

BRAHMASŪTRA-CATUḤSŪTRĪ

The First Four Aphorisms of the Brahmasūtras along with Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary and English Explanation 'Śreyaskari'

The most compassionate God has given every living being three states—*jāgrat*, *swapna* and *suṣupti*. In the *jāgrat* state, the *jīva* obtains *prajñā* of *viśayas* which are outside him; hence he is called *bahisprajñā*. Transacting with *viśayas* in this way, he gets tired and goes to sleep. In sleep, when the *jīva* is no more in association with his body and the *indriyas*, he experiences the dream state. *Vāsanās* of the objects experienced in the *jāgrat* state serve as *viśayas* during *swapna*. Since in dreams these *vāsanās* are experienced within, the *jīva* in the *swapnāvasthā* is called *antahprajñā*. *Prajñā* means knowledge. In *jāgrat*, the *jīva's* *prajñā* is obtained with the help of external light, but in *swapna* the light is from within.*

In *swapnāvasthā* it is the mind which becomes both the *viśaya* and *viśayī* in turns. Constantly becoming *viśaya* and *viśayī* in this manner, the mind gets tired and becomes inactive; then the *jīva* loses connection even with the mind and enters *suṣupti*. In this *nirūpādhic* (adjunctless - without *upādhi*) state, the *śāstra* gives *jīva* the name *prājñā* [*jīva* is the name at the individual level (*vyasṭi*) and *prājñā* is the name at the cosmic level (*samaṣṭi*)]. In this state, the *jīva* is all alone and becomes *ānandamaya*. The light which illuminates the *indriyas* (sense organs) in both *jāgrat*

*Where is the light in the dream coming from? It is not coming from the sun, moon or stars. Some may say that the light is contained in the *vāsanās* themselves. But this is not so because there is a great difference between the external light and its impression on the *vāsanās*. Impressions are photos which have to be exposed to light in order to be seen. Similarly, the mind containing the *vāsanās* has to be illumined to see the dream. This light does not belong to the mind because it is an object for the observer. How? Because its absence is experienced by the observer in deep sleep. So, the dream light is not of the mind. Since its absence is noted by the observer in deep sleep, the light has to be of the observer only.

and *swapna* is that of this *prājñā*. Waking up from *suṣupti* the *jīva* says: “In the absence of the mind and sense organs, I enjoyed the bliss of deep sleep.” This proves that the light on the basis of which the *jīva* experiences the absence of the mind and the *indriyas* has to be his *swadharma* (intrinsic feature). Therefore, the *upādhis** mind etc. are inert; they are objects for his knowledge; they are of the nature of *tamas* (darkness). In this way we see that *jñātr̥tva* (knowership), *kar̥tr̥tva* (doership), *bhok̥tr̥tva* (enjoyership) and luminosity are the features of the *nirūpādhic prājñā* only.

This analysis of *jāgrat*, *swapna*, *suṣupti*, brings out a surprising information: In *jāgrat*, taking the body as Self, everyone very naturally considers himself to be ‘a man, a youth’ etc. Such an identity, which is on the basis of the body, creates no doubt in anyone’s mind. However, when asked about his dream experience, he encounters a difficulty: He says: ‘In my dream, I was swimming in the pool’. If you ask him further, ‘Who were you when you were dreaming? Were you the one on the bed or the one in the swimming pool?’, he would be in confusion. It is very clear that the one swimming in the pool cannot at the same time be the one lying on the bed. In this way, an analysis of the dream state creates a *saṁśaya jñāna* (doubtful knowledge) about himself, in place of the unambiguous knowledge of *jāgrat* (‘I am a man’ etc). If you ask him further, ‘What were you in your *suṣupti*? Where were you?’. He would say, ‘I do not know what I was during *suṣupti*, nor where I was.’ So it is clear that in *suṣupti*, when he is not connected with the mind and other *upādhis*, but is all alone, the *jīva* has *ajñāna* (ignorance) about his own Self. But, despite this *ajñāna*, it is at least clear to him that during deep sleep he was free from all *upādhis*

*An unknown object is sometimes recognised through a known object. For e.g., a nearly invisible glass wall is known by a red patch on it. In this connection it is said that the known object is an *upādhi* for the unknown object and the unknown object is the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the known object. Without *adhiṣṭhāna*, there is no meaning in *upādhi* - it does not exist. However, the *adhiṣṭhāna* exists even without the *upādhi*. In *suṣupti* there is no *upādhi* like the body, *indriyas* or mind. But the observer Self exists, certifying the absence of all *upādhis* in *suṣupti*. We can only identify the *adhiṣṭhāna* with the *upādhi*, but cannot know what exactly is the nature of the *adhiṣṭhāna*. In fact, we may even get a wrong understanding of it. For e.g., in association with the *upādhis* of the body and mind, we understand the *adhiṣṭhāna* Self as man/woman, active/inactive etc. But everyone knows that the *upādhi*-free Self in deep sleep is neither man/woman nor active/inactive. The only way to understand the Self in deep sleep is through *śruti*.

like the mind, *indriyas*, body etc. and was alone. However, no one says that he was not there during *suṣupti*. Therefore, when it is explained to him that his understanding of himself in the form of a 'man or youth' during *jāgrat* is *mithyā jñāna*, he would have no difficulty in recognising his mistake. It is another matter that it is very difficult for him to give up this *mithyā jñāna*. This is a well known fact.

In this manner, not knowing who he is, is the *ajñāna* or *avidyā* of the *jīva*. On the basis of his own experience in *suṣupti*, he knows very well that he has no connection with the body etc. Yet in *jāgrat*, he does have the false knowledge that he is the body etc. This false knowledge is *adhyāsa*. On the basis of this false understanding only does he create the difference of 'I' and 'You', and mixing it up with *rāga-dveṣa*, gets caught up in the cycle of worldly activities (*saṁsāra*). Although worldly activities are natural, the purpose of *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* is to show that for all such activities, the basis is only *adhyāsa*.

Without using a word beyond the universal experience of the three states, the Bhāṣyakāra presents his summary so that everyone can understand one's fault of *avidyā*. In this, we get a glimpse of the incomparable teaching skill and utmost compassion of Bhagawān Śaṅkarācārya. By even just listening to the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*, an intelligent person understands his grievous mistake. After this, the seeker is naturally desirous of listening to the following *śārīraka mīmāṁsā* (sacred discussion of the *jīva*) whose benefit is *ātmaikatva avagati* (experience of the oneness of the Self). In this way, *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* is an introduction to *śārīraka mīmāṁsā*.

Some people find fault with the Bhāṣyakāra for not having done *maṅgalācaraṇa* (words invoking auspiciousness), before commencing the *Bhāṣya*. Obviously, they do not understand the context. *Maṅgalācaraṇa* is meaningful only for the one who has understood his fault of *avidyā* and not for the fool who hasn't. *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* is not a part of the main text. It is only a preface which prepares a seeker for the auspicious message thereafter. Further, hearing the *Sūtrakāra's* word *atha* itself is auspicious for the seeker with *sādhana sampatti*.

Henceforth, the *Bhāṣya Vākyas* would be discussed to the best of our ability:

१. युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः

1. The two (entities) grasped as 'you' and 'I',

(1.1) The word *pratyaya* means knowledge of an object. When a pot is seen, the

buddhi takes the shape of the pot and this shape is known as *pratyaya*. It is only when the *buddhi* takes the shape of the pot that one says he has got the knowledge of the pot. The pot is the object for this *pratyaya*. All such observed objects are *gocara*, i.e that which is available for 'knowing'. All the objects which can be known are grouped in the word '*yuṣmat-pratyaya-gocara*' and the knower is referred to by the word '*asmāt-pratyaya-gocara*'. In the words of Bhagawān Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the meaning of the word '*yuṣmat-pratyaya-gocara*' is *kṣetra* (observable) and the word '*asmāt-pratyaya-gocara*' means *kṣetrajña* (observer) [Gītā 13.1].

Question: The word *yuṣmat* means 'you' which is sentient. However, the *kṣetra* is *jada* (inert). So, how can the inert '*kṣetra*' be referred to as the sentient '*yuṣmat*'?

Answer: It is not like that. Since *kṣetra* is insentient, had it been referred to as '*idam -this*' instead of *yuṣmat*, then one would not have understood that the *kṣetra* (including his body) is actually different from himself. We have already seen how the inert body is accepted by the *jīva* as himself which however is not his true Self.

Here the purpose is to convey that the *kṣetra* (which includes his body) and *kṣetrajña* (his true Self) are of very different natures. Unless this difference is conveyed through something the people experience themselves they will not understand it. The experience here is that of *suṣupti*. In his current understanding however, *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña* are not different. He thinks of himself and others as non-different from their inert-bodies. But at the same time, he very naturally feels himself to be different from others. Therefore, if the *kṣetra* is called *yuṣmat*, it becomes clear to him that it includes all the observable world. He also understands that the *asmāt* has to be different from it. But even then, the task of separating the *kṣetrajña* from his own inert body still remains. Therefore, in the very next word, *kṣetra-kṣetrajña* are respectively called *viśaya* (observable) and *viśayī* (observer) respectively. In this way, by first including the *kṣetra* in *yuṣmat* and then calling it *viśaya*, the difference in the nature of *kṣetra-kṣetrajña* is brought to attention in two steps. From this it is very clear that the whole world (including one's body) is *yuṣmat pratyaya gocara* while 'I' am *asmāt pratyaya gocara*.*

*Any observable is *yuṣmat pratyaya gocara*. *Sthūlaśarīra* - the gross body and *sūkṣmaśarīra* - the subtle body, both are observables. The latter consists of 5 *jñānendriyas* (ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose), 5 *karmendriyas* (motor organs - *vāk*, *pāṇi*, *pāda*, *pāyu*, and *upastha*), 5 *prāṇas* (*prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*) and the four divisions of

२. विषयविषयिणोः

2. which are respectively the observed and the observer,

(2.1) The word *viṣaya* comes from the root *ṣiñ bandhane* - 'विसिनोति निबध्नाति विषयिणम् इति विषयः' - that which binds the *viṣayī* is called the *viṣaya*.

The one who grasps a *viṣaya* is the *viṣayī*. *Śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa* and *gandha* are the *viṣayas*. They get determined only when the different *indriyas* of the *viṣayī* come in contact with their respective *viṣayas*. This is the bond which binds the *viṣayī* to the *viṣaya*. The whole *jagat* belongs to the *viṣaya* category. Who is the *viṣayī* who grasps a *viṣaya*? For the *viṣayas śabda, sparśa* etc, the respective *indriyas* are the *viṣayīs*. For these *indriyas*, the *manas* is the *viṣayī*. For *manas*, the *buddhi* (intellect) is the *viṣayī* and for the *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* is the *viṣayī*. What is *ahamkāra*? It is the feeling: 'I am the knower of the *buddhi pratyayas*'. This *ahamkāra* is clear in *jāgrat* and *swapna*. But now the question arises: 'Is there a *viṣayī* for this *ahamkāra* also? If so, who is it? Indeed, *ahamkāra* is also a *viṣaya*. For whom? For me. 'Who am I?' I am that *Prājña*, who, in *suṣupti*, cognizes the absence of everything starting from *ahamkāra* upto the *jagat* consisting of sound, touch etc.

Question: In *suṣupti*, no one has the experience of identifying the absence of *jagat*. So, how then can it be established that *prājña* is the *viṣayī*

Answer: It is not like that. It is true that during *suṣupti* there is no *anubhava* of any *viṣaya*. But the statement, 'In *suṣupti* there was no *viṣaya*', made after waking up, is the experience identifying the absence of the *jagat*. Keeping this in mind, it is said that *prājña* is the *viṣayī* for *ahamkāra* also. 'भूतभविष्यज्ञातृत्वं सर्वविषयज्ञातृत्वम् अस्य एव इति प्राज्ञः । सुषुप्तः अपि हि भूतपूर्वगत्या प्राज्ञ उच्यते' - He is the *jñātṛ* (knower) of all the *viṣayas* - of the past and the future; therefore, he is called *prājña*. Even though he is in deep sleep (not recognising the presence or absence of anything) he is called *prājña* retrospectively (Mā. Bh. 5).

antaḥkaraṇa (*manas, buddhi, citta* and *ahamkāra*). All these are observables. Observer is the *asmāt pratyaya gocara*. *Bahiṣprājña* in association with the gross and subtle bodies, and *antaḥprājña* in association with the *antaḥkaraṇa* are only intermediate observers. Their ranges of observables are limited. It is only the self in deep sleep who is the ultimate observer who is *asmāt pratyaya gocara* for *bahiṣprājña* }

(2.2) In this way the *bāhyajagat - indriya-manas-buddhi-ahamkāra- prājña* form the chain of *jñāna-kriya* (the act of knowing). In this chain, *jagat* is always the *viśaya* and *prājña* is always the *viśayī*. However, each one of the *indriya-manas-buddhi-ahamkāra* is a *viśayī* for the previous one, but a *viśaya* for the subsequent one. In fact, they become *viśayī* only in the presence of *prājña* - not independently. Since a knower even deeper inside of the *prājña* is not in anyone's experience, *prājña* is deemed to be the ultimate *viśayī*. From the *jagat* to *ahamkāra*, the entire *kṣetra* is its *viśaya*; therefore, *prājña* is the *kṣetrajña*.

३. तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोः

3. being opposite to each other in their nature like darkness and light—

(3.1) *Kṣetra* is *tamorūpa* (of the nature of darkness) while the *kṣetrajña* is *prakāsarūpa* (of the nature of light)*.

Question: How is *kṣetrajña* of the nature of light?

Answer: In *jāgrat*, an external light, like that of sun etc., is needed to gain the knowledge of an external object. But in *swapna*, the act of recognising shapes continues even in the absence of an external light. Which is the light in *swapna*? It has to be internal because there is no scope for an external light. One who thinks he is the body may deny this and say: 'Since mind alone is there in dreams, the light there should be of the mind only'. However, this is not tenable because even the mind is inert, since its absence is also experienced in *susupti*. Therefore, the mind is also an observable object. It belongs to the category of the observed and hence is *tamorūpa*. It is not of the nature of *prakāśa*. *Prājña* alone has *prakāśa-dharma* because he is not becoming *viśaya*.

(3.2) Normally people understand by '*prakāśa*' only the light of the sun etc., which is necessary for identifying the shapes and colours of objects in the external

*Here it is shown that *viśaya* is of the nature of darkness and *viśayī* is of the nature of light. The analysis is as follows: An object is identified by light, but not the other way round. Here light is the identifier and object is the identified. Further on, the eye becomes the identifier and the light the identified. Similarly, mind is the identifier and the eye is the identified. Ultimately, it is the Self who is the identifier and all else are identified. So, the ultimate identifier is the *viśayī* - the Self in deep sleep and all else are *viśayas* - the identified - so of the nature of darkness. Only the Self is the nature of light.

world. Therefore, they find it difficult to understand the statement of the *śāstra* that *prājñā* is *prakāśarūpa*. So what is *prakāśa*? It will be explained: Another word for *prakāśa* is *jyoti* - '-यत् यत् कस्यचित् अवभासकं तत् तत् ज्योतिः शब्देन अभिधीयते' - Whatever illuminates something is called *jyoti* (Sū. Bh. 1.1.24). Just as light enables one to identify an object by its *rūpa*, similarly *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rasa* and *gandha* also help one to know an object. For example, even though it may be dark, we are able to reach the village by hearing a dog's bark. Similarly, through touch we are able to recognise a book etc. Therefore, *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rasa* and *gandha* are also *prakāśa*. The *prakāśa* of all these *prakāśas* is of *prājñā*.

(3.3) The example of *tamas-prakāśa* is given to explain the opposite natures of *viśaya-viśayī*. For making this example completely meaningful, some people say that *tamas* (darkness) is a stuff (*bhāva-rūpa*) like *prakāśa*. This is not correct because: It is only when illumined by *prakāśa* that the shape of an object is known, and not in darkness. Therefore, *tamas-prakāśa* are indeed opposite to each other. But though *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rasa* and *gandha* are also *prakāśa* and knowledge of objects is obtained through them too, they do not have their opposites. Therefore, there is no use in trying to prove that *tamas* is *bhāva-rūpa*.

Tamas-Prakāśa are only examples for showing the difference in the nature of insentience-sentience of *kṣetra-kṣetrajñā*. Confirming this contention the Bhāṣyakāra says '*viśayini cidātmake*' in the very next sentence, separating the sentient *viśayī* from the *jaḍa jagat*.

(3.4) **Question:** Though *prājñā* is the *pratyagātman* (the inner atman), the *turīya / Śuddhātman* is the *ātman* even inside the *pratyagātman*. This being so, is it not proper to take the *Śuddhātman* himself as the ultimate observer?

Answer: No. Because the one who is caught in the mire of *adhyāsa* is the *kṣetrajñā* only and not the *turīya Śuddhātman*. That is why Bhāṣyakāra takes *kṣetrajñā* as the *viśayī*, and not the *turīya*. This has been clearly stated in the Gītā Bhāṣya. 'क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोः विषयविषयिणोः भिन्नस्वभावयोः इतरेतरतद्भ्रमाध्यासलक्षणः संयोगः क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञस्वरूपविवेकाभावनिबन्धनः । रज्जुशुक्तिकादीनां तद्विवेकज्ञानाभावात् अध्यारोपितसर्परजतादिसंयोगवत् सः अयम् अध्यासस्वरूपः क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञसंयोगो मिथ्याज्ञानलक्षणः' - *Kṣetra-kṣetrajñā* are *viśaya* and *viśayī* and of different natures. In them the features of one are mixed up with those of the other due to *adhyāsa*. This is the coupling of *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā*. The reason for this coupling is the lack of knowledge of their intrinsic natures. Therefore, this *adhyāsa* is *mithyā jñāna* (false understanding).

[G. Bh 13.26]. This is the same sentence as the first sentence of the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*. 'युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः विषयविषयिणोः तमः प्रकाशवत् विरुद्धस्वभावयोः इतरेतर भावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम्', which is under consideration here. This should be noticed. Therefore, who should be kept in the place of *viṣayī* should not be decided on the basis of our limited *buddhi*. The serious consequences of considering *Śuddhātman* as the *viṣayī* will be analysed later*.

(3.5) Question: No *viṣayī* is its own *viṣaya*. Therefore, the *pratyagātman prājña* cannot also become its own *viṣaya*; so, how can he be the object of understanding as "I" i.e. *asmāt pratyaya gocara*? If he is *gocara*, he becomes an object.

Answer: That is right. Unlike *jāgrat* and *swapna*, there is no "I" awareness in *suṣupti*. That is why *prājña* is not *viṣaya* for *prājña* himself. But for the *bahiṣprajña* who

*In deep sleep, *prājña* does not recognise anything. Nevertheless, Bhāṣyakāra says that he (*prājña*) is the knower in the wakeful and dream states. The reason is: *Kṣetrajña* is the knower of the *kṣetra*. He has to be different from *kṣetra*; otherwise, the action of knowing the *kṣetra* is impossible. The *jīva* gets totally separated from the *kṣetra* only in *suṣupti*. Therefore, the *jīva* in *suṣupti*, viz. *prājña*, is the *kṣetrajña* - the knower.

Answer: True. But he can know only the external world, but not his own body with which he is associated.

Question: But he can know his eyes and ears?

Answer: But when he is knowing them, he is different from them, but associated with mind and so on. Therefore the true observer of the *kṣetra* has to be different from it totally.

Objection: The assertion that *prājña* who is asleep and who is not knowing is the *jñāta* and the denial that *Ātman* who never sleeps and who is always knowing is not the *jñāta* - both statements are wrong.

Resolution: That '*prājña* is asleep and therefore he is not knowing anything' are mutually contradictory. If *prājña* were asleep, he cannot know that he was not knowing anything. Since he was knowing that he was not knowing anything, he could not have been sleeping. This contradictory statement of *bahiṣprajña* is a consequence of his *adhyāsa*, which is itself a contradiction. Next, it is true that *Ātman* never sleeps. But He cannot be *jñāta*. A *jñāta* is one who observes something other than himself. But there is nothing other than *Ātman*. So, He is not a *jñāta*. Therefore, what is right is only asserted and what is wrong is only denied.

is able to get a *buddhi pratyaya*, *prājñā* becomes an object. How? Listen: Anyone getting up from *suṣupti* says, 'न किञ्चिदवेदिषं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' 'I slept well. I did not know anything', pointing to the *prājñā* only. Since he (*prājñā*) is grasped in this way in the wakeful state, he is indeed experienced as an object. 'बीजावस्थापि 'न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्' इति उत्थितस्य प्रत्ययदर्शनात् देहेऽनुभूयत एव' (Mā. Kā. Bh. 1.2). This is everyone's experience. However, just as *bahisprajñā* knows himself clearly (as 'male', 'youth' etc.), he does not know the *prājñā* clearly. Therefore, anyone will be naturally interested in knowing about him. Let us leave this issue here. Later we will analyse how the *prājñā* who is not a *viṣaya* becomes a *viṣaya*.

(3.6) In this way it is well known that the *kṣetra*, which is *viṣaya* and *tamorūpa* is very different from the *kṣetrajñā* who is *viṣayī* and *prakāśarūpa*. It is also well-known that the *prājñā* and the *jaḡat* are *pratyaya gocara*. In this way, there is only one similarity between the two, that they are both *viṣaya*.

४. इतरेतर भावानुपपत्तौ सिद्ध्यायां तद्धर्माणामपि सुतराम् इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः ।

4. are known to be mutually dissimilar; so the features of one can never be of the other.

(4.1) *Jñānakriya* (the activity of knowing) is possible only when the *viṣaya* and *viṣayī* are different from each other. If they are not different, *jñānakriya* is impossible. Everyone knows that *kṣetrajñā* is *viṣayī* and *kṣetra* is *viṣaya*. Therefore, it is well known that one becoming the other or the features of one being the features of the other is impossible.

५. इत्यतः अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां च अध्यासः ।

5. Therefore, *adhyāsa*, the superimposition of the entity 'you' and its features on the conscious observer 'I',

(5.1) Nevertheless the *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā* are mixed up. Man, woman etc. are the properties of the body; listening etc. are the properties of the *indriyas*; *jñānakriya* is the property of the *buddhi*; All these are the *kṣetra* and its properties. *Jāntr̥tva* is the property of the *kṣetrajñā*. In this way the properties of the *kṣetrajñā* are very different. It is everybody's experience that the *jñāta prājñā* has no connection with

the *kṣetra*. No one is unfamiliar with this. Yet sometimes one says, 'My *buddhi*, my eyes, my body etc', separating himself from the *buddhi-indriyas*-body etc. and at other times says, 'I am intelligent, I am blind, I am a man', identifying himself with the *buddhi-indriyas*-body respectively and correspondingly carries out his transactions (*vyavahāra*) with the world. In other words, he wrongly thinks of the *kṣetra* as himself. In the same way, by identifying with the *buddhi-indriyas*-body etc., he says, 'I decide, I see, I am dark complexioned' etc. Not only this -

६. तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणः तद्धर्माणां च विषये अध्यासः

6. and conversely, the superimposition of the observer and its features on the observed,

(6.1) Conversely, *dharma* of the *pratyagātman* is also superimposed on the *kṣetra*. How? It is not unknown that in *suṣupti* the *ānanda* is without any *viśaya*. Therefore, it is clear that *ānanda* is the inherent feature of the *prājñā*. Instead of knowing this through *viveka*, one argues: 'In *suṣupti*, I was not aware of any *ānanda*. How then can I say that I was in *ānanda* at that time? It could be just a *dukha*-free state?' Thus he doubts his own experience and after getting up seeks *viśaya sukha* in *jāgrat*. He considers himself happy when he gets enjoyment through *viśayas*, otherwise considers himself unhappy. The import is that *ānanda*, which is actually the *dharma* of the *viśayi*, is superimposed on the *viśaya*. Similarly, even though *sarva viśaya jñātṛtva* is the *svadharma* of *prājñā*, he says, "I did not know anything in *suṣupti*. So how can I be the *jñāta*?' With this doubt, he superimposes the *jñātṛtva* on the *buddhi*. He considers himself a *jñāta* only when connected with the *buddhi*; when not connected with the *buddhi* he thinks he is non-existent. In this way, he does *adhyāsa* of his *jñātṛtva dharma* on the *buddhi*. From this it is clear that *adhyāsa* of *viśaya- viśayī* in both the directions is not done unknowingly, but knowingly. That is, even after the Guru explains where the mistake lies, he is still unable to correct himself. Therefore this *adhyāsa* has to be *mithyā-jñāna* only.

७. मिथ्या भवितुं युक्तम्।

7. can rightly be deemed illusory.

(7.1) Just as even after being told that 'This is not silver, but shell', instead of making an effort to examine it and understanding it as shell, the continuation of

the wrong idea that it is silver would be an obstinate wrong knowledge; so is this *adhyāsa* also very obstinate. To see in *prājñā* the *dharmas* of the body etc. which are not in him (*prājñā*) or to see *sukha* and *jñātṛtva* in the *viśaya* and *buddhi* which are not in them - are all *mithyā-jñāna* only. The object of *mithyā-jñāna* is *mithyā* i.e., even though seen, it is *asat* (does not exist). For example, silver not existing in the shell but seen, is *mithyā*, i.e. *asat*. Here it is important to remember that the object silver per se is not *mithyā*; but the silver seen in the shell is *mithyā*. Water seen in a mirage is *mithyā* - it is *asat*. Here the mirage is *prātibhāsika satya*, water is *vyāvahārika satya*. Both are *satya* - not *mithyā*. Therefore, understanding that which is in front of us is not actually water but a mirage which appears like water is right knowledge. To know it as water is wrong knowledge. The object of this wrong knowledge viz. water - is *asat*, because there is no water there. In the same way, world and its *dharmas* or *prājñā* and his *dharmas* - they are *vyāvahārika satyas*, not false. But seeing the *dharma* of the world in the *pratyagātman* and seeing the *dharma* of the *pratyagātman* in the world is *mithyā* only, because the world is not in the *pratyagātman* nor is *pratyagātman* in the world. On the other hand, if it is asserted that all superimposed things are *mithyā* as a rule, and that the world seen in *pratyagātman* is *mithyā*, it is wrong. The reason being that in the reverse *adhyāsa* where the *pratyagātman* is *adhyasta*, he (*pratyagātman*) will become *asat*, which is impossible. It should be remembered that the statement 'अध्यासः मिथ्या भवितुं युक्तम्', implies only that *adhyāsa* is *mithyā-jñāna*; that is, only the *adhyāsa* between the observable and the observer is *mithyā*, not the observer-observable themselves.

८. तथापि अन्योन्यस्मिन् अन्योन्यात्मकताम् अन्योन्यधर्माश्च अध्यस्य इतरेतरा-
विवेकेन अत्यन्तविविक्तयोः धर्मधर्मिणोः मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य
“अहमिदम्”, “ममेदम्” इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः।

8. Nevertheless, superimposing one entity and its features on the distinctly differing other entity and its features indiscriminately due to wrong understanding, mixing up the changing and the unchanging, there is this natural usage in people 'I am this', 'This is mine'.

(8.1) In this way, when *adhyāsa* is taking place in both directions, at least this much is clear: just as ignorance of the shell is the cause for the silver being superimposed on it, the ignorance of the *swarūpa* of the *pratyagātman* is the cause of

the *adhyāsa* of the body on him and the ignorance of the *swarūpa* of the *jagat* is the cause of the *adhyāsa* of the *pratyagātman* on it. This means that the *jīva* does not know the *swarūpa* of either the *pratyagātman* or the *jagat*. Without knowing their *swarūpa*, he recognises them through their activity only. Although the activity cannot exist without the *swarūpa*, the *swarūpa* does exist without the activity. It is essential to know the *swarūpa* to get rid of *adhyāsa*. There is no doubt that even the *ajñānī* knows that *prājñā* has no activity. In spite of this, he does the *adhyāsa* of the activity of *jāgrat* and *swapna* on *prājñā*. Even though activity leaves him, he does not leave activity.

Following this, *śāstra* also talks of his knowership etc for the purpose of teaching etc. 'तेनेव हि अहंकर्त्रा अहंप्रत्यय विषयेण प्रत्ययिना सर्वाः क्रियाः निर्वर्त्यन्ते, तत्फलं च स एव अश्नाति'- It is only by him who has the conceit 'I', who is the object of 'I-awareness', who is the knower that all actions are performed. He alone enjoys their fruit (Sū. Bh. 1.1.4). Here change, inertia, limitation and the activity based on them are the *dharma*s of the world, while the world is the *dharmī*. Knowership, doership and enjoyership are *dharma*s of *prājñā* and *prājñā* is the *dharmī*. Here *dharma-dharmī* relation is not of non-difference as in fire and heat. It is in the sense that 'कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम्' - The effect is not different from the cause but the cause is different from the effect (Sū. Bh. 2.1.9). That is, the *dharma* does not exist without the *dharmī*, but *dharmī* does exist without the *dharma*. The *dharma* is seen in the *dharmī* only through an *upādhi*. In *nirupādhic dharmī*, there is no *dharma*. Both the *jagat* and the *pratyagātman* appear with activity only through their *upādhis*. In their *nirupādhic* state they are actionless. For action in *jagat*, shapes (*vikāras*) are the *upādhi*. In its *nirupādhic* state, *jagat* is *Ātman* only. For action in *pratyagātman*, the body and senses etc. are *upādhis*. Without them, *pratyagātman* too is nothing but the actionless *Ātman*. The cause for this mixing up of *satya* (unchanging) with the *anṛta* (changing), leading to the *adhyāsa* of 'me and mine', is not knowing their inherent *nirupādhic* nature and seeing them only with *upādhis*.

(8.2) What is *satya*? That which does not change. 'यद् रूपेण यन् निश्चितं तद् रूपं न व्यभिचरति तत् सत्यम्' - Known in one form, that which does not change from it, is *satya*. What is *anṛta*? That which changes. 'यद् रूपेण यन् निश्चितं तद् रूपं व्यभिचरत् अनृतम् इति उच्यते'- Known with one form, that which changes from it is *anṛta* (also called *asatya*). (Tai. Bh. 2.1). Here *prājñā*'s unchangingness and the *jagat*'s changefulness are well known.

One who knows the meanings of the words *satya* and *anṛta* will not contest this because there is no *vikāra* in *prājñā* which could cause change in him.*

(8.3) Question: How can *prājñā* be *satya*? Everyone is *prājña* in *suṣupti*, *antahprajñā* in *swapna* and *bahisprajñā* in *jāgrat* that is, he is changing. Not only this. Even at any one time, *jīvas* are in different states—if one is in *suṣupti*, another is in *swapna* and yet another in *jāgrat*. This also contradicts the claim that *prājñā* is unchanging.

Answer: It is not so. *Prājñā* is always *prājñā* only. Through the *upādhi* of mind alone he becomes *antahprajñā* and with the *upādhi* of mind and body becomes *bahisprajñā*. Though he appears different when he is with *upādhis*, his inherent nature never changes. For example, seeing a cook preparing food with the *upādhi* of a ladle, no one says ‘without the ladle, he is not a cook’. Further, even with the difference in bodies, there is no difference in *prājñā*. The reason is this: Following the bodies, there is difference in the experience of *bahisprajñā*. In *jāgrat*, the experience of one person cannot be understood by another person without asking him. To know the experience, one has to ask the experiencer, that is, in *bahisprajñā*, there is multiplicity. Similarly, the experiences of *antahprajñā* are also different. One’s experience in *swapna* cannot be known by another without asking him. But it is not so in the case of *prājñā*. One understands the experience of *suṣupti* of another person without asking him. Therefore, unlike in the case of *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya, there is no multiplicity in *prājñā*, he is only one. Therefore, *prājñā* is *satya*.

*At this point it would be important to understand the definitions of *satya*, *anṛta*, *mithyā*, *sat*, *asat* and *anṛta*. *Satya* means unchanging, *asatya* means changing. *Sat* means existence, *asat* means that which does not exist (example given is of a barren woman’s son which is impossible). *Satya* and *sat* are used interchangeably by some. But this creates confusion. Whatever is *satya* is undoubtedly also *sat* because that which does not change definitely has to exist. But whatever is *sat* (exists), it could be either *satya* (unchanging) or *asatya* (changing). Thus Brahman is both *satya* and *sat*, while the *jagat* is *sat*, yet *asatya*. Many people define Brahman as *sat*, but if only this is said, the problem is that the *jagat* also is *sat*; so, we will not be able to differentiate Brahman from the *jagat*. Therefore, it would be proper to say that Brahman is *satyam*. But afterwards, we will see that Brahman is not only *satyam*, but also *jñānam* and *anantam*. Therefore to say that Brahman is ‘real’ is not enough, because this definition takes into account only one feature of Brahman and not the other two. *Mithyā* means that which is seen, but does not exist. *Anṛta* in the *bhāṣya* means *asatya* and not *mithyā*. *Jagat* is not *mithyā* but *anṛta* or *asatya*.

(8.4) In spite of this, the mixing up of *prājñā* who is *satya* with the body which is *anṛta*, and saying, 'I am a man, I am a woman' etc. and 'He is my friend, he is my enemy' etc, and acting on the basis of this wrong understanding is well known. The mixing of *satya* and *anṛta* is what constitutes *adhyāsa*. The *vyavahāra* taking place on the basis of this is spontaneous and natural (नैसर्गिकः); i.e it is not done after being taught by someone.

९. आह। कोऽयमध्यासो नाम इति? उच्यते। स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः।

9. If asked 'What is this thing called *adhyāsa*?' the reply is 'it is the memory of a previously seen (object) appearing as another (object)'.

(9.1) This sentence gives the definition of *adhyāsa*. It can be understood by the silver-shell example. Silver is *pūrova-dṛṣṭa*, i.e. seen earlier. When a shell is seen on the road, one gets an elementary knowledge that it is something, but not exactly what it is. Its shine brings the memory of silver. Without bothering to examine the shell, one concludes that it is silver. This wrong knowledge is *adhyāsa*. That which is not seen previously cannot come to memory, and that which does not come to memory cannot be superimposed. That is, for *adhyāsa*, it is necessary that one should have seen the superimposed thing previously. If silver had not been seen previously, it would not have come to memory and one could not have superimposed it on the shell. Not only this. The *adhiṣṭhāna* in which it is superimposed should also have been seen previously; otherwise, after examining the shell, one will only know that it is some object, but not that it is shell.

(9.2) The memory of a previously seen object appears only as a mental modification, the corresponding object will not be there physically before a person. The word '*smṛtirūpa*' in the *bhāṣya* above means such a mental modification of a previously seen object. When the object is actually in front, then the knowledge is produced 'This is that object only'. This knowledge is called *pratyabhijñā*, which is of two types—*individual pratyabhijñā* and *category pratyabhijñā*. When the cow named *Kālākṣī*, whom one has seen previously, is seen again at some later time, one recognises her and the knowledge is produced that 'this is the same *Kālākṣī* seen earlier'. This is *individual pratyabhijñā*. When one sees another cow named *Swastimati* and recognises that this is also a cow like *Kālākṣī*, this knowledge is known as *category pratyabhijñā*. Here, *Kālākṣī* is the previously seen cow and *Swastimati* is another cow. Therefore, recognising *Swastimati* as *Kālākṣī* is wrong knowledge.

But, recognising Swasthimati as another cow like Kālākṣī is not wrong knowledge, it is right knowledge. The reason being that for this knowledge the object is not the individual cow but 'cowness'. The 'cowness' in Kālākṣī is recognised in Swastimati also. This is *category pratyabhijñā* and not *adhyāsa*. In this way, if *pratyabhijñā* is right knowledge of a perviously seen object, *adhyāsa* is wrong knowledge of a previously seen object. Therefore, *adhyāsa* is also called *avabhāsa* meaning the rejection of incorrect knowledge after examining the *adhiṣṭhāna*.

(9.3) Question: Even a small child has *category pratyabhijñā*. When the mother shows a cow to her child, calling it as 'cow', the child recognises another different looking cow also as a 'cow'. Through one individual cow, how does the child come to know the 'cowness' in another cow?

Answer: Yes, it is true that even a small child has category recognition. This is due to the impressions of previous births. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śruti calls this '*pūrova prajñā*'. (Br. 4.4.2)

(9.4) Question: The body one gets in this birth has not seen previously. Therefore, in this new body, how does *adhyāsa* arise such as 'this is me'? Is not *adhyāsa* in the body one with a beginning?

Answer: Yes. *Adhyāsa* in the present body has to happen now; that is, it has a beginning; it is not beginningless. But the *vāsanā of deha-adhyāsa* is beginningless. 'अयम् अपि बुद्धिसम्बन्धः शक्त्यात्मना विद्यमान एव सुषुप्तिप्रलययोः पुनः प्रबोध प्रसवयोः आविर्भवति। एवं हि एतत् युज्यते, न हि आकस्मिकी कस्यचित् उत्पत्तिः संभवति' - This connection with the *buddhi* remains potentially in *suṣupti* and *pralaya* and manifests again in *jāgrat* and *śṛṣṭi* because nothing can be produced accidentally (Sū Bh. 2.3.31). Even though children have *adhyāsa* in *buddhi*, there is no *adhyāsa* in the new body. It can be understood like this: When a child is beaten by its mother, it does not feel insulted; its behaviour with her continues as before. The thought of wearing clothes or decorating oneself are not entertained. There is no desire related to sex. These things show clearly that there is no *deha-adhyāsa* in children. That is why the *śruti* also tells the *jñāni* 'बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत्' - Stand in childhood (Br. 3.5.1), i.e. he must have the same innocence as that of a child.

If children have no *deha-adhyāsa* when they are born, how then does the *deha-adhyāsa* develop in them later? It is like this: When there is an injury to the body, the *buddhi* understanding and then feeling the pain are the acts of *prakṛti* 'इच्छा द्वेषः

सुखं दुःखं सङ्घातश्चेतना धृतिः एतत् क्षेत्रम्' - Desire, aversion, pleasure, grief, body, consciousness and *dhṛti* (the quality in *buddhi* which firms up the body when it is falling for some reason) - all these are *kṣetra* (Gītā 13.6). Since in the child, the relation with the *buddhi* is beginningless, it feels that the injury is to itself. When such experiences coming through the gross body happen frequently, a child's body consciousness starts growing.

After this *adhyāsa* is firmly established, and by a misfortune if one loses any part of the body, he continues to have *adhyāsa* in that part for quite sometime even after losing that part. For example, when somebody's leg starts decaying due to gangrene, it is amputated to save the rest of the body from getting infected. Even after this amputation, a person continues to feel itching and pain in that area even though the leg is not there. This is called phantom pain. For nearly a year the person gets the imaginary sensation of itching and pain. As the realisation of the absence of the leg becomes firm in the experience, the pain also goes. It is based on such *adhyāsa* in the body that the *śāstras* prescribe post-death rites.

(9.5) Question: How does the connection with *buddhi*, which is snapped during *suṣupti*, come back on waking up?

Answer: Since the *buddhi* rests in the *nāḍīs* during *suṣupti*, the *jīva* cannot engage in the act of knowing. The *jīva* merges in *Īśwara* while retaining his knowership (potential to know).

That is, even at the time of *suṣupti* there is *avidyā*, but no *adhyāsa*. Following this indicator, *Īśwara* once again connects him with the same *buddhi*.

(9.6) Question: But in *pralaya*, all modifications are destroyed and only *Īśwara* remains. How then can the *jīva* get connected to the same *buddhi* in the next cycle of creation?

Answer: The creation of the world by *Īśwara* each time is as it was in the previous creation - 'सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्' (Rg Veda 10.190.3). The omniscient and omnipotent *Īśwara* creates the necessary *upādhis* like *buddhi* etc. for the *jīva* along with the rest of creation and gives the connections to the corresponding *jīvas*.*

*How is that each *jīva* gets up in the same body after sleep, even though as per the *śāstras* he had merged in Brahman?' The process of wakefulness starts as follows - *jīva* is asleep as long as his *karma* permits. Then he will get up according to his *karma*.

In the foregoing, the sequence of how *adhyāsa* gets created in the new body was explained. Presently, how the different schools define *adhyāsa* will be analyzed. The three schools, according to their definition of *adhyāsa* are: *anyathā khyāti*, *ākhyāti* and *asat khyāti*.

१०. तं केचित् अन्यत्र अन्यधर्माध्यास इति वदन्ति।

10. Some (say), it is superimposing of the features of the one on another;

(10.1) *Anyāthakhyāti*: This is the one agreed upon by the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Bhāṭṭas*. According to them, the *adhyāsa* of silver on the shell happens in the following steps: On seeing the shell, an elementary knowledge i.e. 'it is something' is produced and not the unique knowledge that 'it is a shell'. Because of the similarity of glitter, the previously seen silver comes to memory. It is the nature of the mind to get memory of a previously seen object whenever something similar is seen. This is not the memory of a silver vessel seen earlier in a shop; it is the memory of the category 'silver'. Then the shell is wrongly understood as silver. After examining the shell, the correct knowledge that 'this is not silver, it is shell' - arises. Then the realisation occurs that the silver seen is non-existent. By non-existent it does not mean that 'there is no silver anywhere'; it only means that 'there is no silver in the shell'. If silver were nowhere, its *adhyāsa* in the shell would not have been possible because it would not have been previously seen and so it couldn't have come to memory at all.

११. केचित् तु यत्र यदध्यासः तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबंधनोभ्रम इति।

11. it is the delusion resulting from not discriminating the two.

'But how does he get connection with his body?' Brahman is *sarvajña* (omniscient) and *sarvaśakta* (omnipotent); so, even though the *jīva* cannot recognise, Brahman can. Like the swan has the ability to separate milk from water, Brahman can separate the *jīvas*. This is called *hamsa-kṣīra nyāya*. What happens in *pralaya* is more complicated because in deep sleep, even though the connection with body and mind is lost, yet they are there; but in *pralaya* all *vikāras* (forms) are gone; therefore, there is no *buddhi* to connect to. So how is it again connected? It is as follows: *Īśvara* remakes the universe just like the previous one - 'सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्' (Rg Veda 10.190.3). The omniscient and omnipotent *Īśvara* creates the *buddhis* and the bodies at the end and connects them with the respective *jīvas*.

(11.1) *Akhyāti*: This is propounded by Prābhākara School. As in *anyathākhyāti* here also there are two *jñānas* - elementary *jñāna* of the shell (the *adhiṣṭhāna*), and the memory of silver. Both are correct. But because of non-discrimination between the two, an illusion is created that 'it is silver'. This illusory knowledge is *adhyāsa*. That is, it is not wrong to see the shell as silver, but understanding the shell as silver without separating the two is wrong.

(11.2) **Question:** Even though yellow conch is never seen, how is that to some a white conch appears as yellow?

Answer: Only the one who has jaundice sees the white conch as yellow. Here also, two knowledges are involved. The knowledge of the conch derecognizing its whiteness and the knowledge of yellowness without knowing that one has jaundice. Not differentiating the two knowledges leads to the wrong knowledge of yellow color in the white conch. Ignorance of one's jaundice is the fault here. When he comes to know that he has jaundice, he gets the right the right knowledge that 'this is a white conch, appearing as yellow only to me.'

१२. अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासः तस्यैव विपरीत धर्मत्वकल्पनाम् आचक्षते।

12. Others say, wherever there is *adhyāsa* of one on another, it is imagination of the opposite features of the other on the one.

(12.1) *Asatkhyāti*: Because of the elementary knowledge of the shell and the memory of silver similar to it - imagining the feature of silver in the shell is *adhyāsa*. This is called *dharma adhyāsa*. Understanding the shell itself as silver is *dharmi adhyāsa*. Some reject this saying that this is the Buddhist's *asatkhyāti*. Their thinking is this: 'Though the object is not there it is seen due to *saṃskāra*', this is what the Vijñānavādī Buddhists say. Here, if the silver is *asat* in the sense of 'rabbit's horn' which cannot be found anywhere, then it could be the Vijñānavādī's view. But if we understand it just to mean the 'silver which is not in the shell' then it could be renamed as *mīthyā khyāti*.

Bhagawan Bhāṣyakāra would not have mentioned it if it were wrong. The *bhāṣya vākya* which justifies it is 'शुक्तिकां रजतम् इति प्रत्येति इति अत्र शुक्तिवचन एव शुक्तिकाशब्दः । रजतशब्दः तु रजतप्रतीतिलक्षणार्थः । प्रत्येति एव हि केवलं रजतम् इति, न तु तत्र रजतम् अस्ति' - In the sentence 'shell is understood as silver', the word shell means shell itself but the word silver refers only to the apparent silver because it is the object of wrong knowledge. There is no silver at all in that place (Sū. Bh. 4.1.15).

१३. सर्वथापि तु अन्यस्य अन्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति।

13. Whatever it be, there is no deviation (from the rule) that the dharma of one is seen in another,

(13.1) Now it is being told that the essential meaning of all the three definitions is the same, the difference is only in delineating how the *mithyājñāna* is produced. None of them deviates from the definition of *adhyāsa* viz; 'स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः' and the description of *adhyāsa* viz, formulated by Bhāṣyakāra in the sentence 'अन्यस्य अन्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति' in this sentence.

१४. तथा च लोके अनुभवः "शुक्तिका हि रजतवत् अवभासते", "एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवत्" इति।

14. and it is in the universal experience that 'shell appears like silver', 'one moon as if with a second'.

(14.1) Bhāṣyakāra has given two examples for *adhyāsa*. It is important to remember that both of them describe the situation after the imposed *dharma* is rejected as a result of having obtained the right knowledge of the *adhiṣṭhāna*. After examining the shell and even after understanding that it is not silver, the shell continues to look like silver. Therefore, the knowledge 'shell looking like silver' is correct, not wrong, because knowledge of the shell separates it from the silver in the memory - 'शुक्तिका हि रजतवत्', 'एकः चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवत्'. In both the examples, 'shell looking like silver' and 'one moon looking like with a second', the 'vat' suffix refers to the rejection of a wrong knowledge after the right knowledge of the *adhiṣṭhāna* has been gained.*

(14.2) Now we should turn our attention to the roles of these two different examples. They are respectively associated with the foretold two types of *adhyāsa*. That is why Bhāṣyakāra has used the phrase '*tad viparyayaṇa*' in the beginning and

*(Question) 'It is clear that the *adhyāsa* of *kṣetra* in *kṣetrajñāna* is a case of mistaken identity. But is the *adhyāsa* of *kṣetrajñāna* in the *kṣetra* a case of seeing one in many?' (Answer) It has already been shown that *prajñā* is not different from person to person like *bahisprajñā* and *antaprajñā*, but only one in everybody (see sec. 8.3). But due to *adhyāsa*, even though there is one *prājñā* only, a different *prājñā* is associated with each person. This is a case of seeing many in one.

also in the end of the this introduction. The cause of the first *adhyāsa* from outside to inside is the ignorance of the nature of *pratyagātman*. When one gets the knowledge that he is the fourth *Ātman*, then there arises in him the following realization: Though he appears to be transacting in the proximity of the upādhis, he is actually the transactionless *Ātman*. The purpose of the shell-silver example is to confirm this only. 'Even though it looks like silver, it is only shell', is correct knowledge. Similarly, understanding that 'even though he appears as if coupled with the features of the *kṣetra*, the *kṣetrajñā* is actually different from the *kṣetra*. He is *turīya* only' is the correct knowledge.

The cause of the second *adhyāsa* from inside to outside, is the ignorance of the real nature of the *kṣetra*. Multiplicity is seen in the *kṣetra* when viewed through forms, but in its true nature *kṣetra* is also the fourth *Ātman* only. 'एतैः प्राणादिभिः आत्मनः अपृथग्भूतैः अपृथग्भावैरेष आत्मा रज्जुरिव सर्पादि विकल्पनारूपैः पृथगेवेत्यभिलक्षितो निश्चितो मूढैः । विवेकिनां तु रज्ज्वामिव कल्पिताः सर्पादयः नात्मव्यतिरेकेण प्राणादयस्सन्ति' - These forms of *prāṇa* etc. which are not different from *Ātman* are viewed as different by ignorant people. But for the intelligent they are not different from the *Ātman* just as the imagined serpent is not different from the rope (Mā. Kā. Bh. 2.30).

For the one who knows this, the multiplicity seen through the *indriyas* is sublated in the *Ātman* and therefore the *kṣetra* is seen by him as the non dual *Ātman* only. This is *sarvātmabhāva*, i.e. realising that nothing is different from himself. To confirm this, the example of one moon is given : 'एकस्मिन् चन्द्रे तिमिरकृतानेकचन्द्रप्रपंचवत् अविद्याकृतो ब्रह्मणि नामरूपप्रपंचः विद्यया प्रविलापयितव्यः' - Just as one moon is seen as many due to cataract, the world of multiplicity of names and forms cognised in *Brahman* is due to *avidyā*. This is to be sublated by *vidyā* (Sū. Bh. 3.2.21). One who has cataract in the eye sees two moons even though actually there is only one moon. He who does not have cataract sees only the one moon. In the same way, one who has *avidyā* sees multiplicity in the world of forms. But the realised *jñānī*, who has sublated the multiplicity, understands only oneness. This is because 'कार्याकारोऽपि कारणस्य आत्मभूत एव' - The forms of the effect, in their intrinsic nature, are nothing but the cause only (Sū. Bh. 2.1.18). The world is *kārya* and *Ātman* is its *kāraṇa*. Therefore, the *jñānī* sees only the non-dual Self in the *jagat*.

(14.3) In this way, the benefit of the *sārīraka mīmāṃsā* i.e. discussion on the *jīva*—is the obtainment of the *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman*. That is, from the point

of view of the effect, it is only *Ātman* which is appearing in the two forms as *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā* respectively, through *parā* and *aparā prakṛti*. However, from the point of view of the cause, it is the unchangingly eternal, all pervading (like *ākāśa*), devoid of all modifications, eternally satisfied, without parts, self-illuminated *Ātman*. Obtaining the *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman* means realising that this *Ātman* is himself.

(14.4) *Anirvacaniyakhyāti*: This is the *khyāti* propounded by some others. Their thinking is as follows: One sees silver in the shell. If the silver were not there, it would not be possible to see it. “Things are seen though they are not present”, is the opinion of the Vijnānavādī Buddhists. But this is not acceptable. Since one makes an effort to pick up the silver, it must be there. However, on examination of the shell it is realised that the silver is not there. Therefore, the silver seen in the shell is of the nature which cannot be described unambiguously such as ‘it is’ or ‘it is not’. In the same way the world superimposed on the *pratyagātman* is *sadasadbhyām anirvacaniyā* - that which cannot be described unambiguously as ‘it is’ or ‘it is not’.

This is not in accordance with the Bhāṣya because in the previous section the Bhāṣhyakara has clearly said ‘प्रत्येति एव हि केवलं रजतम् इति न तु तत्र रजतम् अस्ति’ - That there is silver is wrong knowledge. Silver is not at all in the shell. Therefore, the silver seen in the shell is *asat* and that it is seen is wrong knowledge. This is the unambiguous description of silver. So how can the statement that ‘this is *mithyā* silver about which it cannot be said whether it is there or not’ be made? A thing does not admit of options like ‘thus, not thus’, ‘exists, does not exist’. Options are a product of the *buddhi*. The actual knowledge about an object is not dependent on the *buddhi*, but only on the object itself. Indeed, in respect of one and the same pillar, the true cognition cannot be of the type: ‘It is a pillar, or something else, or a man’. In this case, ‘something else or a man’ is *mithyā jñāna*. ‘It is certainly a pillar’ is the true cognition because this knowledge depends only on the object itself and not the *buddhi* of the viewer - ‘न तु वस्त्वेवम् नैवम् अस्ति न अस्ति इति वा विकल्प्यते। विकल्पनाः तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः। न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम्। किं तर्हि? वस्तुतन्त्रम् एव तत्। नहि स्थाणुः एकस्मिन् स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा अन्यो वा इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति। तत्र पुरुषः अन्यो वा इति मिथ्याज्ञानम्। स्थाणुः एव इति तत्त्वज्ञानं वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्’ (Sū Bh. 1.1.2). In the objects *jīva* etc. in one and the same *dharmī* there cannot be two opposing *dharmas* simultaneously like existence and non-existence. If there is the *dharma* of existence, there cannot be the other *dharma* of non-existence. Similarly, non-existence cannot be reconciled with existence. So, this

arhata siddhānta is not rational - 'जीवादिषु पदार्थेषु एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः विरुद्धधर्मयोः असंभवात्, सत्त्वे चैकस्मिन् धर्मे असत्त्वस्य धर्मान्तरस्य असंभवात्, असत्त्वे च एवं सत्त्वस्य असंभवात् असंगतमिदं अर्हंतं मतम्' (Sū. Bh. 2.2.23). For same reason, this *khyāti* is also irrational.

Therefore *sadasadbhyam anirvacanīyatva* - ambiguity in the description of existence or non-existence - is a meaningless imagination born out of the mixing up of right and wrong knowledge; it is not the knowledge of an existent object. If the silver seen in the shell is of a third variety which is neither existent nor non-existent, then its determination requires a seventh *pramāṇa* (other than the six available *pramāṇas*). For an existent object, its existence is fixed by one of the five *pramāṇas* - direct perception, inference, analogy, presumption or śruti and that which is not not an object for any of these five *pramāṇas* is deemed to be non-existent - 'उपलब्धि लक्षण प्राप्तस्य अनुपलब्धेः अभावः वसत्त्वन्तरस्य' (Sū. Bh. 2.2.17).

For some people, there is another *pramāṇa* which determines the non-existence of a thing - the *anupalabdhi pramāṇa*. Agreeing on this, there are a total of six *pramāṇas*, five for existence and one for non-existence. This ambiguous silver being neither, its existence can be fixed only by a seventh *pramāṇa*. But it is not right to search for a *pramāṇa* to decide the existence of an imagined object. 'न अयं साधुः अध्यवसायः यतः प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वकौ संभवासंभवौ अवधार्येते न पुनः संभवासंभवपूर्विके प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती' - Such a decision is not proper because it is through the functioning or non-functioning of a *pramāṇa* that the existence or non-existence of an object is established and not vice-versa, i.e. from existence or non-existence the functioning or non-functioning of a *pramāṇa* is to be decided (Sū. Bh. 2.2.28).

'There is no need for a seventh *pramāṇa*; the existence of this ambiguous silver is established through direct perception, inference, presumption and śruti also', he thus continues with his obstinate claim.

'This is wrong because, these *pramāṇas* are applicable only to things which exist. If they were applicable to even objects which are neither existing nor non-existing, who will have faith in these *pramāṇas*? Moreover, when the existence of an object is proved through one *pramāṇa*, one does not look for another *pramāṇa* to prove it. Your saying that all the four *pramāṇas* can prove its existence shows that you yourself have doubts about its existence.*

*But Naiyayikas (logicians) say that there could be several *pramāṇas* for the same object; they are therefore called *pramāṇa samplavavādis*.

'For you, there is another question: you say that the *jagat*, superimposed on the *pratyagātman* is *sadasadbhyām anirvacanīya*. Conversely, when the *pratyagātman* is superimposed on the *jagat*, is he also *sadasadbhyām anirvacanīya*? Is *pratyagātman* also subject to the ambiguity whether he exists or does not exist? Such imaginations are absurd.*

Objection: 'It is well known that the *jagat* is *tatvānyatoābhyām anirvacanīya* (Sū.Bh.2.1.27). Here *tat* is *sat* and *anyat* is *asat*. Therefore, if we say we have not said anything new, then?'

Answer: *Tatvānyatoābhyām anirvacanīyatva* propounded by Bhāṣyakāra is in no way related to the *sadasadbhyām anirvacanīyatva* propounded by you. It is entirely different. In Bhāṣyakāra's *kārya-kāraṇa-ananyatva* (the non-difference between effect and cause) *tat* represents the *upādāna kāraṇa* (the material cause) while *anyat* refers to its *kārya* (effect). *Ananyatva* (non-difference) is the relation between the two 'कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम्' - Effect is not different from cause but cause is different from effect (Sū. Bh. 2.1.19). This *kārya* is not *asat* like the silver seen in the shell; it is only *anṛta*; that is, subject to change; it is *vyavahārayogya* (capable of transacting) and even when its form is changing it is *ananya* from its non-changing (*satya*) cause. That is why at any one moment there are two ways of viewing the same object: from the point of view of the cause and from point of view of the effect. From the causal point of view, a pot is unchanging-*satya*, i.e. it is nothing but clay only. From the point of view of effect it is *anṛta* (changing) pot. That is why Bhāṣyakāra has called the *kārya* pot *tatvānyatoābhyām anirvacanīya* 'तत्त्वान्यत्वनिरूपणस्य अशक्यत्वम्' - meaning thereby that there is ambiguity in expressing whether it is *tatva* or *anyatva* (different from *tatva*). But there is no cause-effect relationship between shell and

*(**Doubt**): 'In the Gītā (13.12), it is said that Brahman cannot be described as either existing or non-existing - न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते. How is this to be understood in terms of the above discussion? (**Answer**): In the shell-silver issue, it is a matter of *pratyakṣa* - in wrong understanding it is silver and in correct understanding it is shell. But Brahman is a matter for śruti only and not any other *pramāṇa*. However, its import can be understood by reflecting on *prājñā* experienced in *suṣupti*. His existence cannot be conveyed through any word representing some category (*jāti*), action (*kriyā*), quality (*guṇa*) or connection (*sambandha*). However, his existence cannot be denied because it is one's own Self. So, in this sense, it is either *sat* nor *asat*.

silver. The silver seen in the shell cannot be made into different types of ornaments, i.e., it is not *vyavahāra-yogyā*. A fool running to pick up that silver does not bestow on it *vyavahāra-yogyā*. 'कार्यं त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति' - *Karya* in all the three times never ceases to exist (Sū. Bh. 2.1.16). But the silver seen in the shell never existed. If it did not exist even while seen in the shell, then, when else could it have existed?

१५. कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मनि अविषये अध्यासो विषय तद्धर्माणाम्? सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थिते विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति। युष्मत् प्रत्ययापेतस्य च प्रत्यगात्मनि अविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि?

15. 'If so, how can there be *adhyāsa* of an observable or its features on the inner Self which is not an observable? All do *adhyāsa* of an observable on another observable perceived in front. You also assert unobservability of the Self.'

(15.1) Earlier, after defining *adhyāsa*, its feature was described as 'the *dharma* of one superimposed on another'. Two examples were given, one for each of the two *adhyāsas*. But when these examples are used to explain the *adhyāsa* of the *kṣetra* on *kṣetrajñā*, then two objections are raised: In the shell-silver example, both shell and silver are *pratyakṣa*. Therefore, while seeing the shell, the *adhyāsa* of silver on it is possible. But the *pratyagātman prājñā*, unlike the shell, is not available for *pratyakṣa*. Therefore, the *adhyāsa* of *kṣetra* on *kṣetrajñā* is not possible. This is the first objection. The second objection is as follows: The *pratyagātman* is not a *viśaya* but only the *viśayi*. He is unrelated to all *viśayas*. Therefore, *adhyāsa* is not possible.

१६. उच्यते। न तावत् एकान्तेन अविषयः अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः।

16. The reply is - Not unobservable as a rule because, it is the well known experience of everyone that he is an object of I-awareness.

(16.1) The *siddhānti* answers: The objection that because the *prājñā* is not a *viśaya* and therefore *adhyāsa* is not possible, is taken up first. It is true that *prājñā* is the *viśayī* and not a *viśaya* - but not as a rule; because, *prājñā* is being known through 'I - awareness'. It is true that in *suṣupti* there is no awareness of any type. Therefore, when anyone is asked, 'How were you in *suṣupti*?' He would only say 'I do not know'. Indra also said: 'नाहं खल्वयमेवं सम्प्रत्यात्मानं जानाति अयम् अहम् अस्मि इति नो एवमानि भूतानि।

विनाशम् एव अपीतो भवति । नाहमत्र भोग्यं पश्यामि' - At that time he does not know himself nor other things. He gets destroyed. I do not see anything useful here (Cā. 8.11.1). Indra is very intelligent. Therefore, he said to Prajāpati: 'He is not understanding anything' etc., making *prājñā* an object. But ordinary people say, 'I did not know anything', making *prājñā* an object non-different from oneself. That is, the *prājñā* who is not an object for 'I-awareness', is made an object of 'I-awareness'. Thus, *prājñā* for the very intelligent is knowable only, but for the unintelligent, he is the knower and also a knowable. Irrespective of the fact that one is intelligent or not, the *prājñā* is in the immediate awareness of both. He is *aparokṣa*, i.e., neither directly perceived as an object nor indirectly conjectured; but well known as the inside Self.

(16.2) Question: How can *prājñā*, who is the knower, become a known?

Answer: The *jīva* does not know the *prājñā* clearly though he is himself. *Jīva* identifies himself as the knower only through his activity of knowing during wakefulness or dreams and enjoys material pleasures or their memories respectively. In *suṣupti*, there is neither the activity of knowing nor the activity of enjoying. Therefore, he gets the feeling that he does not exist or is destroyed. Actually, knowership in the absence of the activity of knowing and being blissfully happy in the absence of the activity of enjoyment are his natures. Not knowing this, and accustomed to his *adhyāsa* in the *buddhi*, he grasps himself negatively in *suṣupti* through non-action saying 'I did not know anything. I slept happily'*.

An example for this is as follows: When a person loses his eyes, he will be seeing the loss of the eyes and the consequent loss of the activity of seeing. But due to his habit of the superimposition of the eyes on himself he says: 'I am blind, I cannot see'. In the same way, when he is awake, he understands himself in *suṣupti* negatively through inaction because of not knowing his inherent nature. As a result of making himself a knowable object in this way, the *adhyāsa* of the body etc. on himself is possible.

१७. न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरम् अध्यसितव्य-
मिति। अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि हि आकाशे बालाः तलमलिनतादि अध्यस्यन्ति।

17. (And) there is no rule that an observable can be superimposed only on

*In this way he superimposes knowership and enjoyership on the *prājñā*, who is actually neither knower nor enjoyer.

an observable perceived in front; children do *adhyāsa* of (a) surface and impurity on the sky even though the sky is not perceived in front.

(17.1) Even if the *adhiṣṭhāna* is not *pratyakṣa*, *adhyāsa* is possible. For example, *ākāśa* has no shape or colour; so, unlike the shell it is not *pratyakṣa*. Without any *upādhi* (like air), *ākāśa* is not an object for the ear also. Yet, ignorant people superimpose on the *ākāśa* a blue color and the shape of an inverted hemisphere. In actuality, when dust, smoke etc. present in the *ākāśa* scatter the sunlight, only then does the predominant blue color become visible (Mā. Kā. 3.8). Then, just like a transparent crystal appears blue because of a blue flower in the background, this scattered blue color makes the colourless *ākāśa* seem blue. Ignorant people then understand the *ākāśa* to be blue. This is *adhyāsa* because it is actually not blue. Similarly, though the *ākāśa* appears like an inverted hemisphere, it has actually no shape. Therefore, that *ākāśa* is like an inverted hemisphere is also *adhyāsa* only.

१८. एवम् अविबुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यपि अनात्माध्यासः ।

18. In this way, there is no contradiction in the *adhyāsa* of the non-Self on the inner-Self.

(18.1) Two objections had been raised about *adhyāsa* on the *pratyagātman*. They are: That *pratyagātman* is not a *viśaya* and that he is not *pratyakṣa*—and so *adhyāsa* is not possible. After refuting them, it was proved that the *adhyāsa* of *anātman* in *prājña* is possible. Here, *anātman* means the *kṣetra* of body etc, distinctly different from the *prājña*.

१९. तमेतम् एवं लक्षणं अध्यासं पंडिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते। तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्यामाहुः। तत्र एवं सति यत्र यदध्यासः तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न संबध्यते।

19. Scholars consider *adhyāsa* of this nature as *avidyā*. Recognition of its distinctiveness and the determination of the nature of that thing—they call as *vidyā*. This being so, where there is *adhyāsa* of one on another, even an iota of the good or the bad of the one does not stick to the other.

(19.1) The *ajñāna* of the shell is the cause of the *adhyāsa* of silver in it. In the same way, it is the *ajñāna* of the *adhiṣṭhāna* which is the cause of *adhyāsa* anywhere.

Adhyāsa is the effect of this *ajñāna*. But here *adhyāsa* itself is called *avidyā*. How is it possible? It is like this: Just as an act of madness is also called madness, many times a *kārya* is often given the name of its *kāraṇa*. It is in this sense that *adhyāsa* has been called *avidyā* here. However, when it is said that *avidyā* is the *kāraṇa* of *adhyāsa*, it does not mean that it is the *nimitta* or *upadāna*; the word *kāraṇa* is used in the sense of reason. Because of the reason that the inherent nature of the *adhiṣṭhāna* is unknown, one wrongly understands it on the basis of some similarity. Not knowing the inherent nature of the *adhiṣṭhāna* is *ajñāna* - the absence of the knowledge of its inherent nature. This *ajñāna* is lost with the knowledge of the *adhiṣṭhāna*; with this the *adhyāsa* is also lost. Bhāṣyakāra conveys this as follows: 'यदि ज्ञानाभावः यदि संशयज्ञानं यदि विपरीतज्ञानं वा उच्यते अज्ञानम् इति, सर्वं हि तत् ज्ञानेन एव निवर्त्यते' - Whether it is the absence of *jñāna*, or doubtful *jñāna*, or wrong *jñāna*, whichever of these is called *ajñāna*, all of them are destroyed by *jñāna* only (Br Bh 3.3.1). Here *jñānābhāva* is the literal meaning of the word *ajñāna*, that it is *jñāna-virodhī* is its intended meaning. Further, *ajñāna* and *avidyā* are one and the same. 'भाव प्रतियोगी हि अभावः' - *Vidyā pratiyogi* is *avidyā*' (Taittiriya Bhāṣya Introduction).

(19.2) Next, determination of the *swarūpa* of the object is *vidyā*. Now which is the object spoken of here? That which is the *adhiṣṭhāna* for *adhyāsa*. In the first *adhyāsa*, *prājñā* is the *adhiṣṭhāna*, in the reverse *adhyāsa*, *jagat* is the *adhiṣṭhāna*. Both these are the same *Ātman*. He is the object whose *swarūpa* is to be known to get rid of *adhyāsa*. *Jagat* and *prājñā* i.e. *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā*, are both two forms of this same *Ātman*. These forms are not superimposed by the *kṣetrajñā* on the *ātman*; it is impossible for the *jīva* to do *adhyāsa* in *Ātman*. This will be discussed later (section 25.1). These two are forms willingly taken up by *Ātman* for the *bhoga* and *apavarga* of *kṣetrajñā*. *Kṣetra* is *kārya-rūpa*, while *kṣetrajñā* is *akārya-rūpa*. Just as clay appears in the form of pots etc, *Ātman* manifesting through forms is *kṣetra*. Just as clay continues to be clay though appearing in the form of pots etc, *kṣetra* continues to be *Ātman* though appearing with forms.

Further, *kṣetrajñā* is the manifestation of *Ātman*, conditioned by the *upādhi* of *prāṇa*. Just as the crystal continues to be transparent though appearing as coloured because of the *upādhi* of a flower, *kṣetrajñā* is indeed *nirupādhik-ātman*, though appearing otherwise in association with *upādhi*. This *kṣetrajñā* has done the *adhyāsa* of the distinctly different *kṣetra* on himself, due to *avidyā*. This is clearly visible in his activities during *jāgrat* and *swapna*. In *suṣupti* there is no *adhyāsa* because there is

no connection of the *kṣetrajñā* with the *kṣetra*. 'सुषुप्तकाले स्वेन आत्मना सता संपन्नः सन् सम्यक् प्रसीदतीति जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोःविषयेन्द्रियसंयोगजातं कालुष्यं जहाति' - During *susupti* (the *jīva*) is totally contented because he is merged in his own *sad-ātman*. Therefore, he is free from all faults which appear in *jāgrat* and *swapna* due to his association with *viṣaya* and *indriyas* (Cā. Bh. 8.3.4). However, the absence of the *vidyā* that he is *Ātman* remains. For obtaining the *jñāna* of *Ātman*, this is the only obstruction. 'तत्त्व अप्रतिबोधमात्रमेव हि बीजं प्राज्ञत्वे निमित्तम्' - The only reason for *prājñatva* is the ignorance of *tattva* (Mā. Kā. Bh. 1.11). The moment he understands that he is *Ātman* through *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhysāna* of *śāstra* sentences, his *prājñatva* is also lost. This is the *vidyā* of *vastu-swarūpa-avadhāraṇa* discussed here.

Question: Is not *agrahaṇa* (absence of *vidyā*), a *kṣetradharma*? How can there be *agrahaṇa* in the *kṣetrajñā* who is not at all connected with the *kṣetra*?

Answer: 'अग्रहणसंशय विपरीतप्रत्ययाः सनिमिताः करणस्यैव कस्यचिद् भवितुम् अर्हन्ति, न ज्ञातुः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य' - The *pratyayās* of lack of knowledge, wrong knowledge and doubtful knowledge are all *dharmas* of some *karaṇas* only and not of *kṣetrajñā*. Not only this. The *vidyāpratyaya* which is the destroyer of all these three types of *avidyā*, is also a *dharma* of the *kṣetra* (G. Bh. 2.21), because it is obtained only through the mind 'मनसैवानुदष्टव्यम्' (Br.Bh. 4.4.16).

Objection: "No. *Avidyā* is of *kṣetrajñā*. Since he is the *jñāta* of *vidyā*, *avidyā* has to be his. For example, when one is unable to see an object in front, he understands that he is blind. Similarly, *kṣetrajñā* who is in grief is the one who is having *avidyā*."

Clarification: It is not like that because, the cause for not seeing the object could be different. If the knower is to be decided as blind when an object in front is not being seen, the connection of the knower with the object is to be determined by the knower himself. It cannot be determined by some other knower. When he is engaged in looking at the object, he cannot simultaneously determine his connection with it also. So, it is not possible to conclude that the knower is blind. If he wants to infer his blindness he must simultaneously engage himself in looking at the eye and his own connection with it. This is again not possible. So, he has to take the next steps of simultaneously engaging himself in seeing the mind and his connection with it, the *buddhi* and his connection with it and so on. This is an endless regression. To avoid it, he has to concede that he is always the seer and the cause for not seeing the object lies somewhere only in the *kṣetra*. Nevertheless, as long as *adhyāsa* is present in his *jāgrat* and *swapna*, *agrahaṇa* in *kṣetrajñā* is accepted. (G.Bh. 13.2)

(19.3) Next point we note is this: Just as the shell remains undefiled by the *adhyāsa* of silver in it, the *anātman's adhyāsa* does not bring about even a tinge of defilement in the *swarūpa* of *pratyagātman*. That is, the faults of *anṛtatva*, *jaḍatva* and *parichinatva* of the *anātman* do not even touch the *pratyagātman*. Similarly, in the reverse case, the *adhyāsa* of the *dharmas* of the *pratyagātman* on the *anātmabuddhi* and outside objects does not bring *ātmatva* in them. That is, the *ānandamayatva* and *jñātṛva* of the *pratyagātman* are not acquired by them.

२०. तमेतम् अविद्याख्यम् आत्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेय व्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः। सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि। कथं पुनः अविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि च इति? उच्यते। देहेन्द्रियादिषु अहं ममाभिमान रहितस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। न हि इन्द्रियाणि अनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः संभवति। न च अधिष्ठानमन्तरेण इन्द्रियाणां व्यवहारः संभवति। न च अनध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चित् व्याप्रियते। न च एतस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन् असति असंगस्य आत्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते। न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाण-प्रवृत्तिरस्ति। तस्मात् अविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि च।

20. All worldly and Vedic activities involving the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the corresponding objects (*prameya*) are indulged only presupposing this mutual superimposition called *avidyā*; so also the *śāstras* - scriptures - dealing with injunction (*vidhi*), prohibition (*niṣedha*) and emancipation (*mokṣa*). How again, *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa*—direct perception etc. and *śāstras* are matters applicable (only) to one with *avidyā*? We say: *pramāṇas* do not work in the case of one who cannot have knowership, because of the lack of conceit of 'I' and 'mine' in the body, in the sense organs etc. Activity of direct perception etc. is not possible without employing the sense organs. Sense organs cannot function without the body. (Therefore) no one without *adhyāsa* (in them) can function through the body. When none of these is present, the unattached *Ātman* cannot become a knower. Without the knower, the *pramāṇa* cannot function. Therefore, *pramāṇas* such as direct perception etc. and the *śāstra* are matters related only to one with *avidyā*.

20.1 The purpose of this section is to show that all *vyavahāra* takes place only on the basis of *adhyāsa*. *Adhyāsa* of what on whom? ‘आत्मानात्मनोः इतरेतराध्यासः’ - of the *Ātman* on the *anātman* and conversely’. Here it is very clear that the *Ātman* is *kṣetrajñā* and the *anātman* is *kṣetra*. ‘आत्मशब्दस्य निरुपपदस्य प्रत्यगात्मनि गवादि शब्दवत् निरूढत्वात्’ - Like the word cow etc, the word *Ātman* without any prefix refers only to *pratyagātman*’ (Cā. Bh. 6.8.7). In phrases like *Ātma-anātma viveka* etc the same rule applies. The literal meaning of *Ātman* without a prefix cannot refer to the *Śuddhātman* because, being *sarvātman* there is nothing like *anātman* for him. Every *vyavahāra*, is meant for *hāna*—i.e. rejecting something disliked or *upādāna*—obtaining something which is liked. One who does not have such desires, will not be engaging himself in any *vyavahāra*. Before starting a *vyavahāra*, one has to first decide through *pramāṇa* what is *heya* (that which is to be rejected) and *upādeya* (to be accepted). The one who takes decision about the *prameya* on the basis of the *pramāṇa* is called the *pramāta*. *Pramāṭṛtva* (sense of being the *pramāta*) is born out of *adhyāsa* only. How? In this way: The one who does *adhyāsa* of *karaṇakriya* (activity of the *karaṇas* like eyes, ears mind etc) on himself is the *pramāta* who says ‘I saw, I heard, I decided’ etc. That is, only one who has *abhimāna* (attachment to the body, senses and *buddhi*) can alone become the *pramāta*. The *kṣetrajñā*’s *abhimāna* in the *kṣetra* is *adhyāsa*—the union of *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā*. This is the basis of all *vyavahāra*. That is why all *vyavahāra* is *avidyaka* (due to *avidya*). Therefore, they are only for the ignorant. Later, by comparing with the behavior of beasts, that the *vyavahāra* of human beings is also *avidyaka* is reinforced.*

२१. पश्वादिभिश्च अविशेषात्। यथा हि पश्वादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां संबन्धे सति शब्दादि विज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते। यथा दंडोद्यतकरं पुरुषम् अभिमुखमुपलभ्य मां हन्तुमयमिच्छति इति पलायितुमारभन्ते। हरिततृण पूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रति अभिमुखी भवन्ति। एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः क्रूरदृष्टीन् आक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान् बलवतः उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान् प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते। अतः समानः पश्वादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेय व्यवहारः। पश्वादीनां च प्रसिद्धः

*In this paragraph of the *Bhāṣya*, the meaning of the word *vyutpanna-cittāḥ* is ‘intelligent people with discriminating ability’ and not *jñānīs* - as some say - because of their similarity with beasts in their behavioral pattern.

अविवेकपुरस्सरः प्रत्यक्षादि व्यवहारः। तत्सामान्यदर्शनात् व्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादि व्यवहारः तत्कालः समानः इति निश्चीयते।

21. Also because not being different from beasts etc. Just like when the ears etc. come into contact with sound etc. if the cognition of sound etc. is unfavourable they withdraw from it and if the sound is favorable they proceed towards it, just as (when) they see a man with a raised stick in hand they run away thinking 'he desires to kill me', but approach him when they see him with his hand full of green grass. In the same way, men - even the intelligent - recede in the presence of shouting sturdy (people) of fierce looks with raised swords, but approach men of opposite nature. Therefore, the *pramāṇa-prameya* activity of men is the same as that of the beasts. It is well-known that the activity of beasts with regard to direct perception etc, is without discrimination. Because of this apparent similarity, it can be concluded that during the activity of *pratyakṣa* etc of even wise people, the *vyavahāra* is the same.

(21.1) Question: If all *vyavahāra* is due to *avidyā*, how to explain the *vyavahāra* that is seen in a *jñāni*?

Answer: It happens through *prakṛti* and not due to *avidyā*. 'प्रकृतिः च त्रिगुणात्मिका सर्वकार्यकरण विषयाकारेण परिणता पुरुषस्य भोगापवर्गार्थकर्तव्यतया देहेन्द्रियाद्याकारेण संहन्यते' - The *prakṛti* of three *guṇas* modifies into the shapes of all the *kārya*, *karāṇa* and objects and manifests as the body, *indriyas* etc for man's worldly enjoyment and *mokṣa* (G. Bh. Introduction to 13th Chapter). 'यदि तावत् भौतिकानि करणानि ततः भूतोत्पत्ति प्रलयाभ्याम् एव एषाम् उत्पत्तिप्रलयौ भवतः' - The physical *karāṇas* of the body are created along with the creation of the other objects (Sū. Bh 2.3.15). Some people say that the *karāṇas* are made of *tanmātras*. This is not correct. The *tanmātras* belong to *prakṛti*, while the *karāṇas* are products of the *trivṛtkṛta vikṛti*. 'Karāṇa and *viṣaya* belong to same category, not to different categories' (Br. Bh. 2.4.11). That is why the *karāṇas* interact only with their respective *viṣayas*. When the *anṛta rūpa* and the *anṛta netra* come in contact, the *anṛta pratyaya* of the *rūpa* is born in *anṛta buddhi*. The *pratyayas* of *śabda* etc are also born in the same way. This is an activity of the *prakṛti*, not of the *pūruṣa*. *Prakṛtistha puruṣa* i.e. one who thinks he is the *prakṛti*, i.e. the one having *avidyā*—considers himself a *pramāta*. But the *jñāni* understands that 'इन्द्रियाणि इन्द्रियाथेषु वर्तन्ते इति धारयन्' - The *indriyas*

are interacting with their corresponding objects (Gītā 3.28), and remains as a witness for this action. This means that the *vyavahāra* in his body happens without his doership. 'लोकव्यवहार सामान्यदर्शनेन तु लौकिकैः आरोपितकर्तृत्वे भिक्षाटनादौ कर्मणि कर्ता भवति स्वानुभवेन तु शास्त्रप्रमाणजनितेन अकर्ता एव' - Since it appears as the *vyavahāra* of common people, in their view, while roaming around for his *bhikṣa*, he too is a doer; But in his personal realization brought about by the *śāstra pramāṇa* he is a non-doer only (G. Bh. 4.22).

21.2 In this way, *prakṛti* is the cause for the execution of *karma*. Further, how the motivation for starting an action is produced in his *karaṇas* is to be told. Motivation to initiate *karma* is due to his *prārabdha*. 'शरीरारम्भकस्य कर्मणः नियतफलत्वात् सम्यग्ज्ञानप्राप्तौ अपि अवश्यम्भाविनी प्रवृत्तिः वाङ्मनःकायानाम् लब्धवृत्तेः कर्मणः बलीयस्त्वात् मुक्तेष्वादि प्रवृत्तिवत्' - The *prārabdha* that is the cause for the body, surely brings about its fruit even though there is right knowledge and that is responsible for the motivation seen in his speech, mind and body. This is because the *karma* is more powerful like a released arrow (Br.Bh. 1.4.7).

(21.3) Question: Since motivation is caused by *avidyā*, can it be said that there is a remnant of *avidyā* in *jñānī*?

Answer: It is not so. In the case of the *jñānī*, the motivation occurs only in his *karaṇas*; not in him. As long as the momentum of *prārabdha* exists - i.e., till the present body falls off—the *vyavahāra*, which is *kṣetra dharma* continues. Seeing this, if others think that he may not have *Ātma-jñāna*, it is meaningless. 'कथं हि एकस्य स्वहृदयप्रत्ययं ब्रह्मवेदनं देहधारणं च अपरेण प्रतिक्षेप्तुं शक्येत? श्रुतिस्मृतिषु च स्थितप्रज्ञलक्षणनिर्देशेन एतत् एव निरुच्यते' - How can some other person deny the coexistence of *Brahman*-realization with the bodily activity which is his personal experience. It is precisely this situation that is explained as the features of *sthithaprajña* in *śrutis* and *smṛtis* (Sū. Bh. 4.1.15).

(21.4) In this way in *vyavahāra*, whether it is a *jñānī* or an *ajñānī*, *pravṛtti* and *prakṛti* both are there. What is the contribution of each and how much? To decide this we move forward. *Pravṛtti* is the cause for starting of any *karma*. But for the *karma* to happen, *prakṛti* is the cause. That is for the *karma*, *pravṛtti* is the *nimitta kāraṇa* (essential cause) and *prakṛti* is the *upādāna kāraṇa* (material cause). *Avidyā* produces *pravṛtti* in the form 'I have to do this *karma*' and, when the *karma* is over, it generates *kartṛtva* (doership) in the form 'I have done this *karma*'. But during the process when *karma* is being done *avidyā* is not be the cause, since any *kārya* takes place because of *prakṛti*. 'प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः। अहङ्कार विमूढात्मा कर्ता अहम् इति

मन्यते' (Gītā 3.27). Therefore, a *sādhaka* has to decide on the basis of the *śāstras* which *karma* is worth doing 'तस्मात् शास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ' (Gītā 16.24). Then for that *karma*, he has to become only the *nimitta* (instrument to carry it out) 'निमित्तमात्रं भव' (Gītā 11.33). He should not be attached to the fruits of the *karma* 'मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भूः' (Gītā 2.47). As a result of this he gains *citta śuddhi* (purity of mind, *buddhi* and *citta*) which prepares the way for his obtaining *vidyā*.

(21.5) In this way both *avidyā* and *prakṛti* are jointly responsible for any activity. This combination, whether in the activity of *jīva* or *Īśwara*, is called *avidyā-lakṣaṇa prakṛti* (G. Bh 5.14). Referring to *Īśwara's* activity of creation etc, it is also called *avidyā-samyukta prakṛti* i.e. *avidyā* coupled with *prakṛti* 'अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम्' (G. Bh. 7.4). *Īśwara* does not have *pravṛtti* because He has no *avidyā*. Therefore, *śruti* says - 'अनेन जीवेनात्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' - I will create the names and forms by entering into the *jīva-ātman'* (Cā. 6.3.2). Thus getting *pravṛtti* through *jīva*, *Īśwara* handles the activity of creation etc. This combination of *jīva's avidyā* with *māyā* is known as *Īśwara's ahaṅkāra*. Incidentally, this demonstrates that *avidyā* and *prakṛti* are not synonymous.

By now it has been established that all worldly activities (*vyavahāra*) are based on *avidyā*. But, the Vedic activities are of a different type; i.e. they are based on an awareness that the *kṣetrajña* is different from the *kṣetra*. In the next section it is demonstrated that though it is of a different type, even Vedic activities are based on *avidyā*.

२२. शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी न अविदित्वा आत्मनः परलोक-संबंधम् अधिक्रियते, तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यम् अज्ञानायाद्यतीतम् अपेत ब्रह्मक्षेत्रादिभेदम् असंसारी आत्मतत्त्वम् अधिकारे अपेक्ष्यते। अनुपयोगात् अधिकार विरोधाच्च। प्राक्च तथा भूतात्मविज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रम् अविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते। तथा हि "ब्राह्मणो यजेत" इत्यादीनि शास्त्राणि आत्मनि वर्णाश्रमवयोऽवस्थादि विशेषाध्यासम् आश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते।

22. It is true, that one who does not know that he can have contact with other worlds, could get the eligibility to do scriptural activities intentionally. Nevertheless, the eligibility does not require (the knowledge of) the essence

Ātman known only through Vedānta which transcends hunger etc, is free from differentiations of Brāhmaṇa Kṣatriya etc, free from birth and death—because, it is not useful and also opposed to the eligibility (for doing *karma*). *Śāstras* which operate earlier to the knowledge of the *Ātman*, cannot be the topic of one other than the ignorant. That is why *śāstras* like ‘Brāhmaṇa shall do *yajña*’ etc proceeds on the basis of *adhyāsa* in the *Ātman* like caste, state of life, age, condition etc.

(22.1) It is very clear that *adhyāsa* in the body is responsible for all worldly activities because they are based on the desire for woman, home etc. But in Vedic activities it is not so; there is some difference. For activities prescribed by the *śruti* like *Jyotiṣṭoma* etc done with the desire of heaven etc and activities prescribed by the *smṛtis* like *śrāddha*, *tarpaṇa* etc done with desire of *pitṛ-loka* etc, are based on the faith that one is different from the body. This is a faith developed on the basis of *śāstra*. But, that one is different from the body is actually experienced in *suṣupti*. Just as *adhyāsa* continues after waking up inspite of the experience of *suṣupti*, it continues even for him who is having this faith. For that matter, the desire for a superior body which gives greater pleasure and comforts is the basis for performing the activities prescribed by *śruti* and *smṛti*. With a resolution to obtain *swarga* etc one does these activities intentionally. For such people, *śāstras* prescribe a *karma* for each such desire. The competence for *karma* is prescribed like this - ‘अर्थी समर्थो विद्वान् शास्त्रेण अविपर्युदस्तः’ - One who is desirous of the fruit, capable of performing the *karma*, knows the correct procedures to be followed and one not prohibited by the *śāstra*, can perform that particular *karma*.

Therefore, *karma* is based on differences like one’s *varṇa* (*brāhmaṇa* etc), *āśrama* (*brahmacarya* etc), one’s age, situation etc. For example, a widower is not competent to do many of these activities. A *brāhmaṇa* cannot do the Rājasūya *yajña* etc. Therefore, Vedic *karma* is also based on *avidyā*, i.e. it is meant only for one who has *avidyā*. *Ātma-vidyā* is not useful for *karma*. It is indeed even against *karma*. There is meaning for *karma* till he has not understood that he is the *Ātman*, which is known only through the Upaniṣads, which is free from the problems of the body like hunger etc, above the differences of *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya* etc and free from worldly life; not after he has understood the *Ātman*. To grasp the meaning of these statements, it is sufficient to remember the features of *prājña* during *suṣupti*. He has no instruments,

no coming and going and he is brimful of *ānanda*. How can he do *karma*? Why would he do it? In this way, when one is becoming free from *karma* even by staying in *prājñatva*, how is it possible to have any connection with *karma*, when one stays in the *Ātman* who is *sākṣi* even for the *prājña*. It is impossible.

(22.2) Next is about *niṣkāma karma*. *Karma* done with desire strengthens *adhyāsa*; conversely, *karma* done without desire helps to destroy *adhyāsa*. *Karma* done without a desire to enjoy its fruit and done exclusively for pleasing *Īśvara* bestows the grace of *Īśvara* which is absolutely necessary for *Ātma-vidyā*. From this results *vairāgya*. Later on, *śāstras* prescribe *dhyāna karma* as internal *sādhana*. Though *niṣkāma karma* and *dhyāna* both are *karma*, they purify the *buddhi* and facilitate the obtaining of knowledge. In this way, whatever the *karma*, it concerns only the one with *avidyā*; not the one having *vidyā*.

२३. अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिन् तद्बुद्धिः इत्यवोचाम। तद्यथा पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा अहमेव विकलः सकलो वा इति बाह्य धर्मान् आत्मनि अध्यस्यति। तथा देहधर्मान् स्थूलोऽहम् कृशोऽहम् गौरोऽहम् तिष्ठामि गच्छामि लंघयामि च इति। तथा इंद्रियधर्मान् मूकः काणः क्लीबः बधिरः अन्धोऽहम् इति। तथा अन्तःकरण धर्मान् काम संकल्प विचिकित्सा अध्यवसायादीन्। एवम् अहंप्रत्ययिनम् अशेषस्वप्नप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मानि अध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेण अन्तःकरणादिषु अध्यस्यति।

23. We said that *adhyāsa* is the cognition as 'that' which it is not. It is like: features of persons outside, like son, wife etc who are ill or well are superimposed on himself (and he says) 'I am myself ill or well'. Similarly, the features of the body in 'I am fat', 'I am lean', 'I am fair', 'I stand', 'I go', 'I jump'. Similarly, the features of the senses in 'I am dumb, one-eyed, impotent, deaf, blind'. Similarly, the features of the internal organ viz desire, resolve, doubt, determination. In this way, imposes the 'conceited I' on the inner *Ātman* which is the witness of all his thoughts and in the reverse way, superimposes the all-witnessing inner *Ātman* on the internal organs etc.

(23.1) {In this section, Bhāṣyakāra is pinpointing the *adhyasta*, the *adhiṣṭhāna* and the *adhyāsaka* in the *adhyāsas* of *kṣetra* in *kṣetrajña* and of *kṣetra* in *kṣetra*}. Concluding the discussion on the *adhyāsa* which is done in *prājña*, Bhāṣyakāra

describes its variety step by step starting from the outside son, wife etc, who literally belong to the *yusmat-pratyaya-gocara* class, to the innermost *antaḥkaraṇa*. ‘Who is doing this *adhyāsa*?’ The *aham-pratyayī*. ‘In whom is he doing it?’ In the *pratyagātman*. ‘Who are these two (*aham-pratyayī* and *pratyag-ātman*)? People have imagined that *ahamkāra* is the *aham-pratyayī* and *pratyag-ātman* is the *Śuddha-ātman*. To justify their imagination, they are putting forward peculiar arguments. Obviously, they are not agreeing with the sentences of the Bhāṣya. So, their imaginations are plainly wrong. Though it is true that the *aham-pratyaya* appears in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the latter cannot itself become the *aham-pratyayī* because it is *jaḍa*. ‘Them who is the *aham-pratyayī*?—*Atasmin tadbuddhiḥ adhyāsa*. ‘The *buddhi* of that which it is not is *adhyāsa*’. This is a *mithyā pratyaya*. It is born in the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Therefore, the *kṣetrajña* who is having the *upādhi* of the *antaḥkaraṇa* with this *pratyaya* is the *aham-pratyayī*. Since all these *pratyayas* are occurring in *jāgrat*, he is the *bahiṣprajña*. It is he who is doing *adhyāsa*. ‘In whom?’ In the *aśeṣa-svapracāra-sākṣī pratyagātman*. ‘What is *swapracāra*?’ *Mithyā pratyayas* are freely coming and going in the *antaḥkaraṇa*. This free movement is *pracāra*. The *aham-pratyayī* considers the *antaḥkaraṇa* to be himself. Therefore, the *bahiṣprajña*’s desire, volition and doubt is the *swāpracāra*—his own *pracāra*. To say that the *pratyagātman*, who is the *sākṣī* to this is *Ātman*, is not correct because a witness needs something different from him which is to be witnessed. But there is nothing different from the *Ātman*; everything is *Ātman* only. Therefore, *Ātman* cannot be *sākṣī*. Not only this; starting from the external son, wife etc. when Bhāṣyakāra is telling in a sequence the body, the *indriyas*, the *antaḥkaraṇa*, and then pointing out that the *pratyagātman* is the *sākṣī* for all these, then suddenly to jump to the *Śuddhātman* skipping the *prājña* is not proper also. *Prājña* is the *sākṣī* i.e. the *bahiṣprajña* is doing *adhyāsa* of himself in the *prājña*. ‘How is he doing it?’ He does it by saying: ‘I am the knower. I am *prājña*. But during *susupti*, there was no *antaḥkaraṇa*. Therefore, I did not know anything at that time.’ If he had slept leaving his connection with the *karaṇas* intentionally out of his own will, then *prājña* could have been the knower; but it is not so. The *karaṇas*, which cannot even touch *prājña*, have dropped out by themselves. Therefore, to ascribe knowership to *prājña* is not correct. ‘Then, how does *śāstra* ascribe knowership to him?’ Following the *adhyāsa* done by the *bahiṣprajña* due to *avidyā* it tells so for the purpose of teaching. *Prājña* is indeed *Ātman* only; but *avidyā* is the only obstacle in obtaining this knowledge of the oneness of *Ātman*. Due to *avidyā*, the knowership without the action of knowing

is superimposed on *prājñā*. Had the *bahisprajñā* analyzed using presumption (*arthāpatti*) like this: 'Knower should obviously have *jñāna* to know anything. Yet if I did not know anything during *suṣupti*, what could be the reason? Is it the absence of *antaḥkaraṇa* or something else?' Then with the help of the *śāstra*, he would have realized the oneness of *Ātman* beyond knowership. But how can the fool who sees pleasure in *adhyāsa* have a peaceful mind necessary to do this higher thinking?

२४. एवम् अयम् अनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिको अध्यासः मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्व-
प्रवर्तकः सकललोकप्रत्यक्षः। अस्य अनर्थ हेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये
सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते। यथा च अयमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानाम्, तथा वयम् अस्यां
शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः।

24. In this way, the *adhyāsā* of the nature of an illusory cognition which has no beginning, no end, is natural, causing doership and enjoyership, is directly noticed by all. It is for the destruction of this cause of all meaningless nonsense by providing the *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman* that all the Vedāntas start off. That this is the purport of all the Vedāntas, we will demonstrate in this *Śārīraka Mimāṃsā*.

(24.1) After having shown the *swarūpa* of *adhyāsa*, Bhāṣyakāra is now showing the *swarūpa* of *vidyā* which destroys *adhyāsa*. Here *adhyāsa* is said to be beginningless. 'How?' analyzing one's own experience of *suṣupti* the fault of *adhyāsa* is easily understood. Therefore, experience is the *pramāṇa* for *adhyāsa*. *Karma* is due to *adhyāsa* and birth is because of *karma*. Therefore, the *karma* of the previous lives is the cause of the present birth. The previous lives' *karma* is also due to *adhyāsa*. In this way, however far one may go back, *adhyāsa* is seen to be present. Therefore, *adhyāsa* is both known by *pramāṇa* and is also beginningless. It is also endless. 'How is it endless? Is it not destroyed by the *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman*?' Some people answer this question by saying that endless means till one gets *jñāna*. This is not correct because it does not agree with the meaning of the word 'endless'. Even though someone loses *avidyā* by *vidyā*, others still continue to have it. Therefore it is endless.

'Will *adhyāsa* not come to an end when everyone has obtained *vidyā*?' Such a thing can never happen; because, the number of *jīvas* is infinite - 'अयं वै दश च सहस्राणि

बहूनि च अनन्तानि च, प्राणि भेदस्य आनन्त्यात्' - He is himself ten, thousands, many, infinite; because living beings are infinite (Br. Bh. 2.5.19). 'शतं सहस्रमयुतं न्यर्बुदमसंख्येयं स्वमस्मिन् निविष्टम्' - Hundreds, thousands, lakhs, crores, infinite *jīvas* are placed in him (Atharva Saṁhitā 10.8.24), says the *śruti*. Therefore, though many *jīvas* get liberated by *vidyā*, the unliberated continue to exist. 'If all *jīvas* are liberated at once?' This is not possible. Had it been possible, it would have already happened in the infinite time that has already passed. Therefore, *Īśwara* will continue giving births to the *jīvas* with *avidyā*, who will always continue to be there in the world. This takes place due to His *māyā*. Therefore, just as *adhyāsa* is beginningless and endless, *māyā* too should be beginningless and endless.

Naisargika means natural; because it is beginningless it has to be natural.

Sakala-loka pratyakṣa: This *adhyāsa* is *pratyakṣa* i.e., directly perceived because, as already said, experience being the *pramāṇa* for *adhyāsa*, it is immediately understood. This is not possible if *Śuddhātman* is kept in place of *pratyagātman*.

Ātma-Ekātva-Vidyā-Pratipattiḥ: *Adhyāsa* is destroyed only with this. This is because: *Adhyāsa* is the *buddhi* of that which it is not. Therefore, *adhyāsa* expects the duality of 'that' and 'not that'. Here *kṣetrajñā* is 'that' and *kṣetra* is 'not that'. In the reverse *adhyāsa* these also get reversed. Since both these are previously seen things (*pūrva-dṛṣṭa*) there is scope for *adhyāsa*. But not so in the case of *śuddha-ātman*. Both 'that' and 'not that' are *Ātman*. 'ग्रहणग्राहकाभासं विषयिविषयाभासं विज्ञानस्पन्दितं स्पन्दितमिवाविद्यया' - *Vijñāna spandita* is the manifestation of the knower and the known, i.e. the immovable *Ātman* himself appears as these two due to *avidyā* (Mā.Kā.Bh.4.47). Therefore, one who understands that he is *Ātman* has no duality. Therefore, there is no *adhyāsa*. Therefore, there is no *karma*. Therefore, there is no birth. This *Ātman* who is synonymous with *mokṣa* is to be understood only through the Upaniṣads. He is Aupaniṣada Puruṣa. The beginning of Veda is *karma kāṇḍa*, which addresses people with *adhyāsa*. The end part of Veda, i.e., Vedānta are the Upaniṣads. These are addressed to those who want to destroy their *adhyāsa*. Knowing that this *Ātman* is oneself is *mokṣa*.

Śārīraka means the *jīva* who has accepted the *śārīra* i.e. the body as himself. *Mimāṁsā* means a sacred discussion. It is sacred because it is a discussion about *Brahman*. The purport of *Śārīraka Mimāṁsā* is this: In the first two chapters known as *samanvaya* and *avirodha* respectively, it is established that *kṣetra* is *Brahman*. In the

third chapter entitled *sādhana* it is shown that *kṣetrajñā* is also the same *Brahman* and it also tells about *upāsanās* helpful in getting this knowledge. In the last chapter of *phala*, the fruit and features of *mokṣa* are discussed.

(24.2) The steps taken by the *Śārīraka Mimāṃsā* to convey the knowledge of the oneness of *Ātman* are as follows: Through a critical analysis of *adhyāsa* the *kṣetrajñā* is separated from the *kṣetra*. With this, the meaning of the word *tvam* 'you' in the ultimate lesson *Tat-tvam-asi* is determined to be the *pratyagātman* who is *prājñā*. It is everyone's experience that *prājñā* does not know who he is. To make one realize this fault is the first step.

Similarly, the essence of the *jagat* is to be taught, separating the *kṣetra jagat* from its features of change (*anṛtatva*), inertia (*jaḍatva*) and finiteness (*parichinatva*). For this purpose, the *śruti* gives the example of pot, clay etc to show the cause-effect relationship between this essence and the *jagat*. The features of change etc are seen in *jagat* through the forms which are mere words—*vācārambhaṇa*. These forms are an effect, and their cause can only be determined through themselves; there is no other way. What are the features of the cause? There are no features of the effect in the cause. To get the knowledge of the cause, it is not possible to destroy the effect nor is it meaningful to say that one should wait till it gets destroyed on its own. Therefore, even when the effect is visible the cause hidden in it has to be separated from the features of the effect. What is meant by 'separating it?'

It means that through the *śruti pramāṇa* one has to understand that the visible form should also be the cause itself; otherwise it cannot come into existence at all - 'कार्याकारोऽपि कारणस्य आत्मभूत एव अनात्मभूतस्य अनारभ्यत्वात्' (Sū. Bh. 2.1.18). This is the non-difference of cause and effect. The asymmetry in this law has to be noted. Namely 'अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं, न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम्' - Though non-difference of effect-cause is told, effect is of the form of cause, but the cause is not of the form of the effect (Sū. Bh. 2.1.9). This understanding comes from *paramārthadrṣṭi*, i.e. recognizing the effect as nothing but the cause. The moment this understanding is obtained, one will understand that *kṣetra* is nothing but its *upādāna Brahman* even though the *indriyas* experience the features of change etc in *kṣetra*. The meaning of the word 'tat' in the great sentence *tat tvam asi* is this *Brahman*. Though pots are many, they are all one and the same clay, 'ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वम्' - The whole world is *Brahman*

only (Mu 2.2.12). This *Brahman*, contrary to the effect, is *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam*. After this is determined, one has to realize 'तत्त्वमसि' - You are that (Cā. 6.8.7) through *nididhyāsana*. This realization of oneness of *Ātman* is *vidyā* 'बाह्याकार- भेदबुद्धिनिवृत्तिरेव आत्मस्वरूपावलम्बन कारणम्' - Taking support of the *swarūpa* of the *Ātman*, the sense of difference is lost even when seeing the outside forms (G. Bh. 18.50). It is precisely this *sarvātmabhāva*—I am everything—that is *mokṣa* (Br. 4.3.21).

Additional Comments on the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya

(25.1) After this commentary on the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*, some additional comments have to be made. The *asmat-pratyaya-gocara pratyagātman* told in *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* cannot be the fourth *Śuddhātman*, i.e. he is not the *pratyagātman* who is in the experience of the *ajñānī*. The reason is as follows: 'सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' - He is to be sought after, to be discussed (Cā. 8.7.1). Therefore, he is not *pūrva-drṣṭa*, i.e. not seen earlier. Therefore, he cannot be recalled by memory, hence he cannot be *smṛti-rūpa*. 'आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्' - All this is *Ātman* (Cā. 7.25.2). Therefore, there is nothing other than Him. Hence, the sentence defining *adhyāsa* namely *smṛti-rūpa paratra pūrvadrṣṭa avabhāsa* 'स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः' - The appearance elsewhere of a recollected form of a thing seen before is not applicable to *Śuddhātman*. The *Śuddhātman* is invisible, actionless, ungraspable, featureless, unthinkable, indescribable (Mā. 7), i.e. He is without any *dharma*. Therefore, the sentence that '*adhyāsa* is seeing the *dharma* of one in another' *anyatra anya dharma avabhāsana* is also not applicable to *Śuddhātman*. As a rule, He is *viṣayī* and never *viṣaya*. He never becomes *viṣaya* for anybody. 'यः तु आत्मशब्दस्य इतिपरः प्रयोगः स आत्मशब्दप्रत्ययोः आत्मतत्त्वस्य परमार्थतोऽविषयत्वज्ञापनार्थः' - The use of the suffix '*iti*' for the word *Ātman* is intended to remind that really either the word *Ātman* or the *ātma-pratyaya* cannot represent an object (Br. Bh. 1.4.7). One who is not an object even for a *jñānī*, how can He become an object of 'I—awareness' for the *ajñānī*?

Question: 'Due to *adhyāsa*, can he not become an object for 'I—awareness'?'

Answer: No. For *adhyāsa*, *sāmānya jñāna* - just the elementary knowledge of the existence of the *adhiṣṭhāna*, is necessary. *Ajñānī* does not have even that. This is the unobservability (*aviśayatva*) of the *Ātman*. On the contrary, that everyone has this elementary knowledge of the existence of *prājñā* is a common experience. Therefore, only he is *asmat pratyaya gocara* (object for 'I—awareness'). On the other hand, the *Ātman* is his witness. *Bhāṣyakāra* has said this directly as follows: 'ननु आत्मा

अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वात् उपनिषत्सु एव विज्ञायते इति अनुपपन्नम्? न; तत् साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात्' - Since *Ātman* is an object for 'I—awareness' how is it right to say that He is understood only through the Upaniṣads? Not like that. Because, He is witness even for him (Sū. Bh 1.1.4). In this way, the unobservable (*aviṣaya*) *Ātman* is as a rule of the nature of light; if He were an *viṣaya* He would be of the nature of darkness.

Further, since He is the fourth 'एकात्मप्रत्ययसारः' - *ekātma-pratyaya-sāra* (Mā. 7) He can never be *pratyaya gocara*. Though the fourth *Ātman* is *pratyagātman* also, He is not in the experience of the ignorant people. Therefore 'प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः' - *pratyagātma-prasiddeḥ* the well-known *pratyagātman*' does not apply to Him. Not only that, He is not only *pratyagātman*; He is *sarvātman*, He is everywhere. One easily understands when one is told that *prājña* is not at all related to the body etc, though one is doing *adhyāsa* in the wakeful state. Therefore, *adhyāsa* is obviously known to everybody. But if we make the statement that '*adhyāsa* has occurred in *Ātman*', it can never be understood by anybody. Therefore, such *adhyāsa* is not *sakala-loka-ṛṭayakṣa*. Hence, this statement does not motivate the seeker to destroy *adhyāsa*; it remains only as the imagination of the person saying it. Not only this, in the *adhyāsa* made in the reverse direction, the body is the *adhiṣṭhāna* and the *pratyagātman* is the *adhyāsta*. If this *pratyagātman* is the fourth *Ātman* there can be no *adhyāsa* of His *dharma*s on the body etc; because He is without any *dharma*. 'Can't His *jñāna* and *ānanda* be superimposed'? Impossible. They are His *svarūpa*, not *dharma*s which an *ajñānī* can see.

(25.2) In this way, after demonstrating that it is not possible to take the fourth *Ātman* in place of *pratyagātman*, it is necessary also to discuss what havoc has been wrecked on the *siddhānta* by doing so. With the assumption of *Śuddhātman* in the place of *pratyagātman*, whatever is *adhyasta* becomes *asat* - non-existent. If this is agreed upon, only *buddhi*, *indriyas*, body, son, wife etc. being *adhyasta* in the case of *prājña*, only that many become non-existent; however the rest of the world like sun, moon etc., which are not *adhyasta* could be saved from going non-existent. But in the case of *Śuddhātman* it is not so. Saying that *Śuddhātman* is the *adhiṣṭhāna* and the whole world is *adhyasta* in Him, they assert that the whole world is non-existent. If one asks, 'How can it be non-existent when it is being known through the *indriyas*?' They say, 'Just as the serpent seen in the rope is non-existent, the world superimposed in *Ātman* also is non-existent (*asat*). Therefore, in hundreds of places *Bhāṣyakāra* has referred to the *jagat* as *mithyā*, imagined due to *avidyā* (*avidyā-kalpita*).

This is plainly wrong because, taking the same analogy of rope and snake, Bhāṣyakāra has explained that the *jagat* is not *asat*: - 'तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति' - That (*Brahman*) thought of becoming many and being born. Commenting on this *śruti* sentence he has said—'यथा मृद्घटाद्याकारेण, यथा वा रज्ज्वादि सर्पाद्याकारेण बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेन। असदेव तर्हि सर्वं यद्गृह्यते रज्जुरिव सर्पाद्याकारेण? न। सत एव द्वैत भेदन अन्यथा गृह्यमाणत्वात् न असत्त्वं कस्यचित् क्वचित्' - Just as the rope etc. take birth as the conceived serpent etc., similarly, I will be born in many forms. **(Objection)** If so, the world that is perceived is non-existent just like the snake perceived in the rope? **(Answer)** It is not like that. The existent (*Brahman*) itself appears as another because of the sense of duality. Nothing at any time is non-existent (Cā. Bh. 6.2.23).

Therefore, the statement that like the non-existent serpent in the rope, the world seen is also non-existent, is directly opposite to the *śruti* statement that *Brahman* itself is standing in the form of the world out of its own volition and also opposite to the Bhāṣya. When the *śruti* is saying - 'सद् एव सोम्य इदम् अग्र आसीत्' - Somya! In the beginning, this (world) was *sat* only (Cā. 6.2.1), implying that the world was *sat* even when it was not available for the senses. Does it become *asat* when it is available to the senses?

Objection: Bhāṣyakāra has clearly said that 'जाग्रद् दृश्यानामपि.... असत्त्वं स्वप्नदृश्यवत् अनाशंकनीयम्....मिथ्यैव ते' - There can be no doubt that the world is *asat* like the world of dreams. It is *mithyā* only (Mā. Kā. Bh. 2.7). How do you reconcile this statement?

Answer: It is true. It is possible to say this after the oneness of the *Ātman* has been determined. This is because, the world is not different from this *Ātman*. Therefore, there can never be an observable for the *Ātman*. However, the *ajñānī* puts forward his doubt after listening to the oneness of *Ātman*, that he is seeing the world. If he is seeing it then it must be different from the *Ātman*, because we can only see things which are different from us. Hence, it has to be *asat*. It is *asat* just like the chariots etc. seen in dreams. But before establishing the oneness of *Ātman* 'तदेतत् सत्यं अवितथम्। किं तत्?...मन्त्रेषु.....कर्माणि.....' - The *jagat* that is observed is *avitatha*—not *mithyā*, i.e. it is a transactional reality (Mu.Bh.1.2.1). *Jagat* will never be lost; it always exists. 'यथा च कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति एवं कार्यम् अपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति' - Just as *Brahman*'s existence is not affected in either of the three times (past, present and future), the existence of the world also is not affected in either of the three times (Sū Bh 2.1.16).

Doubt: If we accept the existence of names and forms, will it not contradict the *advaita śrutis*, 'This is one without a second', 'There is not the least multiplicity here' etc.?

Answer: No. This has already been resolved through the example of pot, clay etc. Seen from the causal point of view, just as the forms of clay are not different from clay, the world of multiplicity is not different from *Brahman*. On the basis of this understanding one gets the realisation, 'This is one without a second', 'There is not the least multiplicity here' etc. When due to *avidyā* one is seeing only the multiplicity of names and forms then only these transactions occur - 'यदा तु परमार्थदृष्ट्या..वस्त्वन्तरास्तित्व व्यवहारः' (Br. Bh. 3.5.1).

For the knowledge of 'there is not the least multiplicity here' (Br. 4.4.19), namely for the oneness of *Brahman*, *śruti* is the *pramāṇa*, not the *indriyas*. For the multiplicity of the world, *indriyas* are the *pramāṇa* and not the *śruti*. 'One *pramāṇa* does not contradict another *pramāṇa*, in fact, the other *pramāṇa* gives the knowledge of an object which cannot be known by the first *pramāṇa*' (Br. Bh. 2.1.20). Therefore, for the oneness of *Brahman* taught by *śruti*, the multiplicity seen through the *indriyas* need not be rejected. What exists all through this multiplicity is only *Brahman* in which there is no multiplicity. Therefore, fault is only in viewing the object and not in the object itself. *Brahman* is *Ātman*. Hence, there is no multiplicity in Him. However, even after the realisation of *Ātman*'s oneness, the world does not become invisible for the *jñānī*. Then how does he see it? Before he had obtained *vidyā*, the world appeared as different from him; now the same world appears non-different. So what is lost by *vidyā* is what was produced by *avidyā*. 'Anotherness, being the result of *avidyā*, can be realised as a non-object by *vidyā*. Is not the non-existence of the second moon the one that is seen by eyes without cataract' - 'अन्यस्य च अविद्याकृतत्वे विद्यया अवस्तुत्वदर्शनोपपत्तिः। तद्धि द्वितीय चन्द्रस्यासत्त्वं यदतैमिरिकेण चक्षुष्मता न गृह्यते' (Tai. Bh. 2.8). Therefore, what becomes invisible after getting *vidyā* is the one which appeared different from himself because of *avidyā*. One who sees the *jagat* as different from himself is *mithyā-darśī*, i.e., one with wrong knowledge. The *śruti* says that such a person is unfit for *mokṣa*. 'The one who views *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya* (the worlds, *devatās* etc) as different from *Ātman*, and having existence independent of the *Ātman* is a *mithyā-darśī*; and those objects seen as *mithyā* are *mithyā-dṛṣṭa*. The *mithyā-dṛṣṭa* world rejects the *mithyā-darśī*. In this way, seeing difference in the world is ridiculed and

it is asserted that all objects are non-different from the *Ātman* and all this is *Ātman* itself' - 'यो हि ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिकं जगत् आत्मनोऽन्यत्र स्वातन्त्र्येण लब्धं सद्भावं पश्यति, तं मिथ्यादर्शिनं तदेव मिथ्यादृष्टं ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिकं जगत् पराकरोति इति भेददृष्टिमपोद्य इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा (बृ. २.४.६) इति सर्वस्य वस्तुजातस्य आत्माव्यतिरेकमवतारयति।' (Sū. Bh. 1.4.19). Therefore, the statement that the *jagat* is *mithyā* is directly opposite to the *śruti*.

(25.3) Suppose it is asked 'that which is *mithyā* is not available for transaction; but the changing *jagat* is available for transaction. How is this possible?' They say 'Transaction is also *mithyā*.' They do not see any differences in the words *anṛta* (changing), *mithyā* (illusory), *anirvacnīya* (ambiguous for description), *prātibhāsika satya* (apparent reality), *vyāvahārika satya* (transactional reality). *Anṛta* is transactional reality, not illusion. Commenting on Tai. 2.6 Bhāṣyakāra says—'एकम् एव हि परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म। इह पुनः व्यवहारविषयम् आपेक्षिकं सत्यं मृगतृष्णिकाद्यनृतापेक्षया उदकादि सत्यम् उच्यते। अनृतं च तद् विपरीतम्। किं पुनः एतत् सर्वम् अभवत्? सत्यं परमार्थसत्यम्' - Ultimate reality is *Brahman* only. Water which is transactional reality is compared with the mirage which is apparent reality. Here the water is called *satya* and the mirage which is different from water is called *anṛta*. Both these are in their nature the ultimate reality. Further, transaction is also not *mithyā*. For the *jñānī* 'सदात्मना सत्यत्व अभ्युपगमात्.....सर्वव्यवहाराणां सर्वविकाराणां च सत्यत्वम्' - All transactions and all forms are real because they are viewed as *Brahman* (Cā. Bh. 6.3.2). 'प्राक् सदात्मविज्ञानात् स्वात्मनः अन्यस्मात् सतः.....उत्पत्तिप्रलयौ अभूताम्। सदात्मविज्ञाने तु सति स्वात्मत एव संवृत्तौ। तथा सर्वोऽप्यन्यो व्यवहारः आत्मनः एव विदुषः' - Prior to *Ātman*'s knowledge creation, destruction etc were happening from someone different from him. But after getting *Ātma-vijñāna* everything is happening from *Ātman* only. In this way, for the *jñānī*, all transactions are from *Ātman* only' (Cā. Bh. 7.26.1).

(25.4) There is indeed a chain of imaginations done to protect the concept that *jagat* is *mithyā*. Firstly, about the pair *māyā-avidyā*: If the world is treated as non-existent, *māyā* which is the cause for the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world as described in *śruti*, *smṛti* and *purāṇas*, loses its place. When it is said that though it is non-existent it is seen due to *avidyā*, the latter usurps the place of *māyā*. To reconcile with this imagined equivalence of *māyā* and *avidyā*, they have to imagine an ambiguous description (*anirvacnīyatva*) for *avidyā* also, mimicking the *anirvacnīyatva* of *māyā*. Then for some, the *Śuddha-Brahman* gets coupled with *avidyā* (*avidyā-śabala*). For some others, *māyā* and *avidyā* are synonyms. For yet others, *māyā* is *avidyā-kalpita*. For some others, when *avidyā* is lost by acquiring *vidyā*, *māyā* is also

lost. Yet others see remnants of *avidyā* even in the *jñānī*. For others, *avidyā* is the effect of *māyā* - it misleads us by using *āvaraṇa-śakti* and *ākṣepa-śakti*. Since it is said that during *pralaya*, *Brahman* alone exists, *māyā* cannot exist in *pralaya*. Therefore for them, *māyā* becomes *anitya*. Since *Īśvara* is coupled with *māyā*, for some, *Īśvara* also goes out of existence during *pralaya* etc. These are the so called *prakriyās*, i.e., alternatives for *siddhānta*. What *siddhānta*? That *jagat* is *mithyā* - not for the *advaita* propounded by Śaṅkara. But none of these statements is correct.

First about *Brahman* being coupled with *avidyā* (*avidyā-śabala*). *Jīva* is the one with *avidyā*. He is not different from *nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta Brahman*—this is the *siddhānta*. *Paramātman* is different from the *jīva*, but *jīva* is not different from *Paramātman* - ‘परमात्मनः जीवाद् अन्यत्वं, जीवस्य तु न परस्माद् अन्यत्वम्’ (Sū. Bh. 1.3.19). Further, Bhāṣyakāra’s commentary for the sentence—‘He understood himself as *Brahman*’ is as follows: - ‘आत्मानम् एवावेत् अहं ब्रह्मास्मि इति...ब्रह्मणि अविद्यानुपपत्तिः इति चेत् न, ब्रह्मणि विद्या विधानात्।.....न ब्रूमः.....ब्रह्मणि अतद्ब्रह्माध्यारोपणा नास्तीति। किं तर्हि न ब्रह्म स्वात्मनि अतद्ब्रह्माध्यारोपण निमित्तम् अविद्याकर्तृ च इति। भवतु एवं न अविद्याकर्तृ भ्रान्तं च ब्रह्म। किंतु न एव अब्रह्म अविद्याकर्ता चेतनः भ्रान्तः अन्यः इष्यते’ - ‘How is it right to say that there is *avidyā* in *Brahman*?’ It is not like that. *Vidyā* has been prescribed in *Brahman*. ‘We are not saying that there is *adhyāropa* of a *dharma* in *Brahman* which is not in It.’ Then what are you saying? ‘That *Brahman* is not the cause for the *adhyāropa* of this *dharma*. Nor does it create *avidyā* by itself.’ Let it be that *Brahman* is not the imposer of *avidyā* and also not confused. But the *jīva* who is the imposer of *avidyā* and confused - he is not different from *Brahman* (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). So, *avidyā śabalam* *Brahma* is a seditiously wrong imagination.

Further about *māyā* and *avidyā* being synonymous: ‘देहादि संघाताः आत्ममाया विसर्जिताः। आत्मनः माया अविद्या, तथा प्रत्युपस्थापिताः’ - The body etc. are *ātma-māyā-visarjita*. Here *ātman*’s *māyā* means *avidyā*, and the physical body etc are projected by this *avidyā* (Mā. Kā. 3.10) and in the next śloka’s commentary ‘पर एव आत्मायः पूर्वं सत्यम् ज्ञानमनन्तम् ब्रह्म इति प्रकृतः। यस्मादात्मनः.....संघाताः आत्ममाया विसर्जिताः सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं’ - *Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahman* is the *Ātman* in present context. From this *ātman* only, body etc. are created by His *māyā* (Mā. Kā. 3.11). In this way, the same word *māyā* when applied to the *jīva* is called *avidyā* and when applied to the *Brahman* is called *māyā*. In this way, *māyā* and *avidyā* are separated in the *kārikā*. ‘अहंकार इति अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम्’ - *Ahaṁkāra* means *avidyā* coupled with *avyakta* (G. Bh. 7.4); ‘अविद्यादि

अनेकसंसारबीजम् अन्तर्दोषवत् माया' - *Māyā* in which the many seeds of *saṁsāra* like *avidyā* etc are concealed (G. Bh. 7.3); 'प्रकृतिस्थत्वाख्या अविद्या संसारस्य कारणम्' - The coupling with *prakṛti* due to *avidyā* is *saṁsāra* (G. Bh. 13.20); 'प्रकृत्या.....अविद्यारूपः संयोगः संसारः' - The *avidyā* concealed in *prakṛti*, is the cause of *saṁsāra* (G. Bh. 13.21) etc. sentences clearly deny the synonymity of *avidyā* and *mayā*.

In order to satisfy the imagined synonymity between the two, an ambiguous description of *avidyā* is also propounded (see 14.4). But after a detailed analysis *avidyā* is described only as 'अविद्याविपरीतग्राहकः संशयोपस्थापकः अग्रहणात्मको वा' - non-comprehension (*agrahāṇa*), doubtful (*saṁśaya*) and wrong comprehension (*anyathā grahāṇa*) (G. Bh. 13.2). 'यदि ज्ञानाभावः यदि संशयज्ञानं यदि विपरीतज्ञानं वा उच्यते अज्ञानम् इति, सर्वं हि तत् ज्ञानेन एव निवर्त्यते' - Whether absence of knowledge or doubtful knowledge or wrong knowledge, whatever is called *ajñāna*, all that will be removed by *jnāna* only' (Br. Bh. 3.3.1). This is the unambiguous description of *avidyā*. Therefore, the *bhāṣya* does not approve of this *avidyā* of ambiguous description.

Next, the idea that *māyā* is misleading the *jīvas* by its two powers of *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*. This is totally unacceptable because it is only through *māyā* that *Brahman* assumes multiple forms. Why? 'रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव, तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय' - For every form, it assumed a co-form in order to make its inherent form known (Br. 2.5.19). The *bhāṣya* comments on this sentence like this - 'यदि हि नामरूपे न व्याक्रियेते, तदा अस्य आत्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिख्यायेत' - Had It not carved out these names and forms, then, that the adjunctless form of the *Ātman* is just solid awareness could never have been understood (Br. Bh. 2.5.19). 'प्रकृतिः च त्रिगुणात्मिका सर्वकार्यकरणविषयाकारेण परिणता पुरुषस्य भोगापवर्गार्थकर्तव्यतया देहेन्द्रियाद्याकारेण संहन्यते' - This *prakṛti* of three qualities gets modified to the forms of *kārya*, *karāṇa* and objects and gets finally organized in the forms of bodies, *indriyas* etc for the purpose of prosperity and/or *mokṣa* of the *jīva*' (G. Bh. Introduction to chapter 13). Therefore, it is unreasonable to hold *māyā* responsible for the *jīva*'s lustful extrovert response to the world.

Next, that *māyā* is non-eternal is clearly opposite to the *bhāṣya*—'नित्येश्वरत्वाद् ईश्वरस्य तत्प्रकृत्योः अपि युक्तं नित्यत्वेन भवितुम् । प्रकृतिद्वयवत्वम् एव हि ईश्वरस्य ईश्वरत्वम्' - Since *Īśvara* is always *Īśvara* His two *prakṛtis* have to be eternal. This is because, being coupled with these two *prakṛtis* is the *Īśwaraness* of *Īśvara* (G. Bh. 13.9). Some people twist the meaning of the word 'eternal' to mean 'a very long time' to suit their imaginations.

This is not possible. However long this time may be, since—‘धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्’ - *Īśwara* created this world just like in previous times (R̥gveda Samhitā 10.190.3), *māyā* is necessary for the creation that happens even after this long time. So, saying that *māyā* is non-eternal is wrong.

Then about the remnants of *avidyā* in a *jñānī*: ‘य एव अविद्यादिदोष निवृत्ति फलकृत्यत्ययः आद्यः अन्त्यः सन्ततः असन्ततो वा स एव विद्या’ - Whether the first or the last thought, whether it is a result of continuous or discontinuous thinking, the knowledge which removes all the faults of *avidyā* etc. is *vidyā* (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). ‘आत्मविषयं विज्ञानं यत्कालम्, तत् काले एव तद्विषयाज्ञानतिरोभावः स्यात्। अतः ब्रह्मविद्यायां सत्याम् अविद्याकार्यानुपपत्तेः प्रदीप इव तमः कार्यस्य’ - The moment the knowledge of *Ātman* dawns, that moment itself, its (*Ātman*’s) ignorance is removed. So, with the rise of *Brahma-vidyā*, the effects of *avidyā* vanish just as darkness vanishes the moment light comes (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). So, there can never be remnants of *avidyā* in a *jñānī*.

(25.5) Then *sarvātmabhāva* spoken by *śruti* i.e. the awareness that everything is Himself—is an uncomfortable statement for those who proclaim that the world is non-existent. So, they totally abandon it. ‘अहम् अन्नम् अहम् अन्नदः अहं श्लोककृत्’ - I am the food, I am the eater, I am that *Īśwara* who pairs up the eater and his food (Tai. 3.10). ‘अहं मनुः अभवं सूर्यः च’ - I am Manu, I am the sun (Br. 1.4.10), ‘विद्याविनयसम्पन्ने ब्राह्मणे गवि हस्तिनि। शुनि चैव श्वपाके च पण्डिताः समदर्शिनः’ - *Jñānīs* view the learned and gentle *brāhmaṇa*, the cow, elephant, the dog, and the *cāṇḍāla* all equally (Gītā 5.18)—such are the sentences of *sarvātmabhāva*. If the food, the eater, *Īśwara*, Manu, *Sūrya*, *brāhmaṇa* are all non-existent—there is no meaning for such sentences. For this reason too, the non-existence of the world is absurdly wrong.

(25.6) In this way, a limitless number of ideas are superimposed on the *bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara, damaging what is heard from there and imagining the unheard. They have assumed such importance that common people think that this is what has been taught by Śaṅkara. Therefore, a study of the *bhāṣya* is not producing the correct understanding in seekers. Such ideas have created opponents for the otherwise blemishless *bhāṣya*. Moreover, they are mutually contradictory also. Some people offer solace by saying ‘he says like this, the other one says like that; but these are all only alternative proofs for arriving at the one and the same conclusion’. But this pacification does not achieve its intended purpose; on the other hand, it creates more confusion, because ‘this’ and ‘that’ proofs are opposite to each other. In some

intermediate steps of *śāstra*, one could perhaps say ‘*pañcīkaraṇa* is one way and *trivṛtkaraṇa* another of arriving at this result’. But for the ultimate message (*siddhānta*) there can never be alternative proofs, that too proofs contradicting each other.

Therefore, for the *advaita* propounded by the *śruti*, there is only one proof and that is, given by Śaṅkara himself. ‘न अन्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते’ - There cannot be another proof. True. Though the *bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara are pleasant to study, the meaning in a certain place may be difficult to understand because they are guiding a wide spectrum of seekers—like people doing *karma*, intelligent students, *sannyāsis* etc; doubts can arise. **To get the right answer for any doubt, the point to remember is the following: the topic is vast. Solutions for all doubts cannot be available in a single place for everyone. But, for each and every doubt, there is certainly the solution somewhere else in the *bhāṣyas*. There is no exception to this rule at all. This is the omniscience of Bhagavan Bhāṣyakāra.** In the Vedas, it becomes necessary in several places to interpret passages going against other *pramāṇas*. That is done by treating them as *arthavāda* in praise of injunctions. But in the *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya*, one never comes across such situations where an interpretation is necessary, because their very purpose is to explain things clearly without any ambiguity. Therefore, one should never subject the understood words and sentences to squeezing, bending and twisting or adding and dropping ideas to extract the meaning one wants. This is unacceptable. One should understand their meaning only by the other sentences of the *bhāṣya* said in that context. If one does not follow this concept and introduces new ideas therein, they will invariably be damaging what is heard or they will only remain unheard imaginations.

It is extremely regrettable that one such painful example should be there in the very first word of *Vedānta Śāstra*. Who would interpret the word ‘*asmat* -I’ in ‘युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः विषयविषयिणोः’ - *yuṣmat asmat pratyaya gocarayoh* in *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* as the *Śuddhaātman* when he has read and remembers the sentence *kṣetra-kṣetraijñayoh* ‘क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोः विषयविषयिणोः’ in *Gītā Bhāṣya*? Is it not because of this Himalayan blunder that the world had to become ‘*asat*—non-existent’? After assuming that the world is non-existent, who would not drop the assumption when he notices the negative reply to the objection ‘असद् एव तर्हि सर्वं यत् गृह्यते.....’ - Then, is the whole world non-existent like the serpent seen in the snake? Is it not because of continuing with this assumption instead of dropping it that *māyā* and *avidyā* became synonyms? Who

will continue with this synonymity the moment he reads the sentences like ‘अहंकार इति अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम्’ - *Ahaṅkāra* is *avidyā* coupled with *māyā* etc? In this way, making a new imagination to cover up or justify the damage done by the previous imagination, has led to a limitless cascade of fanciful imaginations of the *bhāṣya*. The purport of the *bhāṣya* has gone out of sight and heated debates between the so called alternative proofs have occupied its place. If the word ‘*asmat-I*’ in *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* had been interpreted as *kṣetrajñā* in accordance with *Gītā Bhāṣya*, only difference between the world and its knower *kṣetrajñā* could have been demonstrated and the idea of the non-existence of the world could have been avoided. Is it not so? Consequently, would not the whole of the cascade of consequent imaginations been avoided? In this way, these imaginations have wrought havoc in the *śāstra* instead of making it intelligent. Śaṅkara *Bhāṣya* is pure and complete in itself. It does not suffer from any faults which need to be removed, nor does it require the addition of any virtues. Śaṅkara is *Para-Brahman*, and his *bhāṣyas* are the *Vedas*. This must never be forgotten.



Maha Parivṛta

A Birds' Eyeview of the Brahmasūtras

(1) Bhāṣyakāra has clearly stated at the end of the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* that getting the knowledge of the oneness of *Ātman* is the purport of *Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā*. There is advantage in knowing the sequence of steps followed by the *śāstras* for this purpose. This is only a brief pointer, just enough to meet the goal of this book:

'*Tat*' in the great sentence '*Tat tvaṃ asi*—That you are' is only pure existence—i.e. *Brahman* alone. To know that as one's self is the knowledge of the oneness of *Ātman*. True. It cannot be gotten by speech, mind, eyes or any other sense. Though it is so attributeless, it does exist because it is known to be the cause of the world—'नैव वाचा न मनसा न चक्षुषा न अन्यैः अपि इन्द्रियैः प्राप्तुं शक्यते इत्यर्थः । तथापि सर्वविशेषरहितः अपि जगतः मूलम् इति अवगतत्वात् अस्ति एव (ब्रह्म)' (Ka. Bh.2.3.12).

So, *Brahman* has to be understood only through the world. Therefore, the discussion of *Brahman* starts with 'Creation etc.' *sūtra*. Though *Brahman* as the material cause of the world is implied in this *sūtra*, its main discussion is in the first *pāda* of the second chapter. Using the examples of clay etc, it is shown there that the 'world is *Brahman*', but *Brahman* is different from the world' through the law of non-difference of effect and cause (*kārya kāraṇa ananyatva nyāya*). With this, the oneness of *Brahman* who is *Satyam*, *Jñānam* and *Anantam*, is established. Next about its efficient causeness: In order to teach that the *Ātman* is the *Satyam*-*Jñānam*-*Anantam* *Brahman*, all the transactions like becoming many, creation, entering (in *jīva* form), obtaining pleasure, fearlessness, *saṅkramaṇa* (higher knowledge) etc. are conceived of in *Brahman* - 'सत्यं ज्ञानम् अनन्तं ब्रह्म इति यथोक्तलक्षण आत्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेव बहुभवन सर्ग-प्रवेश-रसलाभ-अभय-संक्रमणादि परिकल्प्यते ब्रह्मणि सर्वं व्यवहार विषये' (Tai. Bh. 2.8).

In this way, in the first step of teaching *Brahman-Ātman* oneness, transaction (*vyavahāra*), which is not actually in *Brahman*, is conceived in *Brahman*. This is called *adhyāropa*. The moment *Brahman* is understood through this, *adhyāropa* becomes *apavāda*. i.e. withdrawn; the conceived transaction is withdrawn.

'Does it mean that the *vyavahāra* which is conceived in *Brahman* is imagined

due to *avidyā* (*avidyā -kalpita*)?' No; what is *avidyā -kalpita* has already been explained (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 25.2). From the causal point of view, even *vyavahāra* is true (Cā. Bh. 7.26.1), not false. It should never be forgotten that nothing is *asat* - non-existent, at any time - 'न असत्त्वं कस्यचित् क्वचित्'- (Cā. Bh. 6.2.23). 'If so, how is the *vyavahāra* of creation etc. possible in *Brahman* who is only pure existence? It is wrong to ask this question when the *śruti* tells us it is so. 'This was the one only without a second *sat*' 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्रासीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयं.....तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति तत्तेजोऽसृजत' - That (*Brahman*) reflected to be born in many forms. It created fire (Cā. 6.21.23) says the *śruti*, which should be understood as such.

'Saying that other *pramāṇas* also apply to *Brahman* since it is an existent object, is wishful thinking. *Brahman*, like *dharma*, can be understood only through *śruti*.' 'Who knows clearly? Who can say from where this multifaceted creation has come out from?' says the *śruti* that even highly evolved souls have difficulty in understanding the cause of the world. So there is no scope for dry logic here. *Prājñā* detached from the world becomes *sat-ātman* in deep sleep. This worldless *Ātman* Himself is creating (the dream world. How?). Though world born out of *Brahman* is not different from it, is not *Brahman* even now the same as it always is? - 'यत् तु उक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वात् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि संभवेयुः इति तदपि मनोरथमात्रम्।आगममात्र समधिगम्य एव तु अयम् अर्थः धर्मवत्।को अब्धा वेद क इह प्रवोचत्, इयं विसृष्टिर्यत आबभूव इति चैते ऋचौ सिद्धानाम् अपि ईश्वराणां दुर्बोधतां जगत्कारणस्य दर्शयतःन अनेन मिषेण शुष्कतर्कस्य अत्र आत्मलाभः संभवति'स्वप्नान्तबुद्धान्तयोरुभयोः इतरेतरव्यभिचारात् आत्मनः अनन्वागतत्वम्। संप्रसादे च प्रपञ्चपरित्यागेन सदात्मनासंपत्तेः निष्प्रपञ्च सदात्मत्वं प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वात् कार्यकारणानन्यन्यायेन ब्रह्माव्यतिरेक' (Sū. Bh. 2.1.6).

(2) Continuing this discussion of *Brahman* being the cause of the world and refuting the view of those who oppose this causality, later *sūtras* deal with the process of creation. Afterwards comes the discussion of '*twam*-you'. Just as *Brahman*'s nature was determined by starting with the creation of the world, the *jīva*'s inherent nature is fixed by starting from his doership etc.

So first comes the discussion of the doer *jīva*. Next, in the second *pāda* of the third chapter, '*twam*-you' is decided as *prājñā*, using the *mahā-tarka* (great logic) of the three states* of universal experience. This *prājñā* does not know who he is. To provide this knowledge, his deep sleep experience of 'I did not know anything, I

*waking, dreaming and deep sleep

slept happily' is investigated. It is shown that the reason for his happiness and not knowing anything is the oneness that he obtained with *Brahman* in his deep sleep. So the *sūtras* decide that *prājñā* is indeed *Brahman*. By reflection and contemplation of this message 'That you are', one gets the realisation of *Ātman*'s oneness. When this realisation illumines the intellect, it shows up in the wakeful and dream states as the feeling 'Everything is myself', because everything is *Brahman*. The rest of the *Brahma Sūtras* discuss the methods of obtaining *vidyā*, its fruit *mokṣa*, the destruction of all *karma* in a *jñānī* and his *pāpa* and *puṇya* etc.

There are four chapters in the *Brahma Sūtras*: Reconciliation - समन्वयाध्याय, non-conflict-अविरोधाध्याय, practice - साधनाध्याय, fruit - फलाध्याय. In each, there are four *pādas* - sub-chapters and in each *pāda* several *adhikaraṇas* (groups of *sūtras* dealing with a single topic). There are 192 *adhikaraṇas* in total. Some *adhikaraṇas* have only one *sūtra*; the total number of *sūtras* is 555. In each *adhikaraṇa*, there are five steps:

(1) *Saṅgati*: Meaning connection with the previous topic. For example, the *saṅgati* for the first *sūtra* is *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*.

(2) *Viṣaya*: The subject under discussion.

(3) *Samśaya*: Doubts about the subject.

(4) *Pūrvapakṣa*: Opposite views

(5) *Siddhānta*: Final decision derived after refuting the opposite views.

