

जिज्ञासाधिकरणम्

Jijñāsādhikaraṇam

At the beginning of every book are delineated four things - Its topic (*viśaya*); Its use (*prayojana*) connection, i.e. how the *viśaya* and *prayojana* are connected; competence (*adhikārī*), i.e. the one who is entitled to study the book. These are known as *anubandhacatuṣṭaya*. Here *Brahman* is the topic; *mokṣa* - total liberation is the use of studying this topic (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* has the purpose of motivating the student for *mokṣa*). The connection between *Brahman* and *mokṣa* is *Brahma-Jñāna*. The one who is competent (for this text *adhikārī*), should have the following qualities: (a). *Viveka*: Discrimination between the eternal and non eternal; (b). *Vairāgya*: Dispassion towards pleasure here or in the other worlds; (c). A group of six qualities: *śāma* - control over mind, *dama* - control over sense organs, *uparati* - enjoying the intimacy of God, *titikṣā*—forbearance, *śraddhā* - faith in God, Veda and guru, *samādhāna* - keeping the mind balanced. (d). *Mumukṣā* - Intense desire for *mokṣa*. All these are contained in the *bhāṣya* to the first *sūtra*.

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा (१.१.१)

atha = afterwards, *ataḥ* = therefore, *Brahma-jijñāsā* = discussion of *Brahman*

१. वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्य इदम् आदिमं सूत्रम्। तत्र अथ शब्दः आनंतर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते न अधिकारार्थः। ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः अनधिकार्यत्वात्। मंगलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात्। अर्थान्तर एव हि अथशब्दः श्रुत्या मंगल प्रयोजनो भवति।

1. This is the first *sūtra* of the Vedānta *mīmāṃsā śāstra* which is being commented upon. Here the word '*atha*' is used in the sense of 'after' not in the sense of 'commencement'; because *Brahma-jijñāsā* is not something which can be commenced. And '*maṅgala*' meaning auspicious has no syntactical relation

with the meaning of the sentence. Besides, 'atha' used in another sense can achieve the purpose of auspiciousness by its mere sound.

(1.1) The word 'atha' has four meanings, three of which are: beginning, auspiciousness, and after the study of *dharma*. The fourth will be explained at the end. Which of the first three meanings are implied in this word? The study of Grammar starts with the *sūtra* 'atha śabdānuśāsanam'. The study of Yoga starts with 'atha yogānuśāsanam - beginning of the discipline of yoga'. Similarly, does the *sūtra* here mean 'beginning *Brahma-jijñāsā*'? No; because *jijñāsā* means 'desire to know'. Such a desire is either there or not there. 'Beginning a desire' has no meaning.

Next, auspiciousness also cannot be the meaning of the word 'atha' here, because then the *sūtra* would become 'auspiciousness *Brahma-jijñāsā*', which are two disconnected phrases. But traditionally, great writers commence their books with auspicious words. here also it is true. However, though used for a different purpose, the very utterance of 'atha' plays the role of auspiciousness. *Smṛti* says it like this:

ॐकारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा । कण्ठं भित्वा विनिर्यातौ तस्मान्माङ्गलिकावुभौ ॥

Before creation 'Om' and 'atha' by themselves emanated from the throat of Brahma; so, both are auspicious'.

२. पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षयाश्च फलतः आनंतर्याव्यतिरेकात् । सति च आनंतर्यार्थत्वे यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेन अपेक्षते एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाऽपि यत् पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेन अपेक्षते तद्वक्तव्यम् । स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यं तु समानम् ।

2. The reference to what has gone before, does not contradict the meaning 'afterwards'. When the meaning is 'afterwards', just as the desire to know *dharma* is preceded by the learning of the Vedas, what precedes the desire to know *Brahman* is to be said. However, 'after learning of one's own Veda' is common to both *dharma-jijñāsā* and *Brahma-jijñāsā*.

(2). Here *pūroaprakṛtāpekṣāyāḥ* means with respect to the previous discussion of *dharma* i.e. some people say that '*Brahma-jijñāsā* is to be done only after *dharma-jijñāsā*'. Here only the word 'after' is acceptable to us - but not 'after *dharma-jijñāsā*'. The reason for this becomes clear in the fourth *sūtra*. Of course, learning the Vedas is mandatory before *dharma-jijñāsā*. Similarly, we have to say 'after what' does *Brahma-jijñāsā* have to start? This will be specified later. However, the study of

Vedas is mandatory for *Brahma-jijñāsā* too. *Dharma-jijñāsā* is based on the *Saṁhitā* and the *Brāhmaṇa* parts of Vedas and *Brahma-jijñāsā* is based on the *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads*.

Question: There are some who are not authorised to study the Vedas. How can they get knowledge of *Brahman*?

Answer: They can get it through the *purāṇas* and *itihāsas* (Sū. Bh. 1.3.34-38). Any common man becomes entitled for this knowledge through special duties like *japa*, *upavāsa* and *arādhana* (worship of God) - 'पुरुषमात्रसम्बन्धिभिः जपोपवासदेवताराधनादिभिः धर्मविशेषैः अनुग्रहः विद्यायाः सम्भवति' (Sū. Bh.3.4.38).

३. नन्विह कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं विशेषः? न, धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागपि अधीत वेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः। यथा च हृदयाद्यवदानानाम् आनन्तर्यनियमः क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात्, न तथा इह क्रमो विवक्षितः। शेषशेषित्वे अधिकृताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावत्।

3. Could 'the knowledge of *karma*' qualify the word '*atha*'? (i.e, *Brahma-jijñāsā* is to be done after acquiring the knowledge of *karma*). No. Even prior to the discussion of *karma*, discussion of *Brahman* is possible for one who has learnt Vedānta. For example, just as there is an intention to tell a sequence in the cutting of the heart etc, there is no intention of telling any sequence here. There is no evidence for a sequential relationship of (the type of) subsidiary (*karma*) and principal (*karma*) or of (the type of) eligibility of the person already eligible.

(3). The opponent's point of view, with respect to the previous discussion of *dharmajijñāsā* etc. left unfinished, is picked up again here. The opponent's argument is: 'Learning the Vedas is necessary for both *dharmajijñāsā* and *Brahmajijñāsā*. After getting the knowledge of *karma* from *dharmajijñāsā* based on the *Saṁhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas*, *Brahmajijñāsā*, based on the *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads* has to start.'

It is not so. He who has studied the *Upaniṣads* - i.e. Vedānta - can start *Brahmajijñāsā* even prior to *dharmajijñāsā*. Bhāṣyakāra gives three arguments for this: In cutting the body of an animal sacrificed in Vedic *yajñas*, the *śruti* says: First the heart, next the tongue and then the chest is to be cut - 'हृदयस्य अग्रे अवद्यति अथ जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः' (Tai. Saṁ. 6.3.10.10). No such sequence is said anywhere in the *śruti* for *dharmajijñāsā*. *Jābāla śruti* says that one can go straight from *brahmacarya* to

sannyāsa without passing through the *gr̥hastha* stage (Jā. 4). This means that one can commence *Brahma-jijñāsā* earlier to knowledge of *karma* which is to be got as a *gr̥hastha*.

Similarly, there is no *pramāṇa* for *śeṣa-śeṣitva* also. *Śeṣa* means main *karma* and *śeṣi* is *karma* subsidiary to it, helpful to the *śeṣa karma*. For example, *Darśa-pūrṇamāsayāga* is the main, *prayājayāga* is the subsidiary. Main *karma* is incomplete without the performance of the subsidiary *karma*. However, there is no *pramāṇa* for a similar sequence between *dharma-Brahma-jijñāsā*. Again, there is no *pramāṇa* for *adhikṛta-adhikārī* type also. *Adhikṛta* is one who is authorised for a particular *karma* because he has the necessary competencies for it. One who is entitled for the main *karma* alone is entitled for subsidiary *karma* also. For example, 'Camasa' is a wooden vessel. Filling it with *ap* (water) is known as *ap-praṇayana*. *Go-dohana* is vessel in which cow's milk is milked. Doing *ap-praṇayana* in *go-dohana* is subsidiary *karma* in *darśapūrṇamāsayāga*. One who is *adhikṛta* for *darśapūrṇamāsayāga* only is competent for doing *ap-praṇayana* in *go-dohana* if he desires to have a lot of cows. There is no such *pramāṇa* in the *śāstras* saying that the *adhikārī* of *karma* alone is *adhikārī* for *Brahman's* knowledge.

४. धर्मब्रह्म जिज्ञासयोः फलजिज्ञास्य भेदाच्च। अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानम्, तच्च अनुष्ठानापेक्षम्। निःश्रेयसफलं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानम्, न च अनुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम्। भव्यश्च धर्मो जिज्ञास्यः न ज्ञानकाले अस्ति, पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रत्वात्। इह तु भूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं, नित्यत्वात् न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम्।

4. Between the discussion of *dharma* and *Brahman*, there is also difference in the fruits and objects of enquiry. The result of *dharma* is prosperity which depends on any performance of (*karma*). But the knowledge of *Brahman* has *mokṣa* as its fruit and it does not depend on any performance. The topic in *dharma* discussion (viz, *karma*) is not there at the time of knowing, because, it is dependent on the person's performance (of *karma*). But here the topic of discussion is existent *Brahman* which does not depend on human performance.

(4). To refute the rule that '*Brahma-jijñāsā* is only after *dharma-jijñāsā*' the second reason is given. For example, the knowledge of the *karma* of *jyotiṣṭomayāga* is obtained through *dharma-jijñāsā*. The fruit of *jyotiṣṭomayāga* is heaven, which depends on the

performance of the *yāga* by the person. However, this fruit is not obtained by the mere knowledge of the *karma*; it depends only on the performance of the *karma* (*yāga*). The fruit is also not obtained immediately after the *yāga*, one has to wait for it. This fruit is also short-lived. But *Brahma-jijñāsā* is the exact opposite of this. Its fruit is *mokṣa*, which does not depend on any performance by the person after he has received the knowledge of *Brahman*. There is no waiting time either; *mokṣa* is the immediate fruit of *Brahma-jñāna*. *Mokṣa* is eternal. Therefore, knowing this difference through *śruti pramāṇa*, the one desirous of *mokṣa*, will not be interested at all in *dharma-jijñāsā*. Next comes the third reason:

५. चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च। या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणम्, सा स्वविषये नियुञ्जानैव पुरुषम् अवबोधयति। ब्रह्मचोदना तु पुरुषम् अवबोधयत्येव केवलम्। अवबोधस्य चोदनाजन्यत्वात् न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते। यथा अक्षार्थसन्निकर्षेण अर्थावबोधे, तद्वत्। तस्मात् किमपि वक्तव्यं यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा उपदिश्यते इति।

5. There is also difference in the response (on listening) to the Vedic sentences. The features of the sentence explaining *dharma* is that it engages the person in its topic (of *karma*). But *Brahman*-related sentences merely inform the person (about *Brahman*). Since knowledge is produced from the sentence itself, the person is not directed to get the knowledge. This is as in the case of knowing an object when it is in contact with the sense organ. Therefore, it is to be told, what is it after which (we are) instructed to take up the discussion of *Brahman*.

(5.1) It is the difference in the motivation generated by *codanā*. *Codanā* is a Vedic sentence and *lakṣaṇa* is *pramāṇa*. The sentences which are a *pramāṇa* for *dharma* direct one towards injunction and prohibition (*vidhi-niṣedha*). But the sentences of the *Upaniṣads*, which are *pramāṇa* for the knowledge of *Brahman*, just narrate the *Brahman-Ātman* oneness; they do not direct a person to do anything. Really speaking, no *pramāṇa* - except the *karma* part of the Vedas - orders or motivates a person to do anything. For example, following the contact of the eye with an object, the eye only informs that 'the object is so and so'; it does not direct a person to do anything.

(5.2) Some other objections and refutations are as follows:

Objection: Some sentences from *śruti* and *smṛti* say that *jñāna* should be attempted only after doing *karma*. For example, 'तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन' - *Brāhmaṇas* desire to know him after *Vedānuvacana*, *yajña*, *dāna*—gifting and the penance called *anāśaka* (Br. 4.4.22), 'न कर्मणाम् अनारम्भात् नैष्कर्म्यम् अश्नुते' - By not doing *karma*, man does not get *mokṣa* (Gītā 3.4) etc. One has to do *karma* to know that its fruit is not eternal.

Answer: It is not like that. As the result of the *karma* performed in previous lives, one can get the eligibility for knowledge of *Brahman* without performing *karma* again in this life.

(5.3) Objection: Is it not mandatory that one should free oneself from the three debts: gods, *ṛṣis* and the manes (*pitṛas*)?

Answer: Repaying the three debts is mandatory for the householder. Since the previously quoted *Jābāla śruti* allows for *sannyāsa* straight from student life, this duty is not inevitable for getting *jñāna*.

(5.4) Objection: In *upāsanās* like *udgīta* etc, one has to view them as *Brahman* by injunction. *Brahma-jijñāsā* is necessary for that. So, *Brahma-jijñāsā* is subsidiary to *upāsanā*.

Answer: No. These *upāsanās* need the knowledge of *saguṇa Brahman*. If these *upāsanās* are done without desire, the intellect becomes clean and so help in getting knowledge of *nirguṇa Brahman*.

This *sūtra* is however discussing the *nirguṇa Brahman* (determined in the second chapter of the *Brahma Sūtras*). This can never be subsidiary to *karma*. *Bhāṣyakāra* proves this in the fourth *sūtra*.

६. उच्यते, नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः शमादिसाधना संपत् मूमुक्षुत्वं च। तेषु हि सत्सु प्रागपि धर्मजिज्ञासायाः ऊर्ध्वं च शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च, न विपर्यये। तस्मात् अथशब्देन यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यानन्तर्यम् उपदिश्यते।

6. It will be told: discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal, dispassion for things of enjoyment here and in other worlds, the wealth of practices such as control of mind, control of senses etc., and desire for *mokṣa*. If they are present, it is possible to discuss *Brahman* and also know It even prior to the discussion of *dharma* and after it too; not otherwise. Therefore, the word

'after' intimates that 'after (the possession) of the wealth of practices mentioned above'.*

(6) In this way, after giving three reasons, the objection that *Brahma-jijñāsā* should come only after *dharma-jijñāsā* - is refuted. Since it has been accepted that the meaning of the word '*atha*' is afterwards, the question arises 'after what?' The answer is:

७. अतः शब्दो हेत्वर्थः। यस्मात् वेद एव अग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयःसाधनानाम् अनित्यफलतां दर्शयति “तद्यथेह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते” (छां. ८.१.६) इत्यादिः। तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति “ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्” (तै. २.१) इत्यादिः। तस्मात् यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या।

7. (The word) 'therefore' signifies reason. Veda itself shows that *agnihotra* etc which are means to prosperity have an impermanent fruit (by saying that) “As here (the enjoyment) acquired by *karma* perishes, that acquired elsewhere through *karma* also perishes” etc. Similarly, it shows also that the supreme goal of man results from the knowledge of *Brahman* (by saying) “One who knows *Brahman* attains the Supreme” etc. Therefore, after acquiring the aforesaid wealth of means, discussion of *Brahman* is to be done.

(7) There are some sentences like 'after sipping *soma*, we become deathless', meaning that the fruits of heaven etc are eternal. Veda itself clarifies by saying that they are in praise of that *karma*; but the fruit of that *karma* is certainly not eternal. On the other hand *mokṣa*, which is the fruit of the knowledge of *Brahman*, is indeed

*Section 6 refers to four qualifications required for receiving *Brahma-jijñāna*. They are 1. *Nityānitya vastu viveka* ability to discriminate eternal and ephemeral things, 2. *Ihāmutrartha bhogavirāga*—disinterest in the pleasures of this world and other worlds like heaven etc., 3. *Śamādi ṣaṭsāmpatti* (six kinds of wealth). They are : (a) *Śama* - controlling the mind from wandering outwards, (b) *Dama* - Controlling the sense organs from contact with their respective sensuous object and the motor organs from indulging in unnecessary activity (c) *Uparati* - Enjoying intimacy with God alone (d) *Titikṣā* - putting up with three types of troubles viz, *ādhyātmika* - bodily and mental, *ādhidaiivika*—due to nature like heat/cold etc, *ādhibhoutika* - caused by other creatures. (e) *Śraddhā* - Total faith in God, scriptures and the guru, (f) *Samādhāna* - mental poise in the midst of ups and downs of life and finally 4. *Mumukṣutva* - an ardent desire for *mokṣa*.

eternal. Therefore, one with the qualities of *viveka* etc (mentioned above in 2.1) should get into *Brahma-jijñāsā*.

८. ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा। ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाण लक्षणम् “जन्माद्यस्य यतः” इति। अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरम् आशङ्कितव्यम्।

8. *Brahma-jijñāsā* is discussion of *Brahman*. *Brahman* is defined by the feature to be specified later as ‘(That) by which the creation etc of this (world)’. For this very reason, there cannot be the doubt of any other meaning like *jāti* etc for the word ‘*Brahman*’.

(8) The word *Brahman* has several meanings in *śruti* and *smṛti* like the brahmin caste, the four-headed *Brahmā*, *Vedas* and even *jīva*. Here the word is not used in any of these senses. It is used for the cause of the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world, indicated in the next *sūtra*.

९. ब्रह्मणः इति कर्मणि षष्ठी न शेषे, जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वात् जिज्ञासायाः जिज्ञास्यान्तर अनिर्देशाच्च। ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुध्यते, संबंध सामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वात्? एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वम् उत्सृज्य सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यात्। न व्यर्थः, ब्रह्माश्रित अशेषविचार-प्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वात् इति चेत्? न। प्रधानपरिग्रहे तदपेक्षितानाम् अर्थाक्षिप्तत्वात्। ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेन आप्तुमिष्टतमत्वात् प्रधानम्। तस्मिन् प्रधाने जिज्ञासा कर्मणि परिगृहीते यैर्जिज्ञासितैर्विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति तानि अर्थाक्षिप्तान्येव इति न पृथक् सूत्रयितव्यानि। यथा “राजासौ गच्छति” इत्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनम् उक्तं भवति, तद्वत्।

9. ‘Of *Brahman*’ is in the Sixth Case in accusative sense and not in the residuary sense—because, discussion requires what is desired to be known and nothing else is indicated for discussion. ‘Even accepting the Sixth Case in the residuary sense, *Brahman* being the object of discussion is not violated because, the general relationship has to end in the principal object itself’. Even thus, discarding the direct objectness of *Brahman* and imagining indirect objectness is a vain effort. ‘It is not in vain if it is said that it has the premise of enquiring into everything dependent on *Brahman* without exception.’ No. with

the acceptance of the principal, whatever is dependent on it will also be covered. *Brahman* is the principal because it is most desired to be attained by knowledge. If the principal is accepted as the object of discussion, those things without discussing which the discussion of *Brahman* will not be complete, will all be implied; hence, they need not be stated separately in the sūtra—just as, when it is said ‘Here goes the king’, the going of the king along with his retinue is implied.

(9) ज्ञातुम् (to know) इच्छा (desire) is जिज्ञासा *jijñāsā*. In *Brahmaṇojijñāsā*, the word *Brahmaṇo* stands for ‘of *Brahman*’. This is in the sixth case, which is used in two contexts: (a) The desire to know things related to *Brahman*; this is called *śeṣaṣaṣṭhī*; (b) The desire to know *Brahman* itself directly; this is called *karmaṣaṣṭhī*. The question is: In this sūtra, the sixth case is used in which sense? Is it *śeṣaṣaṣṭhī* or *karma ṣaṣṭhī*? i.e., is the *jijñāsā* for things related to *Brahman*? or *Brahman* Itself?

The Opponent’s View: In the first sense, *Brahman* is also included in things related to *Brahman*. So, there is nothing wrong in accepting *śeṣa ṣaṣṭhī* here.

Vedantin: What you say is true. But in *śeṣa*, the related things become important and *Brahman* secondary. In *karma ṣaṣṭhī*, it is not like that. The importance is for the knowledge of *Brahman* Itself and related things are secondary but do not get included. It is because with the knowledge of *Brahman*, the knowledge of related things are also obtained. But with the knowledge of related things, the knowledge of *Brahman* is not obtained. So, by taking the second sense, unnecessary effort is avoided.

Question: What are the things related to *Brahman*?

Answer: We say the objects of the world. In the example given by Bhāṣyakāra above, the king is *Brahman* and objects of the world are his retinue. This is explained in Bṛhadāraṇyaka *bhāṣya* like this: ‘Not knowing being common, *Ātman* is to be known and also *unātman*. When it is so, why is stress given (in *śāstra*) to contemplate on *Ātman* only? We reply that *Ātman* which is our concern is what we have to obtain and not the other. The phrase ‘of all this’ is used in the sixth case of fixing (the object of the desire to know) amongst all this. This *Ātman* - this *Ātmatattvam* - the inherent nature of the *jīvātman* (is the one to be known). ‘Is not the other thing to be known?’ It is not like that. Though it is to be known, its knowledge does not

need anything other than *Ātman*'s knowledge. 'How?' It is because, knowing *Ātman*, one will know the un-*Ātman* also - everything. अनिज्ञातत्वसामान्यात् आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः अनात्मा च। तत्र कस्मात् आत्मोपासने एव यत्न आस्थीयते 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत' इति? न इतर विज्ञाने इति?

अत्र उच्यते—तत् एतत् एवं प्रकृतं पदनीयं गमनीयं न अन्यत्। 'अस्य सर्वस्य' इति निर्धारणार्था षष्ठी। अस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन् इति अर्थः। 'यदयमात्मा' यदेतदात्मतत्त्वम्। किं न विज्ञातव्यम् एव अन्यत्? न। किं तर्हि? ज्ञातव्यत्वे अपि न पृथग्ज्ञानान्तरम् अपेक्षते आत्मज्ञानात्। कस्मात्? अनेनात्मना ज्ञातेन हि यस्मात् एतत् सर्वम् अनात्मजातम् अन्यत् यत् सर्वं समस्तं वेद जानाति (Br. Bh. 1.4.7). *Ātman* in these sentences is *prājña* (who is really *Brahman*) and *un-Ātman* is the world which is also *Brahman*. It is because of not knowing these two that one is doing *adhyāsa* - superimposing in both directions. The world indeed is *Ātman* only, but the ignorant person thinks it is *un-Ātman*. So its *un-Ātmanness*, imagined due to *avidyā* is illusory - 'अविद्ययैव अनात्मत्वं परिकल्पितं, न तु परमार्थतः आत्म व्यतिरेकेण अस्ति किञ्चित्' (Br. Bh. 2.4.14). So, the knowledge of things related to *Brahman* is not the big desire; the big desire is to know *Brahman* itself.

In this way, since knowledge of *Brahman* subsumes the knowledge of things related to it, the *sūtra* does not have to say it separately. The features of a *sūtra* are described as follows:

अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद् विश्वतोमुखम्। अस्तोभमनवद्यञ्च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः॥

Without using unnecessary words (*astobham*), giving scope to see the issue from different angles (*viśwatomukham*) a *sūtra* speaks about a very significant matter (*sāravat*), in a faultless way (*anavadyam*), unambiguously (*asandigdham*) and in a few letters (*alpākṣaram*).

१०. श्रुत्यनुगमाच्च। “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते” (तै. ३. १) इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः “तद्विजिज्ञासस्व, तद्ब्रह्म” (तै. ३. १) इति प्रत्यक्षमेव ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति। तच्च कर्मणि षष्ठीपरिग्रहे सूत्रेण अनुगतं भवति। तस्मात् ब्रह्मणः इति कर्मणि षष्ठी।

10. This is also in conformity with *śruti*. *Śrutis* like “from where these beings originate’ etc explicitly show that *Brahman* is the principal object of discussion (by saying) ‘Discuss that; that is *Brahman*’. That will conform to the *sūtra* if the Sixth Case is accepted in the accusative sense. Therefore, ‘Of *Brahman*’ is in the Sixth Case in the accusative sense.

११. ज्ञातुम् इच्छा जिज्ञासा। अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म। फलविषयत्वादिच्छायाः। ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेन अवगन्तुं इष्टं ब्रह्म। ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः। निःशेष-संसारबीज-अविद्याद्यनर्थ-निबर्हणात्। तस्माद्ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासितव्यम्।

11. Jijñāsā is the desire to know. The knowledge culminating in experience is the object of desire expressed by the *san*-suffix, because the fruit is the object of desire. The knowing of *Brahman* is the *pramāṇa*—i.e., the valid means of knowledge—through which experience is desired. The experience of *Brahman* is the human goal because it destroys tracelessly all the evil seeds of *saṃsāra*—transmigration or worldly life in general—like *avidyā* etc. Therefore, *Brahman* has to be discussed.

(11.1) Desire to know is *jijñāsā*. The *sā* here is called *san* suffix. So, the meaning of this suffix is desire and knowledge is the object of this desire. What is knowledge? It is the modification of the intellect in accordance with the object. This has been said even in the beginning. The knowledge of all limited objects generates a corresponding modification in the intellect. When this is so, the question that arises in knowing *Brahman* is: *Brahman* is formless. So how can a corresponding modification occur in the intellect? Following this objection, *śruti* also says 'अप्राप्य मनसा सह' - Unapproachable even by mind (Tai. 2.4). However, another *śruti* says 'मनसैवानुद्द्रष्टव्यम्' - It has to be grasped by the mind alone (Br.4.4.19). These two sentences are contradictory. How to reconcile them? The sentence in the text 'अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म' - The knowledge culminating in *avagati* is the object of desire indicated by the *san* suffix shows the way.

(11.2) In order to know them, the intellect is constantly interacting with changing, inert and limited objects. This has been happening since the infinite past. So, the intellect has become dirty, coloured and blunt. Such an intellect cannot grasp *Brahman* which is unchanging, conscious and unlimited. However, a competent person - i.e. with the qualities of *viveka*, *vairāgya* etc. mentioned in the beginning of this *sūtra* - can get the knowledge of *Brahman* when his intellect becomes clean, transparent and sharp by constant practice. That is, his intellect becomes as formless and motionless like *Brahman* with Its understanding (G. Bh. 6.20) - 'अत्यन्तनिर्मलत्व अतिस्वच्छत्व अतिसूक्ष्मत्व उपपत्तेः आत्मनः बुद्धेः च आत्मसमनैर्मल्यात् उपपत्तेः आत्मचैतन्याकाराभासत्व उपपत्तिः' - *Ātman* is totally clean, transparent and extremely sharp.

If the intellect also is equally clean etc, the intellect does reflect *Ātman's* features (G. Bh. 18.50) (The *Ātman* in this sentence is *Brahman*)*.

This formless, motionless 'modification' of the intellect represents the knowledge of *Brahman* 'अकल्पकं सर्वकल्पनावर्जितं....ज्ञानं-ज्ञेयेन परमार्थसता ब्रह्मणा अभिन्नं....सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तम् इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः' - This formless knowledge is not different from the object *Brahman*. That the *śruti* says *Brahman* is *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam* is the *pramāṇa* for this (Mā. Kā. 3.33).

Next, what is *avagati*? How is *avagati* obtained starting from this knowledge? These questions need answers.

(11.3) The answer to these questions is shown by the sentence: 'ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेन अवगन्तुम् इष्टं ब्रह्म' - The desire is to realize *Brahman* through the *pramāṇa* of Its knowledge'. For this *pramāṇa*, what is the *prameya* - object? Who is the *pramāta* - knower? The object has to be *Brahman* because, when the aspirant was in search of the unchanging, conscious and limitless *Brahman*, this extraordinary modification of the intellect occurred. At least, during that time, this modification is changeless and timeless. It also has the feature of consciousness, because: Any modification of the knowledge of finite objects has an adjective and a noun. For example, in the 'knowledge of the pot', 'of the pot' is the adjective and 'knowledge' is the noun. These qualified knowledges are changing according to the objects. But the noun 'knowledge' is unchanging. This is called 'consciousness' which is the second characteristic of *Brahman* - also called *jñapti* (Tai. Bh. 2.1) by Bhāṣyakāra. This formless, motionless 'modification' being attributeless is not different from *jñapti*. Therefore, the object of this knowledge is *Brahman*. 'ब्रह्म ज्ञेयं यस्य स्वस्य तदिदं ब्रह्म ज्ञेयम्' - *Brahman* which is the object for him is the object-*Brahman* (Mā. Kā. 3.33). Next, who is the knower of this *Brahman*? The extrovert wakeful aspirant (*bahisprajñā*) who is having this special modification is the knower.

*Here 'clean' means free from universally accepted bad qualities like lust, anger, greed etc. This cleanliness is not sufficient for *Brahma-jñāna*; the intellect should be 'transparent' also, i.e. without any prejudice or bias. Only then it would know anything as it is. Further, it also needs 'sharpness'. The intellect loses its ability to grasp subtle ideas - becomes blunt - if it is used for understanding crude things. *Brahman* is the subtlest. So, to grasp it, the intellect must be extremely pure, extremely transparent and extremely subtle - like *Brahman* Itself.}

(11.4) What is *avagati*? It is the experience of the oneness of *Brahman-Ātman*. The aforesaid knowledge is the *pramāṇa* for it. Himself is the knower and *Brahman* is the known. Therefore, in this transaction of knower and the known, there is oneness. How to obtain oneness starting from this duality? It is like this: *Brahman* is always *jñapti* - consciousness. But the 'modification' of the intellect corresponding to *Brahman* is a reflection of *Brahman* in the intellect - not *Brahman* Itself, not consciousness itself. Since it does not always stay in formlessness, it is not immutable. So, it is not right to know it as Oneself. It is also impossible for a knower to feel oneness with the known. But the *prājñā*, who is between the knower and the known, is Himself and also *Brahman*. 'How?' It is like this: *Prājñā* has all the features of *Brahman*, he is not an image of *Brahman*, he is *Brahman* itself. 'He is clean like water, he is without a second. Therefore, this is fearless, this is *Paramātman*. This is the ultimate goal the *jīva* has to reach, this is the greatest wealth, this is the greatest heaven. This is the greatest bliss - 'सलिल एको द्रष्टाद्वैतो भवति.....एषास्य परमागतिः एषास्य परमासंपत् एषोऽस्य परमो लोकः। एषोऽस्य परम आनन्दः' (Br. 4.3.32).

Further, *prājñā* is himself also, because he has *avidyā* which is the absence of the realisation that he is *Brahman*. Indeed, he is the *Brahman* who is yet to realize 'he is *Brahman*'. Since he has already understood *Brahman* directly through *jñāna-pramāṇa* and also since all the features of *Brahman* are being experienced in *suṣupti*, it is not impossible to realise his oneness with *Brahman*. It is being experienced within the body - 'देहेष्वेव विभाव्यमानत्वात्' (G.Bh. 13.16).

'तेन आत्मस्वरूपेण अजेन ज्ञानेन अजं ज्ञेयम् आत्मतत्त्वं स्वयमेव बुध्यते' - From that unborn consciousness which is his inehrent nature *ātmatattva*—i.e, *prājñā* - realizes himself as the unborn *Brahman* (Mā. Kā. 3.33). Therefore, the aspirant should keep his intellect continuously flowing towards *Ātman* with the awareness 'I am *Brahman*' generated by *śruti*. This is called *nididhyāsana* or *jñāna-niṣṭhā*. With this, the relationship of *adhyāsa* with the intellect drops off; along with this, *prājñā* also drops off. Proceeding in this way, when *jñāna-niṣṭhā* which started with *jñāna-pramāṇa* culminates in the realization of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness, the aspirant settles down in the oneness of *Ātman*. Therefore, without feeling tired, one should pursue in *jñāna-niṣṭhā* for realization. Since *Brahman* is the goal of everything, this realisation expresses itself in waking and dreaming states as *sarvātmabhāva* - everything is himself. This may happen very quickly for great people, for others it may require

several lives. The Gītā says: ‘बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान् मां प्रपद्यते। वासुदेवः सर्वमिति’ - The man with *jñāna* reaches me at the end of many lives and realizes that everything is Vāsudev' (Gītā 7.19). With this realization, both the entities grasped as 'you' and 'I' (first words in the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya*) drop off; all nonsense (*anartha*) comes to an end. Therefore, this is the highest human goal. So, one desirous of *Ātman*, should discuss about *Brahman**.

(11.5) Another question: In part (7) of the bhāṣya it is said: ‘ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या’- *Brahma-jijñāsā* should be done. In (11), the same is said - ‘ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासितव्यम्’। In Taittirīya Bhāṣya it is said ‘ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व’ - Desire the clear knowledge of *Brahman*. The meaning of all these is the same: Do or have the desire for *Brahma-jijñāna*. But this does not reconcile with the former sentences because: ‘तस्मात् किम् अपि वक्तव्यं यद् अनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा उपदिश्यते इति’- Having said ‘therefore it is to be told after what is *Brahma-jijñāsā* to be taught?’ (section 5 of text), the answer is given as ‘after *sādhana-sampatti*’ - i.e., the qualities of discrimination, dispassion etc., which make one competent for *Ātman*'s knowledge (section 6 of text). Desire for *mokṣa* is included in these set of qualities. Hence, to one who is already having desire for *mokṣa*, the advice to have desire for knowledge or *mokṣa* is not meaningful. So, what is the

***Question:** It is a strange situation: While demonstrating that *adhyāsa* is *mithyājñāna*, clear separation is shown between *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā*, using the shell-silver example. But after realising that *kṣetrajñā* is *Brahman*, *kṣetra* is shown to be non-different from *Brahman* (though *Brahman* is different from *kṣetra*) using the gold-ornament example. What exactly is happening?

Answer: *Adhyāsa* is the relation between the *kṣetra* and the Self and effect-cause is the relation between *kṣetra* and *Brahman*. Therefore, either way, during *avidyā* or *vidyā*, Self is different from *kṣetra*. But clarity is needed only in the reverse direction, viz., what is the relation of the *kṣetra* with the Self? The answer is: During *avidyā*, *kṣetra* is **different** from Self - **but not as a rule**; there is a sense of oneness with some selected parts of *kṣetra* - like one's own body and the difference in some other parts - like his enemies. But during *vidyā*, *kṣetra* is **non-different** from Self **as a rule**. To remove the inconsistency in the ignorant person, *śāstra* proceeds as follows: It is clear that *prājñā* has all the characteristics of *Brahman*, viz., *satya*, *jñāna*, *ananta*, *ānanda* and oneness. So, *prājñā* is *Brahman*. After realising this, he is different from *kṣetra* as he was before. Now with the help of *śruti* he realises that the whole of *kṣetra* is himself and his previous inconsistency is removed.

meaning of the sentences in the beginning of this paragraph? Answer is this: *Jijñāsā* has two meanings: (1). Desire to know and (2). Discussion. The second meaning is in common usage. So the three sentences above mean 'do discuss about *Brahman*'. For knowledge of *Brahman*, Its discussion is necessary. For discussion of *dharma*, *śruti* etc. are the only *pramāṇas*; not so in the case of discussion on *Brahman*. *Śruti* and experience are *pramāṇas* as the occasion arises, because knowledge of *Brahman* has to culminate in its experience and it is an existent object - 'न धर्मजिज्ञासायाम् इव श्रुत्यादयः एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम् किन्तु श्रुत्यादयः अनुभवादयः च यथासम्भवम् इह प्रमाणम्। अनुभवावसानत्वाद् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य।' (Sū. Bh.1.1.2)

१२. तत् पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्। यदि प्रसिद्धम्, न जिज्ञासितव्यम्। अथ अप्रसिद्धम्, नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुमिति। उच्यते। अस्ति तावद् ब्रह्म नित्य-शुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावम्, सर्वज्ञम्, सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्। ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धत्वादयः अर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते। बृंहतेर्धातोः अर्थानुगमात्। सर्वस्य आत्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः। सर्वो हि आत्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न नाहमस्मि इति। यदि हि नात्मास्तित्व प्रसिद्धिः स्यात् सर्वो लोको नाहमस्मि इति प्रतीयात्। आत्मा च ब्रह्म।

12. 'That *Brahman* again could be well-known or unknown. If well-known, it need not be discussed; if unknown, it cannot be discussed.' We say: There does exist *Brahman* which is by nature eternally pure, enlightened and free, omniscient and endowed with all powers. If the word *Brahman* is extracted in conformity with the meaning of the root 'Brahm', the meanings of eternal purity etc. will emerge. Also because of being the *Ātman* of all, the existence of *Brahman* is well known. Everyone indeed cognizes his existence, None says 'I do not exist'. Had not the existence of *Ātman* been well known, everyone would have said 'I do not exist'. That *Ātman* is *Brahman*.

(12.1) It has been said that discussion of *Brahman* has to be done. This leads to the following objection: If *Brahman* is famous i.e., already known to everyone, then discussion is unnecessary. If It is not famous i.e., unknown to everyone, discussion is not possible. So how can discussion be done?

Answer: *Brahman* is not famous; so discussion is necessary and *Brahman* is famous, so discussion is possible. It is famous in the sense that everyone has some

faint knowledge that 'there is some such thing'. It is not famous in the sense that there is no clear knowledge of *Brahman*.

Objection: Common people will not have even heard of the word *Brahman*. How do you say It is famous?

Answer: This is the answer to those who know the word *Brahman*. The origination of the world itself establishes an eternal, clean, enlightened, free *Brahman*'s existence. Starting from the root 'बृहि वृद्धौ' - Grown unrestrictedly' if the word is constructed as 'बृहणाद् ब्रह्म' - It means that *Brahman* is limitless, grown without damaging its inherent nature. This leads to Its features: After growth also, It remains as It was before growth, so It is eternally clean. Since It grows by Itself, It has to be a conscious activity. So, It is eternally enlightened. Though grown unrestrictedly, It has not left Its cleanliness and enlightenment. So, It is eternally free. Therefore, it follows that there is the object *Brahman* following the meaning of the word *Brahman*.

(12.2) Next, it is shown that *Brahman* is famous amongst all - those who know the meaning of the word *Brahman* or those who do not know, whether scholars or laymen: *Prājñā*, the inner *Ātman*, is in the experience of all. No one says that he is not existing 'though he is not understanding the world or even himself' (Cā. 8.11.1). No one says 'I was dead in *suṣupti*, I was not alive'. It is true that during *suṣupti* itself, nobody is aware that he was not knowing anything and that he was happy. Nevertheless, after waking up, everyone says: 'न किञ्चिदवेदिषं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' - I was not knowing anything, I slept happily. In this way, *prājñā* is famous. This *Ātman* Itself is *Brahman* - '*Ātmā ca Brahma*' - says Bhāṣyakāra. This is because, during that time, the reason for not knowing anything and for the experience of extreme bliss is the oneness that he had obtained with *Brahman* - says the *śruti*. So *Brahman* is famous.

(12.3) It is to be noticed that this proof for the fame of *Brahman* (in the form of *prājñā*), cannot apply to the fourth *Ātman* because, he is as unknown as *Brahman*. So, it is also wrong to take fourth *Ātman* in place of the entity grasped as 'I' - *kṣetraja* the *pratyagātman* (inside *Ātman*). Not only that. Even in this section of the *bhāṣya* the *Ātman* referred to is *prājñā* only. Just as in the sentences like 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' - This *Ātman* is *Brahman* etc, here too, the *Ātman* in 'आत्मा च ब्रह्म' - is *prājñā* only: 'ब्रह्म अयम् आत्मा । कोऽसौ? यः प्रत्यगात्मा द्रष्टा श्रोता मन्ता बोद्धा विज्ञाता - This *Ātman* is *Brahman*. Who is He? *Pratyagātman* the seer, the listener, the thinker, the knower (Bṛ. Bh. 2.5.19).

(12.4) Question: How is that in *suṣupti*, the *pratyagātman*'s oneness was the reason for his not knowing anything and his experience of extreme happiness?

Answer: During the waking state, the mind, eyes and the outside forms are posed as separate due to *avidyā*. Therefore, there are qualified knowledges of forms, i.e., seeing the forms with eyes, grasping them with his mind etc.. But in the case of *Brahman*, none of these is different from It. So, though *Brahman* is of the nature of consciousness, there are no qualified knowledges in It. Therefore, if *pratyagātman* does not have qualified knowledges in *suṣupti*, the reason is the oneness he had with *Brahman* - 'यद् हि तद् विशेषदर्शनकारणम् अन्तःकरणं चक्षुः रूपं च, तदविद्यया अन्यत्वेन प्रत्युपस्थापितमासीत्। तदेतस्मिन् काले एकीभूतम् आत्मनः परेण परिष्वङ्गात्।अयं तु सर्वात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः स्वेन परेण प्राज्ञेन आत्मना प्रिययेव पुरुषः। तेन न पृथक्त्वेन व्यवस्थितानि करणानि विषयाश्च। तदभावाद् विशेषदर्शनं नास्ति'। (Br. Bh.4.3.23). Further, *Brahman* is also of the nature of bliss (*Paramānanda*). So, during *suṣupti*, *pratyagātman* experiences that bliss also.

१३. यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति ततः ज्ञातमेव इति अजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नम्। न। तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः। देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टम् आत्मा इति प्राकृता जनाः लोकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः। इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनानि आत्मा इत्यपरे। मन इत्यन्ये। विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके शून्यमित्यपरे। अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्ता इत्यपरे। भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्ता इत्येके। अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तः इति केचित्। आत्मा स भोक्ता इत्यपरे। एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्नाः युक्ति-वाक्य-तदा-भास-समाश्रयाः सन्तः। तत्र अविचार्य यत्किञ्चित्प्रतिपद्यमानः निःश्रेयसात् प्रतिहन्येत। अनर्थं च इयात्। तस्मात् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधतर्कोपकरणानिःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते।

13. 'If *Brahman* is well-known to people as the Self, then, since it is already known, the objection that it need not be discussed comes back!' No, because, there are conflicting views as to Its unique nature. Common people and Lokāyatikas conceive of *Ātman* as the mere body qualified by animation; others conceive of *Ātman* as animated sense organs; yet others as mind; others as mere momentary cognition; others as void; still others say there is a *samsārī* - (one leading a worldly life)—different from the body who is doer and enjoyer.

Some say that, he is enjoyer alone and not doer. Some say, there is, as different from him, an omniscient and omnipotent Īśwara. He, the *Ātman*, is the enjoyer, say others. Thus, there are different views based on reasoning, quotations (both sound and) fallacious. Accepting any one of these without enquiry would deprive one of *mokṣa* and one may also end up in grief. Therefore, by saying that discussion of *Brahman* should be done, a holy enquiry into Vedānta sentences is begun with reasoning not inconsistent therewith, and whose purpose is *mokṣa*.

(13) In this way, if it is said that *Brahman* is well-known, once again the objection that it need not be discussed props up. 'If each day, *Brahman* is coming to the experience of everyone, what is there to discuss about *Brahman*?' It is not like that. Everyone experiences only Its existence, no one knows Its nature - what exactly It is. That is, there is only a vague idea of It, not Its full knowledge. So *Bhāṣyakāra* says 'तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः' - Here are contradictory opinions about its characteristics' among thinkers. (Notice that if *Ātman* is referred to here is not *prājñā*, but the fourth *Ātman*, these sentences cannot be reconciled; nobody has even a vague knowledge of that *Ātman*). Therefore, non-believers in God, Veda etc, *Vijñānavādīs* and nihilists among Buddhists, Logicians, *Mimāṃsākās*, *Sāṃkhya*s etc- describe the *pratyagātman* (who is *Brahman*) in different ways. Dualists who disagree with the statement 'आत्मा च ब्रह्म' - This *Ātman* is Īśwara, describe that the omniscient and omnipotent Īśwara is different from this *Ātman*. Some thinkers say He is the enjoyer. All of them use logic and some even *śruti* sentences for proving their point. Obviously everybody cannot be right, because one and the same thing cannot have mutually contradictory characteristics. Therefore, without discussing, if someone accepts one of them out of blind faith and respect, he will miss *mokṣa*. Not only that; he may end up even in distress. So, people who desire *mokṣa*, should discuss about *Brahman*. How? They should use a logic not contradictory to the *śruti*. *Brahmasūtras* and its *bhāṣya* by Śāṅkarācārya do precisely this.



जन्माद्यधिकरणम् Jammādyadhikaraṇam

१. ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तम्। किं लक्षणं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्म इति? अत आह भगवान्
सूत्रकारः -

1. It has been said that *Brahman* is to be discussed. The question now arises what the characteristics of that *Brahman* are. Hence the venerable author of the sūtras says:

जन्माद्यस्य यतः (सू. १.१.२)

(It is that) *yataḥ*=from which, *janmādi* = creation etc, *asya* = of this universe (happen).

(1.1) **Question:** *Śruti* says that *Brahman* is not an object for knowing - 'एतत् अप्रमयम्' (Br. 4.4.20); It is not visible, cannot be grasped - 'अदृश्यम् अग्राह्यम्' (Mu. 1.1.15); inaccessible even to the mind - 'अप्राप्य मनसा सह' (Tai. 2.4). Further, creation etc are features of the world, not of *Brahman*. *Brahman* is absolutely unrelated to the world. How can these features of the world be characteristics - *lakṣaṇa* - of *Brahman*, through which It could be known?

Answer: True. It cannot be grasped by speech, mind, eye or any other sense organ. Though so much featureless, It is known to be the cause of the world. So, it must have characteristics related to the features of the world - 'नैव वाचा न मनसा न चक्षुषा न अन्यैः अपि इन्द्रियैः प्राप्तुं शक्यते। तथापि सर्वविशेषरहितः अपि जगतः मूलम् इति अवगतत्वात् अस्ति एव (ब्रह्म)'। (Ka. Bh. 2.3.12)

Question: The fourth *Ātman* (who is *Brahman*), is said to be without characteristics - *alakṣaṇam*. So, what sort of *lakṣaṇa* are creation etc?

Answer: What we know are features like creation etc and properties like change, inertness, limitedness; these belong to the world. But what we are actually looking at is *Brahman*. If we shift our attention gradually from creation etc to the

world of change and move on to *Brahman*, we can recognise It. In *Brahman*, there are neither creation etc nor change. In this way, though these features are absent in *Brahman*, they are indicators of It - the so called *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*.

(1.2) One definition of *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* is: An accidental occurrence showing the object by separating it from others 'कदाचित्कत्वे सति व्यावर्तकं तदस्थलक्षणम्' - For example, a crow sitting on Devadatta's house is an indicator (*lakṣaṇa*) of the house. But creation etc of the world are not *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* in that sense because they will be occurring periodically from infinite past to infinite future. *Śruti* says: 'सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्' - God created the universe of sun, moon etc just like previously (Rg. Sam. 10.190.3), 'आत्मनः स्थावरजङ्गमं जगत् इदम् अग्निविस्फुलिङ्गवत् व्युच्चरति अनिशम्, यस्मिन् एव च प्रलीयते जलबुद्बुदवत् यदात्मकं च वर्तते स्थितिकाले' - The universe of moving and unmoving objects are coming out continuously like sparks of fire from the *Ātman*, getting dissolved like bubbles in water staying as a form of *Ātman* during sustenance (Br. Bh. 2.1.20). Another definition of this *lakṣaṇa* is: 'स्वरूपान्तर्भूतत्वे सति इतरव्यावर्तकं तदस्थलक्षणम्' - Any indicator of the object other than its inherent characteristics is *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*. In this sense, creation etc are *taṭastha lakṣaṇas*, because they are not *Brahman*'s inherent characteristics (*swarūpa lakṣaṇa*). 'How can they bring *Brahman* to our attention?' 'रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय' - Because these forms were assumed by *Brahman* to make us recognise It (Br. 2.5.19). Just as man expresses his meaning through speech.

Brahman took up these forms to let us know It. There is a one way identity between the world and *Brahman*, just like that of speech and meaning. It is one way because: Speech is not different from meaning, but meaning is different from speech. So, creation etc and change etc of the world convey *Brahman* though they are not in *Brahman*.

२. जन्मः उत्पत्तिः आदिः अस्य इति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः। जन्मस्थितिभंगं समासार्थः। जन्मनश्च आदित्वं श्रुतिनिर्देशापेक्षं वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षं च। श्रुतिनिर्देशस्तावत् "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते" (तै. ३.१) इत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां क्रमदर्शनात्। वस्तुवृत्तमपि जन्मना लब्धसत्ताकस्य धर्मिणः स्थितिप्रलयसंभवात्।

2. Janma—Creation; adih—etc. (meaning existence and destruction), janma ādi asya is Tadguṇasamvijñāna Bahuvrihi compound (meaning creation,

existence and destruction taken together). The meaning of the compound is creation, existence and destruction. Creation being mentioned first is according to the śruti and also the nature of things. It is thus stated in scripture 'That from which these beings are created'. In this sentence, the sequence shown is creation, existence and destruction. The nature of a thing is also such that existence and destruction can happen only to a thing which has come into existence through creation.

(2.1) Creation etc mean creation, sustenance and dissolution. Separating the three in any way does not convey the purport of śruti; they have to be taken together as a compound word to imply śruti's purport. 'Creation' is not an adjective of the compound word. If the word is understood without separating the adjective, the compounding is called *tadguṇasaṁviṣṭāna bahuvrīhiḥ*; if separated, it is called *atadguṇasaṁviṣṭāna bahuvrīhiḥ*. If the latter is taken, then that could imply one animate cause for creation and another inanimate cause for sustenance and dissolution. The first could be the efficient cause and the second the material cause such as the *pradhāna* of the *Sāṁkhya*s etc. This would not be according to śruti, which says that *Brahman* is both the efficient and material cause of the world. So, the first compounding is accepted. Another point about the sequence of creation, sustenance and destruction is as follows: When the world is not visible, we cannot talk of the latter two. Therefore, the sequence is taken as mentioned. Śruti also speaks of the same sequence with respect to the creatures.

(2.2) This *sūtra* considers the creation etc of both the inert and animate world, i.e., both *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*. 'आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैः घटाकाशैरिवोदितः। घटादिवच्च संघातैः जातावेतन्निदर्शनम्' - *Ātman* is born in the form of *jīvas* like *ākāśa* in the form of the space inside pots and also in the form of bodies like pots etc. This is the example for His birth (Mā. Kā. 3.3). The *kṣetra* coming out of *aparāprakṛti* is *Brahman*; 'सत्यं च अनृतं च सत्यम् अभवत्' - Changing unchanging and apparent truth are only forms of the absolute truth (Tai. 2.7) is *pramāṇa* for this. *Kṣetrajña* coming out of *parāprakṛti* is also *Brahman* - 'क्षेत्रज्ञं च अपि मां विद्धि' (Gītā 13.2) 'You are that' (Cā. 6.8.7) etc. are *pramāṇa* for this. Though two pairs viz., *aparā-kṣetra* and *parā-kṣetrajña* are mentioned, *Hiraṇyagarbha* appearing through *aparāprakṛti* is the first born *kṣetrajña*, and *kṣetrajñas* appear through *parāprakṛti* i.e. *prāṇa*—which is *kṣetra*.

For creation of *nāma-rūpa* the qualified knowledge (of the forms) and contact with matter is necessary. These two can be found only in a *jīva* with *avidyā*, not *Īśvara*. Hence, motivation for creation is in *jīva* and not *Īśvara*. *Paramātman* is passive in His inherent nature, but motivated in association with *māyā* - ‘परमात्मनः तु स्वरूप-व्यपाश्रयम् औदासीन्यं मायाव्यपाश्रयं च प्रवर्तकत्वम्’ (Sū. Bh. 2.2.7). Here *māyā* means ego-*aharṅkāra* - which is the cause of the motivation - which is *avyakta* in conjunction with *avidyā* - ‘अहंकारः इति अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम्...., प्रवर्तकत्वात् अहंकारस्य’ (G. Bh. 7.4). In this way, the material cause of creation etc. of effects is the *māyā* of *Īśvara* and the cause for motivation is *avidyā*. That is the reason why *Brahman* enters in *jīva* form to create *nāma-rūpa* - ‘अनेन जीवेनात्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि’ (Cā. 6.3.2). With His *icchā-śakti*, *jñāna-śakti* and *kriyā-śakti* (powers of desire, knowledge and action), *Īśvara* enters into the *jīva* through His *parāprakṛti prāṇa* and transacts the creation etc.

Question: Rather than this, why don’t we just say that *māyā* is the material cause of the world and *Hiraṇyagarbha* the efficient cause and thereby retain *Brahman* in Its essentially passive nature?

Answer: No. Knowledge of *Brahman* is not possible without imposing causeness of the world on *Brahman*. The *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman* is not possible without the knowledge of *Brahman*; otherwise *Brahman* will remain *parokṣa*. Therefore, to teach *Brahman*, the imposition of both the efficient and material causeness is inevitable.

Question: If the *vyavahāra* of creation etc, which does not exist in *Brahman*, is imposed on It, does it not amount to telling a lie?

Answer: It is not a lie, since both *Hiraṇyagarbha* and *māyā* are not different from *Brahman*. *Hiraṇyagarbha* handles the transaction of creation etc only through *Brahman*’s power *māyā*. For e.g., though it is only the mason who does the actual building of a house, people point to the owner as the builder. Similarly, in the case of *Brahman*, the imposition of causeness is in the secondary sense; it is *adhyāropa* - imposition done by *śāstra* to teach *Brahman*. Not a lie, it is not even *adhyāsa* - wrong knowledge.

३. “अस्य” इति प्रत्यक्षादिसंनिधापितस्य धर्मिणः इदमा निर्देशः। षष्ठी जन्मादिधर्मसंबंधार्था।

3. (In the expression) “Of this” (the word) ‘this’ refers to the thing (i.e.,

universe) seen through perception etc. The sixth case refers to its relation to creation etc.

(3.1) Here 'asya' means 'of the world'. Creation etc are the *dharma*s of the world and the world is the *dharmi*, i.e. in which the *dharma*s are seen. *Dharma* cannot exist without *dharmi*, but *dharmi* does exist without *dharma*. This is because the world always exists; when it is not seen, it is only unmanifest - 'कार्यम् अपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति' (Sū. Bh. 2.1.16). Manifestation is creation, existing in the manifest form is sustenance and becoming unmanifest again is destruction. This implies that the *dharmi* (world), is independent of the *dharma* (creation etc). Similarly in the next step, change, inertia and limitedness are *dharma*s of the world; and the *dharmi* independent of them is its material cause viz., *Brahman*. World is not free from *Brahman*, but *Brahman* is free from the world. It is like the changing pot which is not free from clay, but clay, which is unchanging, is free from the pot. This *dharma-dharmi* relation is nothing but effect-cause relation (Sū. Bh. 2.1.9). In this way, creation etc are not free from the world, and the world is not free from *Brahman*; so, creation etc and the world can become features of *Brahman*.

Creation etc are *upa-lakṣaṇa* - more distant features; change, inertia, limitedness of the world are *dharma-lakṣaṇa* - nearer features and immutability (*satyam*), awareness (*jñāna*) and limitlessness (*anantam*) are *swarūpa-lakṣaṇa*, viz., inherent features of *Brahman*. Similarly, birth, living and death of *kṣetrajñā* are *upa-lakṣaṇa*, his different levels of pleasures are the *dharma-lakṣaṇa* and bliss is *swarūpa-lakṣaṇa* - of *Brahman*. That is why the Brahma Sūtras start the discussion of *Brahman* from creation etc in the *janmādi* section and then show that the world is non-different from the immutable *Brahman* in the *vilakṣaṇa* (Sū. 2.1 sec3) and *ārambhaṇa* (Sū. 2.1 sec. 6) sections and finally in *ubhayaliṅga* section (Sū 3.2 sec. 5) establish its inherent nature of attributelessness. Similarly, in *tadabhāva* section, the inherent nature of *kṣetrajñā* is shown to be *Brahman* (Sū. Bh. 3.2 sec. 2). In this way, the *vidyā* of the oneness of *Ātman* is to know the inherent nature of the world which is *Brahman*, which is also the inherent nature of the individual soul *kṣetrajñā*; *vidyā* is not to know that the world is an illusion. In fact, *Bhāṣyakāra* has warned that the one who understands the world as illusory is unfit for *mokṣa* (see *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 25.2 end part)*.

*Because: If what is seen by the eyes is to be rejected by the mind as *mithyā*, it needs

Kṣetra (world) and *kṣetrajñā* (individual soul) are described as of different natures. If *kṣetra* is non-existent, this sentence does not make sense. If it is non-existent, how could the *Sūtrakāra* and *Bhāṣyakāra* have taken so much pains to establish that the inherent nature of *kṣetra* is *Brahman*? If the features of *kṣetra* are not in *Brahman*, the reason is that *Brahman* is its material cause. This featureless *Brahman* is *prājñā*. The characteristic features of *Brahman* viz., immutability, awareness, limitlessness, oneness, bliss are experienced by everyone in deep sleep. Therefore, when informed, anyone easily understands that *adhyāsa* is wrong knowledge.

४. “यतः” कारणनिर्देशः। अस्य जगतः नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेक कर्तृभोक्तृ-संयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियत-देश-काल-निमित्त-क्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभंगं यतः सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद् भवति “तद् ब्रह्म” इति वाक्यशेषः।

4. “From which” designates the cause. That omniscient and omnipotent cause from which occur the creation, existence and destruction of this universe; a universe differentiated by name and form, containing many doers and enjoyers, the support of the fruit of action regulated by place, time and causation, the nature of whose design cannot even be conceived by the mind; “that is *Brahman*” is the remaining part of the sentence (in the *sūtra*).

(4.1) The gist of this section is that the omniscient, omnipotent *Brahman* alone is the cause of the world. For confirming it, some comments may be made using inference -

(a) The world of names and forms could not have come from an inert cause. The cause has to be animate. *Śruti* puts it like this: ‘सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरः नामानि कृत्वा अभिवदन् यदास्ते’ - That brave one creating forms, is calling them by their names (Tai. Ar. 3.12.7) ‘सः अकामयत’ - He desires (to create) (Tai. 2.6), ‘सः ईक्षत, सः ईक्षांचक्रे’ - He saw (Ai. 1.1.1) etc.

(b) The world is full of doers and enjoyers. The one enjoying the fruit of *karma* done in this life is both the doer and enjoyer. When enjoying past *karma*, he is not a doer but only an enjoyer. Since doers and enjoyers are included in creation, there cannot be doership or enjoyership in the cause *Brahman*.

knowership in the doer and this separates him from *Brahman*. Knowership is lost only when what is seen by the eyes is accepted by the seer as himself.

(c) The doer's *karma* is his action (*kriyā*). The fruit of *karma* that he enjoys later is the fruit (*phala*) of action. This enjoyment has to follow the rules of space, time and causation. As this space, time and causation are effects, they cannot exist in the cause.

(d) The complexity of the world is beyond imagination. Scientists of extraordinary brilliance have been breaking their heads since centuries to unravel the mystery of the world using inference (*anumāna*). They are succeeding only in discovering some intermediate causes, never the ultimate one. It is impossible to determine the ultimate cause by inference. Why? The reason is: Seeing *vyāpya* (the pervaded), the *vyāpaka* (the pervader) is conjectured on the basis of the knowledge of *vyāpti* (pervasion) in *anumāna pramāṇa*. The knowledge of *vyāpti* is possible in determining an intermediate cause, but it is impossible in the case of the ultimate cause; because neither itself nor something similar to it is already known. Therefore, the ultimate cause never be determined by inference.

(4.2) Question: In (4.1c) above, time has been mentioned as a created item. Time is what is referred to as earlier, now, later etc when the world is being seen; it is the time recognised during sustenance. Dissolution is when it goes unseen. Therefore, creation etc are possible only when time is accepted, i.e. time has to be the cause. How is it that it is included among the created?

Answer: Times are really two: one is countable like earlier, now later etc. This is relative time. Another is its cause, which is uncountable. This is the absolute time. Relative time changes from place to place; it is of decaying type and countable like day and night. Absolute time is immutable, so not countable, so not decaying type - like the time of one on the sun, where there is no setting or rising of sun. Countable relative time is *Brahman* - 'कालः कलयताम् अहम्' (Gītā 10.30). So also uncountable absolute time - 'अहम् एव अक्षयः कालः' (Gītā 10.33). When this appears as standing grown up, it becomes relative time - 'कालः अस्मि लोकक्षयकृत् प्रवृद्धः' (Gītā 11.32). Therefore, relative time is the effect and absolute time is its material cause. Absolute time belonging to the causal category appears like relative time through the event of creation. So also space. Indeed, even space and time are undivided before creation - 'देशकालापरिच्छिन्न' (Lalitā Sahasranāma 701)*.

*We can show that the space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*) and direction (*dik*) are all effects. Space, time and direction are also created along with the *jagat*. Actually, there is no

(4.3) Objection: In accordance with the names and forms already existing in his mind, the pot maker creates the pots etc. But *Brahman* has no mind (Mu. 2.1.2). How then can It be the efficient cause of the names and forms of the world?

Answer: *Jīvas* are *alpajñas* (अल्पज्ञ). For creating anything, they need instruments (*karaṇas*). Based on this, if it is conjectured that the omniscient (*sarvajña*) and omnipotent *Brahman* also needs instruments for creation is not right. It is known that people with special powers (*siddhas*) create things without the usual instruments (Sū. Bh. 2.1.25). Another example is of the dreaming *Ātman*, which though one, creates the several forms seen in dreams. Knowing all this, it is not right to use the logic of other *pramāṇas* to make objections on *śruti*. Indeed, *śruti* tells us only about those things which are not available for other *pramāṇas*. Actually, that the instrumentless *Brahman* is the cause of this mysterious creation shows Its omniscience and omnipotence.

(4.4) Objection: One cannot say that *Brahman* is always knowing something or the other and doing something or the other; because, there is nothing to know or do in *pralaya*. Therefore, how is it possible to say that *Brahman* of mere awareness - *kevala jñānaswarūpa* - is omniscient and omnipotent?

space, time and direction in objects themselves, but we as *jñāta* (knower) see them always together. For example, when we see a pot, we see it along with the space where it is. When something is moving we say 'then' and 'now'. Similarly with direction. Objects belong to one class, while space, time and direction to another. As observers we are aware of the object as well as space, time and direction. For knowing the object we use the sense organs but not so to know space, time and direction. These we get to know only along with the object. If one is grasping the object, they must be there. Similarly, the question arises: 'Where are space, time and direction existing?' Since we get their *pratyaya* in the *buddhi*, they must be existing somewhere. However, if we remove all the objects, then there won't be space, time or direction. But whenever the object is seen, they are also noticed. Therefore, the cause of the objects and space, time, direction should be the same. That is *Brahman*. Therefore, space, time and direction are also effects of *Brahman* and not a cause. Space, time are the shadows of the object in the mind. Originally, space-time are one undivided, but are produced distinctly along with the objects by *Īswara*. In *Brahman* they are undivided, in creation, they seem to get divided. Since we observe space, time etc, therefore they have to be there. Therefore, there is a time (*kāla*) before creation; it is absolute time (*nirapekṣa kāla*), which is not measurable. We are

Answer: It is omniscient precisely because it is *jñānaswarūpa*. The statement that one which has the eternal capacity of *jñāna* which can illumine (know) everything is not omniscient is self-contradictory - 'यस्य हि सर्वविषयावभासनक्षमं ज्ञानं नित्यम् अस्ति सः असर्वज्ञः इति विप्रतिषिद्धम्' (Sū.Bh.1.1.5), Omniscience is its inherent nature - 'सः सर्वज्ञस्वभावः' (Ai. Bh. 1.1). But it does not have the transaction of omniscience, because transaction is possible only through the adjuncts (*upādhis*) of intelligence etc. Without adjuncts, transaction is not possible and *Brahman* has no adjuncts. However, it is omniscient in its very nature; omniscience is not its attribute. Omnipotence is also to be understood similarly.

(4.5) Objection: Omniscience and omnipotence are in *Brahman*, not *jīva*. Then how is *Brahman-jīva* oneness possible?

Answer: Since the *vyavahāra* of omniscience and omnipotence are not there in *jīva*; so *Īśvara* is different from him. Bhāṣyakāra indeed says later that *jīva* cannot engage in the *vyavahāra* of creating the world etc. But in his inherent adjunctless nature, *jīva* is certainly omniscient - 'सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र भवतीह महाधियः' (Mā.Kā.4.89). Therefore, in the case of *jñānī*, creation etc are through him only. This has already been said (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 25.3).

Objection: Then would it not lead to several *Īśvaras*?

Answer: This fault arises only when the *jñānī* is cognised through the adjuncts of body etc. Such a cognition is wrong, because he is the *Ātman* unrelated to the body. That *Ātman* is one and is *Īśvara*.

measuring time with respect to the sun. In sun itself it is not measurable. Absolute time manifests as relative time with respect to objects. Similarly, there is absolute space also that is *ākāśa*; before that it was in the form of *Brahman*.

All divisions are like this. What were previously of the nature of *Brahman*, show up as modifications graspable by the intellect - without losing their inherent nature of *Brahmanness*. This is just like clay appearing like pots etc - not at all different. 'The world which was in an undifferentiated form earlier to creation, was an object for only one word and one concept i.e. *Ātman*. Now, after differentiation of names and forms, it is available for several words and concepts and also for one word and one concept i.e. *Ātman* - 'प्रागुत्पत्तेः अव्याकृतनामरूपभेदम् आत्मभूतम् आत्मैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरं जगत् इदानीं व्याकृतनामरूपभेदत्वात् अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरम् आत्मैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरं च' (Ai. Bh.1.1.1). This sentence knocks out the statement that the world is an illusion.

Question: How to know that *Īśwara* is only one ?

Answer: Unchangeability, awareness (*jñāna*) and limitlessness are the characteristics of *Īśwara*. Here *jñāna* is not the qualified *jñāna* appearing in the intellect as a result of the action of knowing. It is mere awareness. This is only one; it cannot be more than one. If it is, the other one becomes the known. Similarly for *ānanda* of *Īśwara*. It is also free of adjuncts; it is not that which is experienced through objects. This oneness of *jñāna* and *ānanda* is directly experienced by everyone in deep sleep. The *Īśwara* of the characteristics of *jñāna* and *ānanda* is one only.

Question: It is said that *parā* and *aparā prakṛtis* are eternal. So they exist even in *pralaya*. Does this not contradict the oneness of *Brahman* in *pralaya*?

Answer: No. Even during existence when multiplicity is seen, there is only one *Brahman* from the causal point of view. What to say during *pralaya*? Even then it is one because *prakṛti* is non-different from *Brahman* - 'सा शक्तिः ब्रह्म एव अहं शक्तिशक्तिमतोः अनन्यत्वात्' (G.Bh.14.27) My *māyā* is of My own nature - 'मम स्वरूप भूता मदीया माया' (G. Bh. 14.3).

५. अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेव अन्तर्भावः इति जन्मस्थितिनाशानाम् इह ग्रहणम्। यास्क परिपठितानां तु जायते अस्ति इत्यादीनां ग्रहणे तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले संभाव्यमानत्वात् मूलकारणात् उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशाः जगतो न गृहीताः स्युः इत्याशङ्क्येत। तन्माशङ्कि इति या उत्पत्तिः ब्रह्मणः तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च त एव गृह्यन्ते।

5. Creation existence and destruction are to be understood here, because all other modifications of being are included in these three. If (those) enumerated by Yāska viz., 'born, exists' etc were taken, they could occur even during the existence of the universe and there could arise a doubt that the creation existence and destruction of the universe by the ultimate cause are not to be taken here. To prevent that doubt, existence and destruction are also taken in the same *Brahman* from which creation has happened.

(5.1) Creation, sustenance and destruction mentioned in this *sūtra* apply to the world as a whole. Yaska mentions six modifications for things: *jāyate*-born, *asti*-exists, *vipariṇamate*-transforms, *vardhate*-grown, *apakṣiyate*-decays, *vinaśyati*-dies. All these modifications could be observed in things we see during the sustenance of

the world; for e.g. in a plant. For a plant, the cause could be the earth, not necessarily *Brahman*. In that case, the earth would be an intermediate cause. So, a doubt could arise whether this *sūtra* is referring to the ultimate cause or to some penultimate cause like the earth in the example here. In order to rule out an intermediate cause and keep only the ultimate cause, sustenance and destruction are also included as happening from the *Brahman* from which creation happens. This is done by absorbing Yaska's six modifications in sustenance alone.

Question: What is the *pramāṇa* for the ultimate causeness of *Brahman*?

Answer: The *mantra*: 'Īśwara created the sun moon earth (the whole universe) as it was previously—'सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् दिवं च पृथिवीं चान्तरिक्षमथो स्वः' (Rg Veda 10.190.3), says clearly that the world as a whole is subject to the cycle of creation etc and that Īśwara is its cause.

६. न यथोक्त विशेषणस्य जगतः यथोक्तविशेषणम् ईश्वरं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः प्रधानात् अचेतनात्, अणुभ्यः अभावात् संसारिणो वा उत्पत्त्यादि संभावयितुं शक्यम्। न च स्वभावतः विशिष्ट देशकालनिमित्तानाम् इह उपादानात्।

6. Apart from Īśwara having the above mentioned qualities, the creation etc of the universe having the above mentioned qualities can never happen from anything else like the insentient *pradhāna* or atoms or vacuum or *jīva*; nor by its own nature because (it) needs specific space-time-causation (relation).

(6.1) This section tells us that none other than the omniscient and omnipotent Īśwara is the ultimate cause of this complex universe. The Sāmkhyas say that their *pradhāna* of the three *guṇas* changes by itself and gets the form of the world. There is no example of such an inert stuff doing this sort of work. Even agreeing that the inert *pradhāna* could assume the form of the world like milk becoming curd, it can never allot the fruits of *karmas* to the *jīvas* because of its inertness. So, inert *pradhāna* could never be the cause (Sū. Bh. 2.2. sec. 1).

Further, Vaiśeṣikas say that atoms are the material cause of the world and a doer-enjoyer *Ātman* conceived by them is the efficient cause. It has been shown that this theory is full of contradictions (Sū. Bh. 2.2.12-17).

Next come the nihilist Buddhists. They say 'a plant grows with the death of the seed. So, absence of the seed is the cause of the plant. Similarly, this world too

comes from void.’ They have no answer for the question: ‘How only absence of mango seed is the cause of a mango tree and not the absence of a tamarind seed?’ Moreover, it is directly seen that the sprout of the tree is hidden in the seed and as it starts growing, the seed is lost. So, their logic is irresponsible; no one agrees with it.

Also, the world cannot come from *jīva* either - ‘न च गिरिनदीसमुद्रादिषु नानाविधेषु नामरूपेषु अनीश्वरस्य जीवस्य व्याकरणसामर्थ्यम् अस्ति’ (Sū. Bh. 2.4.20).

Next, whether something could spontaneously generate the world by its inherent nature. What is inherent nature working spontaneously? It should be something which works without the expectation of any particular place, time or an animate agent. Even milk cannot become curd without taking recourse to place and time. Even a straw cannot move without an animate agent. An inert thing is that which cannot work by itself. So, without an animate agent, it is impossible for the world to come into existence. Therefore, this mysterious universe can come only from the omniscient, omnipotent *Īśvara*.

(6.2) Question: Starting off with a discussion of *Brahman*, how is it that suddenly an omniscient and omnipotent *Īśvara* is introduced as the cause of the world? Who is He? How is He related to *Brahman*?

Answer: *Brahman* is mere *jñāna* and transactionless. It is impossible to know It. In order to teach It, *śāstras* take the following sequence as steps: *Prakṛti* is actually non-different from *Brahman*. However, it is treated as different, and is supposed to be an adjunct of *Brahman*. This is an imposition (*adhyāropa*) on *Brahman*, made by *śāstra*. With this adjunct, *Brahman* is called *Īśvara*. One part of *prakṛti* called *avyakta*—the inert power—is material cause of the world; the other is *prāṇa*—the action power that activates the world. This sustains the whole world of *kṣetra-kṣetrajña* (Gītā 7.5) This *prāṇa* is the vibrating force in all (Sū. Bh.1.3.39). *Avyakta* contains in it the defects of *avidyā* of *jīvas* - ‘अविद्याद्यनेकसंसारबीज रूपमन्तर्दोषवत् माया’ (G.Bh.12.3), which creates motivation in *Īśvara*. Creation is meant for *jīvas*’ experiencing the fruits of their *karma* and also *mokṣa*. *Brahman* Itself is described as the agent of this activity in the form of *Īśvara*. In the *avidyā* view of *jīvas*, themselves, world and *Brahman* are all different. But from the causal point of view, world is not different from *prakṛti* and *prakṛti* is not different from *Brahman* - ‘कारणस्य आत्मभूता शक्तिः शक्तेश्च आत्मभूतं कार्यम्’ (Sū. Bh. 2.1.18) including *jīva*.

To teach this oneness of *Ātman* and *Brahman*, a difference is presupposed in the otherwise one and alone *Brahman*: The *prakṛti*, non-different from It, is conceived as Its adjunct to reconcile with the world of *vyavahāra*. This is *adhyāropa*, which if not done, *Brahman* cannot be taught. The moment *Brahman* is understood through the effect-non-difference law, this *adhyāropa* automatically drops off. In this way, *Brahman-Īśvara* difference is just a verbal one (*vācārambhaṇa*)*.

७. एतदेव अनुमानं संसारि-व्यतिरिक्त-ईश्वर-अस्तित्वादिसाधनं मन्यन्ते ईश्वर-कारणिनः। ननु इहापि तदेव उपन्यस्तं जन्मादिसूत्रे? न। वेदान्तवाक्य कुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात् सूत्राणाम्। वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैः उदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते वाक्यार्थ-विचारण-अध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिः न अनुमानादि प्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता।

7. Those who accept *Īśvara* as the cause, regard this very inference as the proof for the existence of an *Īśvara* different from *jīva*. 'Is not the same presented here also in (this) *sūtra* 'Creation etc?' No, because the *sūtras* are intended to string together the Vedānta sentences like flowers. *Sūtras* investigate quoting only the Vedānta Sentences. Realization of *Brahman* occurs at the end of the investigation of the sentences, and not by other *pramāṇas* like *anumāna* etc.

(7.1) Till now, the material causeness of *Brahman* is hidden in the acceptance of the *tadguṇasainvijñānabahuorīhi* compounding of creation etc, and only Its efficient causeness has been discussed. Since this could be established even by *anumāna*, a doubt arises whether in this *sūtra* also, *Īśvara* is portrayed using *anumāna*. The answer is no. An Efficient *Īśvara*, established by *anumāna* is only an object for the knower *jīva* - not accessible for the experience of oneness with the knower. So, such an *Īśvara* is always indirect. But *Brahman* spoken of by the *śruti* is not so. Though it is just existence alone - *sanmātra*, it is the cause of the world; though the cause of the world, it is *sanmātra*. This deeply dignified *Brahman* spoken of by *śruti* is *satyam*, *jñāna*, *anantam* and *ānanda*, which can be experienced by *prājña* as himself. This changelessness separates it from change and limitlessness from limitedness. These two are Its relative characteristics with respect to the world derived by its material

**Apara Brahma*, *Saguṇa Brahma* and *Kārya Brahma* are the other names of *Hiraṇyagarbha* - the First Born (Sū. BH. 4.3.7 and 4.3.10). This *Īśvara* is not *Apara Brahma*.

causeness. Change and limitedness are not illusions, they are transactional truths. Further, *jñāna* separates It from the *adhyāropita* - the imposed agency - and *ānanda* from the illusory *ānandamaya* etc *ātman*s; these are absolute characteristics. Through reflection and contemplation, one obtains the knowledge of *Brahman*. When this knowledge culminates in the experience of oneness, the fruit is this: When without thoughts, the intellect stays in existence-alone *Ātman* and when with thoughts, stays in the experience of oneness of *Ātman* with everything. The sense of difference is totally destroyed.

In this way, the gulf of difference between *anumāna* etc and *śruti* is this: Till the end, there will be the multiplicity of knower-knowledge-known and the associated transaction in the former. *Śruti* however, though starting with multiplicity, demolishes it gradually but tracelessly, transforms even its gross form like camphor, to spread light and becomes one with it. *Brahma Sūtras* is a garland of the flowers of such *śruti* sentences.

८. सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगतो जन्मादिकारणवादिषु तदर्थग्रहणदाढ्याय अनुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्य-अविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत् न निवार्यते। श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्य अभ्युपेतत्वात्। तथा हि “श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः” (बृ २.४.५) इति श्रुतिः “पंडितो मेधावी गन्धारानेव, उपसंपद्येत एवमेव इह आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद” (छां ६.१४.२) इति च पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यम् आत्मनो दर्शयति। न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्, किंतु श्रुत्यादयः अनुभवादयश्च। यथासंभवमिह प्रमाणम् अनुभवावसानत्वात् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य। कर्तव्ये हि विषये न अनुभवापेक्षा अस्ति इति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्। पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वाच्च कर्तव्यस्य कर्तुम् अकर्तुम् अन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म यथा अश्वेन गच्छति, पद्भ्याम् अन्यथा वा न वा गच्छति इति। तथा “अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति”, “नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति”, “उदिते जुहोति”, “अनुदिते जुहोति” इति विधिप्रतिषेधाश्च अत्र अर्थवन्तः स्युः। विकल्प-उत्सर्ग-अपवादाश्च। न तु वस्तु “एवं” “नैवम्”, “अस्ति”, “नास्ति” इति वा विकल्प्यते। विकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः। न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम्। किं तर्हि। वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्। न हि स्थाणौ एकस्मिन् स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषः अन्यो वा इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति। तत्र पुरुषः अन्यो वा इति मिथ्याज्ञानम्।

स्थाणुरेव इति तत्त्वज्ञानम्। वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्। एवं भूतवस्तु विषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम्।
तत्र एवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव, भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात्।

8. In order to confirm the apprehended meaning of the Vedānta Sentences which discuss the creation etc. of the world, an inference unopposed to the Vedānta sentences is not to be excluded as a valid *pramāṇa*; for the upaniṣads themselves accept reasoning as a help. “(The self is) to be heard, it is to be thought about” and “a learned intelligent person reaches Gandhāra, in the same way, a man with an *ācārya* understands” show that one is helped by the human intellect. In the discussion of *Brahman*, *śruti* etc are not the only *pramāṇa* as they are on the discussion of *dharma*. But rather, *śruti* etc. and experience etc are *pramāṇa* as occasion arises because, the knowledge of *Brahman* culminates in experience and it (*Brahman*) is an existent object. In the case of *karma* which does not expect experience, *śruti* etc are the only *pramāṇa*. Since coming into existence of *karma* depends on the person, worldly and Vedic *karma* may be done, not done, or done in a different way. For e.g. one goes on horseback or on foot or otherwise or does not go at all. Similarly, “In the *atirātra* he takes the sixteenth cup”, “In the *atirātra* he does not take the sixteenth (cup)”; “As sun rises, he does the oblation”, “Before sunrise he does the oblation”. Prescriptions and prohibitions are meaningful here; also options, general rules and exceptions. But an object does not admit of options like “thus, not thus”, “exists, does not exist”. Options are dependent on human intellect (i.e. subjective). The knowledge of the true nature of an object is not dependent on the human intellect, What then? It depends on the object itself (i.e. objective). In the case of one post, true cognition cannot be as “It is a post or something else or a man”. In this case “a man or something else” is an illusory cognition; “It is certainly a post” is the true cognition, because it depends on the object. Thus, in the case of existent things, the validity of the *pramāṇa* is objective. Therefore, the knowledge of *Brahman* also is objective as it is an existent object.

(8.1) Though inference etc are blamed in this manner, they cannot be rejected because in the process of knowing *Brahman* they too have a role since ultimately,

Brahman too is an existent object to be experienced. Just as in the case of other objects, *Brahman's* knowledge too is objective - to be understood as it is. It is not subjective; i.e., the knower cannot know it as he likes. The example of the stump given by *Bhāṣyakāra* has been discussed in (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 14.4). So, *śruti* etc and experience etc are *pramāṇas* in the discussion of *Brahman* as the occasion arises. *Śruti* etc means *śruti, śmṛti, purāṇa, itihāsa*; and experience etc means experience obtained through other *pramāṇas* and the logic necessary to remove doubts.

(8.2) This is not so in the discussion of *dharma* (*dharma-jijñāsā*). *Karma* taught there is not objective. So, there is room for injunction-prohibition, choice-general rule-exceptions. Unlike *Brahma-jijñāsā*, experience is not a criterion in the discussion of *dharma*.

(8.3) After rejecting inference etc for *Brahman's* experience, if it is said that they also have a role besides *śruti*, the question arises 'When are other *pramāṇas* also acceptable? Why? When are they not acceptable? Why?' In the absence of clear answers to this question, one will not know the method of discussing *Brahman*. One will argue when one should not argue and will not argue when one should argue. These defects will hamper the discussion of *Brahman*. To prevent it, we will take up its examination.

(8.4) Things are of two types: available to the senses and not available. *Pramāṇas* are five: direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), Vedas (*śruti*). Those available for the senses are objects for the first four, since all of them depend on direct perception. Though inference concerns a thing which is indirect at that particular moment, finally its existence has to be verified only by direct perception; otherwise the concept is rejected. On the other hand, *śruti* speaks only of things that are not perceptible to the senses. *Dharma/adharma* and things beyond *prakṛti* are not available for sense perception; they are topics exclusively for *śruti*. Nevertheless, *dharma/adharma* meant for the prosperity of the *jīvas*, are not unrelated to the objects of perception. So, though the *dharma* part of the Vedas discusses only things beyond perception, it cannot speak against other *pramāṇas*. 'Even if 100 *śrutis* say that fire is cold and without light, they cannot be *pramāṇa*. If *śruti* at all says that 'fire is cold, without light', then another intended meaning has to be conceived. Otherwise, it will not be valid. The conceived meaning should not contradict either the *pramāṇa* in question or *śruti* - 'न

हि श्रुतिशतम् अपि शीतः अग्निः अप्रकाशो वा इति ब्रुवत् प्रामाण्यम् उपैति । यदि ब्रूयात् शीतः अग्निः अप्रकाशो वा इति तथापि अर्थान्तरं श्रुतेः विवक्षितं कल्प्यं प्रामाण्य-अन्यथा-अनुपपत्तेः न तु प्रमाणान्तरविरुद्धं स्ववचनविरुद्धं वा' (G.Bh. 18.66).

(8.5) Next, in *Brahman's* discussion, how can there be room for other *pramāṇas*? *Śruti* itself encourages them because *Brahman* has to be understood only through the perceived world; there is no other way. Therefore, upto the point of conveying the knowledge of *Brahman*, *śruti* uses other *pramāṇas* also and never speaks contradictory to them. 'One *pramāṇa* can never contradict another *pramāṇa*. A *pramāṇa* objectifies only that which is not an object for other *pramāṇas*. Without resorting to the words and objects of the world, even *śruti* cannot convey another unknown thing - 'न च प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरेण विरुध्यते, प्रमाणान्तराविषयम् एव हि प्रमाणान्तरं ज्ञापयति । न च लौकिकपदपदार्थाश्रयाव्यतिरेकेण आगमेन शक्यम् अज्ञातं वस्त्वन्तरम् अवगमयितुम्' (Br. Bh. 2.1.20). So, there is certainly profit derived from other *pramāṇas* in the process of getting the knowledge of *Brahman*. After getting this knowledge, one crosses the limits of multiplicity and enters into the region of oneness. After this there is no room for other *pramāṇas*, not even for that part of the *śruti* dealing with the prosperity of the *jīvas*.*

Here, Upaniṣads are the only *pramāṇa*. Therefore, after learning about *Brahman* through the world, one cannot ask questions in the reverse direction based on inference etc. For e.g., there is no meaning in asking the questions: 'How can the world emerge from a *Brahman* which is alone without a second? How can the immutable *Brahman* handle transactions like creation etc?' Even as the compassionate *Bhāṣyakāra* cautions the questioner that these are unusable questions, he simultaneously makes the effort of pacifying him with an appropriate answer as follows: 'It has indeed been said that other *pramāṇas* are also possible of application since *Brahman* is an existent object'. This thought is merely a fancy. *Brahman* is not

***Question:** A *śruti* against *pratyakṣa* is interpreted reconciling both *pramāṇas*. Should the same be done if the *śruti* is against inference?

Answer: No, because: Whether inference or *śruti*, its validity is only by direct experience. In the case of the first five *pramāṇas*, experience is only by *pratyakṣa*. So, the other four *pramāṇas* cannot go against *pratyakṣa*. But in the case of *śruti*, the object to be experienced is not *pratyakṣa*; so it need not conform to *pratyakṣa*. But the validity of *śruti* does hold since the object propounded by it is experienceable - though not by *pratyakṣa*.

available for perception by the senses because it has no form etc. It is not available for inference etc because It has no signs. Like *dharma*, *Brahman* too is to be understood only through *śruti* - 'यत् तु उक्तम् परिनिष्पन्नत्वात् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि संभवेयुः इति तदपि मनोरथमात्रम् । रूपाद्यभावाद्धि न अयम् अर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः । लिङ्गाद्यभावात् च न अनुमानादीनाम् । आगममात्रसमधिगम्य एव तु अयम् अर्थः धर्मवत्' । (Sū. Bh. 2.1.6).

One has to carefully examine the phrase 'like *dharma*, to be understood only by *śruti*' in the above quotation and the sentence '*śruti* etc are not the only *pramāṇa* in the discussion of *Brahman* as in the discussion of *dharma*' in the *bhāṣya* text section being discussed presently. Questions raised above in the reverse direction belong to the former category. They are answered by a logic not contradictory to the *śruti* as follows: 'Waking and dreaming states come and go, leaving the *prājñā* untouched. In deep sleep he is the worldless *Ātman* because he leaves the world and merges in *Brahman*; the world is a product of *Brahman* and so non-different from *Brahman* by the law of non-difference of effect-cause - 'श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एवं तर्कः अनुभवाङ्गत्वेन आश्रीयते । स्वप्नान्तबुद्धान्तयोः उभयोः इतरेतरव्यभिचारात् आत्मनः अनन्वागतत्वम्, संप्रसादे च प्रपञ्चपरित्यागेन सदात्मना संपत्तेः निष्प्रपञ्चसदात्मत्वम्, प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वात् कार्यकारणानन्यन्यायेन ब्रह्माव्यतिरेक इति एवं जातीयकः' । (Sū. Bh. 2.1.6).

९. ननु भूतवस्तुत्वे ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमेव इति वेदान्तवाक्यविचारणा अनर्थिकैव प्राप्ता? न। इंद्रियअविषयत्वेन संबन्धाग्रहणात्। स्वभावतो विषयविषयाणि इंद्रियाणि न ब्रह्मविषयाणि। सति हि इंद्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः इदं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं कार्यमिति गृह्येत। कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह्यमाणं किं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं किमन्येन केनचिद्वा संबद्धमिति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम्। तस्मात् जन्मादि सूत्रं नानुमानोपन्यासार्थम्, किं तर्हि? वेदान्तवाक्यप्रदर्शनार्थम्।

9. 'If *Brahman* is an existing thing, it would be an object for other *pramāṇas* and so would it not become meaningless to investigate Vedānta sentences to know *Brahman*?' No, because, as It is not an object for the senses the connection cannot be known. Senses by nature cognize things and cannot cognize *Brahman*. If It were cognizable by the senses, then, Its connection with this effect (world) could be grasped. When effect alone is being grasped, it is not possible to determine whether it (the effect) is connected with *Brahman* or with something else. Therefore, the *sūtra* 'creation etc' could not be speaking of inference. 'What then?' It is conveying the meaning of the Vedānta sentences.

(9.1) By the law of non-difference of effect-cause, 'the world, which is an effect, is one with its cause, which is *Brahman*' (Sū. Bh. 2.2.38) - this is the former part of the law. But *Brahman* is different from the world - this is the latter part of the law. *Śruti* discusses the former part through the examples of clay-pot etc and thereby teaches about *Brahman*. During this step, it uses a logic not in disagreement with other *pramāṇas*. But in the region of the latter part, apart from superimposing (*adhyāropa*) of causeness of the world on *Brahman*, it does not say anything more. Indeed no theory, professing to discuss the issue, tells us anything more than this, because it is just not possible. This becomes obvious when one has understood *Brahman*. Nevertheless common people, who are influenced by other *pramāṇas*, do ask the unaskable question 'How is it possible that from *Brahman*, who is 'merely existence' (*sanmātra*), the world could be produced?' It is to clear this doubt that the *bhāṣya* uses the rope-snake example. 'Though this appears as snake, it is rope only. Similarly, though it appears like the world, it is *Brahman* only. There is *Brahman* alone. There is nothing like a world different from *Brahman*'. Therefore factually, there is no scope for this question. This is the logic, uncontradictory to *śruti*, which is employed by the *bhāṣya* to answer the above question.

In this way, while explaining *Brahman* through the world, the clay-pot examples are used and after teaching, to remove doubts about the understood *Brahman*, the example of snake and rope is given. But those who are stuck firmly to the illusoriness (*jagat-mithyātva*) of the world, caused by the blunder of associating '*asmāt-pratyaya-gocara*', the very first word of *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* with the fourth *Ātman* - not bothering to investigate the roles of the extremely dissimilar examples of clay-pot and rope-snake - ditch the example of clay-pot which shows the cause-effect relation - hold on firmly to the rope-snake example which does not show the cause-effect relation - cook up the word *vivartopādāna* whatever it is, to explain the cause-effect relation of *Brahman* and the world. If they are ascribing *vivartopādānaness* to *Brahman* to reconcile the creation of the world with the immutability of *Brahman* - it is unnecessary, because the clay-pot example itself reconciles it since 'clay alone is immutable - 'मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्य'. But the effort of their 'logic' is aimed at proving that the world is non-existent. This is discardable outright. No one who has studied the 'pot-*bhāṣya*' of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad* (Br. Bh. 1.2.1) will accept that the world is non-existent. This section of the *bhāṣya* is also not convenient for these illusionists. It is like this: In the rope-snake example, both the rope and the snake are objects for

the eyes. Though a snake is being seen, on examining the rope with the same eyes one realises 'this is not a snake, it is a rope'. But in the case of *Brahman-jagat*, only the *jagat* is an object for the eyes and not *Brahman*, which is the cause of *jagat* (world). Therefore, *Brahman* cannot be taught through the world by saying that 'the support - *adhiṣṭhāna* - of this illusory world is *Brahman*'.

१०. किं पुनस्तद्वेदान्तवाक्यं यत् सूत्रेण इह लिलक्षयिषितम्? “भृगुर्वै वारुणिः। वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति” इत्युपक्रम्य आह “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। येन जातानि जीवन्ति। यत् प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति। तद्विजिज्ञासस्व। तद्ब्रह्मेति” (तै. ३.१) तस्य च निर्णयवाक्यम् “आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति। आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति” (तै. ३.६) इति। अन्यान्यपि एवं जातीयकानि नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव-सर्वज्ञस्वरूप-कारणविषयाणि उदाहर्तव्यानि।

10. 'Which then is the Vedānta Sentence which this *sūtra* draws attention to?' Beginning with “Bhṛgu, the son of Varuṇa, approached his father and asked, “Teach me *Brahman*, venerable one”, the reply was “That from which these beings originate, being originated they live, that to which they return. Discuss that. That is *Brahman*”. And the answer settling the question is “Verily from bliss alone these beings originate. Unto bliss do they return”. There are to be quoted other sentences too of this nature, which speak of the cause which is eternally pure, enlightened, free and omniscient.

(10.1) Here, Vedānta sentences considered in *janmādi sūtra* are quoted which teach the cause *Brahman*. As already mentioned, the world contains both *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā*. The sentence quoted above teaches us *Brahman* through *kṣetrajñā*. Just as the characteristics changelessness (*satya*), *jñāna* and limitlessness (*ananta*) of *Brahman* were separated from the inert world of change and limitedness, the *ānanda* characteristic is to be separated from the material pleasures of *kṣetrajñā*. These pleasures are really not related with materials at all. The *ānanda* of deep sleep of the adjunctless *kṣetrajñā* appears as material pleasure due to the *adhyāsa* in wakeful state. *Śruti* says ‘यथा प्रियया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेदान्तरं’ - (Man) embraced by woman not knowing anything inside or outside (Br. 4.3.23). Further, Bliss of deep sleep

itself is the bliss characteristic of *Brahman* - 'एषोऽस्य परम आनन्दः' (Br. 4.3.32). That is why anyone getting up from deep sleep describes his experience by saying 'I did not know anything' from his mind's point of view and but from the point of view of his inherent nature of *ānanda* he says 'I slept happily'. Other sentences of *śruti* which teach *Brahman* through *kṣetrajñā* are 'सत्यं ज्ञानम् अनन्तं ब्रह्म.....तस्मात् वा एतस्मात् आत्मनः आकाशः सम्भूतः' - Immutable, *jñāna*, limitless is *Brahman*. From that this *Ātman*, *ākāśa* was created (Tai. 2.1), 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् एकमेव अद्वितीयम्.....तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति, तत्तेजोऽसृजत' - Somya, previously this was the second-less only one *sat*. That reflected 'I will become many, I will be born.' It created fire (Cā. 6.2.1-3). 'दिव्यो हि अमूर्तः पुरुषः... ..अप्राणो ह्यिमनाः शुभ्रः.....एतस्मात् जायते प्राणः मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च' - The lustrous formless *Puruṣa*. without *prāṇa*, without mind, clean. from him are born *prāṇa*, mind, all *indriyas* (sense and motor 'organs') (Mu. 2.1,2-3), 'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्.....स इमाल्लोकानसृजत' - Previously this was *Ātman* alone.. He created these worlds (Ai. 1.1.1-2) etc. After fixing the nature of *Brahman* starting from the world, *śruti* gives the final message that it is the inherent nature of *jīva*. Since this results in his inherent *ānanda*, *Brahman's* sentence is quoted mainly and the other sentences have been included in 'others'.



Maha Par...