargo viyadādisargavat* – पारमार्थिकस्तु नायं सन्ध्याश्रयः सर्गो वियदादिसर्गवत् - The dream creation is not transactional like the creation of *ākāśa* etc. that are seen in wakeful state.' (S.bh.3.2.4). Dream world is certainly illusory where nonexistent objects are seen. Though this is universal experience, *Kārikākāra* establishes its illusoriness by logic. But forgetting that dream objects are illusion because of the special reason of *saṃvṛtatva* (narrowness of space), taking only the common feature of seeability in wakeful state and dream, illusoriness is extended to the wakeful world also. This is unacceptable.

36. The logic involved here has also another fault. Namely, they are in direct contradiction with the unambiguous statement of *Bhāṣyakāra* that wakeful world is not illusory '*upalabhyate hi pratipratyayaṃ bāhyo'rthaḥ stambhaḥ kuḍyaṃ ghaṭaḥ paṭaḥ iti; na copalabhyamānasyaivābhāvo bhavitumarhati; yathā hi kaścīd bhujjāno bhujisādhyāyāṃ tṛptaḥ svayamanubhūyamānāyāṃ evaṃ brūyāt 'nāhaṃ bhujje na vā tṛpyāmi' iti tadvadindriyasannikarṣeṇa svayamupalabhamāna eva bāhyamartham, 'nāhamupalabhe na ca so'sti' iti bruvan, kathamupādeyavacanaḥ syāt* - उपलभ्यते हि प्रतिप्रत्ययं बाह्योऽर्थः स्तम्भः कुड्यं घटः पटः इति; न चोपलभ्यमानस्यैवाभावो भवितुमर्हति; यथा हि कश्चिद् भुञ्जानो भुजिसाध्यायां तृप्तौ स्वयमनुभूयमानायाम् एवं ब्रूयात् 'नाहं भुञ्जे न वा तृप्यामि' इति तद्वदिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षेण स्वयमुपलभमान एव बाह्यमर्थम्, 'नाहमुपलभे न च सोऽस्ति' इति ब्रूवन्, कथमुपादेयवचनः स्यात् । - In every understanding

corresponding to the objects like the pillar, the wall, the pot and the cloth seen outside, it is not right to reject what is actually seen. Just as when one eats and is satisfied with the meal and got the experience of satisfaction of the meal, if he says 'I have not eaten, I am not satisfied' will be unacceptable, similarly saying 'I am not seeing, it does not exist' after seeing the outside objects with his senses , how can this be acceptable?!' (S.bh.2.2.28). Further, it is wrong to say that wakeful world objects are also illusion on the basis of similarity with dream because, similarity does not produce one's *dharma* in another. '*anubhava virodhahprasaṅgājāgaritapratyayānām svato nirālambanatām vaktumaśaknuvatā svapnapratyaya-sādharmyādvaktumiṣyate' na ca, yo yasya svato dharmo na sambhavati so'nyasya sādharmaḥsādharmyāttasya sambhaviṣyati* - अनुभव विरोध प्रसङ्गाज्जागरित प्रत्ययानां स्वतो निरालम्बनतां वक्तुमशक्नुवता स्वप्नप्रत्ययसाधर्म्याद्वक्तुमिष्यते । न च यो यस्य स्वतो धर्मो न संभवति सोऽन्यस्य साधर्म्यात्तस्य संभविष्यति - because he is incapable of establishing supportlessness for the knowledges of the waking state because of direct experience, he is trying to assert it on the similarity of dream knowledges. But similarity does not produce one's features in another.' (S.bh.2.2.29)

'It is not so. It has been told that wakeful world objects also do not have absolute reality. They are also *māyāmātram* - '*na ca viyadādi sargasyāpi ātyantikaṃ satyatvamasti / pratipāditaṃ hi 'tadananyatvam' ityatra samastasya prapañcasya māyāmātratvam* - न च वियदादि सर्गस्यापि आत्यन्तिकं सत्यत्वमस्ति । प्रतिपादितं हि 'तदनन्यत्वम्' इत्यत्र समस्तस्य प्रपञ्चस्य मायामात्रत्वम् - There is no absolute reality for *śṛṣṭi* of *ākāśa* etc. because it's *māyāmātratvam* is shown in the *sūtra* '*tadananyatvam*' / (S.bh.3.2.4). Even though it is told like that, in the very next sentence the difference between wakeful state and dream is also told. '*prāk tu brahmātmatvadārśanāt viyadādiprapañco vyavasthitarūpo bhavati / sandhyāśrayastu prapañcaḥ pratidinam bādhyate* - प्राक् तु ब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्शनात् वियदादिप्रपञ्चो व्यवस्थितरूपो भवति । सन्ध्याश्रयस्तु प्रपञ्चः प्रतिदिनं बाध्यते (S.bh.3.2.4) -



Before the realization of *Brahman-ātman* oneness, the world of *ākāśa* etc. stays as it is; but the dream world is affected everyday' (S.bh.3.2.4). In this way, according to the *Bhāṣya*, the world of wakeful state is transactionally real, not illusory and the dream world is illusory, not real. Just by similarity with the dream world, wakeful world does not become illusory. Seeing the similarity between the illusory image of oneself in the mirror, nobody concludes he is also illusory. Not only that; conversely, nobody thinks that the image in the mirror is real like himself because of similarity. But using the logic of similarity in sec 33, we can conversely show that dream world is also real like the wakeful world. This is displayed in the following table. (See Table – 3 below).

		<i>Parārtha</i>	<i>Svārtha</i>
1	Dream world is real. How do you say?	Proposition	Inferential knowledge
2	Because seeability is in dream. From seeability, how dream reality is determined?	Reason	Sight of the pervaded
3	Since seeability and reality are seen together in wakeful world. How does seeability of wakeful world apply to dream world?	Example	Memory of pervasion
4	Since there is seeability in dream world also.	Application	
5	Therefore, dream world is also real.	Conclusion	Concluded pervader

Table - 3

Therefore, this statement that wakeful world is illusory like the dream world is against universal experience and the *Bhāṣya*; it is also illogical.

### (37 to 38) Rebuttal of Objections

37. That the proof for the illusoriness of the wakeful world is faultless can be known only when the purpose of the proof is understood. What is the purpose of the proof? It is to show the oneness of *ātman* - that is, that there is nothing different from *ātman*. The ignorant sees the wakeful world as independent of *ātman*. The world known like that is nonexistent and so illusory. To show this, the *Kārikākāra* uses the universal experience of the dream world. Unknown things are to be taught only through known things. Therefore, he uses the commonness of seeability of both wakeful and dream worlds and shows that the wakeful world seen different from *ātman* is also illusory. If narrowness aspect of the dream world is included, this cannot be demonstrated. Therefore, only the similarity is taken. That there is no fault in this procedure will now be demonstrated.

There are two ways for establishing *atmaikatva*: Rejecting objects known through the senses and telling that *ātman* alone exists. Some of our own people say only like this. But, this is impossible because ever existent *Brahman* is the cause of all the observable objects. Therefore, they cannot be nonexistent. '*mūlaṃ cejjagato na syāt asadanvitamevedaṃ kāryaṃ 'asat' ityeva gṛhyeta/ na tvetatasti 'sat' 'sat' ityeva tu gṛhyate* मूलं चेज्जगतो न स्यात् असदन्वितमेवेदं कार्यं 'असत्' इत्येव गृह्येत । न त्वेतदस्ति 'सत्' सत्' इत्येव तु गृह्यते । - Had there been no cause for the world, this should have followed in what is seen and known only as nonexistent. But it is not so. Everything is known to be 'It is. It is.' (K.bh.2.3.12). *Kārikākāra* has also told that the world in the forms of *Vishva*, *Taijasa*, and *Prājña* are all existent. (Kā.1.6, sec 19). In this way, the cause of the observable things is *Brahman* and that *Brahman* is one's self. Had these objects been nonexistent, it would have

been impossible to get the knowledge that one's self is *Brahman*. 'yadi hi nāmarūpe na vyākriyete tadā asyātmano nirupādhikam rūpaṃ prajñānaghanākhyāṃ na pratikhyāyeta/ यदि हि नामरूपे न व्याक्रियेते तदा अस्यात्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यां न प्रतिख्यायेत। – Had not the names and forms been created there would have been no way to determine that this *ātman* is *prajñānaghana*' (Br.bh.2.5.19). Not only that, the *Vijñānavādīs* who were saying that the objects of the wakeful world are nonexistent have been extensively and severely been refuted. Therefore, to say that *Bhaṣyakāra* who condemns the nonexistence of the wakeful world there is now condemning their existence here would be plainly foolish. Moreover, when it is clearly told that the world of multiplicity is not opposed to nonduality (Kā.3.18, sec 58), what is the reason for this enthusiasm to prove that the world is nonexistent? Therefore, it is totally wrong to reject the wakeful state world for the establishment of the oneness of *ātman*.

In that case, what is the other way to establish oneness of *ātman*? It is to say that the wakeful world is existent and that it is not different from *ātman*. In other words, though the world is existent, *ātman* alone exists because the world is not different from *ātman*. What is proved in the *Prasthānatraya Bhāṣyas* and the *Kārikās* is precisely this. Before getting *ātmavidyā* the ignorant imagines the dual world of the knower and the known, though in reality, it does not exist. This is just like in the dream. Though there is mind alone, it appears with knower-known difference. The ignorant who sees a tiger in the dream becomes awake due to fear and realizes 'the tiger was also myself. I imagined it to be different and got scared.' In this way, he realizes the illusoriness of duality of the dream world after waking up. Similarly, *śāstra* wants to wake up the ignorant from his sleep of ignorance and tell him that 'this wakeful world is not different from you and therefore, you are not the knower. So, do not restrict yourself to the body. Understand that you are the all-pervading *ātman*'. As long as

he does not understand this, the wakeful world is illusion like the dream world. **This *Kārikā* is telling of the nonexistence only of the knower-known dual world and not of the world itself.** This becomes clearer in *Advaita Prakaraṇa*. There is no knower-known difference in nonduality because both are *Brahman* and not because there is no known. Therefore, to refute the known is not the purpose here. The purpose is to remove the knowership. 'na prajñamiti yugapat sarvaṣya prajñātṛtva pratiśedhaḥ – न प्रज्ञमिति युगपत् सर्वविष्य प्रज्ञातृत्व प्रतिषेधः - By telling 'not *prajñam*' the knowership of all the objects is refuted in one stroke.' (Mā.bh.7).

**Question:** How would knowership which is universal experience in wakeful state be refuted?

**Answer:** It is not so. Knowership is imagined due to ignorance. It is wrong understanding of oneself. How? It is like this. Between the known object and the knowledge, each is decided by the other. This is *anyonyāśraya doṣa* – the fault of mutual dependence (This is discussed in sec 85). Therefore, on the basis of the known and its knowledge, neither the known nor the knowership is getting fixed. Knowership is the result of the beginningless impression of ignorance. For knowership, there is no rule that there should be the known. For example, even in the absence of objects in the dream, there is knowership. **Therefore, in one who has no knowledge of *ātman* this fault of knowership is common in both wakeful state and dream.** Both wakeful and dream objects are equally illusory. That is why, *Kārikākāra* drops *samvṛtattova*- narrowness and adopts only the common seeability to prove that the wakeful world is illusory like dream world. In this way, it is established that there is no fault in the proof. It should be understood that the proof is addressed to the ignorant.

**Question:** 'How does the object's seeability get eliminated in *ātman*?'

**Answer:** Knower and known are both *Brahman*. Therefore, in *ātman* who is *Brahman* both drop out. Therefore, the second

object seen as the known by the ignorant is obviously different from *ātman* and so it becomes non-*ātman*. Then, just like an ornament without gold is nonexistent, the second non-*ātman* object becomes nonexistent. In other words, earlier to the realization of *ātman* just as the ignorant sees nonexistent object in dreams, in wakeful state also he sees nonexistent objects. Therefore, there is no difference between his knowledges in wakeful state and dream. Not only that. Because he has not given up knowership even in deep sleep, that is also equivalent to wakeful state and dream. 'trayaḡ svapnāḡ jāgratsvapnāsuḡptyākhyā/ nanu jāgaritam prabodharūpatvānna svapna/ naivam, svapna eva/ katham? paramārthasvātmaprabodhābhāvāt svapnavadasadvastu darśanācca/ – त्रयः स्वप्नाः जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याख्या । ननु जागरितं प्रबोधरूपत्वान्न स्वप्नः । नैवम्, स्वप्न एव । कथम्? परमार्थस्वात्मप्रबोधाभावात् स्वप्नवदसद्वस्तु दर्शनाच्च । - All the three that is, waking, dream and deep sleep are only dream. **Since there is knowledge in waking, is it not different from dream? Not so. That is also dream. How? There he does not have the knowledge that he is *ātman* and he sees nonexistent object there also as in dream'** (Ai.bh.1.3.12).

The summary of the above discussion is this: ***vidyā* means understanding the world as nondifferent from oneself. Seeing the world as different, one who considers it as the known and himself as the knower is an illusory seer and the known is illusory. Such an ignorant person is unfit for mokṣa.** 'yo hi brahmakṣatrādikaḡ jagatātmano'nyatra svātantryeḡ labdhasadbhāvaḡ paśyati taḡ mithyādarśinaḡ tadeva mithyādrṣṡtaḡ brahmakṣatrādikaḡ jagat parākarotīti bhedadrṣṡtimapodya 'idaḡ sarvaḡ yadayamātmā' iti sarvasya vastujātasya ātmāvvyatirekamavatārayati - यो हि ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिकं जगत् आत्मनोऽन्यत्र स्वातन्त्र्येण लब्धसद्भावं पश्यति तं मिथ्यादर्शिनं तदेव मिथ्यादृष्टं ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिकं जगत् पराकरोतीति भेदधृष्टिमपोद्य 'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा' इति सर्वस्य वस्तुजातस्य आत्माव्यतिरेकमवतारयति - He who sees the world of *brahmakṣatra* etc. as different from *ātman* and independent of it is an illusion-seer and the world seen is illusory. This *brahmakṣatra* etc. world, seen as illusory,

refuses him because of his view of difference. It proclaims 'All this is *ātman*' and asserts 'All the created objects' are non-different from *ātman*' (S.bh.1.4.19). What we understand from this sentence is the following: in *Prasthānatraya Bhāṣyas* and *Kārikās*, illusory object does not mean that it is an imagined object which is not existent. It means an object seen differently from himself. One who sees an object as different from himself is ignorant, one who sees as nondifferent is wise. Therefore, *ātmavidyā* is called *sarvātmabhāva* – **the experience that everything is himself.**

38. By logic, *Kārikākra* shows that the objects seen by the ignorant during wakefulness are all illusion. The objects of the wakeful world are composed of the five elements. In dream only their memory plays the role of objects which do not contain the elements. Nevertheless, his knowledges obtained in the two states are not different. In both places, he is seeing only the form which is nonexistent. His knowledges of them are all mind-constructs from beginning to the end. So, they are all illusion. (Kā.2.7). 'How do you say that? In wakeful state, one experiences enjoyment of the use of the objects. Therefore, they cannot be illusion.' It is not so. After having food before going to sleep, one may experience hunger in dream. If the use of the meal had been for the self, the satisfaction would not leave him when he changes from wakeful state to dream. Therefore, the satisfaction obtained from the meal is also a mind-construct' (Kā.2.7). Not only that; it is well known that what happens in the dream is the seeing of nonexistent objects. But within dream itself, there will be mind-constructs of existing and nonexistent. Even while in dream, what is thought of in the mind is nonexistent and what is seen by the senses is existing. Therefore, both existence and nonexistence are also thoughts only. (Kā.2.9). Similarly, what is recognized as existing and nonexistent in wakeful state are also mind-constructs – illusory (Kā.2.10).

### (39) Who Imagines the World of Objects?

39. The next question is this: If things observed in wakeful state are illusory, who has imagined them? Who is understanding them? **If these questions are not answered, all that is told till now amounts to Bouddhamata.** In order to avoid this mistake, these questions are answered. *kalpayatyātmanā'tmānamātmādevaḥ svamāyayā/sa eva budhyate bhedāniti vedāntaniścayaḥ/* - कल्पयत्यात्मनाऽऽत्मानमात्मा देवः स्वमायया । स एव बुध्यते भेदानिति वेदान्तिश्चयः—The *ātma* imagines multiplicity in him through the power of his *Māyā*; he alone cognizes the difference. This is the final conclusion of Vedānta.' /Kā.2.12/

*Ātmādeva* - i.e. *Turīya* - i.e. *Brahman* – imagines himself as of many forms by his *Māyā*, just like the snake is imagined in the rope and he himself gets knowledges of these forms.

**Question:** 'What is this! One who sees a snake in the rope is the *jīva* with ignorance and he is confused. How can you say that *Ātmādeva* creates ignorance for himself and becomes confused?'

**Answer:** It is not so. In the view of the ignorant, *jīva* is different from *Brahman*, but in the view of the wise he is not different - '*paramātmano jīvādanyatvaṃ, jīvasya tu na parasmādanyatvaṃ* - परमात्मनो जीवादन्त्यत्वं, जीवस्य तु न परस्मादन्यत्वं' (S.bh.1.3.19). Therefore, during the time of teaching knowledge, *jīva*'s view and *śāstra*'s view are mixed. For example, in the statement '*tat tvam asi*', one has to say 'that *Brahman* is you. *tvam* is the ignorant one who does not know he is *Brahman*.' Otherwise, the word '*asi*' (you are) cannot be reconciled. Therefore, as long as one does not understand that he is *Brahman*, he is addressed as *jīva*, the one who has caused ignorance to himself and he is confused. But in *śāstra* view, he is *Brahman* and not different from that. After the ignorance is removed he is *Brahman* and *Brahman* is himself. *Bhāṣyakāra* puts it like this '*na brahma svātmani ataddharmādhyāropana nimittam avidyākartu ceti brūmaḥ/ bhavatvevaṃ nāvidyākartru bhrāntaṃ ca*

*brahma/kintu naiva abrahma avidyākartā cetano bhrānto'nya iṣyate* - न ब्रह्म स्वात्मनि अतद्धर्माध्यारोपण निमित्तम् अविद्याकर्तुं चेति ब्रूमः। भवत्वेवं नाविद्याकर्तुं भ्रान्तं च ब्रह्म। किन्तु नैव अब्रह्म अविद्याकर्ता चेतनो भ्रान्तोऽन्य इष्यते – Objection: *Brahman* is not responsible for superimposing features on itself which are not in it. Therefore, we say that it has not created ignorance for itself. Let it be so. *Brahman* itself has not created ignorance for itself nor is it confused. But we do not accept that the creator of ignorance and the confused *jīva* is different from *Brahman*.' (Br.bh.1.4.10)

In this way, imagining the objects of world in his mind like imagining the serpent in the rope and projecting various forms of the world according to that is the work of *aparabrahman Hiranyagarbha* (Ch.6.2.3). But in order to show that *Hiranyagarbha* is not different from *Parabrahman*, *śāstra* superimposes this imagination of *Hiranyagarbha* on *Brahman*, just like *jīva*'s extrovert knowership etc. were superimposed on *Vaiśvānara* etc. (Sec 10). What is done in the above *Kārikā* is precisely this. *Chāndyogya* conveys it in the following way '*bahusyāṃ prajāyeya yathā mṛdghatādyākāreṇa yathā vā rajjvādi sarpādyākāreṇa buddhiparikalpitena* - बहुस्यांप्रजायेय यथा मृद्घटाद्याकारेण यथा वा रज्ज्वादि सर्पाद्याकारेण बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेन – Just as rope etc. give rise to mentally imagined snake etc., I will be born in many forms.' (Ch.bh.6.2.3). '*seyam ... devatā ..... ikṣāṃ ... kṛtavoatī svabuddhisthaṃ pūrvasṛṣṭi anubhūta prāṇadhāraṇam ātmānameva smarantī .... nāmarūpe vyākaraṇāni* - सेयं ... देवता ..... इक्षां ... कृतवती स्वबुद्धिस्थं पूर्वसृष्टि अनुभूत प्राणधारणम् आत्मानमेव स्मरन्ती .... नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि – That *devatā* created the name forms after remembering the *jīvātmā* in his intellect who has experienced *prāṇadhāraṇa* in the previous creation.' (Ch.bh.6.3.2). '*jāgradvaiṣayā api mānasapratyayābhirnirvṛttā eva / sadīkṣābhirnirvṛtta tejo'bannamayavājjāgarita viṣayānām* / - जाग्रद्विषया अपि मानसप्रत्ययाभि- निर्वृता एव । सदीक्षाभिनिर्वृता तेजोऽबन्नमयत्वाज्जागरित विषयाणाम् । – The wakeful state objects are also created starting from mental imaginations, because they are the effects of *tejas*, *ap* and *anna* after they are

seen by *sad Brahman'* (Ch.bh.8.5.4). All this amounts to saying that outside objects are first imagined by *Hiraṇyagarbha* and then arranged as objects using *pañcabhūtas*; the knowledges of these objects produced in *jīva* are the imaginations of *jīva*. In this way, outside objects take birth from the mind of *Hiraṇyagarbha* and end up in the mind of *jīva*. We will later consider (Sec 41) the question why it is said (Kā.2.1) that *ātman* by his *Māyā* 'imagined' the outside objects and not 'created.'

#### (40) Dual Time

40. Now another question related to time. In sec 38 it was told that the wakeful world objects are also mental constructs as in dream. But there is one difference between the two states namely, in wakefulness the knowledge of time is obtained in relation to the outside activity of objects, whereas, in dream it is all inside. For example, in the sentence 'He sits as long as he is milking the cow' there is one time experienced in wakeful state. This is called *dvaya kāla* – dual time by *Kārikākāra*. This dual time is clear and long. However, when this activity of milking is thought about in the mind as in dreams, there is another time. This is mental, unmanifest and momentary. Therefore, there is difference between the imagined time and the time understood in relation to outside activity. How can they be similar? (Kā 2.14)

*Answer:* True. There is difference. This is because the dual time has occurred in the mind through the senses and the mental time has occurred directly in the mind. So, both are mental constructs (Kā.2.15). For example, when an object which is too small for direct perception is viewed through a microscope, it looks big and clear. Nevertheless, there is no difference in the size of the object. Similarly, though the time observed through the senses is long and clear (not momentary), it is also mental. There is no difference.

*Question:* In that case, we expect a joint support for both. What is the support for the dual time and the mental time?

*Answer:* Dual time is not produced in the absence of outside things and their activity. Therefore, the support of the dual time would also be the support of the outside objects. Therefore, that principle in which outside objects become *upaśānta* – suppressed, dual time should also get suppressed. Where do all objects get suppressed?

'In deep sleep'

Is dual time also getting dissolved there or not?

'Yes. Not only that. Mental time is also getting dissolved there.'

What is the principle there?

'*Ātmadeva* is the principle.'

Therefore, *ātman* is the support for all the times. Similarly, he is the support for the space also. *Samsāri jīvas* are distinguishable in time, not so *ātman*. '*Yathā anye saṃsāriṇaḥ kālena ahorātrādilakṣaṇena paricchedyā na tathā ayamātmā kālaparicchedyah* - यथा अन्ये संसारिणः कालेन अहोरात्रादिलक्षणेन परिच्छेद्या न तथा अयमात्मा कालपरिच्छेद्यः – just as the other worldly people are limited by time like day and night, *ātma* is not limited by time like that' (Ch.bh.8.4.1).

#### (41 to 42) Why 'Imagination'? Why Not 'Creation'?

41. It has been told that the outside objects and the times associated with them are all the imaginations of *Ātmadeva*. These imaginations are not different from him because '*ahorātrādi ca sarvaṃ sataḥ kāryam* - अहोरात्रादि च सर्वं सतः कार्यम् - Day and night etc. are all effects of *sat*' (Ch.bh.8.4.1), '*saṃvatsaro vai prajāpatiḥ* – संवत्सरो वै प्रजापतिः - the year is *prajāpati*' (Pr.1.9), '*māso vai prajāpatiḥ* – मासो वै प्रजापतिः - the month is *prajāpati*' (Pr.1.12), '*ahorātre vai prajāpatiḥ* – अहोरात्रे वै प्रजापतिः - Days and nights are *prajāpati*' (Pr.1.13). The question 'Why does *ātman* do these imaginations?' is being answered now: *ātma* does these imaginations for the sake of the *jīva*. The *jīva* does *karma* in one body and because of it he gets another body; that is, he is of

the nature of *hetu-phala* (reason-result). But he cannot imagine his own body, senses etc. *Ātmadeva* must imagine them and give him. Not only that, *Ātmadeva* does the imagination of the *jīva* also. *Kārikākāra* says:

*jīvaṃ kalpayate pūrovaṃ tato bhāvān pṛthagvidhān/ bāhyān ādhyātmikāṃścaiva yathāvidyastathā smṛtiḥ//* - जीव कल्पयते पूर्व ततो भवान्मृथग्विधान् । बाह्यानाध्यात्मिकांश्चैव यथाविद्यस्तथा स्मृतिः - *Jīva's kalpana* is done first, then the objective and subjective multiplicity. As is the knowledge so is the memory/*Kā.2.16/*.

'In the above sentences, had there been the word 'created' in place of *kalpana* – 'imagines' it would have been easy for all to understand. Instead of that why the word 'imagines' is used? Just as *śruti* has told, why the cause-effect relation between *Ātmadeva* and the world is not told? Has not the *śruti* said that *Brahman* is the cause of the world? Is not *Ātmadeva* *Brahman* itself?' These are the questions for which answers must be told.

42. Giving the examples of clay-pot etc, *śruti* describes the causal relation between the world and *Brahman* in a pair of sentences (S.bh.2.1.9). As an example, 'the pot is not different from the clay, but the clay is different from the pot' is the nondifference relation between pot and clay. In this, the meaning of the former sentence is understood by direct perception; the inherent nature of the pot, is indeed clay. If we stop at this statement, the *Tārkika* counters by asking 'If so, collect some water in the clay and bring!' This is not possible. To store water, the pot shape is unavoidable; in the absence of shapes, transaction is not possible. Therefore, the latter sentence 'clay is different from pot' tells the nature of the transactionless clay. It is only through this pair of sentences that one must understand nondifference. Similarly, 'the world is not different from *Brahman*, but *Brahman* is different from the world.' Here, the former sentence tells the feature of the world and the latter of *Brahman*. '*Ananyatve'pi kāryakāraṇayoh kāryasya kāraṇātmatvaṃ na tu kāraṇasya kāryātmatvaṃ* - अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम् – Though the

effect and cause are nondifferent, the effect is of the nature of the cause, but the cause is not of the nature of the effect (S.bh.2.1.9). **If one does not notice the asymmetry in this pair of sentences, *Vedānta* will be difficult to understand. This pair of sentences is the backbone of the whole of *Vedānta*.**

There is another asymmetry different from the one in this pair of sentences in world-*Brahman* relation. It is the following: In the pot-clay example, the pot-maker who is different from clay arranges the clay in pot shape. But in the case of *Brahman*, to put it in the form of the world, there is no one different from *Brahman* because the *śruti* says '*sadevedamagrāsīt ekamevādvitīyam* – सदेवेदमग्रासीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयम् - Before creation, this was one existent without a second' (Ch.6.2.1). Not only that. Even if there could be one such second, *Brahman* is not transformable. '*na tadaśnāti kiñcana na tadaśnāti kaścana* – न तदश्नाति किञ्चन न तदश्नाति कश्चन - It does not eat anything, no one can eat it' (Br.3.8.8). If so, how can world be created? *Brahman* does not act by itself and anyone else cannot act with it either. *Brahman* transcends all activity. Therefore, how can there be creation activity in *Brahman*? This question is answered in the following way.

The limitless primordial cause, does not have the activity of the intermediate cause *prakṛti* which takes up the form of the world. *Hiraṇyagarbha* does the activity of posing the *prakṛti* in the forms of the world by his thought process (Sec 39). From the point of view of duality this answer is satisfactory. But, if one stops here, *Brahman* is not taught. To convey *Brahman*, *śāstra* superposes the activities of *Hiraṇyagarbha* and of the *prakṛti*, which takes different shapes, on *Brahman*. *Bhaṣyakāra* puts this as follows: '*satyaṃ jñānāmanataṃ brahma iti yathokta lakṣaṇa atma pratipattiyarthameva bahubhavana-sarga-praveśa-rasalābha-abhaya-saṅkramaṇa parikalpyate sarvaṃ brahmani vyavahāra viśaye* – सत्यं ज्ञानमनतं ब्रह्म इति यथोक्त लक्षण आत्माप्रतिपत्यर्थमेव बहुभवन-सर्ग-प्रवेश-रसलाभ-अभय-सङ्क्रमण परिकल्प्यते सर्वं ब्रह्मणि व्यवहार विषये - In order to teach

that the *ātman* is *Brahman* which is changeless, consciousness, limitless, *śāstra* superposes the activities of becoming many, creation, entry, getting taste, crossover etc. in *Brahman*.’ (T.bh.2.8).

In this way, *śāstra* establishes the causal relation between the world and *Brahman*. Later, invoking the latter sentence of the nondifference relation, it establishes actionlessness of *Brahman*. The innate nature of *Brahman* as decided now disallows the causal relation. Therefore, **causality is rejected and only nondifference is retained**. That is, ‘the world is not different from *Brahman* but *Brahman* is different from the world.’ This implies that causality is superposed by the *śāstra* on *Brahman* only to teach nondifference. **In this way, even in the absence of causality since there is nondifference, the coming of the world is described as ‘imagination of *Ātmadeva*’ instead of his creation.**

#### (43) Questions and Answers About Creation

43. Question: ‘*śāstra* superposes causality in *Brahman* and obtains nondifference relation between the world and *Brahman* and discards causality. But without causality the creation of world is not possible. Therefore, how could the world have been created?’

*Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra* answers it in three ways (1) It is not possible to say how world is created by *Brahman* without causality. ‘In that case, it is a fault in *Vedānta* theory’. Not so. In all theories propounding the creation of the world, this fault exists. In other theories based on inference, there are other faults and this. But in *Vedānta* there is only this fault. This being the same for all, it is not right to force only *Vedānta* to solve it.

(2) After all, the *śruti* itself confesses its helplessness in this matter. ‘*ko addhā veda ka iha pravocat iyaṃ visrṣṭiḥ yata ābabhūva* - को अद्धा वेद क इह प्रवोचत् इयं विसृष्टिः यत आबभूव (R.sam.10.129.6-7) – Who knows it clearly? Who can explain it how this mysterious creation has happened?’ Gita also tells this ‘*na me viduḥ*

*suragaṇāḥ prabhavaṃ na maharṣayaḥ* - न मे विदुः सुरगणाः प्रभवं न महर्षयः - No one among gods or *maharishis* knows my creation’ (G.10.2). Therefore, *āstikās* cannot discuss beyond this.

‘That apart, what is the *pramāṇa* for nondifference without causal relation?’ True. ‘*niścita phalavad vijñānotpādakatvaṃ yatrāsti tat pramāṇaṃ vākyaṃ, yatra nāsti tadapramāṇam* – निश्चित फलवद् विज्ञानोत्पादकत्वं यत्रास्ति तत् प्रमाणं वाक्यं, यत्र नास्ति तदप्रमाणम् - Only that sentence can be a *pramāṇa* which yields a well-defined useful knowledge, otherwise it is not a *pramāṇa*’ (Br.bh.1.4.7). The *śruti* sentence ‘*ātmaivedaṃ sarvaṃ* – आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् all this is *ātman*’ tells *sarvātmaḥ* and this does not depend on causality. Since this is experienced by the *jñāni* who feels that the whole word is himself, the testimony of this sentence is assured.

(3) Another asks: ‘It is a different matter that *jñānis* experience the nondifference without causal relation. But, how can a student who is accustomed to the causal relation understand that the world emanates from actionless *Brahman*?’

Answer: He can understand as follows: The *jīva* in deep sleep is without activity. Also, he does not have any implements to perform any activity. But the dream world is indeed created by him! Therefore, just as dream creation takes place by the *pratyagātman* without activity, the world could be created by *Brahman* without activity. (S.bh.2.1.6). Therefore, *Kārikākāra* simply comments that appearing in the form of the world is the nature of *ātman* and closes the discussion.

#### (44) Illusoriness in Buddhism and *Vedānta*

44. It was said in sec 41 that the outside world and *jīva* are imaginations of *Ātmadeva*. Here, the discussion about the imagination of the outside world is over. What remains is the discussion about the imagination of the *jīva*. Who is *jīva*? He has three forms: His first form is of the extrovert knower who coupled with the senses and the mind understands the outside things. The second is the form of the introvert knower coupled

only with the mind. His third form in deep sleep is without implements and he remains as covert knower without the action of knowing. He is *pratyagātma Brahman* (Ke.bh.avatara). It is well known that in deep sleep, there is nothing which is born or dies. Therefore, when *śāstra* talks of his creation, it is in the secondary sense with respect to his body. That is, based on the birth of the body, *jīva* is described as taking birth. Further, *śāstra* derives the world–*Brahman* nondifference by superposing causality. But no such procedure is necessary to show nondifference of the *jīva* with *Brahman* because it is easily understandable by self-analysis (Sec 24). Therefore, it is sufficient if an example is given for the creation of *jīva* – his imagination- without causality. That example is the imagination of the snake in the rope. *Ātmadeva*'s imagination of the *jīva* is like the imagination of the snake in the rope which is nondifferent from the rope. The *jīva* understood before *ātmajñāna* is different from *Turīya*. Therefore, he is illusory *jīva*, nonexistent. But after *ātmajñāna* he is '*Turīya* appearing like *jīva*'; he is existent. That is, with the loss of ignorance, *jīva*'s jivaness is gone. Similarly, during ignorance, world is different from *Turīya*; it is therefore nonexistent and after knowledge, world is '*Turīya* appearing like the world'. In other words, after knowledge, the worldness of the world is gone. '*agneragnitvavat apagājjagato jagattvam* - अग्नेरग्नित्ववत् अपगाज्जगतो जगत्वम् - After knowing its cause, just as fire's fireness is lost, after knowing the *ātman* world's worldness is lost' (Ch.bh.6.4.4). In this way, the *brahmatva* of the world is assured, the world is not lost. **The rope-snake example is used by Bouddhas and us. Without taking the rope into account, they say 'everything is nonexistent'. We agree with them. But the snake appearance does not occur without the rope. Therefore, taking the rope into account, only we assert the existence of the snake-like appearance with the knowledge that 'the rope appears like snake.'**

Therefore, according to *Vedānta*, though the world viewed

with duality is nonexistent, the world itself is not nonexistent. This is unambiguously made clear in *Chāndyogya Bhāṣya* through the same rope-snake example. How did *Brahman* appear as the world in many forms? '*bahu syāmī prajāyeya .... yathā rajjvādi sarpādyākāreṇa buddhiparikalpitenā/ asadeva tarhi sarvaṃ yad gr̥hyate rajjuriva sarpādyākāreṇa? na sata eva dvaitabhedena anyathā gr̥hyamāṇatvāt nāsattovaṃ kasyacit kvacit / बहु स्यां प्रजायेय .... यथा रज्ज्वादि सर्पाद्याकारेण बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेन । असदेव तर्हि सर्वं यद् गृह्यते रज्जुरिव सर्पाद्याकारेण? न सत एव द्वैतभेदेन अन्यथा गृह्यमाणत्वात् नासत्त्वं कस्यचित् क्वचित् । - I will be born in many forms like the rope etc. appearing like the mentally imagined snake etc. Objection: If so, what is being seen as snake etc. are all indeed nonexistent! Answer: No. The existent self itself is wrongly understood because of the impressions of duality in the intellect. Nothing at no time is nonexistent' (Ch.bh.6.2.3). Here, the understanding 'this is snake' is rope's wrong knowledge and the snake is illusory. 'Neither the wrong knowledge nor the imagined illusory object is a lesson to be taught – *na ca mithyājñānaṃ boddhavyaṃ bhavati, tatpratyupasthāpitaṃ vā vastvābhāsam* - न च मिथ्याज्ञानं बोद्धव्यं भवति, तत्प्रत्युपस्थापितं वा वस्त्वाभासम्' (G.bh.4.18). Therefore, **the purpose of the rope-snake example is not to teach that the snake is nonexistent. Its purpose is to remove the ignorance of the rope and give its right knowledge as 'the rope appearing like a snake'**. This is to be remembered. *Kārikākāra* also says the same thing. Just as only the rope remains after negating all the imaginations of snake etc., following the lesson of the *śruti* '*neti neti* – not this not this' - when all the imaginations are discarded, one comes to know that all this is *ātman* (Kā.2.18). Even after so much of explanation, people raise the question 'How all these are created?' and each person tells his own theory. (Kā.2.20-27). But *ātman* alone is here. Those who do not know this, imagine all these things in *ātman* as different from *ātman*. (Kā.2.28). '*etaiḥ prāṇādibhiḥ ātmanaḥ aprthagbhūtaiḥ aprthagbhāvaiḥ eṣa ātmā rajjuriva sarpādi vikalpanārūpaiḥ prthagveti abhilakṣitaḥ niścitaḥ**



*mūḡḡhaiḡ ityarthaiḡ/ vivekināḡ tu rajjvāmiva kalpitāḡ sarpādayaḡ na ātmaḡvyatirekeḡṇa prāḡṇādayaḡ santi* - एतैः प्राणादिभिः आत्मनः अपृथग्भूतैः अपृथग्भावैः एष आत्मा रज्जुरिव सर्पादि विकल्पनारूपैः पृथगेवेति अभिलक्षितः निश्चितः मूढैः इत्यर्थः । विवेकिनां तु रज्ज्वामिव कल्पिताः सर्पादयः न आत्मव्यतिरेकेण प्राणादयः सन्ति (Kā.bh.2.30) – **Just as for the ignorant, the rope appears like snake etc. as different from the rope, all things like prāḡṇa etc. appear to be different from ātman for the ignorant. But for the intelligent, just as the rope appears like the snake etc., prāḡṇa etc. appear not different from ātman.**

#### (45) Oneness of Turīya

45. Multiplicity is nonexistent. Where? In ātman. ‘*neha nānāsti kiḡṇcana - iha brahmaḡṇi nānā nāsti kiḡṇcana* - नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन – इह ब्रह्मणि नाना नास्ति किञ्चन – Here, in **Brahman**, multiplicity is not at all there. (K.bh.2.1.11). ‘*na tu tad dvitīyam asti* – न तु तद् द्वितीयम् अस्ति - But there is no second’ (Br.4.3.23) etc. are the *pramāḡṇa* for this statement. But for people who cannot discriminate, multiplicity appears existent and differently from them. What is seen is certainly different from the seer. Everything is ātman because ātman is the cause of everything. So, to whom something different from himself is seen is without the cause and so what he sees is nonexistent and he is ignorant. But since he is indiscriminating, he thinks it is existent. Any effect which is different from its cause is nonexistent. How? As in dream or magic creation. Here, magic creation means the creation of the things shown by the *māyāvi* – the magician (Kā.2.31). Therefore, *na nirodho na cotpattirna baddho na ca sādhaḡkaḡḡ/ na mumukḡṣurna vai mukta ityeṣā paramārthatā //32//* न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः । न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता – In reality, there is no dissolution, no creation, no bondage, no practitioner, none desirous of liberation, none liberated. This is the ultimate truth (Kā.2.32).

Duality has no birth and death since it is nonexistent. Question: ‘Does not the *śruti* say that the world of *prāḡṇa* and

five elements have both birth and death? How can it be contradicted?’ Answer: It is not so. When everything is understood as ātman only, then there is neither birth nor death for them and when they are thought to be different from ātman they are nonexistent; for nonexistent also, there is neither birth nor death! Just like the serpent seen in the rope, duality is imagined only. ‘Is not the rope also imagination?’ Let that too be imagination. But one who is imagining is not an imagination. ‘But the *jīva* who imagines is also told to be an imagination?’ (Kā.2.16 and sec 41) It is not so. Jivaness of the *jīva* is imagination. This is done by the extrovert knower. When this wrong imagination has been removed by right knowledge, one who remains is *Turīya*. He is not imagination and nothing is different from him. One who considers himself the bound or the practitioner who is endowed with restraint or the one who desires liberation or the realized who is free from bondage – all are ātman. Therefore, there is no birth and death for anyone. But identifying each with the body one says I am bound, a *sādhaka*, the one who desires only liberation, realized and so on. But there are no such differences in ātman.

#### (46 to 47) The Process of Attainment of Turīya

46. Therefore, *Turīya* alone is one without a second. He does not have anyone different from him. This absence of the second is *śiva* – auspicious, and all imaginations are inauspicious, because they create fear etc. like the snake seen in a rope. (Kā.2.33). One cannot also distinguish the imaginations *prāḡṇa* etc. The reason is this: if they are different from ātman, as viewed by the ignorant, they are nonexistent and one nonexistent cannot be distinguished from another nonexistent. If they are one with ātman as viewed by the realized, they are again indistinguishable because there is no trace of difference of any kind in *Turīya*. One who knows this is *tattoavit* – the knower of truth (Kā.2.34). Only one who is free from lust, fear, anger and one who has understood the meaning of *Veda* only can understand this differenceless *Turīya*.

He is *nirvikalpa* that is, one who is without imaginations of duality. He is *prapañco'paśama* that is, one who has sublimated all differences of the world in him. Therefore, he is *advaya* – he has no second to him. Only those *sanyasis* who are faultless and stay steadfast in the meaning of *Vedānta* can obtain this knowledge; not others (Kā.2.35).

Therefore, understanding oneself as *Brahman*, one should keep the intellect in constant flow towards *Brahman*. This is called *nididhyāsana* and when the intellect can stand firmly in *ātman*, *advaya* – the secondless is attained. The reason for that is as follows: the intellect is the first creation and so it comes exactly between *Brahman* and the world. It is always in a state of vibration obtaining the forms of the world and the knower since immemorial past. So, it has developed the habit of flowing towards external objects. Therefore, it is not easy to turn it towards the *pratyagātman*. But, if one succeeds in turning inwards by the methods taught by the *śāstra*, it can stay in *Brahman*; that is, it can take the form of the formless *Brahman*. If this practice is continued incessantly, in due course, the intellect stops going outside, because it would have come to know that peace is not obtained outside. Therefore, one must keep the flow of the intellect in the single thought that he is himself *Parabrahman*. Worldly activity should be conducted as if one is inert. One should not show off himself in anyway (Kā.2.36)

47. He must give up all desires and action like even prayer and prostration. He should beg for his food (Br.3.5.1). '*tad buddhayaḥ tad ātmānaḥ tanniṣṭhāḥ tatparāyaṇāḥ* - तद् बुद्धयः तद् आत्मानः तन्निष्ठाः तत्परायणाः - He must keep his intellect constantly in *Brahman*, make it his *ātman*, staying always in it and treat it as his ultimate destination' (G.5.17). He should never give room for thoughts of duality. During this *sādhana*, one's attention is diverted towards the body due to hunger, thirst etc. Then he is *calaniketana* – the moving body is his residence and when the intellect is in *ātman* he is *acalaniketana* – the unmoving, the

unchanging *ātman* is his residence. In this way, he should always be between the two residences and never pay attention to the outside world. He must be satisfied by the loin cloth that he gets and be satisfied with the morsel of food he gets (Kā 2.37). The body or the outside objects as known through the senses are nonexistent and as viewed from the *śāstra*, they are existent; they are *ātman*. Nonexistent is limited and it has differences but *ātman* is existent and unlimited, fearless, complete and spread over in everything. Therefore, one must reject the nonexistent and place his mind only in *ātman*. In the beginning stages of this practice when the mind moves away from *ātman*, one feels that he has slipped from *ātman* and when it stays in *ātman* he feels he becomes *ātman*. This is not correct. The reason for such a feeling is the superimposition of the mind on oneself. The only way to remove this is by continuous train of the thoughts of *ātman* till it is completely lost. Till then, this effort should continue. *Kārikākāra* therefore says '*tattvadaprachyuto bhavet* – तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो भवेत् - one should not slip from *ātman*' (Kā 2.38). What is the indication of the complete destruction of superimposition? It is the feeling of equality between the highest and the lowest without any sense of difference. This is because everything is indeed *ātman* only.



## ADVAITA PRAKARAṆA

### (48) Nonduality is by Śruti Only, Not by Logic

48. In the first āgama section, it was shown on the basis of Veda that ātman, in whom the world sublimates, is without a second. Therefore, ātman is auspicious. Veda says the same thing: 'neha nānāsti kiñcana – नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन - Here (in Brahman), there is no multiplicity at all' (K.2.1.11). 'vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam – वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयम् - Effect is only a word and a name' (Ch.6.1.4). In this way, āgama negates the forms in Turīya. Therefore, it was shown that anything different from ātman as viewed by the ignorant is illusory (Sec 37). In the previous Vaitathya Prakaraṇa, this was done only by using logic. Now, the question is: just as the dual world was shown to be nonexistent using logic, can nonduality also be established by logic or must be done by Veda only? In this section, it is being shown that this can also be done by using logic.

**Objection:** 'It is only for determining the innate nature of the object, that pramāṇas and logic are used. Since Brahman has been determined by śruti pramāṇa which is experienced by the jñānis, nonduality is determined by śruti itself. Therefore, what is the need of logic for establishing nonduality?'

**Answer:** There are people who have no belief in śruti. For their sake, is it not good that Brahman is established by logic!

**Objection:** 'It is not correct. 'naiṣā tarkaṇa matirāpaneyā – नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया — Its knowledge cannot be obtained through logic.' (K.1.2.9). 'āgama mātra samadhigamyā eva ayamarthah dharmaivat – आगम मात्र समधिगम्य एव अयमर्थः धर्मवत् — This thing is

to be understood only by āgama like dharma' (S.bh.2.1.6). 'śāstrādeva pramāṇāt ... .. brahma adhigamyate – शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणात् ... .. ब्रह्म अधिगम्यते— Brahman is understood only by śāstra pramāṇa' (S.bh.1.1.3). 'brahmatvabhāvasya śāstramantareṇa anavagamyaṃ – ब्रह्मत्वभावस्य शास्त्रमन्तरेण अनवगम्यम् – brāhmatvabhāva cannot be understood without śāstra. '(S.bh.1.1.4) 'śrutyavagāhyameva idamatigambhūraṃ brahma, na tarkāvagāhyam – श्रुत्यवगाहमेव इदमतिगम्भीरं ब्रह्म, न तर्कावगाह्यम् - This very subtle Brahman is to be understood only by śruti, not logic' (S.bh.2.1.3). Therefore, it is wrong to depend upon logic for the understanding of Brahman. Further, nonduality should never be told to those who have faith only in logic and not in śruti – 'na vācyaṃ tarkaśāstradagdhāya - न वाच्यं तर्कशास्त्रदग्धाय - nonduality should never be told to those whose mind is burnt by logic and who have no faith in śruti' (Mo.dh.247.18).

**Answer:** That is true. However, 'tadarthagrahaṇadārḍhyāya anumānamapi pramāṇaṃ bhavat na nivāryate - तदर्थग्रहणदाढ्यं अनुमानमपि प्रमाणं भवत् न निवार्यते – For confirming the grasp of the meaning, inference cannot be rejected.' (S.bh.1.1.2). Śruti also encourages the use of logic by saying 'śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ – श्रोतव्यः मन्तव्यः - To be listened to, to be discussed' (Br.2.4.5). In this way, there are two types of sentences in Bhāṣya which appear to contradict each other. However, the Bhāṣyakāra cannot be expected to contradict himself because he is sarvajña and compassionate. Therefore, we must understand in what context which sentence is said. This is analyzed in the following section.

### (49) Where is Logic and Where is Not?

49. Advaita knowledge means the experience of oneness of Brahman and ātman - that is, the experience that one is Brahman himself. In this process, there are three aspects: Brahman, ātman and their oneness. It is only when a clear knowledge of the first two are obtained that one will be able to see their oneness.

This is said by the *Bhaṣyakāra* like this: ‘*jñānena hi pramāṇena avagantumiṣṭam brahma* – ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेन अवगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म -It is only by *jñāna pramāṇa* that one desires to acquire the experience of *Brahman*’ (S.bh.1.1.1). Therefore, in the first step *Brahman* is to be determined. This process is as follows: *Brahman* being the ultimate cause of the world, it does exist in the world, but is concealed by the forms. Therefore, the one *Brahman* existing everywhere is to be separated from the forms of the world. How should it be done? For example, all the sounds produced by the *vīṇa* (a stringed instrument) are subsumed in their one common cause namely, ‘The sound of *vīṇa*’. Similarly, the sounds of conch, sounds of the drum are also subsumed in their common causes. Further, these three common causes which are also effects – are subsumed in their common cause – sound (*śabda*), whose cause is *Ākāśa*. Similarly, the other five *bhūtas* can also be extracted out of the multitude. In this way, from the point of view of the cause, multiplicity of the world reduces to quintuple. Similarly, moving backwards, the one *Brahman* which is the cause of these five *bhūtas*, must be determined. How? As a rule, the features of the effect are not in its cause – whether intermediate or ultimate. Applying this rule, we conclude that the features of the world namely, change, inertia, limitedness, are not in *Brahman*. Therefore, *Brahman* is unchanging, limitless, consciousness. In this conclusion, logic is involved which is discussed in the following section.

In the second step, *ātman* is to be determined. This *ātman* is *pratyagātman* (Sec 8) that one experiences in deep sleep. In association with the senses and the mind, he becomes the extrovert knower in wakeful state and with the mind alone he becomes introvert knower in dream. In deep sleep, there are no senses or the mind. Therefore, there is no qualified knowledge but he has got unqualified knowledge which is spread in all the qualified knowledges like pot’s knowledge, cot’s knowledge, mat’s knowledge etc. This unqualified knowledge is the basis for obtaining qualified knowledge. This

is unchanging and unlimited. This can be verified by introspection of the deep sleep experience. As in the case of fixing the nature of *Brahman*, logic is not necessary here.

In the third step, *sāstra* deals with the oneness of *Brahman* and *ātman*. That the features of *Brahman* are the features of *pratyagātman* is also easily checked in deep sleep because *pratyagātman* is unchanging, limitless, consciousness.

**Question:** ‘Even though all the three features are common, could *Brahman* and *pratyagātman* be not different like twins?’

**Answer:** They cannot be different because unqualified knowledge is one. Suppose it is two. Then each one determines the other as its known. Then both become known only. This is a contradiction. Therefore, unqualified knowledge must be one. *Brahman* and *ātman* are not different. *Ātman* must be *Brahman* only.

### (50 to 51) Reason for Logic

50. In the previous section, it was said that there will be logic in fixing the nature of *Brahman*. Now, the reason for this is to be told. It is this: *Brahman* is to be filtered (in thought) from the world to fix its inherent nature and this world is an object for the senses and other *pramāṇas*. Therefore, *sāstra* cannot speak against these *pramāṇas*. ‘*na hi śrutiśatam api śīto’gniḥ aprakāśo vā iti brūvat prāmāṇyamupaiti/ yadi brūyāt śīto’gniḥ aprakāśo vā iti tathāpi arthāntaram śruteḥ vivakṣitam kalpyaṇi prāmāṇyānyathā’nupapatteḥ/ na tu pramāṇāntara-viruddham/ na tu pramāṇāntaraviruddham svavacanaviruddham vā* - न हि श्रुतिशतम् अपि शीतोऽग्निः अप्रकाशो वा इति ब्रूवत् प्रामाण्यमुपैति । यदि ब्रूयात् शीतोऽग्निः अप्रकाशो वा इति तथापि अर्थान्तरं श्रुतेः विवक्षितं कल्प्यं प्रामाण्यान्वयाऽनुपपत्तेः । न तु प्रमाणान्तरविरुद्धं स्ववचनविरुद्धं वा - Even if hundred *śrutis* say that fire is cold and without light, they do not become *pramāṇa*. If at all it says that fire is cold and without light, another meaning to that sentence of *śruti* must be conceived. Otherwise, it does not get its *prāmāṇya*. While determining another meaning, it should not be contradictory

either to the other *pramāṇa* or to the *śruti*. (G.bh.18.66). That is, **while filtering Brahman from the world, if the śruti sentence is in contradiction with other pramāṇas, then it should be reconciled with other pramāṇas in such a way that it does not contradict the śruti**. The reason for this is the following: 'na ca pramāṇam pramāṇāntareṇa virudhyate/ pramāṇāntarāviśayameva hi pramāṇāntaram jñāpayati/ na ca laukikapadapadārthāśrayavyatirekeṇa āgamena śakyam ajñātaṃ vastvantaram avagamayitum/ - न च प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरेण विरुध्यते। प्रमाणान्तराविषयमेव हि प्रमाणान्तरं ज्ञापयति। न च लौकिकपदपदार्थाश्रयव्यतिरेकेण आगमेन शक्यम् अज्ञातं वस्त्वन्तरम् अवगमयितुम्। - One *pramāṇa* will never contradict another *pramāṇa*. Another *pramāṇa* reveals only that object which is not an object for this *pramāṇa*. Without depending upon the objects of this world and their names, it is impossible even for the *āgama* to reveal another unknown object' (Br.bh.2.1.20). Therefore, in this process of determining *Brahman* which needs reconciliation with other *pramāṇas*, there is bound to be logic. While adopting logic, it is not unlikely that a previous person has made a mistake. Such a mistake has to be corrected while fixing the meaning 'na hi pūrvoajo mūḡha āsīditi ātmanāpi mūḡhena bhavitavyamiti kiñcidasti pramāṇam/ - न हि पूर्वजो मूढ आसीदिति आत्मनापि मूढेन भवितव्यमिति किञ्चिदस्ति प्रमाणम्। - If one previous person has been wrong (in fixing the meaning), there is no *pramāṇa* which says the latter one should also be wrong' (S.bh.2.1.11). While fixing the worldly objects, the logic that is employed in inference should not be opposed to sense perception because the testimony of the inferred is fixed only by sense perception. Similarly, the logic that is used in fixing *Brahman* should not be opposed to *śruti* because *Brahman* is experienced only on the basis of *śruti*.

51. In this way, based on *śruti* and logic it was decided that *Brahman* is unqualified knowledge (See Sec 67) and the deep sleep *ātman* who is the covert knower without the action of knowing is *pratyagātman*. By this, the multiplicity of the world is reduced to two. In this duality, *Brahman* is known with the

help of *śāstra* and logic, but oneself - *pratyagātman* is not known. *Śruti* tells that *pratyagātman* is *Brahman*. This is the third and the final step for the attainment of nonduality. Here, neither *Brahman* nor *pratyagātman* is a matter for sense perception since they do not have any form. They are not objects for inference also. Since they do not have any indications. Since there is no similarity with anything, they are not matters for analogy also. Therefore, when *śruti* says that they are one, there is no room for contesting it by logic. 'rūpādyabhāvōddhi nāyamarthaḡ pratyakṡasya gocaraḡ/ liṅgādyabhāvōcca nānumānādīnām/ āgamamātra samadhigamyā eva tu ayamārthaḡ dharmavat/ - रूपाद्यभावाद्धि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः। लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनाम्। आगममात्र समधिगम्य एव तु अयमर्थः धर्मवत्। - Since it has no form, it is not an object for sense perception. Since it has no indications, it is not an object for inference. Therefore, this is to be understood only through the Veda like *dharma* (S.bh.2.1.6). The purpose of Veda is only to convey those matters which cannot be conveyed by other *pramāṇas*. *Brahman* and *pratyagātman* which are beyond *prakṡti*, and *dharma* and *adharmā* are precisely such matters. Therefore, logic should not be brought into the discussion of the oneness of *Brahman* and *ātman*. It can be discussed only based on the Veda.

### (52) Attainment of *Turīya* - Not by Meditation

52. Now we come back to the *Kārikās*. In the beginning of this section, it is determined by logic that the *pratyagātman* is unconnected with the body, though he is experienced within the body and that he is *Brahman*. *Dharma* - that is *jīva*, thinks that he is born (K.2.1.14). Even those practitioners who have studied the *śāstra* think that they are born and with the desire to become *Brahman*, they adopt meditation. Their thinking is as follows: 'In the beginning of the *kalpa*, I was indeed *Brahman*. At that time when *Brahman* transformed into the world, I got transformed into the body. Therefore, I, the meditator will do meditation and after the death of the body, I become one with *Brahman* meditated upon.' This thinking is faulty. *Brahman* in

this thinking, is *aparabrahman* that is *Hiraṇyagarbha*. But *pratyagātman* is *Parabrahman* itself. This *Brahman* does not transform into the world and is not obtained by meditation. 'tadeva brahma tvaṃ viddhi nedaṃ yadidamupāsyate - तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपास्यते – Understand that alone is *Brahman* and not that whose meditation is done as 'this' (Ken 1.4). The only thing that separates me from that is its ignorance. The meditator who does not know this truth is indeed pitiable (Kā.3.1). Though all the features of *Brahman* are being experienced by oneself during deep sleep every day and the *śāstra* is repeatedly reminding him of that, he is struggling without understanding. Therefore, he is pitiable. To free him from this pitiable condition, now *Parabrahman* is being informed. Anything that is second to one gives room for this pitiable condition (Ch.7.24.1). Because the second thing is nonexistent, its meditator is certainly pitiable. As opposed to it, the *bhoomā Brahman* which is equally spread over everywhere is free from this pitiable condition. It has no birth. Now that birthless *Brahman* is being told:

### (53) *Pratyagātman* is Not Born

53. *Pratyagātman* is *Brahman*. So, he is also without birth. 'How is that? Am I not born?' No, you appear to be born in relation to the body. As an example, the space is not born and is spread everywhere. But when a pot is born, pot-space also appears to be born along with it. But it is not born. Pot-space is not different from space and pot-space is not connected with the pot. Similarly, one says '*pratyagātman* is born' only with respect to the body. From *ākāśa* the other *bhūtas* are born and at the end *ānnamaya śarīra* – the body made of food is born (T.2.1.2). That is, the body is also born from *Brahman*. Therefore, to say that *Brahman* is born in the form of *pratyagātman* is a secondary description in relation to the body. (kā.3.3). With the loss of the pot, pot-space becomes one with space. Similarly, with the loss of the body, *pratyagātman* becomes one with *Brahman* (kā.3.4).

**Question:** 'If all *pratyagātman*s are only one *Brahman*, how is it that pleasures and pains belong only to a given person and not to all? '

**Answer:** It is not so. The analogy of pot-space explains this. Each pot has its own dirt due to which the pot's space appears unique. But there is no variety in space. Similarly, differences are seen in the case of *jīvas* also. Here, in the place of the pot, the body is taken. This body includes not only the gross but also the subtle. Pains and pleasures are born in the subtle body - that is the intellect. In different intellects, there will be different faults. Therefore, pains and pleasures are also different. But they are only the features of the body – not of *pratyagātman*. In Gita, *Bhagavān* says '*icchā dveṣassukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ saṅghātaścetanā dhṛtiḥ/ etat kṣetraṃ* - इच्छा द्वेषः सुखं दुःखं संघातश्चेतना धृतिः। एतत् क्षेत्रं – Desire, hatred, pleasure, pain, the body, mental activity, persistence – all these are the features belonging to the known world only (G.13.6). But by the force of superimposition, these pains and pleasures appear to be his own to the *pratyagātman*. But really, he has no connection with them (Kā.3.5). This can be understood by examining one's own experience during deep sleep when one is free from gross and subtle bodies. *Pratyagātman* has no pains and pleasures. Not only that. During that time, there is no difference between one another. That is, all the *pratyagātman*s obtain oneness during deep sleep. This is universal experience. There, mother is not mother, father is not father, husband is not husband, wife is not wife. But one does not know how this oneness occurs. *Śāstra* tells the reason. It is this: all the *jīvas* give up their special identities of wakefulness and dream and merge in unqualified *Brahman* during deep sleep. Therefore, all people experience oneness. This discussion is in *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* (S.bh.2.3.46). Therefore, though in wakefulness and dream *jīvas* appear to be different because of their association with different bodies, they are not different. '*avibhaktam ca bhūteṣu vibhaktamiva ca sthitam* - अविभक्तं च भूतेषु विभक्तमिव च स्थितम् – Though undivided,

it appears to be divided in beings (G.3.16). But this division is imaginary, not real. Gold may really get divided into different ornaments which are effects, but *jīvas* are not effects of *Brahman* in that way. One tree with parts divides into branches, leaves, flowers and fruits. But the *jīvas* are not parts of *Brahman* in that way. Therefore, differences in their appearance is not real. (Kā.3.7).

#### (54) Multiplicity in *Pratyagātman* Due to Adjunct

54. That the *jīvas* are different is an appearance due to the adjunct of bodies. Due to superimposition of these adjuncts, they also feel that they are different. An example for this is: sky has no colour, it has no connection with the dust and smoke in it. Despite it, because of these impurities, when sunlight scatters the blue colour, innocent people see space as blue even though there is no colour in it. Similarly, *jīva's* superimposition of the features of the body and the mind on his *pratyagātman* which has no connection with the body or the mind is responsible for the differences seen in him (Kā. 3.8). Birth and death are features of the body. When the body is present, the all-pervading *Brahman* appears as the *pratyagātman* in it. But because of superimposition, the *jīva* feels he is born and dies when the body is born and dies (Kā.3.9).

#### (55) Is Body's Creation Due to Ignorance or *Māyā*?

55. *saṅghātāḥ svapnavatsarve ātmamāyāvisarjitāḥ/ ādhikye sarvasāmye vā nopapattirhi vidyate// सङ्घाताः स्वप्नवत्सर्वे आत्ममाया-विसर्जिताः। आधिक्ये सर्वसाम्ये वा नोपपत्तिर्हि विद्यते॥* - All entities (multiplicity) are like dream appearing due to the power of *ātman's* *Māyā* and their superiority (or inferiority) or equality cannot be known. /Kā 3.10/

In the pot *upamāna* (analogy) given in sec 53, the pot exists. But in the *upameya* for which the analogy is given, bodies do not actually exist; they are nonexistent. By giving the analogy that the pot-space is not different from space, it was told that *jīva* is not different from *Brahman*. Based on this analogy it

should not be concluded that the body in the *upameya* also exists like the pot. The application of the analogy is to be restricted to get the knowledge of the *upameya*. The similarity should not be stretched beyond that. Bodies of wakefulness are not different from the bodies of dream. They are *ātmamāyāvisarjita* – produced by *ātmamāyā*. **Here, *ātma* means *jīvātmā* and *māyā* means his ignorance.** That is, the bodies are *avidyākālpana* – imagined due to ignorance. Whether the bodies are of the devatās or humans, they are imagined by ignorance (Kā.3.10).

**Question:** 'If body is imagined by ignorance, is it destroyed when ignorance is destroyed by the experience of brahma-*ātma* oneness? '

*Kārikākāra* answers this question: *rasādayo hi ye kośā vyākhyātāstaittirīyake/ teṣāmātmā paro jīvaḥ khaṇi yathā samprakāśitaḥ// रसादयो हि ये कोशा व्याख्यातास्तैत्तिरीयके । तेषामात्मा परो जीवः खं यथा सम्प्रकाशितः॥* -The *ātmā* of the *rasādi kośas* described in *taittirīyo'paniṣad* is the highest *jīva* who is *ākāśa*. /Kā 3.11/

It is not so. The body as understood by the *jīva* is imagined by ignorance. Therefore, it was told in the previous *śloka* that it is due to the ignorance of the *jīva*: *ātmānaḥ māyā avidyā – jīvātmā's māyā* is ignorance. But, if the body is looked at from the view of the cause *Brahman*, the body is due to *ātmamāyāvisarjita* where *ātma* means the unchanging limitless consciousness *Brahman*, not *jīva* and *Māyā* means that *brahma śakti* through which *Brahman* itself appears in the form of bodies consisting of the five sheaths *annamayā* etc. and not ignorance. '*brahma svarūpa anugamāya ca ākāśādi annamayāntaṃ kāryam - ब्रह्मस्वरूप अनुगमाय च आकाशादि अन्नमयान्तं कार्यम्* – From *ākāśa* up to the *annamayā kārya* – the effect of food (that is, the body) *Brahman* has followed.' (T.bh.2.6). **From the *Bhāṣya* of the two *ślokas* above (Kā.3.10-11) about the body, it becomes clear that ignorance and *Māyā* are not synonymous. This also implies that when oneness of *ātman***

is to be taught, the body is discarded as imagined due to ignorance. But from transactional view, the reality of the body is accepted and its creation is explained. *Jīva* is also imagination of the same *Brahman* (Kā.2.16). Who is *jīva*? The *pratyagātman Brahman* who does not know that he is *Brahman* (Sec 39). The five sheaths of *jīva* are activated by *Brahman*. In the analogy, the pot stands for the sheath and *Brahman* stands for space. These bodies are existent (Kā.1.6). *Brahman* has no connection with bodies, but bodies have connection with *Brahman*. Whether *jīva* has attained the knowledge of *Brahman-ātman* oneness or not – the body continues to function till *prārabdha* lasts and then as *prārabdha* is over, it dies.

### (56) Brahman in Ādhidaiva and Adhyātma Same

56. Through the relation of *hṛdayākāśa* - a tiny space in the heart and the space outside, it was shown that the *pratyagātman* in the body is *Brahman* which is spread all over the world. The same thing is conveyed in several steps in the *Madhu Brahmana* in *Bṛhadāraṇyako'paniśad* (Br.2.5.1-15). It is like this: The *pañcabhūtas* – the five elements outside are also inside the body. In the external *bhūtas* there are *adhidaivas* – the presiding devatās outside the body who are *adhyātmās* inside the body. There are several pairs like this. Some of them are respectively *prithvī* (earth)- body, *ap* (water) – *retas* (semen), *agni* (fire)– *vāk* (speech), *vāyu* (air) – *prāṇa*, *mahākāśa* (space) – *hṛdayākāśa* etc. In these pairs of *ādhidaiva* and *adhyātma*, there is mutual *upakārya-upakāraka* relation – the helped and the helper relation. Gita tells it like this: '*devān bhāvayātānena te devā bhāvayantu vaḥ*/ देवान् भावयतानेन ते देवा भावयन्तु वः। – By *yajña* you please the devatās and the devatās please you' (G.3.11). Therefore, it implies that the whole universe has a single cause and that is *Brahman*. Whether *ādhidaiva* or *adhyātma* or elements – nothing is different from *Brahman* (Kā.3.12). Though *Kārikā* establishes this by logic, the matter is what *śruti* tells '*na tu tad dvitīyamasti* - न तु तद् द्वितीयमस्ति – but that second is not there' (Br.4.3.23), '*idaṃ sarvaṃ yadayamātmā* - इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा – All this is only

that *ātman'* (Br.2.4.6) etc. Not only that; just as duality is condemned here by logic by calling it as illusory, *śruti* also condemns. '*dvitīyādvai bhayaṃ bhavati* - द्वितीयाद्वै भयं भवति – It is only with the second that the fear comes' (Br.1.4.2), '*udaramaṃtaraṃ kurute atha tasya bhayaṃ bhavati* - उदरमंतरं कुरुते अथ तस्य भयं भवति – Even if slight difference is made (here) he gets fear' (T.2.7), '*mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyumāpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati* - मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति – He who sees here as if there is difference, he gets death after death' (K.2.1.10) etc. (Kā.3.13).

### (57) Karma Kāṇḍa Not Opposed to Vedānta

57. 'But throughout *karma kāṇḍa* - action part of the *Veda*, *jīva-jīva* difference and *jīva-Paramātma* difference are told. If *jñāna kāṇḍa* - knowledge part of *Veda* tells oneness, does it not imply that there is contradiction between the two parts of the *Veda*?'

It is not so. The candidate for the action part is one who desires the result of action and the candidate for knowledge part is one who desires liberation. In this way, the subject matter is different and candidates are also different in the two parts. Therefore, there is no contradiction. *Bhaṣyakāra* explains it like this: '*na hi paramārthāvadhāraṇaniṣṭhāyāṃ vastvantarāstitvaṃ pratipadyāmahe 'ekamevādvitīyam'* (Ch.6.2.1) '*na hi paramārthāvadhāraṇaniṣṭhāyāṃ vastvantarāstitvaṃ pratipadyāmahe 'ekamevādvitīyam'* (Ch.6.2.1) '*anantaramabāhyam'* (Br.2.5.19) *iti śruteḥ/ na ca nāmarūpa vyavahārakāle tva vivekināṃ kriyākāraḥ kaphalādi saṃvayahāro nāsti iti pratiśidhyate/ tasmāt jñānājñāne apekṣya sarvaḥ saṃvayahāraḥ sāstrīyo laukikaśca / ato na kācana virodhāśaikā// न हि परमार्थावधारणनिष्ठायां वस्त्वन्तरास्तित्वं प्रतिपद्यामहे 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा.6.2.1) 'अनन्तरमबाह्यम्' (Br. 2 15 119) इति श्रुतेः। न च नामरूप व्यवहारकाले त्व विवेकिनां क्रियाकारकफलादि संव्यवहारो नास्ति इति प्रतिषिध्यते। तस्मात् ज्ञानाज्ञाने अपेक्ष्य सर्वः संव्यवहारः शास्त्रीयो लौकिकश्च। अतो न काचन विरोधाशङ्का॥ – While determining transcendental, we do not mean to say that there is another thing, because the*



*śruti* says 'only one, it has no second' (Ch.6.2.1) 'it does not have inside, it does not have outside' (Br.2.5.19) etc. During one's activity with the world, we are not saying that there is no result for that action. Therefore, with respect to knowledge and ignorance there is certainly spiritual and worldly transaction. Therefore, there is no room for conflict (Br.bh.3.5.1).'

Further, after telling both action and knowledge, *Veda* deprecates action; but nowhere has it deprecated knowledge; indeed, it has praised. Therefore, the differences told in the action part cannot be in the primary sense. So, that difference must only be in the secondary sense (Kā.3.14). In the same way, knowledge part describes the creation of the world giving the examples of clay, gold, iron etc. (Ch.6.1.4) and the creation of the *jīva* through the example of sparks of fire (Br.2.1.20). Those examples are intended to show the nondifference of the world and the *jīva* respectively with *Brahman*. These examples are all stories like *prāṇa* conversations to convey the oneness of the world (Kā.3.15). Similarly, *varṇa*, *āśrama*, *karma*, meditation etc. are told for only those who are in duality. If they proceed according to what is told in the *Veda* in a desireless way, they become competent candidates for the knowledge part (Kā.3.16).

### (58) Duality is Not Opposed to Nonduality

58. *svasiddhāntavyavasthāsu dvaitino niścītā dṛḍham/ parasparam virudhyante tairayaṃ na virudhyate//* - स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निश्चिता दृढम्। परस्परं विरुध्यन्ते तैरयं न विरुध्यते॥ - The dualists conflict with one another because they stubbornly stick to the methodologies of their own respective systems. But this (Upanisadic vision) has no conflict with them. /Kā.3.17/

*Sāṅkhya*, *Kanāda* etc. adopt only inference as *pramāṇa* to propound the cause for the inert world, but without giving up *śruti*. Therefore, in their theories, the efficient and material causes are different. For *Sāṅkhya* there is no efficient cause.

Both these causes come under the category of observable entities. If there should be validity for their theories, these two causes must be sense perceptible according to the rules of inference. But they are not perceptible entities and so there is no question of validity for their theories. Next, *Bouddhas* etc., though they use powerful logic, do not accept *śruti*. But their theories are against universal experience. Therefore, they too do not have validity. All these people, being in love and hatred, stubbornly stick to their own theories and they indulge in condemnation of others. But nonduality is not against anybody. The reason is given in the next section.

*advaitam paramārtho hi dvaitam tad bheda ucyate/ teṣāmubhayathā dvaitam tenāyaṃ na virudhyate//* अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि द्वैतं तद्भेद उच्यते। तेषामुभयथा द्वैतं तेनायं न विरुध्यते॥ - The nonduality is the final reality and *dvaita* (duality) is only its effect. The dualists (in their ignorance) hold that either way (in the final reality and in its effect) duality is the truth. The nonduality is the very self, the very light of duality and therefore is not opposed to it. /Kā.3.18/

Nonduality is the cause and duality is its effect. Nowhere the effect is against the cause. **Therefore, to assert that oneness of ātman is possible only if the world is rejected as nonexistent is a sign of immaturity.** Moreover, that cause is one's self and therefore 'I am myself in many forms, but they are not in me' is the experience of the *jñānis*. So, there is validity for the statement that the existence of the world is not opposed to nonduality. For that matter, even ignorant people have a similar experience. For example, the existence of many parts of his body is not against his feeling of oneness. Similarly, even amid multiplicity as observed by the senses, nonduality does come into experience. Therefore, it stands verified. But, in duality theories, there is difference in both views – in the view of the cause and in the view of the effect. The causes are two – the efficient and the material; and the differences in the view of the effect is obvious. On the other hand, for us, there is

oneness in the causal view and only mental imagination in the view of the effect. **Therefore, nonduality is transcending duality but duality is not opposed to it.** 'How do you say that in the view of the effect, the duality is mental imagination?' The answer is told in this way:

### (59) Duality is the Appearance of Nonduality

59. Just as the rope appears as snake etc., nonduality appears in the forms of the effect due to *māyā*. This effect is not really born. Here, what do we mean by 'really'? 'Really' means understandable through *pramāṇa*. For example, clay is 'really' taking many forms as seen by the senses. This is possible because, clay has parts. Similarly, the creation of the world through an intermediate cause like *prakṛti* is according to *śruti-pramāṇa* taken with logic. Therefore, it is also real. But *Turīya* who is the ultimate cause of the world does not have parts. Therefore, it is not possible to say that *Turīya* is 'really' born in many forms. Further, if *Turīya* is really born, he would also die. In that case, *śruti* would not have called him partless, deathless, birthless etc. (Kā.3.19). Deathlessness is the nature of *Turīya*. So, it cannot have death. Similarly, death is the nature of forms; they cannot be deathless.

**Question:** 'If there is no creation of the world that is seen, how to reconcile the sentences of *śruti* describing its creation?'

**Answer:** They are sentences used as a ploy to teach oneness (See sec 57). Whether creation is real or magical (Kā.1.6, Sec 9) – their purpose is to teach oneness. Therefore, they are ploys used for this purpose. In these two – real creation and the magical creation - we cannot even say which has primary meaning and which has secondary meaning. 'How do you say that?' It is told based on *śruti*, '*ne ha nānāsti kiñcana* – ने ह नानास्ति किञ्चन- Here there is absolutely no *nānātva*' (K.2.1.11), '*indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate* - इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते – Indra by his *māyās* acquires many forms' (Br. 2.5.19) etc. say the *śrutis*. 'Here, does not '*māyā*' mean *prājñā* – knowledge?' Yes. Knowledges

of multiplicity come from the senses and this multiplicity is not in *Turīya*. Therefore, these knowledges are *avidyāmaya* – not corresponding to the truth – nevertheless believed because of ignorance. Therefore, the *śruti* uses the word *māyābhiḥ* – through *māyās*. Not only that, '*ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate* - अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते – One who is not born is taking birth in many forms' (T.āranyaka.3.13). *Kārikā* also tells the same thing (Kā.3.20-24).

### (60) Denial of Creation

60. *sambhūterapavādācca sambhavaḥ pratiśidhyate/ konvenam janayediti kāraṇam pratiśidhyate// सम्भूतेरपवादाच्च सम्भवः प्रतिषिध्यते। कोन्वेनं जनयेदिति कारणं प्रतिषिध्यते।।* - Moreover, by the denial of creation, all the effects are denied. And by telling 'who can cause it to birth', the cause is denied /Kā.3.25/.

In this *śloka*, it is told that there is no creation of either the world or the *jīva*. One *mantra* of *Īśāvāsya* for the noncreation of the world and one *mantra* of *Kaṭha* for the noncreation of the *jīva* are considered in this *Kārikā*. First, we will give the content of the *Īśāvāsya mantra*. It says: The meditator who does meditation of *asaṃbhava* goes to darkness and the meditator of *sambhava* goes to pitch darkness (*Īśa.mantra.12*). Here *sambhava* means the first creation of the mind and the intellect of *Hiraṇyagarbha* and *asaṃbhava* means the *prakṛti* which is the cause of this mind and intellect. For the meditation of the cause, there is one result and another result for the meditation of *Hiraṇyagarbha*. In this Upaniṣad, the intention of this *mantra* is as follows: Each meditation has a different result. If only one of the two is performed, he does not get its result – it is wasted like going into darkness or into pitch darkness. But, if the two are done jointly, the result is the following: the obstructions for obtaining the result of the second meditation – like the faults of inauspiciousness – will be removed by the first meditation and the result of the second meditation namely, 'deathlessness' is obtained. (A well-known example is this: before doing

worship of one *devatā*, *Gaṇapati* worship is done first. The worship of *Gaṇapati* removes the obstructions for the worship of the other *devatā* and the worship of the other *devatā* gives its result.). How does he get it? From the first meditation of the cause, he avoids the inauspiciousness and from the second meditation of *Hiraṇyagarbha* he gets 'deathlessness' (it is not absolute deathlessness but only relative). But, in this *Kārikā*, this *mantra* has been interpreted as follows: Since the creation (of *Hiraṇyagarbha*) is criticized, it means that the creation of the world is denied.

**Question:** 'In *Īśāvāsya mantra*, each meditation is criticized only to say that the meditation of the creation and its cause are to be jointly done. How, then does it mean that this criticism of the meditation of creation is denying creation?'

**Answer:** The answer of *Bhaṣyakāra* to this question is as follows: It is true that singly done meditation is criticized only to say that the two should be jointly done. Suppose that they are jointly done with desire, the meditator gets the result of both. But, if they are done without desire, the result is this: by the first one, he overcomes the inauspiciousness of desire through the purification of the mind and from the second he gets 'deathlessness'. He would have also followed the injunction that the two be jointly done. Further by the meditation done with no desire, one obtains true deathlessness that is, the knowledge of *ātman*; equivalently, the attainment *Turīya*. In *Turīya*, there is no world at all and therefore, its creation is also not there. In comparison with this, creation is denied in the transcendental view. It is true that the world is created in the transactional view. Though there is no transaction in *ātman*, there is *ātman* in transaction. Therefore, that there is creation in the transactional view and no creation in the transcendental view are not contradictory. Further, there is nothing like attainment of deathlessness in the transcendental view because *Turīya* is always deathless. He does not attain deathlessness at some stage.

Further, the discussion is about *Kaṭha mantra* telling that there is no creation of the *jīva*. 'na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścit nāyaṃ kutaścinnā babhūva kaścit - न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित् नायं कुतश्चिन्न बभूव कश्चित् - *ātmaññāni* is neither born nor he dies. He is not born from anything and nothing is born from him' (K.1.2.18). There is no matter in him which has birth or death. To give rise to birth or death of something, he does not even have any implements. This latter feature can be understood by introspecting the covert knower in deep sleep. But, there is jivaness in the *jīva* imagined by ignorance. Till it is not destroyed by knowledge, *śāstra* accepts his creation by magic (Kā.1.6, Sec 19). But, when jivaness is lost by knowledge of *ātman*, even creation by magic cannot be attributed because he is himself the birthless *Turīya*. Further, though *Turīya* is the base for the imagination of the multiplicity of the world, it is not possible to say that the creation has taken place by him. This is already discussed in sec 59. So, *Kaṭha mantra* tells this clearly by saying 'nothing is born from him'.

### (61) Ignorant's World Nonexistent, Wiseman's World Existent

61. There are two questions to be answered here. (1) Are objects of the wakeful world existent or nonexistent? (2) Does the world have creation and destruction or not? The reason for raising the first question is the following: In the foregoing *vaitathya prakaraṇa* and in this *advaita prakaraṇa*, objects of the wakeful world are described as existent in some places and nonexistent in some other places. '*prabhavaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ satām/* प्रभवः सर्वभावानां सताम्। - there is creation for all the objects which are existent (Kā.1.6). In the next *śloka* (Kā.1.7), they have been described as '*svapna māyā sarūpa* स्वप्न माया सरूप। - like the objects in dream and magic. It is well known that the objects in dream are nonexistent. Further, the objection is raised that the food eaten brings satisfaction and therefore the objects like food cannot be nonexistent. Countering it by logic, it is

concluded that the objects of the wakeful world are nonexistent (Kā.2.7). Therefore, the question whether they are existent or not is to be answered unambiguously. *Bhaṣyakāra* answers it as follows:

Just as the snake which is seen as different from the rope by the unintelligent, the world seen as different from *Ātman* is nonexistent. But the intelligent examines the rope and finds it as 'the rope appearing like snake'. This snake like appearance is the inherent feature of the rope and therefore, it is nondifferent from the rope. Similarly, **appearing like the world is the inherent feature of Brahman and so the world is nondifferent from Brahman; so, it is existent** (Kā.2.30, Sec 44 last part). This means that the world seen by the ignorant with knower-known difference is nonexistent and that seen by the learned as nondifferent from him is existent. The reason for this difference in these two understandings is the following: The world is effect and *Brahman* is the cause. One who knows he is *Brahman* is the learned and one who does not know this is the ignorant. In this way, the world seen by the learned is with the cause and that seen by the ignorant is without the cause. Therefore, the world seen by the intelligent is existent and that seen by the ignorant is nonexistent.

### (62) Do Creation and Destruction Happen or Not?

62. Now the second question whether creation and destruction are there or not is being considered. The reason for raising this question is the following: In *Kārikā* 1.6, it is said 'prabhava sarvabhūtānāṃ satām / प्रभव सर्वभूतानां सताम् । – Creation for the objects which are existent'. Telling 'kalpayati ātmanātmānam ātmādeva ... / कल्पयति आत्मनात्मनम् आत्मादेव .... । – *devaātma* creates the multiplicity (Kā.2.12, sec 39), the creation of the objects is accepted. But by telling 'na nirodho na co'tpattiḥ / न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः । – there is neither destruction nor creation' (Kā.2.32), both are denied. More than this, by saying that the creation of the world told in *śruti* through the examples of clay-

pot etc. is just a story like the conversation with *prāṇa*, it is strongly rejected. But, the *Kārikākāra* or the *Bhaṣyakāra* cannot speak in contradictory ways. Therefore, how are these sentences to be reconciled? As answer to this question, we show that creation and destruction of the world described in the duality view is real and they are not at all there in unitary *Turīya*. They happen only in transactional view and not in the transcendental view.

### (63) They Are in Transaction

63. When the ignorant man understands rope as snake, following his knowledge, the rope does not become a snake. Similarly, though the world as understood by the dualist is nonexistent, the world does not become nonexistent. Therefore, for the sake of teaching, *śāstra* can tell creation and destruction of the world from the dualist view and it does tell. Had they been illusory, there would have been no reason to reject the *Mīmāṃsakas* who say that the world is eternal. Even the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikās* who posit efficient and material causes from the dualist view, would not have been rejected. Also, *Sāṅkhyas* who assert only the *pradhāna* as the material cause of the world, would have also not been rejected. Not only that. Some of our own people say 'since there are opposing descriptions of creation in the *Upaniṣad*, the intention of the *Upaniṣads* is not to describe creation.' Rebutting this stand, *Bhaṣyakāra* has told that there is no contradiction in the *Upaniṣads* in describing the sequence of creation (Su.bha.2. pāda.3). More specifically in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya*, reconciling the creation as starting from *ap*(water), *Bhaṣyakāra* writes 'ākāśaprabhṛtināṃ trayāṇāmutpatyanantaram iti vaktavyam / śrutyantarasāmarthyāt vikalpa asaṃbhavācca sṛṣṭikramasya // आकाशप्रभृतीनां त्रयाणामुत्पत्त्यनन्तरम् इति वक्तव्यम् । श्रुत्यन्तरसामर्थ्यात् विकल्प असंभवाच्च सृष्टिक्रमस्य ॥ – Since, there cannot be contradictions in the *Upaniṣads* about the creation sequence, we have to say on the basis of another *śruti* that the creation of *ap* (water) happened after the creation of *ākāśa*, *vāyu*, and *tejas*'

(Br.bh.1.2.1). Further, to teach the idea that creation, sustenance and destruction of the world happen only by *Brahman*, *śruti* gives the examples of *vīṇa* (stringed instrument), *śaṅkha* (conch) and *duṇḍubhi* (drum). The *Bhaṣyakāra* defines the word *Brahman* as the cause of creation, sustenance and destruction of the world by telling '*brahma ca vaksyamāṇalakṣaṇaṃ janmādyasya yataḥ iti*' ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणं जन्माद्यस्य यतः इति। - *Brahma* has the feature defined by 'from where creation' etc. (in the next *sūtra*)' (S.bh.1.1.1). '*rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva tadasya rūpaṃ praticakṣaṇāya*' रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय। - *Brahman* takes many forms to convey its inherent nature' (Br.2.5.19). Therefore, the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world in the transactional view are undeniable. This is not contradictory to the statement that they are not present in the transcendental view.

#### (64) They Are Not in *Ātman*

64. 'How can you say undeniable? Existence is only of *ātman*. In him there is no world. Therefore, there is no question of creation and destruction of the world at all.'

What you say is not wrong. But that there is no world in *ātman*, is known only after understanding *ātman*. Since there is no world in *ātman*, there is no question of its creation and destruction in *ātman*. But, presently what we are talking is not about *ātman*, it is about the world. In *ātman*, there is no world, but there is *ātman* in the world. Therefore, there can be transaction of creation etc. in the world. *Ātman* is known by *śruti* and the world is known by the senses. Since both the object and the *pramāṇa* are different, there is no contradiction in telling the creation of the world though it is not in *ātman*. Moreover, creation etc. are not against the nature of *ātman* (Kā.3.18, Sec 58). Though, the world appears with multiplicity and grossness for the senses, it is not different from *ātman*. Before creation, the world was representable only by one word *ātman*. Not so now. 'Before creation when the world was not

distinguishable by several names and forms, it was an object only for one word and thought, that is, *ātman*. Now that it has become distinguishable by different names and forms, it is available for several words and thoughts and also for the one word and thought *ātman* - *prāgutpatteḥ avyākṛta nāmarūpa bhedaṃ ātmabhūtaṃ ātmaikaśabdapratyayagocaram jagatidānīṃ vyākṛtanāmarūpabhedaṭvāt* *anekaśabdapratyayagocaram ātmaikaśabdapratyayagocaram ca* प्रागुत्पत्तेः अव्याकृत नामरूप भेदम् आत्मभूतं आत्मैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरम् जगत् इदानीं व्याकृतनामरूपभेदत्वात् अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरम् आत्मैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरं च" (Ai.bh.1.1.1). 'Even when it is an object for the intellect as 'this', it is really the one without the second from the causal view. - *ekamevādvitīyaṃ paramārthata idam buddhikāle'pi* एकमेवाद्वितीयं परमार्थतः इदं बुद्धिकालेऽपि। (Ch.bh.6.2.2). Therefore, though *ātman* is without a second, the creation, sustenance and destruction of the inert world appearing with multiplicity to the senses, is not a nonexistent transaction. Creation etc. are done by *ātman*. 'Prior to the knowledge of *ātman*, creation and destruction of the world from the *prāṇa* up to the names were happening from the one who is different from the self. After getting the knowledge of *ātman*, they happen by himself' (Ch.bh.7.26.1). In this way, all the transactions are only of *ātman* by *ātman* for the *jñāni* - *prāk sadātmanvijñānāt svātmano'nyasmāt sataḥ prāṇādernāmāntasya utpattipralayau abhūtām/ sadātmanvijñāne tu sati idānīṃ svātmana eva saṃvṛttau/ tathā sarvo'pyanyo vyavahārah ātmana eva viduṣaḥ/ प्राक् सदात्मविज्ञानात् स्वात्मनोऽन्यस्मात् सतः प्राणादेर्नामान्तस्य उत्पत्तिप्रलयौ अभूताम्। सदात्मविज्ञाने तु सति इदानीं स्वात्मत एव संवृत्तौ। तथा सर्वोऽप्यन्यो व्यवहारः आत्मन एव विदुषः।।' (Ch.bh.7.26.1). In this way telling that creation and destruction are happening by himself, the *jñāni* endorses them. 'If so, what is the difference between the transaction of the ignorant and the wise?' The ignorant owns the transaction done only by his body and senses etc. whereas, the wise owns all the transactions of the whole world. 'That the world of *prāṇa* etc. is born from *Parabrahman* is *Vedānta-maryādā* - the dignified statement of *Vedānta* - *parasmācca brahmaṇaḥ prāṇādikaṃ jagat**

*jāyate iti Vedāntamaryādā/ परस्माच्च ब्रह्मणः प्राणादिकं जगत् जायते इति वेदान्तमर्यादा ।* (S.bh.1.4.18). After attaining oneness with *Brahman*, there is neither the world nor logic; till then the world is there and also the logic because though there is no world in *ātman*, *ātman* is there in the world. Therefore, **based on the features of *ātman* it is not right to raise objections while discussing the world and inversely, based on the features of the world, objections should not be raised in the discussion of *ātman*. Therefore, *Bhaṣyakāra* warns that we must distinguish and understand the statements depending on the contexts. ‘*idaṃ evam paraṃ vākyaṃ, adō’nya param - इदं एवम् परं वाक्यम्, अदोऽन्य परम् – this sentence has meaning in this context, that sentence has meaning in another context*’ (Kā.2.30).**

### (65) Causality in Duality, Not in *Ātman*

65. *Śāstra* establishes the oneness of *Brahman* by invoking causality of the world and recognizes its nondifference with *Brahman*. Now, we show that the nondifference without causality is concealed in the law of nondifference with causality. In clay-pot example, though there is causal nondifference, clay is not entirely different from the pot, both clay and pot have the features of the effect. Both are changing, inert and limited. Therefore, clay is an intermediate cause for the pot. That is, clay itself is the effect of another cause. Since *prakṛti* is also having these features of the world, it means that all the causes of the world up to the *prakṛti* are only intermediate causes. While establishing the nondifference of the world with *Brahman* through causality, *Īśvara* is the efficient cause and *prakṛti* is the material cause. This relation of causality is real. That is, established on the basis of *śruti* and other *pramāṇas* and logic. But after obtaining *Brahman* through the law of nondifference, both efficient and material causes drop out and the transactionless *Brahman* is obtained. This is the ultimate cause of the world. There is no trace of any activity in this. As opposed to the world, *Brahman* is unchanging, unqualified

knowledge and limitless. ‘If it has none of the features of the effect, how can there be nondifference?’ No. It is not so. The common feature between *Brahman* and the world is *sat*-existence. ‘*brahmaṇo’pi (tarhi) sattālakṣaṇaḥ svabhāvaḥ ākāśādiṣu anuvartamāno dṛśyate/ ब्रह्मणोऽपि (तर्हि) सत्तालक्षणः स्वभावः आकाशादिषु अनुवर्तमानो दृश्यते – the feature of existence of *Brahman*’s nature follows in the world of *ākāśa* etc.’ (S.bh.2.1.6). Therefore, nondifference remains without causality. That is, *Brahman* exists and the world also exists. Both are existent. ‘In that case, what is the difference between the two?’ The existing world is transactionally existent, *Brahman* is transcendently existent. *Brahman* does exist in the world and the world does not exist in *Brahman*. In that case, where is the absence of multiplicity? ‘*neha nānāsti kiñcana – iha brahmani nānā nāsti kiñcana - नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन – इह ब्रह्मणि नाना नास्ति किञ्चन – Here, in *Brahman* there is no trace of multiplicity (K.2.1.10). Therefore, there is no possibility of the world emerging out of *Brahman*. That is, causal relation is not possible between world and *Brahman*. But the transactional world available for *pramāṇa* and logic exists. ‘If the world does not exist in *Brahman*, where could it have come from?’. This question must be answered. Since *Brahman* alone exists before creation, it should have come only from *Brahman*. In other words, **though there is no world in it, *Brahman* has the capacity to project itself in the form of the world nondifferent from itself.** This capacity itself is *Māyā*. ‘*māyā nāma bahiranyathā ātmānaṃ prakāśya anyathāiva kāryaṃ karoti sā māyā - माया नाम बहिरन्यथा आत्मानं प्रकाश्य अन्यथैव कार्यं करोति सा माया – (saṃsāris) show themselves in a different way and act in a different way and that is *Māyā*’ (Pr.bh.1.16). Therefore, this creation is called magic creation as different from real creation (This definition of the word *Māyā* is applicable to worldly people and also *Brahman*. But the *Māyā* of the worldly people is meant for misleading others, whereas, *Brahmamāyā* is intended to guide people towards *mokṣa*). In this way, the examples of the clay-pot etc, given to show causality between***

the world and *Brahman*, is all a story like ‘conversations of *prāṇa*’ to teach oneness of *ātman* (Sec 57 last part.). And *Māyā* means that *Brahmaśakti* which can project the world of multiplicity which is absent in itself. In this way, *Brahman* is the greatest *māyāvi* – magician.

### (66) Duality is Mind’s Projection

66. Nondifference of the world with *ātman* is the basis to obtain *ātmaññāna*. *Ātman* is unborn and unknowable. Whatever that exists in front of us is born and is what is known. That is only *upāya* - ploy to give the knowledge of the *upeya ātman*. *Upāya* - ploy has many adjectives but there are no adjectives in the *upeya ātman*. Therefore, if all the adjectives in the ploy are rejected by ‘*neti neti* – not like this, not like this’, the knower can get the knowledge of *ātman*. ‘How can he come to get that knowledge by this method?’ It is like this. The knower is the one who rejects the adjectives and the only thing that he cannot reject is himself. Therefore, when everything has been rejected, only he remains. He himself is unborn and the unknowable. ‘Who is he?’ the covert knower (Kā.3.26). When he comes to know that he himself is *Brahman*, he is called *Turiyātman*. ‘When all the knowables are rejected, does not *Turiya* also get discarded?’ No. It is not possible because, just as in the known and in the born body, the unknown and the birthless covert knower resides, so also the unknowable and the unborn *ātman* exists who gives room for the birth of all the other knowables which are born. Therefore, none of them is nonexistent. (Kā.3.27). There is no birth, real or magical to the nonexistent. (Kā.3.28). What determines the knowable as the knowable and the knower as the knower is the mind. This is a stuff which takes the forms of the knowable and the knower and acts as a vibrating mediator between the two (Sec 13). From this *saṃskāra* – the habit developed by the impressions, it does not give up its vibration even in the absence of the senses and the objects as in the dream. The duality experience continues even in their absence. In this way, since the experience of the knowable and

knowing of duality exists even in the absence of the senses, duality is only *manodṛśya* – an observable for the mind. (Kā.3.29). That is, duality exists if the mind exists. When the mind subsides as in deep sleep, there is no duality also. In this way, we can say that duality is only in the mind.

‘During deep sleep, mind is, of course subdued and so there is no experience of duality. But during that time, the duality of the external world does not cease to exist. Therefore, suppose I say that duality is not yet decided as an object only for the mind?’

*Answer:* True. But it is decided in the following way: the whole of the world is *ātman*, but in *ātman* there is no world. The mind which mediates between them can take up the form of the known or the form of *ātman*. If one proceeds according to the teachings of the *śāstra*, the mind can give up the knowing activity and stay in *ātman*. Then it becomes *amanas* – that is, the mind loses its existence – that is, it becomes one with *ātman*. Since there is no duality in *ātman*, it gets decided that ‘Really only nonduality exists. But the mind sees duality due to the habit of impressions and therefore duality is only a mental projection.’ (Kā.3.32).

### (67) Who is Knower in Nondual Knowledge?

67. *akalpakamajaṃ jñānaṃ jñeyābhinnaṃ pracakṣate/ brahmajñeyamaṃ nityamajenāṃ vibudhyate// अकल्पकमजं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाभिन्नं प्रचक्षते । ब्रह्मज्ञेयमजं नित्यमजेनाजं विबुध्यते ॥* - Knowledge (*viśeṣya jñānam*) is ever free from imaginations, unborn, inseparable from the *jñeya*. *Brahman* is the sole object of this knowledge. The unborn knows the unborn. /Kā.3.33/

Therefore, the only way to get freedom from duality is to understand that the self is *Brahman*. The moment this is said, questions arise. What are the features of *Brahman*? In the understanding of anything, there is known-knower duality and the instrument of the mind. If duality is nonexistent, who is the knower who must understand *Brahman*? What is the

instrument by which he understands? The answer for the first question is as follows: here, *Brahman* is to be known and this is the quintessence of all that is to be known. This is unchanging, unqualified knowledge and limitless. Here, **unchanging means 'that which is fixed to be in a certain form once, it never deviates from that form - yadrūpeṇa yanniścitaṃ tadrūpaṃ na vyabhicarati tatsatyam - यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं न व्यभिचरति तत्सत्यम् (T.bh.2.1). As opposed to this, 'that which changes its form is asatya - changing'.** In these three characteristics of *Brahman*, the middle one is not the qualified knowledge that is obtained in the intellect. It is the quintessence of all qualified knowledges. For example, pot's knowledge, cot's knowledge etc. are qualified knowledges. Pot's, cot's etc. in them are adjectives and the noun which is common to all of them is the unqualified knowledge. This is *Brahman's* characteristic knowledge. The qualified knowledges are changing and limited and these two features come from the adjectives pot's, cot's etc. But the unqualified knowledge is unchanging and limitless. Therefore, this unqualified knowledge is the characteristic of *Brahman*. This is really not accessible for understanding by the intellect (Sec 49, last part). Therefore, *Brahman* is really not graspable by the intellect. Nevertheless, till it is understood as oneself, it can be deemed as understandable. That is why *Kārikākāra* calls it as *Brahmajñeya* – the *Brahman* to be grasped as self.

Now the next question: Who is the self who has to grasp this *Brahmajñeya* in the absence of duality? It is the covert knower in deep sleep. Is it possible for him to grasp it? Yes, it is possible because the covert knower is possessing all the three characteristics of *Brahman*. It is universal experience that the self in deep sleep is unchanging and limitless. 'Further, what about the other characteristic – unqualified knowledge? Does he have that also?' Yes. He has. If he did not have it, it would have been impossible for him to get qualified knowledges in his intellect after he woke up. It is unqualified knowledge of

the covert knower which takes the form of qualified knowledges in the intellect through interaction with the outside objects like pot, cot, etc. Therefore, it is clear that all the three characteristics of *Brahman* are in the self in deep sleep. So, there is noduality between them. Therefore, *Bhaṣyakāra* calls him as *pratyagātma Brahman* – the *Brahman* which is experienced inside the body during deep sleep (Ke.bh.avataranika). Therefore, it is possible for *pratyagātma Brahman* to know that he is *Brahman*.

Now is the third question: Which is the instrument to understand that one is *Brahman*? It is the mind only. '*manasaivānudraṣṭavyam - मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यम् - it should be understood only through the mind,*' (Br.4.4.19). But it is not understandable by an impure mind. 'It should be extremely pure, extremely transparent and extremely subtle like the *ātman*. Then it can become shapeless like *ātman* – *atyantanirmalatva atisvacchatva atisūkṣmatvo'papatteḥ ātmano buddheśca ātmasamanairmalyādyupapatteḥ ātmacaitanyākārā bhāsatvo'upapattiḥ/ - अत्यन्तनिर्मलत्व अतिस्वच्छत्व अतिसूक्ष्मत्वोऽपपत्तेः आत्मनः बुद्धेश्च आत्मसमनैर्मल्याद्युपपत्तेः आत्मचैतन्याकारा भासत्वोऽपपत्तिः'* (G.bh.18.50). This mind is in wakeful state. Therefore, the effort to grasp *Brahman* should be done by the extrovert knower in the wakeful state. The mind is a thing which can take up shapes of finite objects and also the limitless shape of *ātman* (Sec 65). Therefore, the knower *pratyagātma-Brahman* who has to understand *brahma-jñeya*, the extrovert knower in the wakeful state should withdraw his mind from all qualified knowledges and continuously keep it flowing towards *Brahman* only. Then the *manas* becomes *amanas*, that is, the mind loses its identity by becoming one with *Brahman*. It is in this way that the unborn *pratyagātma-Brahman* grasps the unborn *Brahman* as himself. He gives up his wrongly imagined *pratyaktva*, i.e., the feeling born out of ignorance that he is limited to the inside of the body. Then, *Parabrahman* only remains. The *pratyagātman* who got this realization is called *Turīya*.



### (68) The Acquirement of Nondual Knowledge

68. When the mind merges in *Brahman* as described above, one realizes that he is *Brahman*. Therefore, this realization is one without qualified knowledges. Since one has realized that he is without duality, his mind is said to be discriminating.

Now a question: 'There is no qualified knowledge in deep sleep also. Therefore, what is the difference between this experience of oneness and deep sleep?' There is a gulf of difference between deep sleep and *Turīya*. In deep sleep, there is ignorance in seed form which after waking up gives rise to activity of duality; the intellect is subdued retaining its impressions of ignorance. It can be known in this way: once he gets up from deep sleep, his dual thinking returns. But the intellect which has merged in *Turīya* does not have ignorance, it has the experience of its inherent nature. So, he does not return to duality. 'How this is decided?' It is decided because, the intellect which has the experience of *Turīya* when later obtains qualified knowledges in relation to external objects, his dual thinking which is responsible for his grief does not return. He does not have fear, lust etc. The light of unqualified knowledge does not leave him. Therefore, *Turīya* is very different from the covert knower (Ka.34-35).

Since his ignorance is destroyed totally by the realization of *Turīya*, the wise is not born like others once again after the death of the present body. Therefore, he is unborn. 'Does it mean that he had births previously?' Not like that. Realization of *Turīya* means that he was birthless and deathless *Turīya* all through. Therefore, after realization he does not get even the thought that he had births previously. Not only that. 'Qualified knowledges like 'I am so and so, I am the son of so and so', etc. will never occur to him because they all arise due to ignorance. Since ignorance has been destroyed tracelessly by *Brahman's* knowledge how can this wise person of the inherent nature of consciousness get such qualified knowledges? Even when the body is alive such qualified knowledges do not arise in him.

'ahamasau amuṣya putraḥ ityevamādi lakṣaṇam avidyākṛtatvāt tasyā avidyāyāśca brahmapravidyayā niranvayato nāśitatvāt kuto viśeṣasaṃjñā saṃbhavo brahmapravidāḥ caitanyasvabhāvāvasthitasya? śarīrāvasthitasyāpi viśeṣasaṃjñā nopapadyate - अहमसौ अमुष्य पुत्रः इत्येवमादि लक्षणम् अविद्याकृतत्वात् तस्या अविद्यायाश्च ब्रह्मविद्यया निरन्वयतो नाशितत्वात् कुतो विशेषसंज्ञा संभवो ब्रह्मविदः चैतन्यस्वभावावस्थितस्य? शरीरावस्थितस्यापि विशेषसंज्ञा नोपपद्यते (Br.bh.2.4.12). Further, ignorance which is the absence of *ātmañāna* is called sleep and superimposition is called dream (Kā.1.14, Sec 23). Ignorance is the cause of superimposition. Therefore, the moment *ātmañāna* arises, both are lost and so it is without sleep and without dreams. It is nameless. It is not describable in any way. It is ever *lustrous*, everything is itself. Therefore, it is omniscient. Since there is nothing to gain after this realization, there is nothing for him to do. (Kā.3.36). He is one without the implements like speech etc. He is one without the mind. Therefore, he is always at peace. (Kā.3.37). There is no activity in him of either taking or leaving since he is without parts. Since there is nothing different from him to be understood, he always stays in himself. (Kā.3.38).

### (69) *Asparśa Yoga* and *Yoga*

69. Mind is always getting qualified knowledges by *sparśa* – touch with objects. For obtaining knowledge of *ātman*, it is inevitable to keep the mind away from the touch with the outside world and keep it in *ātman* alone. *Ātman's* knowledge may not be obtained by doing like this just once; one should be trying repeatedly. Therefore, this effort is called *asparśayoga* – **the yoga of no touching**. Because of this yoga when *ātman's* knowledge is obtained, complete fearlessness is achieved. It is very difficult for yogis to obtain this because they see fear in the fearlessness of oneness. (Kā.3.39). Since fear could arise only when the mind is active, yogis see fearlessness and the destruction of grief only in stopping mental activity by their effort. But, to think that grief is destroyed by controlling the

mind in this way is a day dream. It is as practical as drying up the ocean by emptying it with the help of a grass blade drop by drop. (Kā.3.40-41). This is because mind control is possible only when there is doership. If there is doership, it is impossible to get *ātman's* knowledge followed by fearlessness and peace.

**Question:** '*asparśa yoga* also consists in withdrawing the mind from all qualified knowledges. Therefore, is not *asparśa yoga* itself mind control?'

**Answer:** No. Retaining the memory of the inherent nature of *ātman* which is unqualified knowledge, results in mind control. *Bhāṣyakāra* discusses this in the following way: '*cittavṛttinirodhasya vedāntavākyaajanita ātmavijñānāt arthāntaratovāt tantrāntareṣu ca kartavyatayā avagatatvāt vidheyatvamiti cet? na hi ātmavijñāna tatsmṛti santāna vyatirekeṇa cittavṛttinirodhasya sādhanamasti* - चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधस्य वेदान्तवाक्यजनित आत्मविज्ञानात् अर्थान्तरत्वात् तन्त्रान्तरेषु च कर्तव्यतया अवगतत्वात् विधेयत्वमिति चेत्? न हि आत्मविज्ञानं तत्स्मृति सन्तान व्यतिरेकेण चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधस्य साधनमस्ति – Mind control which is different from the knowledge produced by the sentences of *Vedānta* and it being prescribed in other disciplines, is it not a rule for every one? No. For mind control, there is no other method than retaining the memory of the inherent nature of *ātman*, namely, unqualified knowledge' (Br.bh.1.4.7). That is, according to *Vedānta*, retaining the memory of *ātman's* unqualified knowledge is the means and mind control is its result. On the other hand, for the yogis it is the opposite: Mind control is the means and *ātman's* knowledge is its result. *Vedānta* does not agree with this: '*na mokṣasādhanatvena anavagamāt/ na hi vedānteṣu brahma vijñānādanyat parama puruṣārtha sādhanatvena avagamya-* न मोक्षसाधनत्वेन अनवगमात् । न हि वेदान्तेषु ब्रह्म विज्ञानादन्यत् परम पुरुषार्थ साधनत्वेन अवगम्यते – Mind control is not prescribed as a means for *mokṣa*. In *Vedānta* nothing other than the knowledge of the oneness of *Brahman* is prescribed for the highest goal of *mukti*.' (Br.bh.1.4.7).

### (70) The Method of *Sādhana*

70. It has been said that stopping the mind's activity is essential for *ātman's* knowledge. If yoga is not the method for that, what else is it? *Kārikākāra* answers this question: It is *asparśa yoga*. Mind is always shaking restlessly due to desire and it is to be kept firmly in *ātman*. When this is being done, sometimes one gets asleep. This is as bad as desire. Therefore, one must be alert not to fall asleep while keeping the mind in *ātman* (Kā.3.42). To free the mind from desire, *śāstra* tells only one way and that is *vairāgya* – dispassion. The mind is disturbed by the thoughts of the desired objects (G.2.62). Therefore, the moment a thought comes to the mind, the practitioner should start thinking that everything is *Brahman* which is himself and anything different from him is nonexistent. Then the mind returns to the *ātman* (Kā.3.43). This is called practice of knowledge. Therefore, the practice for obtaining *ātman's* knowledge consists in keeping the mind in *ātman* alone by practice of knowledge and dispassion and also keeping alert not to fall asleep. If the mind does not stop, it means that one is not yet free from desire. Therefore, till desire is destroyed, practice must continue. When the mind comes to equality, it should be retained in that state without disturbing it (Kā.3.44).

There is pleasure in this mental equality. But it should not be enjoyed because enjoyment of this pleasure involves the duality of *ānanda-ānandi-* the pleasure and its enjoyer. Therefore, without enjoying the pleasure, mind is to be settled in just existence - *sadbhāva* (Kā.3.45). When the mind becomes settled in *Brahman* without getting interested in outside objects, stays without sleep and without obtaining any qualified knowledges – then it has become *Brahman* (Kā.3.46). This equality is the highest. It is *svastha* – stays in itself. It is *śānta* – peaceful. It is *sanirvāṇa* – of the nature of bliss. This bliss is not born out of contact with outside objects. Therefore, it is *aja* – unborn. Just as there is no pleasure – enjoyer duality in the happiness of deep sleep, here also the duality is not there. But

the happiness of deep sleep is a result of the state of sleep. It is not unborn. It is born when one slips into deep sleep and leaves him when he wakes up. It is only *ātman*'s bliss which is unborn because it is *Brahman* (Kā.3.47).

Now, about the last śloka of this section: No *jīva* is born. There is no one like knower or enjoyer. Had there been something to be known, there could have been a knower, doer and enjoyer. Since there is nothing else in the ultimate *ātman*, there is no doership or enjoyership in *ātman*. Therefore, there is no reason for his birth. Reason for birth is ignorance. In *Turīya* who has *nitya dṛṣṭi* – ever awake, how can there be ignorance? Further, creation, destruction, cause-effect nondifference etc. are all transactional realities. *Ātman* is the greatest reality among all of them. (Kā.3.48). With this summary, this section ends.



## ALĀTASHĀNTI PRAKARAṆA

### (71 to 72) Introduction and *Mangalaślokas*

71. As said in the beginning (Sec 5), the topic of this section is to refute the doctrines of duality and of Buddha which are against *advaita*. All these theorists are mutual opponents. Entertaining hatred, they condemn each other. Just as the arguments of one when condemning the other are satisfactory, the arguments of the other which condemn this one are also satisfactory! 'How is that?' It is because none of them have noticed that the parts of the entire universe are working in a mutually helpful way (Sec 56) and therefore, there must be a single ultimate cause for the entire universe. Some of these people consider only some intermediate cause which is a part of the universe and some others consider the parts as independent. Therefore, there is no completeness in their theories. They give opportunities for their refutation. But nonduality has completeness because it is based on the ultimate cause. So, it does not offer opportunities for its refutation. ***Advaita is not opposite to anyone.*** This is because, when the discussion is about the world which is common between us, the object and the *pramāṇas* are also common and therefore, there is no conflict (Sec 50). Further, while discussing the ultimate cause of the universe, the topic is different and the *pramāṇa* is also different. Therefore, in that discussion also there cannot be conflict.

72. *jñānenā'kāśakalpena dharmānyo gaganopamān/  
jñeyābhinnena sambuddhastam vande dvipadāṃ varam//*  
ज्ञानेनाऽऽकाशकल्पेन धर्मान्यो गगनोपमान् । ज्ञेयाभिन्नेन सम्बुद्धस्तं वन्दे द्विपदां वरम् ॥

- I bow down to the best among mankind who knows the *ākāśa*-like (all pervading) knowledge as inseparable from the knowable -/Kā.4.1/

*asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattoasukho hitaḡ/ avivādo'viruddhaśca deśitastaḡ namāmyam//* अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम सर्वसत्त्वसुखो हितः। अविवादोऽविरुद्धश्च देशितस्तं नमाम्यम्॥ - I bow down to him who taught the *asparśayoga* (beyond *the* relative) which is conducive to the well-being of all, beneficent, free from dispute and non-antagonistic. / Kā.4.2/

**Question:** 'Mangalaślokas are always written only in the beginning of the treatise. How is it that they are coming here?'

**Answer:** It is only when nonduality dealt with in previous *prakarḡas* is proved to be faultless that the theory obtains completeness. That important task is done in this *prakaraḡa*. Therefore, the author might have written the *mangalaślokas* at this stage.

That apart, the knowables in these *ślokas* are the *pratyagātman*s, the knower is *Īvara* and knowledge is unqualified knowledge (Sec 67). Each of the three entities here is actually *Brahman* which is *ākāśasama*- limitless. The same *Brahman*, in association with the adjunct body, becomes *pratyagātman* and the extraordinary *puruṣa* – namely *Īvara*, who is knowing all the *pratyagātman*s. Therefore, both forms are limitless like *Brahman*. In this way, *Īvara* of limitless knowledge is knowing the *pratyagātman*s of limitless knowledge with his limitless unqualified knowledge. The author prostrates to this mysterious *Brahman*.

The *asparśayoga* mentioned in the second *śloka* has already been defined (Kā.3.39, sec 69). The result of this yoga is attainment of *Brahman*. Therefore, this yoga is also called *Brahman*. This is *sarvasattoasukha* – that is maximum happiness for creatures. The *śruti* says 'eṣo'sya parama ānandaḡ - एषोऽस्य परम आनन्दः – this is his highest bliss' (Br.4.3.32). All the creatures experience this happiness in their deep sleep. This is the

maximum happiness. It is not like material pleasure which ends in grief; it is *hita* – faultless joy. This is universal experience and so it is not debatable. Nobody contradicts it. The author prostrates to the *asparśayoga* of these features (Kā.4.2). That is, he pays respect for the result in the first *śloka* and then to the effort to get it in the second *śloka*.

### (73 to 74) Sāḡkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Ajāti

73. Now, we come to the rebuttal of dualist theories. All these people consider only the intermediate causes and argue. Among them, the *Sāḡkhyas* are *sat vādis*. Their theory is this: 'The effect is existent. Even before its birth it was in its cause in an unmanifest form. That effect is born.' As opposed to this, the *Vaiśeṣikas* are *asat vādis*. Their theory is 'The effect which is nonexistent before, is newly born in the cause.' *Vaiśeṣika* confronts *Sāḡkhya* like this: 'Is it not meaningless to say that the effect which is already present is born? For example, *ātman* is already present and is not born.' In his turn, the *Sāḡkhya* confronts the *Vaiśeṣika* like this: 'How can the effect which does not exist at all be born? For example, how can the horns of a rabbit which do not exist be born?' In these arguments, the objections and counter objections raised by each party are both right (Kā.4.3-4). We agree with both. 'In what aspect, both are agreeable?' Both disclaim birth and this *ajāti* that nothing is born is agreeable to us. 'How?' It is because everything is *ātman* with neither birth nor death. Nothing is born from this *ātman*.

The summary is this: Both discuss only the effect of the intermediate causes, but we are different. We look at the ultimate cause and tell birthlessness is not against either of them (Sec 71). 'How?' It is as follows: When *Sāḡkhya* says 'what is born is only what was existing', we ask what was existing previously. For example, the sculptor sculpts out the idol which was already existing unmanifest in the stone. That is, what was previously existing is born. But just as the idol is born, the stone is also born, because that is also an effect only. Where was that previously? In this way, as we go on enquiring backwards, we come to know that

only ātman is existing and he is not born at all. Therefore, nothing is born. That is, ajāti – meaning that nothing is born – is established. Similarly, when the Vaiśeṣika says ‘what was not there is born’ we ask, ‘what was not existing previously? For example, there was no cloth previously. The weaver created it from threads. Further, ‘where the cloth was not existing?’ It was not there in the thread. ‘Where was not the thread existing?’ It was not in the cotton fiber. In this way, as we enquire backwards, once again we arrive at ajāti namely, there was not existing anything in ātman which is to be born (Kā.4.5). What is not destroyed by its own inherent nature, is deathless. What is destroyed by its inherent nature is the destroyable. The destroyable does not become the deathless and deathless does not become the destroyable (Kā.4.6-8).

74. Being deathless or destroyable is the inherent nature of things and this does not change. This is true even in worldly matters. This inherent nature appears in four ways.

*sāṃsiddhikī svābhāvīkī sahajā akṛtā ca yā/ prakṛtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvam na jahāti yā//* सांसिद्धिकी स्वाभाविकी सहजा अकृता च या। प्रकृतिः सेति विज्ञेया स्वभावं न जहाति या॥ - By the nature of a thing is understood that which is complete in itself, that which is its very condition, that which is inborn, that which is not artificial, or that which does not change. /Kā.4.9/

*Sāṃsiddhikī* are those special yogic powers, which *yogis* obtain by practice. *Svābhāvīkī* is what exists by its inherent nature like ‘fire burns’. *Sahajā* is the feature appearing even from the moment of birth like children suckling, *akṛtā* – what happens by itself without other’s effort, like water flowing down a slope. These inherent natures are called their *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* does not leave even worldly objects. What to say about transcendental matters? In their case, also, *prakṛti* does not change. Nevertheless, *jīva* appears as though he has given up his inherent nature. How? Because he is *ātman*, he has no birth and death. But, because of his superimposition in the body, he feels wrongly that he has birth and death. In other words, *jīva* is birthless though he does not know it (Kā.4.10).

### (75) Refutation of Sāṅkhya Theory

75. Now, about the birthlessness of the world. The *Sāṅkhya* theory that the world is born is wrong. (Kā.4.3-4). This is shown by logic. His theory is the following: ‘*pradhāna* is the cause of the world. From that, *mahat* etc. are born as effects. This *pradhāna* is unborn, eternal.’ This theory is not right. What is unborn can never be born in any form because unborn means not born. Therefore, to say that unborn is born is a contradiction. Similarly, from the eternal *pradhāna* non-eternal effects cannot be born. If he insists on saying that non-eternal effect is born, then, we posit that the eternal *pradhāna* has two parts, one which is eternal and the other non-eternal. But anything with parts cannot be eternal. Therefore, to say that non-eternal effects are born from eternal *pradhāna* is also contradictory (Kā.4.11). Based on the nondifference of the effect with the cause, he might say that the effects which are born are not different from unborn *pradhāna*. That also ends in contradiction in the following way: That which is born is not different from unborn, that which is eternal is not different from the non-eternal – are also mutually contradictory statements (Kā.4.12). Moreover, there is no example for the birth of an effect from a cause which is not born. And any thesis without an example is not useful. ‘Suppose, I say that *pradhāna* is also born which further creates *mahat* etc.’? That is also not possible because, then you must tell one cause for the *pradhāna* and another cause for that cause and so on, ending up in infinite regression. (Kā.4.13)

**Question:** ‘*Vedānta* also speaks of cause-effect nondifference (Sec 42). What is the difference between that and what the *Sāṅkhya* says?’

**Answer:** In *Vedānta*, the effect is not an object. The ultimate cause *Brahman* appears like an effect in association with form. The effect is just speech. (Preface 6\*). It is only a shape, a name (Ch.6.1.4). Using the language of the common people though it is called effect, it’s effectness is finally rejected and established

that it is only the cause. The cause-effect nondifference is superposed and after withdrawal of the superposition of causality, only nondifference remains. The effect is not a different object. Anything understood as different from the cause is nonexistent, illusory. *Vedānta* also speaks of *prakṛti*, *mahat* etc. but they all are intermediate causes, not the ultimate cause. They are all nonexistent, changing, inert and limited and the ultimate cause is unchanging, unqualified knowledge and limitless. In this way, any duality theory based on intermediate causes can never be free from faults.

### (76) Reason–Result are in Transaction, Not in Ātman

76. Next: *karma* part of the *Veda* tells that the body is a result of *dharma* and *adharmā* done in the previous life. This is now taken up for analysis. Here, there are two choices: One can say that the body is the result of the performance of *dharma* and *adharmā* or *dharma* and *adharmā* are the result of the body. That is, it is possible to treat *dharma* and *adharmā* as reason and body as the result or the body as the reason and *dharma* and *adharmā* as the result. Basing on this choice of reason and result, *Kārikākāra* shows that *jīva* is never born. For giving the proof, he divides the question into three parts. (1) Is each one of reason and result beginningless? (2) Is the sequence of result beginningless? or (3) Like the seed and sprout relation, from one reason one result and from that result another reason - is the reason-result sequence beginningless?

In the first choice, both reason and result cannot be beginningless because result means what is produced and reason means its cause. Here, *dharmādharma* is the reason and the body is its result. Result is an occurrence at some point of time and so, it is not beginningless. Therefore, the body is not beginningless. Similarly, if the body is the reason and *dharmādharma* is the result, the *dharmādharma* has beginning. Therefore, it cannot be beginningless (Kā.4.14).

Now about the second choice. 'It is not so. We say: the reason of *dharmādharma* yields the body as the result and with

this body as the reason another *dharmādharma* is the result. This sequence of reason-result is beginningless.' This is also not possible. This statement is like telling the father begets the son and the son begets the father which is meaningless. (Kā.4.15). Therefore, it is necessary that the sequence between reason and result be fixed. That is, which is the first and which is the second must be told. Otherwise, if reason and result are born together like the horns of a bull, there would be no reason–result relation. Suppose you say that it is not possible to decide which one is first and which one is second, it amounts to accepting beginninglessness that is, neither *dharmādharma* nor the body is born. (Kā.4.16-19).

Now the answer for third choice: 'As in the case of seed and sprout, we say from the reason of one body, one *dharma* is the result and from that *dharma* as reason, another body is the result and from that body as the reason, there is yet another *dharma* as result etc. This reason-result sequence as in seed-sprout is beginningless.' That is also not possible because, when you say 'from one body, one *dharma*' that *dharma* has beginning. Similarly, when you say 'from that *dharma* another body' then that body also has beginning. Therefore, in each link of reason-result, each one has beginning and therefore, that its sequence is beginningless is not tenable. Indeed, in the seed-sprout example also, there is the same fault. Therefore, it does not serve the purpose of an example. In this way, from every point of view, only one thing is established that nothing has beginning. (Kā.4.20-21).

**Question:** 'In the *karma* part of *Veda* it is discussed that reason-result relation between *dharmādharma* and the body is in accordance with seed-sprout relation. Based on this analysis atonement ritual is prescribed for a committed fault. How can that be reconciled?'

**Answer:** It is not so. It must be remembered that this type of doubt is occurring throughout the discussion. For example, there is no creation or its cause in *ātman* (Sec 60). That is, there

is no creation of world nor its cause. Their meditations are also not there. But if their combined meditation is performed without desire, it was found that it leads to knowledge of *ātman*. 'In comparison with *ātman*, creation is discarded as not real- '*brahmavidyāmapēkṣya nindārtha eva bhavati sambhūtyapavādaḡ* - ब्रह्मविद्यामपेक्ष्य निन्दार्थ एव भवति संभूत्यपवादः' (Kā.3.25, Sec 60). In other words, it means that *Vedānta* accepts the creation of the world and also its meditation. It rejects all this only in *ātman*. In the same way, though illusoriness is told for objects in *ātman*, existence of objects is accepted in transaction (Kā.1.6, Sec 19). Again similarly, *Vedānta* tells nondifference in *Turīya* but also accepts *jīva-jīva bheda* and *jīva-paramātma bheda* in *karmakānda* (Sec 57).

Similarly, here also. *Karma* part of *Veda* prescribes atonement ritual accepting reason-result relation between *dharmādharma* and the body on the analogy of seed-sprout example. This is done from the transactional view of the ignorant. That this is not against *Vedānta* can also be shown by logic: In the body of the wise who has experience of oneness of *ātman*, the transaction of sustaining the body and *ātmajñāna* in his intellect exist simultaneously in accordance with the features of *sthitaprajña* described by *Bhagavān*: '*katham hi ekasya svahṛdyapratyayaḡ brahmavedanaḡ dehadhāraḡaḡ ca apareḡa pratikṣetum śakyeta/ śruti-smṛtiṣu ca sthitaprajñalakṣaḡanirdeṣena etadeva nirucyate* - कथं हि एकस्य स्वहृद्यप्रत्ययं ब्रह्मवेदनं देहधारणं च अपरेण प्रतिक्षेतुं शक्येत । श्रुति-स्मृतिषु च स्थितप्रज्ञलक्षणनिर्देशेन एतदेव निरुच्यते - How can someone else deny the simultaneous existence of *Brahman*'s knowledge and the maintenance of the body which is experienced in one's own heart? Is not the same thing described in *śruti* and *smṛti* when they speak of the features of *sthitaprajña*?' (S.bh.4.1.15). Again, it is universal experience that in *susuptātman*, though there is no reason-result relation, the causal relation does exist in the activities of the body. Therefore, duality is not opposed to nonduality (Kā.3.18, sec 68). So, *Bhaṣyakāra* says that it is necessary that *Vedānta śāstra* should

be understood as a whole. He advises in this way: '*idam evaḡ param vākyaḡ, adō'nyaparam* - इदम् एवं परं वाक्यम्, अदोऽन्यपरम् - This sentence is applicable here and that sentence is applicable there' (Sec 64). Otherwise it becomes a serious lapse and we become unfit for the study of the subtle *Vedānta*.

### (77) Nothing is Born

77. *svato vā parato vā'pi na kiñcidvastu jāyate/ sadasatsadasadvā'pi na kiñcidvastu jāyate//* स्वतो वा परतो वाऽपि न किञ्चिद्वस्तु जायते । सदसत्सदसद्वाऽपि न किञ्चिद्वस्तु जायते ॥ - Nothing is born either out of itself or another (thing). Nothing ever gets born: neither that which exists nor that which does not exist, neither that which both exists and does not exist. /Kā.4.22/

No object is produced by itself – a pot is not born by itself. It is not born from another also – a cloth is not produced from a pot, nor a pot from a cloth. From itself, in association with something else also, nothing is born – the pot and cloth together do not produce another pot or a cloth.

*Objection*: 'These are all too obvious which need not be discussed separately. But is not the pot coming from the clay?'

*Rebuttal*: What you say is true. But, from transaction point of view though clay is different from pot, pot's inherent nature is clay only. Indeed, the shape of the pot is also clay. '*kāryākāro'pi kāraḡasya ātmabhūta eva, anātmabhūtasya anārabhyatvāt* - कार्यकारोऽपि कारणस्य आत्मभूत एव, अनात्मभूतस्य अनारभ्यत्वात् – Even the shape of the effect, is only the cause, otherwise, it could not have come to existence' (S.bh.2.1.18). Clay is clay whether in the form of a pot or a cup. Even if there is no shape, it continues to be clay. Therefore, from the point of view of the inherent nature, the value of the shape is zero. Therefore, by pinpointing what can you say 'This pot is born from clay?' Pot is a mere word, only a shape, only a name to distinguish it from others in a transaction (Sec 75). Therefore, we can never say something is born. If it is existent, it exists always and so it is not born. If it is nonexistent, it is also not born. **'If it is both**

**existent and nonexistent?’ Something is existent and also nonexistent is meaningless prattle.**

Therefore, nothing is born in anyway. But it was told ‘*prabhavaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ satām* - प्रभवः सर्वभावानां सताम् - All the objects which are existent were created’ (Kā.1.6)? That is true. It was said from the transactional view. But, in transcendental *ātman*, there is no creation. These two statements are not contradictory.

### (78) *Vijñānavādi’s Refutation of Sarvāsthitvavādi*

78. In the previous twenty *ślokas*, the mutually contradictory theories of *Sāṅkhyas* and *Vaiśeṣikas* were discussed. The theories of both *Satvādi* and *Asatvādi* were accepted and birthlessness was established which cannot be contradicted by either. Afterwards, the reason-result law told in *karma* part of *Veda* in relation to the transactional world is also rejected and birthlessness in *ātman* was established. From here on, *Bouddhās* are considered. There are several groups among them. One group *Sarvāsthitvavādīs* accept outside objects and their qualified knowledges in the mind born out of contact with the objects. The *Vijñānavādīs* assert that outside objects do not exist at all and getting qualified knowledges is the nature of *chitta* – the mind. *Sūnyavādīs* say nothing exists.

*prajñapteh sanimittatvamanyathā dvayanāśataḥ/*  
*saṅkleśasyopalabdheśca paratantrāstitā matā//* प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमन्यथा  
द्वयनाशतः। सङ्कलेशस्योपलब्धेश्च परतन्त्रास्तिता मता॥ -Knowing depends  
on the object. Otherwise duality is destroyed. The experience  
of pain also shows that ‘others’ is acceptable. /Kā.4.24/

This *Kārikā* presents the following theory of *Sarvāsthitvavādi*: In this *śloka*, *prajñapti* means the qualified knowledge born in the mind and *nimitta* means the outside object which is the reason for its birth. Though the two are distinctly different, they are together. Here, *dvaya* refers to this duality. This knowledge is born because there is the object. Since the five features of an object are recognized by the five

senses, the object must be existing. Those who accept this are ‘*paratantras*’. There is another reason to say that there must be an object: When the hand is burnt by fire, there is not only the knowledge of the fire, but also the pain of the burn. Therefore, the object must be existing.

This theory of *Sarvāsthitvavādi* is refuted by *Vijñānavādi* in this way: ‘What you say is what comes to be known through the senses. But the fact is otherwise. Even though the pot is seen by the eyes, it is only clay; only the senses recognize it as pot. Similarly, the clay is also an appearance of another stuff. If one proceeds with this enquiry till he reaches the sky, then there is no qualified knowledge at all. Therefore, it is proved that there is no outside object. Not only that; even illusion is qualified knowledge and everyone knows there is no corresponding object in illusion; though one sees the snake, really there is no snake. There are no objects in dreams. There is only the mind. Still one gets knowledge. Therefore, it is not correct to say that knowledge is produced by the object. Similarly, even in wakefulness there is only mind. Still, one gets qualified knowledges. It does not touch any object nor the impression of an object like the snake. There is really neither object nor the appearance of an object. Everything is only the mind. ‘If so, what is the difference between illusory and real?’ Had there been something real, it could have been distinguished from the illusory. Since, it is decided that there is only the mind, there is neither real object nor illusory object (Kā.4.25-27).

### (79) *Rebuttal of Vijñānavāda*

79. In this way, refuting the *Sarvāsthitvavādi* who accepts outside objects, *Vijñānavādi* demonstrates that there is only the mind and no outside objects at all. But, *Vijñānavādi* proceeds further, thinks about the mind and comes out with the statement ‘Mind is born, it is momentary, dies the next moment after its birth. Therefore, it has no inherent nature of its own’. That is, based on the activity of thinking of the mind, he concludes that it has no inherent nature. This is not possible.



**Question:** 'How impossible?' 'yugapat jñānānutpattirmanaso liṅgam? युगपत् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम्। – The indication for the existence of the mind is that two knowledges cannot be produced simultaneously.' (Nya.su.1.1.16). That is, by the mental process of inference the mind is being determined. Similarly, by thinking, why not the nature of the mind also be determined?'

**Answer:** No. By the thought process of inference, what is being determined in the *Nyāya Sutra* is only the existence of the mind and not its nature. That which thinks is the thinker. In the present context, the thinker is the mind. Therefore, the mind must determine its own nature by thinking. Thinker's mind cannot decide its own nature by thinking. Nothing can act on itself. For example, no one can climb on his own shoulder. Thinking consists in qualified knowledges of the mind. They are the effects and the mind is their cause and these knowledges do not leave their impressions on their cause itself. For example, the pot cannot leave its mark on the clay. Therefore, trying to decide the nature of the mind by the qualified knowledges of thinking is like the boldness of deciding the nature of the space by the tracks of birds who fly in it. This boldness is great indeed. *Śūnyavādi* who denies the existence of everything including himself who denies everything is bolder than this *Vijñānavādi*. *Vedānta* asserts that the mind is not born nor even the outside objects, because both are *Brahman*. Not being born is the inherent nature of *Brahman*. But, whether it is the mind or the outside objects, they appear as though they are born. But they are really not born. (Kā.4.28-19).

Further, about the *jīva*: the bondage and release which he imagines by himself for himself are not objects like the mind; they are only wrong knowledges appearing in the mind. They are illusory; they do not have existence. 'How?' It is like this. If the beginningless bondage really exists, it cannot have an end; no object which has no beginning can come to an end.

Similarly, the release which has beginning cannot last forever either. It has already been shown that neither the destruction of bondage nor the birth of release is meaningful (Sec 76).

**Question;** 'Is not the beginningless bondage coming to an end by *ātmaavidyā*?''

**Answer:** Yes. That is why it was said that bondage is not an object and it is only an illusion due to ignorance. When ignorance is lost by acquirement of knowledge, the wrong idea of bondage leaves him. That is why it has already been told that there is no one in bondage nor one who tries for release nor one who is already released. (Kā.2.32, sec 45). The summary of these *Kārikās* is the following: though the objects in wakeful state appear to be born, they are not really born because they are illusory. This has been discussed and decided in *Vaitathya Prakaraṇa*. Continuing the same process, the same thing is confirmed in the coming eight *ślokas* on the similarity between the objects in dream and wakefulness.

### (80) *Samāchāra and Ātmavijñāna*

80. *upalambhātsamācārāstavastutvavādinām/ jātistu deśitā buddhaiḥ ajātestratām sadā// उपलम्भात्समाचारादस्तवस्तुत्ववादिनाम्। जातिस्तु देशिता बुद्धैः अजातेस्त्रसतां सदा।। - But the well-informed teach the birth (of objects) only for the sake of those pious people who believe in objects out of fear of non-birth. /Kā.4.42/*

*Upalambhāt* means 'since it is being known' and *samācārāt* means 'since following the good actions prescribed in *śāstra* based on *varnāśrama dharma*'. Based on these two, we nondualists also accept the birth of objects for the sake of teaching. People who have faith in *karma* argue as follows: 'fire is visible. *śāstra* prescribes *yajna*. Therefore, *yajña* must give birth to its result.' These people fear *Vedānta* which denies birth. People who are attached to *karma* like this should not be shaken from their conviction. '*na buddhibhedaṃ janayet – न बुद्धिभेदं जनयेत्* - their determined intellect should not be shaken' (G.3.26). Since these people are in *samāchāra* (defined above), they will

gradually come to know to do *karma* without desire and therefore, they will get dispassion. They will go forward and in due course they will obtain *ātmajñāna*. Then they will realize that nothing is subject to birth and death including themselves and also nothing is different from them. This experience of the world being not different from oneself is called *sarvātmabhāva*. 'sa ca bāhyaloko nāsti asmākam ātmavyatiriktaḥ/ sarvaṃ hi asmākam ātmabhūtameva, sarvasya ca vāyam ātmabhūtāḥ - स च बाह्यलोको नास्ति अस्माकम् आत्मव्यतिरिक्तः । सर्वं हि अस्माकम् आत्मभूतमेव, सर्वस्य च वयम् आत्मभूताः - That external world is not against our *ātman* because, for us everything is *ātman* and we are the *ātman* for everything.' (Br.bh.4.4.22). Deciding like this, those who develop *sarvātmabhāva* left *karma* and went away. Therefore, *sāstra* itself teaches about *karma* and the birth of its result and asks us to perform *karma* dispassionately as a procedure to realize the ultimate oneness. Those who believe that *karma* gives rise to result will commit the fault of missing *ātmajñāna*. 'How?' They will get another birth. But that fault is indeed small. 'How?' They do not get ruined; till they obtain *ātmajñāna*, their journey continues. (Kā.4.43).

### (81 to 82) Example of Burning Stick

81. Suppose one asks: 'The knowledge of an object obtained and its use are sense perceptible. Does it not show that duality does exist?' The answer is already told. (Kā.2.7, Sec 38). Therefore, there is really no duality, there is only nonduality. But nonduality itself appears as an object which is born and which is moving. This is in everyone's experience. For example, through the body, we refer to *Devadatta* as born, as moving, as fair-coloured etc. But when we consider himself in his solitary state in deep sleep he is neither born nor moving nor fair-coloured. During that time, *Devadatta* with the body of the wakeful state or the dream does not exist at all. He is unborn, unmoving and *avastu*- not an object. Therefore, he is at peace without duality. This is a universal experience (Kā.4.44-45). He is himself *pratyagātma Brahman*. The same *Brahman* is in

everybody. There is birth neither of the body nor of the mind in him. He himself is *Parabrahman*. One who realizes this, that is *ātmataṭṭva* without any second to it, will not fall into the darkness of ignorance of the self once again. (Kā.4.46)

82. *ṛjuvagrādīkābhāsamalātaspaṇḍitaṃ yathā/ grahaṇa-grāhakābhāsaṃ vijñānaspaṇḍitaṃ tathā//* ऋजुवक्रादिकाभासमलातस्पन्दितं यथा । ग्रहणग्राहकाभासं विज्ञानस्पन्दितं तथा ॥ - The knower and the known are only appearances of knowledge. Similar to the straight or curved appearance (of light) in a moving flame. /Kā.4.47/

In this way, it is the unitary *Parabrahman* which appears in the dual form of the known and the knower like this: 'I know this object; I am the knower.' This happens due to ignorance. That is, this knower-known vibration that appears in *Brahman* due to ignorance is called here *vijñānaspaṇḍitā*. An example for that is 'The burning stick'. The flame in it appears like straight, circular etc. only due to its straight movement or circular movement. By itself, it is neither straight nor circular. In the same way one who does not know his unitariness, superimposes in himself the features of the adjunct due to ignorance and says 'the object in front of me is known and I am the knower'. The moment this ignorance is lost, he realizes that he himself is the unborn and the unknowable unqualified knowledge (Kā.4.48). When the burning stick is in motion, the shape of straight or circular light that is seen is not a different object; it has not come from somewhere else and tagged on to the stick. When the stick stops movement, that shape of light does not go away to some other place (Kā.4.49). This is because, the shape does not have substance. In the same way, there is no knower and known duality that appears in connection with the body. This duality is imagined due to ignorance. Therefore, introvert knowership and extrovert knowership etc. are negated in *Turīya* (Sec 21). Just as there is no cause-effect relation between the stick and the shapes of light, there is no cause-effect relation between *Turīya* and the different appearances of knowership (Kā.4.50-52).

**(83) No Causal Relation in Ātman**

83. *dravyaṃ dravyasya hetuḡ syādanyadanyasya caiva hi/ dravyatvamananyabhāvo vā dharmāṇāṃ nopapadyate//* द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य हेतुः स्यादन्यदन्यस्य चैव हि । द्रव्यत्वमन्यभावो वा धर्माणां नोपपद्यते ॥ - One stuff can be the cause of another stuff, because one can be the cause of only another. But the jivas are neither stuff nor anything is different from them. /Kā.4.53/

In this śloka, *dharmā* means the *jīva*. Now, the *Kārikākāra* establishes by logic that he is neither the effect of a cause nor the cause of any effect. Where is the cause-effect relation seen?

(1) One stuff can be the cause of another stuff but not for itself. For example, the thread is the cause for the cloth, not for itself.

(2) That which is not stuff, cannot be independently the cause of something else. For example, the shape of the thread by itself is not stuff. Therefore, by itself, it is not independently the cause of cloth. On the other hand, when the shape is clubbed with the stuff of cotton, then it becomes the cause of a cloth. As in these examples, it must now be decided whether the *jīva* is the cause of something or the effect of something else. (1) If the *jīva* is considered as the body following his superimposition, he can be the cause of another body. That is, he can give birth to another body. But, he is not born by himself. (2) if *jīva* is considered as *pratyagātman*, he is not a stuff. Therefore, he cannot independently be the cause of anything.

**Question:** 'Even though it is not stuff, the shape of the thread can become the cause of the cloth through cotton. Similarly, can *pratyagāman* become the cause through something else?'

What could be that something else?

'It is *Brahman* which is his support'

With *Brahman* as support, for what could *pratyagāman* be the cause?

'He could be the cause of the world or his own body.'

Whether the world or the body of the *jīva*, nothing is

different from *Brahman*. Now, nothing can be the cause of itself. Therefore, *Brahman* is neither the cause nor the effect of anything. This is already discussed. (Sec 65). Therefore, even though *pratyagātman* himself is *Brahman*, he cannot be the cause for anything. Since *pratyagātman* is not different from *Brahman*, he is not the effect of *Brahman*. In this way, *jīva* is neither the cause nor the effect. Śruti tells precisely this. '*nāyaṃ kutaścīt na babhūva kaścīt* - नायं कुतश्चित् न बभूव कश्चित्- He is not born from anything and nothing is born from him.' (K.1.2.18).

**(84) Everything Temporary till Reason-Result Faith Lasts**

84. Just as nothing is born from *pratyagātman* nor is *pratyagātman* born from anything else, nothing is born from the mind and the mind is not born from anything else. In the same way, no object in the world is neither a cause nor an effect since everything is *Brahman*. Therefore, *brahmajñāni* decides that no reason gives rise to a result nor the result gives rise to a reason. This is already shown (Kā.4.54). Without understanding this, the *jīva* with ignorance feels that 'I am the reason for *dharmādharmā*. They are mine. Because of that, I take another body'. This is his reason-result faith. As long as it lasts in him, *dharmādharmā* and the body continue in accordance with seed-sprout relation (Kā.4.55-56). This is because both the reason and result are the features of the body. This faith is indeed due to ignorance of his being *Brahman*. Further, the feeling is that the body is himself. This wrong understanding is superimposition. Till ignorance lasts, there is nothing permanent, everything is transient. When he realizes that he is *Brahman*, then everything is unborn. In that view, nothing is born, nothing is lost. (Kā.4.57). The objects seen or his own body during ignorance are not his imaginations, because when he gets *ātman's* knowledge, neither the objects nor his body vanish though ignorance is lost. If so, from where did the objects and the body come from? Both are the *māyā*-magic of *Ātmadeva* (Kā.4.58). This has already been told (Kā.2.16, sec

41). In that case, is *Māyā* another object? No. When it is said 'from *Māyā* they are born' we mean, they appear to be born - not really born. There is *Brahman* alone; there is nothing like *Māyā* different from it. Further, *vidyā* - knowledge, means the knowledge that one is himself *Brahman*. With the acquirement of *vidyā*, one realizes that he is everywhere. Afterwards there is nothing to distinguish and say 'this is permanent, this is transient'. In this way, the difference is completely lost. In this *ātmatattva* there is no room for speech (Kā.4.59-60).

### (85) Lacuna in Duality Knowledge

85. From the similarity of the dream world the illusoriness of the wakeful world was demonstrated in *Vaitathya Prakaraṇa* (Kā.2.4, sec 32-38). In this demonstration, it must be remembered that the illusoriness of the wakeful world was established only based on similarity with the dream world in order to correct the sense of duality of the ignorant. Even here, similarly, the probe starts with the example of dream where duality is only in the mind and is extended to the wakeful world and told that duality there is also in the mind. One who sees the dream is *svapnadṛk* - the dreamer and his mind is *svapnadṛkchitta* - the dreamer's mind. It is common knowledge that the animals and the objects seen in dream are not different from the dreamer's mind. Nevertheless, the ignorant experiences duality and is a victim of love and fear. Just as the mind alone assumes the two forms of the known and the knower in dreams, in the wakeful state also, *Brahman* alone assumes the two forms of the knower and the known. He does not know that *Brahman* is himself. Therefore, the ignorant who feels he is different from *Brahman* thinks that animals and objects seen in the wakeful state are different from him and experiences love and fear. Therefore, the duality experienced by the ignorant in the wakeful world is not different from his mind just as in his dream experience. (Kā.4.61-66, Sec 37). In this way, the animals seen by him and himself are mutual observers. That is, each is defined by the

other. That is to say, the determination of one is based on the other as *pramāṇa*. This not correct. This lacuna exists not only in dreams but also in the wakeful state: It is not possible to decide whether the object is as am I seeing it or I am seeing the object as it is. This is an unavoidable lacuna in observer-observable duality. No theory based on intermediate causes can be free from this lacuna. Because of this mutual dependence neither is determined. Therefore, the object and its knowledge are *lakṣaṇāsūnyam*. That is, there is no *pramāṇa* to take a decision. In dual knowledge one does not know what is the *pramāṇa* and what is the *prameya* (Kā.4.61-67).

This lacuna is absent only in nonduality: in the knowledge of the nondual, *pratyagātman Brahman* is the knower and *Brahman* is the known. Both are *Brahman*. When *pratyagātman* wants to understand *Brahman* he starts with the intellect due to the habit of superimposition. Nevertheless, since it is not different from *Brahman*, the intellect merges in *Brahman* at the moment of knowing it. The knower-known difference is lost. **That is, *pratyagātman* understands *Brahman* as it is and *Brahman* is as *pratyagātman* *Brahman* understands it.** Therefore, the understanding that *pratyagātman* is *Brahman* himself is not the result of the action of knowing. There is no duality in that. Therefore, it is not *lakṣaṇāsūnyam*.

'Are the knowledges taught in *karma* part of *Veda* *lakṣaṇāsūnyam* or not?'

No. Because there is no mutual dependence in these knowledges. The reason is as follows: Though the candidate for *karma* is the ignorant, the *Veda* which is omniscient is not ignorant that everything is *Brahman*. The *karma* they teach and the worlds obtained by their performance are real, not illusory. '*tadetat satyam avitatham* - तदेतत् सत्यम् अविथम्' (Mu.bh.1.2.1). This is because, though there is no multiplicity in *Brahman*, there is *Brahman* in multiplicity. Therefore, the worlds with *Brahman* cannot be illusory. Further, the things taught in *karma* section are not decided mutually or by the *jīva*. They are determined

by omniscient *Īsvara*. 'na hi *īdrśasya śāstrasya rgvedādīlakṣaṇasya sarvajña guṇānvitasya sarvajñāt anyataḥ saṃbhavosti* - न हि ईदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञ गुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञात् अन्यतः संभवोस्ति – The *śāstra* could not have come out from anyone else except the omniscient *Īsvara* because *Rgveda* etc. are themselves omniscient (S.bh.1.1.3) In this way, there is no mutual dependence in *karmakāṇḍa* and therefore, the knowledges taught there are not *lakṣaṇāśūnyam*.

### (86) Duality is Only Shaking of Mind

86. Just as in the dream, the birth and the death of *jīva* in the wakeful state also are only imaginations of the mind (Kā.4.68-70). This is explained in the further *Kārikās. cittaspanditamevedaṃ grāhyagrāhakavaddvayam/ cittaṃ nirviṣayaṃ nityamaṅgaṃ tena kīrtitam// चित्तस्पन्दितमेवेदं ग्राह्यग्राहकवद्वयम्। चित्तं निर्विषयं नित्यमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम्॥* - Duality born through the objects and the senses is only vibration of the mind. But in itself mind is object-free. So, it is said that that the mind is eternal and unattached. /Kā.4.72/

The knower-known duality is only a shaking of the mind (Kā.4.35, Sec 67). The mind is the link between the transactionally real world and the knower and also transcendently real *Brahman* and the knower, because both the realities are to be understood only by the mind. In transaction, the mind establishes the connection between the world and the knower *jīva*. Vibrating between the knower and the known, it produces the knowledge of the object in the knower (Sec 13). Further, the mind is the first creation and therefore in *paramārtha*, that creates the link between *Brahman* and *jīva* also. Therefore, when the *jīva* is the knower who understands a thing different from him, it vibrates between the object and the knower. When *jīva* wants to understand *Brahman* who is himself, it does not go towards an object but turns towards *Brahman* and merges there. Therefore, the mind is the reason for both bondage and release. Really, it is only

the mind which goes from bondage to release and not the *pratyagātman*; *pratyagātman* is already *Brahman* and free. Therefore, because of superimposition in the mind, *pratyagātman* feels that he is in bondage. Whether it is the ignorance of not knowing that he is *Brahman* or it is the wrong knowledge of knowing himself as the body, it is only in the mind – i.e. in the extrovert knower. Not only that. The right knowledge that one is *Brahman* himself is also produced only in the mind of the extrovert knower. '*advaita jñānaṃ manovṛttimātram* - अद्वैत ज्ञानं मनोवृत्तिमात्रम्—*advaita* knowledge is only a knowledge in the mind' (Ch.bh.*avataraṇika*). When it turns to the object, it is limited and vibrating and when it turns to *Brahman*, it stops vibration because there are no objects in *Brahman*; it merges in its cause *Brahman* and becomes unmoving and limitless. Therefore, the *Kārikākāra* throughout calls transaction as the vibration of the mind and the mind in its inherent nature as *Brahman* (Kā.4.72). Both bondage and release are attached only to the mind. If the mind is having features as prescribed by *śāstra*, *jīva* gets birth as *devatā*, if it is mixed with bad features, he gets human birth and if it is full of bad features only, he gets the birth as animal. This is the appearance of the birth of the mind. When both *dharma* and *adharma* quit the *jīva*, there will be no reason for birth and so the mind merges in *Brahman* becoming unborn, equal and one without a second (Kā.4.77). When the mind stands firmly in its inherent nature *Brahman*, the *jīva* becomes free from grief, lust and fear. This *tattva* understood only by the wise is unborn, without ignorance and without wrong knowledge. It is lustrous by its nature (Kā.4.81).

### (87) Advaita Knowledge Difficult for Logicians

87. People do not understand this *tattva* because it is entrenched in duality. This is the only reason for not knowing it. More particularly, even scholars who are infatuated with their own logic can never understand it. They are drowned in four types of logic: the *Tārkika* says '*ātman* is', *Bouddha* says 'is

not', *Jaina* says 'is and is not', *Śūnyavādi* says 'is certainly not'. Arguing among themselves about these four choices, all of them conceal their own self. But the *jñāni* obtains the knowledge that he is the *ātman* who is everything and stays in peace – never indulges in action. Action is done only to get something else. When that something is also himself, there is no reason for doing action. 'naiva tasya kṛtenārthaḥ – नैव तस्य कृतेनार्थः – For him, there is no use doing *karma*' (G.3.18, Kā.4.82-86).

### (88) *Loukika, Śuddha Loukika, Lokottara*

88. All the arguments are over. Now, the summary of determining the *ātman* through the discussion of the three states told by the *Upaniṣad* is being presented. The three states waking, dreaming and sleeping are respectively called *Loukika*, *Śuddha Loukika*, and *Lokottara*. *Loukika* has the feature of known-knowing in the presence of objects. *Śuddha Loukika* has the known-knowing feature in the appearance of an object. *Lokottara* has neither object nor the appearance of an object nor knowing (Kā.4.87-88). All these three are transactional realities and *Turīya* is transcendental reality. This *Turīya* is himself. The three states of waking etc. are **heya – to be rejected**. Knowledge of the *śāstra* is *pānditya*, not showing oneself off is *bāla bhava* – being childlike and silence is *mouna*. These three practices are *āpya – to be acquired*. Knowledge of the faults like love, hate etc. are *pākya – to be baked*. *Jñeya – to be known* which is the transcendental reality is free from the four logics mentioned in the previous section (Sec 87). All these four are implements for knowing the highest truth. But the difference between the first three and the last is the following: The first three are all mental states – whether the three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep or knowledge of the *śāstra*, being childlike, silence or love, hate - are all transactional realities absent in the transcendental reality of *ātman*. But, the last one *jñeya – to be known*, which is transcendental reality, is *Brahman*.

### (89) Gulf Between Nonduality and *Bouddha Siddhānta*

89. As told above (Sec 86) *pratyagātman* is already *Brahman*. Therefore, that he should be understood is a teaching addressed to the extrovert knower who is having superimposition in his mind. All *pratyagātman*s are ever peaceful, birthless, ever free, equal, pure and not different. This is well known. Therefore, release is not something that is to be acquired newly. Those who understand this are *mahajñānis*. Though *Goutama Buddha* rejects outside objects different from *ātman* as done in *Vedānta*, he does not talk about *ātman*. During ignorance, *advaita* describes the known in the knower-known pair as an outside object. But after getting *ātmajñāna* the same object is described as not different from *ātman* and in this way, establishes that everything is *ātman*. This has never been said by him who rejects the existence of an *ātman* (K.4.89). In the last *śloka*, *Kārikākāra* does *namaskara* for this highly dignified oneness and completes the treatise.

### (90) *Mangalaślokas*

90. Afterwards, there are three *ślokas* by *Bhaṣyakāra* paying respects to *Brahman*, his *paramaguru Kārikākāra* and his own *Guru*.

*ajamapi janiyogaṃ prāpadaiśvaryaḡogādagati ca gatimattāṃ  
prāpadekam hyanekam/ vīvidhaviṣayadharmagrāhi  
mugdheksaṇānām praṇatabhayavihantr̥ brahma yattnmato'smi//  
अजमपि जनियोगं प्रापदैश्वर्ययोगादगति च गतिमत्तां प्रापदेकम् ह्यनेकम्।  
विविधविषयधर्मग्राहि मुग्धेक्षणानाम् प्रणतभयविहन्तु ब्रह्म यत्न्मतोऽस्मि ॥१॥* My *namaskaras* to that *Brahman* which by its unimaginable prowess appears to be born though it is birthless, appears as moving though it is unmoving and appears as many to those who are in attachment to duality though it is one. and which removes the fear of those who pray to it.//1//

*prajñāvaiśākhavedhakṣubhitajalanidhervedanāmno'ntarasthaṃ  
bhūtānyālokyā magnānyaviratajananagrāhaghore samudre/*

*kāruṇyāduddadhārāmṛtamidarairdurlabhaṃ bhūtahetoryastaṃ  
pūjyābhipūjyaṃ paramagurumamuṃ pādapātairnato'smi//2//*  
प्रज्ञावैशाखवेधक्षुभितजलनिधेर्वेदनाम्नोऽन्तरस्थंभूतान्यालोक्य मग्नान्यविरतजननग्राहघोरे  
समुद्रे। कारुण्यादुद्दधारामृतमिदमरैर्दुर्लभं भूतहेतोर्यस्तं पूज्याभिपूज्यं परमगुरुममुं  
पादपातैर्नतोऽस्मि - We are animals drowned in the fearful ocean full  
of crocodiles in the form of continuous births. The nectar of  
*advaita* which even *devatās* find it difficult to get is hidden in  
the ocean of *Vedas*. My most worshipful *parama guru* who  
churned this ocean by his deep knowledge and got this nectar  
to us. I bow down to him again and again.//2//

*yatprajñālokaḡbhāsā pratihatimagamatsvāntamohāndhakāro/  
majjonmajjacca ghore hyasakṛdupajanodanvati trāsane me/  
yatpādāvāśritānām śrutiśamaḡvinayaḡprāptiragryā hyamoghā  
tatpādau pāvānīyau bhavabhayaḡvinudau sarvabhāvairnamasye//*  
यत्प्रज्ञालोकभासा प्रतिहतिमगमत्स्वान्तमोहान्धकारोमज्जोन्मज्जच्चघोरेह्यसकृदुपज-  
नोदन्वति त्रासने मे। यत्पादावाश्रितानां श्रुतिशमविनयप्राप्तिरग्या ह्यमोघा तत्पादौ पावनीयौ  
भवभयविनुदौ सर्वभावैर्नमस्ये॥३॥ - I was the one who spent many  
lives floating and sinking in the fearful ocean of *saṃsāra*. He,  
by whose light of knowledge the darkness of attachment in  
my heart was destroyed is my *guru*. One who takes shelter at  
his holy feet will acquire valuable *śama* and *vinaya* prescribed  
by the *śruti* and become free from the fear of *saṃsāra*. My  
prostrations to his sacred feet.

