

शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणम्

Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇam

१. जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म इति उपक्षिप्तम्। तदेव द्रढयन् आह।

1. Demonstrating that *Brahman* is the cause of the universe, Its omniscience was indicated. To strengthen this itself, it is said:

शास्त्रयोनित्वात् (सू. १.१.३)

Śāstrayonitvāt = Of the *śāstra*, It is the cause (So, *Brahman* is omniscient).

Bhāṣyakāra has written two commentaries for this *sūtra*. This is the first one:

(1.1) The *śāstra* is omniscient since it teaches *varṇa/āśrama*, *dharma/adharma* necessary for the prosperity of the *jīvas*, the lessons necessary for their *mokṣa*, the inherent nature of *kṣetra/ kṣetraijña* and so on. Only the Vedas can tell us about the methods to be followed for prosperity/*mokṣa* for all types of people of all times; humans cannot tell it because they cannot decide them. In order to make the meaning of the Vedas clear, many disciplines magnify the Vedas. These are the *purāṇas*, *mīmāṃsā*, *dharmaśāstras*, logic, and the six limbs of Veda (*ṣaḍaṅga*).* The creation of such an omniscient Veda is possible only by the omniscient (*sarvajña*) *Īśwara* and not by the *jīvas* who know but little (*alpajñā*). This means that the Vedas are *apauruṣeya* - not of human origin.

(1.2) **Question:** The Vedas are eternal. The writer of the *Brahma Sūtras* himself says so later (1.3.29). Then what is the meaning of saying 'the creation of the Vedas'?

Answer: 'Creation' is a formal way of saying 'manifestation'. In this aspect, there is no difference between the creation of the world and the Vedas: Before creation, this world was *Brahman* only - 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्रासीत्' (Cā. 6.2.1), *Jīvas* were earlier unmanifest, became manifest in the middle and became unmanifest after death - 'अव्यक्तादीनि भूतानि व्यक्त मध्यानि भारत, अव्यक्तनिधानि एव' (Gītā. 2.28). The world

*viz., rules of recitation, details of *karma*, grammar, dictionary, meter and astronomy.

dissolves retaining its potential and is reborn from that potential - 'प्रलीयमानमपि च इदं जगत् शक्त्यवशेषम् एव प्रलीयते । शक्तिमूलम् एव च प्रभवति' (Sū. Bh. 1.3.30) etc speak of eternity with the same meaning, even for the world of *kṣetra-kṣetrajñā*.

Uttered Veda is also like this. This does not mean that even during *pralaya* it retains its wordness. If it were so, it is not *pralaya* at all; it would also violate the *śruti* 'Only one without a second - 'एकमेवाद्वितीय'. So it means that during *pralaya*, world or Veda is one with *Brahman* and in creation It manifests without leaving Its *Brahmanness*. With the grace of *Īśwara*, Veda enters into the mind of the seers and manifests itself in sound-tone-word-sentence-form (Tai. Bh. 2.3). Indeed, the world itself manifests starting from Vedic sound. 'Prajāpati created *devatās* with the word *ayte*, men with *asṛgram*, manes with *indavaḥ*, *grahas* with *tirapavitram*, stotra with *āśvaḥ*, *śāstra* with *viśvāni* and other beings with *abhisoubhaga*'—'एते इति वै प्रजापतिः देवानसृजत, असृग्रमिति मनुष्यान्, इन्द्रव इति पितृन्, तिरःपवित्रमिति ग्रहान्, आशव इति स्तोत्रं, विश्वानि इति शस्त्रम्, अभिसौभगेति अन्याः प्रजाः' (Tāṇḍya *Brahman* 6.9.15). Just because manifestation happens through Prajāpati, no one says that the world is man-made. Similarly Veda too. 'This creation (of Veda) is just the continuation of the tradition, because, no other sort of creation is possible for the Veda which has no beginning or end - 'उत्सर्गः अपि अयं वाचः संप्रदायप्रवर्तनात्मकः द्रष्टव्यः अनादि निधनायाः अन्यादृशस्य उत्सर्गस्य असम्भवात्' (Sū. Bh. 1.3.28). 'One who first creates Brahma, then communicates the Veda to him, who reveals the knowledge of *Ātman* - to Him I surrender (Św. 6.18), i.e., *Brahman* makes use of Brahma for the manifestation of Veda. It is just like *Brahman* entering into the *jīva*, creating the world through him. If *Brahman* is not exhausted by creating the universe and whirling it from beginning to the end of *kalpa*, does it get exhausted by entering into *jīva*? No. It creates the Veda effortlessly. Therefore, It is omniscient and omnipotent.

(1.3) Some say that omniscience and omnipotence appear in the *Paramātman* due to the beginningless *avidyā*. Some say that transactions of omniscience and omnipotence are imagined in Him due to *avidyā*. They say so because, in their concept, omniscience and omnipotence cannot exist in the adjunctless *Brahman*. But these concepts are wrong, which has been mentioned (*janmādi* 4.4-5). Adjunctless *Brahman* Itself is indeed omniscient (Sū. Bh. 1.1.5). Further, Even though *jīva* has features equal to *Īśwara*'s, they are covered due to his defects of *avidyā* etc - 'जीवस्य.ईश्वर समानधर्मत्वं.....विद्यमानम् अपि, तत् तिरोहितम् अविद्यादि व्यवधानात्' (Sū. Bh. 3.2.5), Since

Īśwara is eternally free from *avidyā* - 'ईश्वरस्य नित्यनिवृत्ताविद्यत्वात्' (Sū. Bh. 3.2.9). So, their concepts that omniscience and omnipotence appear in *Īśwara* due to the beginningless *avidyā* or due to *jīva's avidyā*, are plainly contradictory to *bhāṣya*. They do not know that omniscience etc which are in *Brahman* express themselves as a transaction due to the adjunct of *māyā* in *Īśwara*; so they entertain these concepts. Omniscience etc are not due to *avidyā*, but their transactions are due to *avidyā* because these transactions are not in adjunctless *Brahman*. Actually, even transactions appear due to *avidyā* only when they are viewed independently; when viewed from the point of view of a cause, even they are true.

(1.4) Question: What is the difference between human literature and the Vedas?

Answer: An author writes books according to his mental make up and ability. He picks up only a few aspects of the world and discusses them. His books are like small lamps illuminating only a few nearby items. They could contain errors, confusion and even half truths. If not these defects, they at least have the defect of incompleteness. The Veda is unlike this. Its sphere is the entire creation of the inanimate and animate and their cause. Indeed, the inherent nature of Veda is *Brahman*. 'इमे वेदाः यदयमात्मा- These Vedas are *Ātman* only' (Br. 2.4.6). Since Veda discusses the entire creation without leaving its inherent nature, it is complete and faultless. It is a dazzling light illuminating everything. This is its omniscience. So, its cause *Brahman* has to be omniscient too.

(1.5) Question: The omniscience of *Īśwara* has already been established in the previous *sūtra*; why then does it need to be confirmed here?

Answer: The *Mīmāṃsākās*, interpreting the eternity of the world and the Veda in their own way, deny an omniscient creator. The first commentary of the *sūtra* is intended to show that their concepts are contradictory to *śruti*.

२. महतः ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्य अनेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीपवत् सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म। न हि ईदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादि लक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञ गुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञात् अन्यतः संभवोऽस्ति। यद्यद् विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात् पुरुषविशेषात् संभवति, यथा व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेः ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थमपि, स ततोऽपि अधिकतरविज्ञानः इति प्रसिद्धं लोके, किमु वक्तव्यम् अनेकशाखाभेदभिन्नस्य देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यवर्णाश्रमादि प्रविभागहेतोः ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य अप्रयत्नेनैव लीलान्यायेन पुरुषनिः-

श्वासवद् यस्मात् महतो भूताद्योनेः संभवः “अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यद् ऋग्वेदः” (बृ. ४.५.११) इत्यादि श्रुतेः, तस्य महतो भूतस्य निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं च इति।

2. *Brahman* is the *yoni*—cause of the greatest *śāstra* comprising of ṚgVeda etc, elaborated by many disciplines, which illuminates many topics like a powerful torch and is omniscient. Nothing but an omniscient being could be the cause for such a *śāstra* comprising of the ṚgVeda etc with omniscient features. For it is a well recognized fact in the world that the person, from whom scriptures expanding upon various subjects emerge, has more extensive knowledge than the scripture itself. For example, Pāṇini (has more knowledge) than his scripture on grammar. What then to say that the great Being has absolute omniscience and omnipotence, since from him emerge the ṚgVeda etc.—which is divided into many branches, which is the cause of such distinctions like gods, lower animals, men, castes and orders of life, which is the ocean of all knowledge—has originated from that great Being effortlessly like sport, like human breath. The śruti says “Of that great Being is this breath, which is the ṚgVeda”.

The second commentary on this *sūtra* is as follows:

Śāstrayonitvāt = Only Veda—being yoni (pramāṇa)

(Brahman has to be understood only through the Veda)

३. अथवा यथोक्तं ऋग्वेदादि शास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणम् अस्य ब्रह्मणः यथावत् स्वरूपाधिगमे। शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणात् जगतो जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्म अधिगम्यते इत्यभिप्रायः। शास्त्रम् उदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते” (तै. ३.१) इत्यादि।

किमर्थं तर्हि इदं सूत्रं, यावता पूर्वसूत्रे एव एवं जातीयकं शास्त्रम् उदाहरता शास्त्रयोनित्वं ब्रह्मणो दर्शितम्? उच्यते। तत्र पूर्वसूत्राक्षरेण स्पष्टं शास्त्रस्य अनुपादानात् जन्मादि केवलं अनुमानम् उपन्यस्तम् इत्याशङ्कयेत ताम् आशङ्कां निवर्तयितुम् इदं सूत्रं प्रवृत्ते शास्त्रयोनित्वाद् इति ॥

3. Or, the *śāstra* comprising of the ṚgVeda etc as described above, is the

yoni—i.e. the *pramāṇa* for understanding the nature of *Brahman* as it is. The intended meaning is: It is only from the scripture as *pramāṇa* that *Brahman* which is the cause of the creation etc. of the *jagat*, is to be understood. The *śāstra* cited in the previous *sūtra* is “From which these beings originate”. ‘What is the purpose of the present *sūtra* when *śāstra* of the same class has been cited in the previous *sūtra* itself, to show that *Brahman* is to be understood only through *śāstra* as *pramāṇa*?’ There, the *śāstra* is not stated in clear words of the *sūtra*. So, it could be doubted that in the *sūtra* only inference is said. This *sūtra* ‘only Veda being *yoni* (*pramāṇa*)’ intends to remove such a doubt.

(3.1) Question: In the previous *sūtra*, it was said that ‘*śruti* etc and experience etc are *pramāṇa* for *Brahman*’s causeness of the world’. Here it is said that ‘*śāstra* is the only *pramāṇa*’. How are the two to be reconciled?

Answer: When understanding *Brahman*’s causeness from *śrutis* like ‘Earlier all this was *Brahman*’, it becomes necessary to depend on experience etc because ‘*idam* - this world’ is a matter of *pratyakṣa* etc. So, *śruti* cannot give up other *pramāṇas*. But in the *śruti* quoted here ‘from where these creatures are taking birth’, the *swarūpa* of *Brahman* is *ānanda*. That *ānanda* is the cause of the world is not a matter for other *pramāṇas* or logic; it is a matter for *śruti* only. So, in this context, *śruti* is the only *pramāṇa*. If one doubts whether this could also be handled by inference, this *sūtra* is intended to remove that doubt. Therefore, this *śruti* sentence, though already quoted there, is quoted again here.



समन्वयाधिकरणम्

Samanvayādhikaraṇam

In this way, *Brahman* is established from *śāstra pramāṇa*. This *Brahman* is totally unrelated with *karma*. So *Mīmāṃsākās*, who speak only of *karma*, oppose this. The following *sūtra* is intended to refute these arguments. For an understanding of the *bhāṣya* on it, a knowledge of some of the issues of *pūrvamīmāṃsā* is necessary; a brief summary is presented here.

(S1) An objection of *pūrvamīmāṃsaka* is that Vedic sentences unrelated to *karma* are meaningless. Answering it, the *mīmāṃsā śāstra* says that apparently meaningless sentences are to be understood only after being reconciled with *karma*. For e.g., 'वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतिकामः' - One desirous of prosperity should sacrifice a male-goat to the god *Vāyu* (Tai. Sam. 2.1.1), is an injunction sentence (*vidhi-vākya*). Following it, there is another sentence about *Vāyu* 'वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता वायुमेव स्वेन भागधेयेनोपधावति स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति' - *Vāyu* is the fastest god. With portion of his *karma* (the person) reaches *Vāyu* himself. (*Vāyu*) himself gets him prosperity (Tai. Sam. 2.1.1). If one says, 'this sentence is unrelated to the injunctive sentence quoted earlier. It is meaningless and so not valid', how to establish its validity?

Reply: It is valid when you view it as praising the injunction and the relation is seen. Such sentences in praise of the injunction are called *arthavāda*. In the same way, passages in denigration of prohibition (of an act) are also *arthavāda*. For e.g., 'सोऽरोदीत् यदरोदीत् तद्रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वम्' - He cried; because he cried, he became *Rudra* (Tai. Sam. 1.5.1) is a sentence. In a situation, it appears, *Rudra* cried. His tears which fell on the earth became silver. This sentence is apparently meaningless when viewed independently, i.e. unrelated to *karma*. But by context, this is interpreted as a denigrating passage to prohibit the gifting of silver in *barhiyāga*. In this way does the passage get its validity. The summary is: *Arthavāda* appear meaningless when not related to *karma*. Taking *arthavāda* sentences together with injunction/prohibition as passages in praise/denigration respectively, they become meaningful and so get their validity (Jai. Sū. 1.2.7).

Arthavāda is of three kinds: *anuvāda*, *guṇavāda*, *bhūtārthavāda*. 'अग्निः हिमस्य भेषजम्' - Fire is the cure for cold weather is a matter verifiable by another *pramāṇa*, namely direct perception. Such an *arthavāda*, which can be verified by another *pramāṇa*, is called *anuvāda*.

An example of *guṇavāda* is as follows: *Yūpa* is a wooden stump cut with eight faces. 'आदित्यो यूपः' - *Yūpaḥ* is the sun is a sentence contrary to direct perception. However, when we take its meaning as 'Yūpa is lustrous like the sun' it becomes a valid sentence. Such an *arthavāda* - contrary to another *pramāṇa* - but reconciled with another meaning, is called *guṇavāda*.

Finally, an *arthavāda*, which is neither a matter for nor contradictory to other *pramāṇas*, is called *bhūtārthavāda*. For e.g., Vedic statements which say that: 'gods have forms'. It is unreasonable to question the validity of such statements on the basis of any other *pramāṇa*. So, Vaidikas accept them as they are (Sū. Bh. 1.3.33).

(S2) There are *mantras* which speak of an act or a *devatā*. The discussion is about their intended meaning. For e.g., a branch of a particular tree is cut for use in the *darśapūrnamāsayāga*. While cutting it, the *mantra* 'इषेत्वा' - for strength you is to be uttered. By context - the word 'छिनत्ति' - I will cut is to be added to it. Consequently, 'इषेत्वा छिनत्ति' - for strength I will cut you is the meaning of the *mantra*. It might be that it is only an instruction to cut the branch; it is not necessary to utter it while thinking about its meaning. 'Is the meaning of the *mantra* intended or not during the action of cutting?' is the question. *Mīmāṃsā śāstra* answers it like this: The action is to be performed thinking about the meaning because, it has an unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa*) fruit. Similarly, in *mantras* like 'agnirmūrdhā' etc, the intended meaning of the *mantra* is the *devatā* - which is an instrument of action. Uttering while thinking about its meaning has an unseen fruit. In summary: just as *arthavāda* gets its validity through praise/denigration of injunction/prohibition, *mantras* get their validity only through speaking of an action or an instrument of action. Otherwise, they have no meaning (as per the *Mīmāṃsakas*).

(S3) Injunctive and prohibitory (*vidhi* and *niṣedha*) sentences are of two types: *Ajñātajñāpaka* are those sentences which teach unknown matters. These teach details of *karma* and the means for it. The sentences which prompt those who are not prompted into *karma* are known as *apraṇṛtāpravartaka*. Such sentences motivate the unmotivated by describing the attractive fruits of the *karma*. The former kind of

passages, unaccompanied by the latter, are meaningless; they will have no validity. They are valid only when they are together, because, only then do they serve the purpose of man.

The following passage is the preface of the Bhāṣyakāra to the discussion of the next *sūtra*.

१. कथं पुनर्ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते यावता “आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात् आनर्थक्यम् अतदर्थानाम्” (जै. सू. १.२.१) इति क्रियापरत्वं शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम्? अतः वेदान्तानाम् आनर्थक्यम्। अक्रियार्थत्वात्। कर्तृदेवतादि प्रकाशनार्थत्वेन वा क्रिया-विधिषोषत्वम्। उपासनादि क्रियान्तर विधानार्थं वा। न हि परिनिष्ठितवस्तुप्रतिपादनं संभवति। प्रत्यक्षादि विषयत्वात् परिनिष्ठितवस्तुनः। तत्प्रतिपादने च हेयोपादेयरहिते पुरुषार्थाभावात्। अत एव “सोऽरोदीत्” (तै. सं. ५.१.१) इत्येवमादीनाम् आनर्थक्यं मा भूत् इति “विधिनात्वेकवाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः” (जै. सू. १.२.७) इति स्तावकत्वेन अर्थवत्त्वमुक्तम्। मन्त्राणां च “इषे त्वा” (तै. सं. १.१.१) इत्यादीनां क्रियातत्साधनाभिधायित्वेन कर्मसमवायित्वम् उक्तम्। न क्वचिदपि वेदवाक्यानां विधि-संस्पर्शमन्तरेण अर्थवत्ता दृष्टा उपपन्ना वा। न च परिनिष्ठिते वस्तुस्वरूपे विधिः संभवति। क्रियाविषयत्वात् विधेः। तस्मात् कर्मापेक्षित कर्तृस्वरूप देवतादि प्रकाशनेन क्रियाविधिषोषत्वं वेदान्तानाम्। अथ प्रकरणान्तरभयात् नैतत् अभ्युपगम्यते, तथापि, स्ववाक्यगत-उपासनादि-कर्मपरत्वम्। तस्मात् न ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वम् इति प्राप्ते उच्यते।

1. “How again can it be said that *Brahman* is to be understood through *śāstra* when *śāstra* shows it implies action as in ‘Since *śāstra* is for the purpose of action, (sentences) not conveying that meaning are futile?’” Therefore, futile are Vedāntas since they do not speak action. Or else, they could be subsidiaries to the injunction of action with the purpose of telling about the doer, deity etc, or presenting other actions like *upāsana*—meditation etc. (Just) narration of existent things cannot happen (in Veda) because, existent things are objects for the senses. There is no human purpose served in such a narration because, there is no rejecting or taking. Therefore, to prevent futility in cases like “He cried” etc, they are stated to be meaningful as praise: ‘But by syntactical unity with injunction, they have the meaning of praising the injunction’. *Mantras*

like “you for strength” etc are said to be related to *karma* because they tell action and the instruments therefor. Meaningfulness of the Vedic Sentences without connection with injunction is not seen anywhere, nor is it reasonable. Injunction cannot be related with the nature of an existent thing, because injunction is a matter of action. Therefore, by enlightening the nature of the doer, the deity (*devatā*) etc, Vedānta sentences are only subsidiary to acts of injunction. If this is not accepted for fear of being different, even then, they have the purport of the act of *upāsanā* present in their own sentences. Therefore, the *śāstra* cannot be the *pramāṇa* for knowing *Brahman*”. When confronted like this the reply is:-

(1) The implications of the first sentence here are summarised in (S1) above. Stating the opposition view viz, ‘Sentences unrelated to action are futile’, *pūrvamīmāṃsā* demonstrates that *śāstra* has content only in action. *Brahman* taught in Vedānta is unrelated to action. So, the *mīmāṃsaka*’s objection is this: ‘Sentences in Vedānta are unrelated to action and hence futile. At least, had they said something about the doer, *devatā* etc, which are the means of action, it would have been purposeful. It does not do that either. It does not speak even of the action of *upāsanā*. It just speaks of an existent thing, which serves no purpose. Such an object, being an object for other *pramāṇas*, the Veda need not speak about it. It does not have any injunction or prohibition; so, it is of no use (S2). Therefore, Vedānta sentences are futile’. The Vedāntin may say: ‘This is the *jñāna* portion of the Veda. So, it is not right to apply the arguments of the *karma* portion here.’ To this the *Mīmāṃsaka* replies: ‘The *jñāna* portion viz, the Upaniṣads, do talk of *upāsanā*. So, these sentences must be speaking of *upāsanā*, which is a mental *karma*. Otherwise, they cannot have any validity. So, *śāstra* is not *pramāṇa* for *Brahman*’. Now it is replied:

तत्तु समन्वयात् (१.१.४)

Tu—But, Tat - Brahman (knowledge is through śāstra because of), Samanvayāt—perfect agreement.

२. तु शब्दः पूर्वपक्षव्यावृत्त्यर्थः। तद् ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्ति जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकारणं वेदान्तशास्त्रादेव अवगम्यते। कथम्? समन्वयात्। सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्पर्येण

एतस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुगतानि “सदेव सोम्येदमग्रासीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयम्” (छां. ६.२.१), “आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्” (ऐ. १.१.१), “तदेतद् ब्रह्म अपूर्वम् अनपरम् अनन्तरम् अबाह्यम् अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः” (बृ. २.५.१९), “ब्रह्मैवेदम् अमृतं पुरस्तात्” (मुं. २.२.१२) इत्यादीनि। न च तद्वतानां पदानां ब्रह्मस्वरूपविषये निश्चिते समन्वये अवगम्यमाने अर्थान्तरकल्पना युक्ता। श्रुतहान्यश्रुतकल्पना प्रसङ्गात्।

2. The word ‘but’ is to refute the *pūrvapakṣa* (the opposite view). *Brahman*, the omniscient, omnipotent cause of the creation, existence and destruction of the universe is understood from Vedic scripture alone. How? Because of the *samanvaya*—(i.e., all the Vedānta Sentences closely follow this same meaning in the assertion of the summary)—as in: “This was *Sat*—Being-only—in the beginning”, “One alone without a second”, “This was the one *Ātman* alone in the beginning”, “That this *Brahman* is uncaused, devoid of effect, without an interior, without an exterior”, “This Self is *Brahman*, the experience of all”, “*Brahman* alone, the immortal in front” etc. When the *samanvaya* of the words in these sentences is clearly being understood in fixing the nature of *Brahman*, it is not proper to imagine other meanings because it would result (in the fault of) giving up what is heard and imagining the unheard.

(2) In the *sūtra*, ‘tat’ stands for *Brahman*. Which *Brahman*? The omniscient, omnipotent cause for the creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe established in the *janmādi sūtra*. This is *śāstrayoni* - ‘श्रुत्यवगाह्यम् एव इदम् अतिगम्भीरं ब्रह्म, न तर्कावगाह्यम्’ - To be understood only through *śruti*, not by logic (Sū. Bh. 2.1.31). The sentences in all the Upaniṣads and their words are perfectly reconciling in this *Brahman* only. To substantiate this, one sentence is quoted from each of the four Vedas.

‘सदेव सोम्य.....’ is from Chāndogya of Sāma Veda. Its summary is: ‘*Brahman* - the one alone without a second - is standing in the form of the universe of *kṣetra* - the observable, and the *kṣetrajña* - the observer *kṣetrajña* is *Brahman*.’

‘आत्मा वा इदम्.....’ is from the Aitareya of Ṛg Veda. Its summary is: Earlier, there was *Ātman* alone. He created the whole universe and entered into the bodies of beings in the form of individual souls. All this is Himself. This is *Prajñānam Brahma* - which is mere *jñāna*’.

‘तदेतद् ब्रह्म’ - is from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka of Śukla Yajurveda. Its summary is: ‘To let us know its inherent nature, *Brahman* has stood as the universe of countless forms. It is experiencing everything through the *jīvas* - the individual souls. This *Ātman* is that *Brahman*’.

‘ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं.....’ is from Muṇḍaka of the Atharva Veda. ‘Everything noticed in front in the forms of the universe and the *jīva* are *Brahman* only. One who realises it becomes *Brahman*’ is its summary.

These sentences and their words are unambiguously proclaiming *Brahman* and *Brahman-Ātman* oneness. When such perfect reconciliation of the message is directly visible, to imagine unheard meanings damaging the heard ones is wrong.

३. न च तेषां कर्तृस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरता अवसीयते। “तत्केन कं पश्येत्” (बृ. २. ४.१३) इत्यादि क्रियाकारकफल-निराकरण श्रुतेः। न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादि विषयत्वं ब्रह्मणः। “तत्त्वमसि” (छां. ६.८.७) इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य शास्त्र-मन्तरेण अनवगम्यमानत्वात्। यत्तु हेयोपादेय रहितत्वात् उपदेशानर्थक्यमिति, नैष दोषः। हेयोपादेयशून्य-ब्रह्मात्मता-अवगमादेव सर्वक्लेशप्रहाणात् पुरुषार्थसिद्धेः। देवतादि प्रतिपादनस्य तु स्ववाक्यगत-उपासनार्थत्वेऽपि न कश्चिद्विरोधः। न तु तथा ब्रह्मणः उपासना विधिशेषत्वं संभवति। एकत्वे हेयोपादेय शून्यतया क्रियाकारकादि द्वैतविज्ञान-उपमर्दोपपत्तेः। न हि एकत्व विज्ञानेन उन्मथितस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य पुनः संभवोऽस्ति येन उपासना-विधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपद्येत। यद्यपि अन्यत्र वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेण प्रमाणत्वं न दृष्टम्, तथापि-आत्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यन्तत्वात् न तद्विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम्। न च अनुमानगम्यं शास्त्रप्रामाण्यम्, येन अन्यत्रदृष्टं निदर्शनम् अपेक्षेत। तस्मात् सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वम्।

3. Nor is their purport to teach the nature of the doer, the deity etc because, there are *śrutis* like “Then by what, whom could one see?” etc which refute action, instrument of action and fruit of action. Though of the nature of an existent thing, *Brahman* is not an object for perception etc, because that *Brahman* is the Self—“That you are” which cannot be understood by any means except by *śāstra*. What was said that being devoid of rejection and acceptance the teaching is futile, this is no defect, because, the realization of Self as *Brahman*

which is devoid of rejection and acceptance results in the destruction of all suffering—which is attainment of human goal. There is nothing objectionable even in telling about the deity etc for the sake of *upāsanā* in its own sentences. But it cannot be subsidiary to the injunction of *upāsanā* in the case of *Brahman* because being one and devoid of rejection and acceptance, the sense of duality such as action, instrument etc is annihilated. The cognition of duality once destroyed by the knowledge of the oneness of *Brahman* cannot return; (if it could) *Brahman* could be taught as subsidiary to the injunction of *upāsanā*. Though in other places Vedic sentences are not seen to be *pramāṇa* except in conjunction with injunction, the *pramāṇa* nature of the *śāstra* in that topic cannot be denied since the knowledge of *Ātman* culminates in the fruit. The *pramāṇa* nature of the *śāstra* is not to be concluded by inference, because, that would need an example seen elsewhere. Therefore, it is established that the scripture (*śāstra*) is the *pramāṇa* for *Brahman*.

(3.1) The reason for the absence of any connection to *karma* in *Brahman--Ātman* oneness is being explained here. *Karma* is possible only in the presence of the duality of the doer, instruments of doing etc; it is impossible in their absence. Doership in *Brahman-Ātman* oneness is rejected by the *śruti* saying ‘यत्र सर्वम् आत्मा एव अभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत्, तत् केन कं शृणुयात्’ - One who has himself become everything, with what can he see and whom can he see? With what can he hear and whom can he hear? etc. How can there be any possibility of *karma* in him?

‘In saying about the deity etc’: It is true that *upāsanā* has been said in the Upaniṣads. But later they say that the Self of the *upāsaka* (one who does *upāsanā*) is *Brahman*. Therefore, *Brahman* cannot be subsidiary to the injunction of *upāsanā*, because *upāsanā* is also based on duality. But *Brahman* is one alone without a second. ‘Though in other places Vedic sentences etc’: In the portion dealing with *karma*, there is no validity for sentences unrelated to injunction. But it is not so in portions dealing with *jñāna*. Here, the *Brahman-Ātman* oneness told by *śruti* is directly experienced in *susupti*. Based on this experience, when the enquirer gets into the meditation of staying in this ultimate *jñāna*, it ends in the fruit of *Ātman*’s realization. This demonstrates the validity of the Upaniṣadic sentences. Validity of a *pramāṇa* is indeed established only by experience. Therefore, one need not conceive of the

validity of the Upanisads by the inference of extending the logic of the *karma*-portion to them.

(3.2) Based on the *Brahman-Ātman* oneness resulting from *Brahman* realisation, relation of *Brahman* with action - either of *karma* or *upāsanā* - was refuted above. But some oppose this by arguing that *Brahman* is taught by *śruti* not for showing the oneness of *Brahman* and *Ātman* but as a subsidiary to *upāsanā*. Their arguments are as follows:

४. अत्र अपरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते। यद्यपि शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म, तथापि प्रतिपत्तिविधि विषय-तथैव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म समर्प्यते। यथा यूप-आहवनीयादीनि अलौकिकान्यपि विधिषोषतया शास्त्रेण समर्प्यते, तद्वत्। कुत एतत्? प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिप्रयोजनपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य। तथा हि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदः आहुः “दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्” (शा. भा. १.१.१) इति। “चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम्” (शा. भा. १.१.२), “तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः...” (शा. भा. १.१.२), “तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाप्नायः” (जै. सू. १.१.२५), “आम्ना-यस्य क्रियार्थत्वात् आनर्थक्यम् अतदर्थानाम्...” (जै. सू. १.२.१) इति च। अतः पुरुषः क्वचित् विषयविशेषे प्रवर्तयत् कुतश्चित् विषयविशेषात् निवर्तयच्च अर्थवत् शास्त्रम्। तच्छेषतया च अन्यत् उपयुक्तम्। तत्सामान्यात् वेदान्तानामपि तथैव अर्थवत्त्वं स्यात्। सति च विधिपरत्वे यथा स्वर्गादि कामस्य अग्निहोत्रादि साधनं विधीयते एवम् अमृतत्वकामस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं विधीयते इति युक्तम्।

4. Here some others confront (like this): Though *śāstra* is the *pramāṇa* for *Brahman*, yet *Brahman* is taught only as an object for the injunction of *upāsanā*, just as the *yūpa*—sacrificial post, the *āhavanīya* (fire) etc. unknown to common people are intimated by the *śāstra* only as subsidiary to injunction. Why so? Because the purport of the *śāstra* is to instigate to act or to restrain from it. So, those who know the purport of the *śāstra* say “Its purport is seen to be knowledge of action”, “*Codana* means (Vedic) Sentence urging action”, “Its (dharma’s) knowledge comes from injunction”, “Words denoting things to be attained should be connected with those denoting action”, “Purport of Veda being action, passages without it are meaningless”. Therefore, *śāstra* is purposeful either in prompting a person to do something or in refraining him

from doing something else. If the purport is injunction, then it would be correct to say that, just as *agnihotra* etc are prescribed as means desirous of heaven, similarly, knowledge of *Brahman* is prescribed for one desiring immortality.

(4) *Pratipatti* means *upāsanā*. *Śāstra* teaches *Brahman* for *upāsanā*. Just as the unknown *yūpa*, *āhvanīya* etc are taught in the karma portion as instruments of karma, unknown *Brahman* in the *jñāna* part of the Vedas is also taught for the sake of *upāsanā*; because, the very purpose of the Vedas is to teach *karma*. *Codana* is a sentence of *śruti* asking one to do *karma*. 'Its knowledge comes from': *Tasya jñānam* knowledge, i.e. Veda teaches *dharma* i.e., *karma*. For e.g., one desirous of heaven should perform *jyotiṣṭoma-yajña*. Upadeśa is any injunctive sentence. When the two go together, sentences of *śāstra* become valid. 'Words denoting things': Unknown things are made known by the Veda using words and objects which are known. Why? For the sake of action. '*Āmnāyasya*' etc: Raising the question of the purposelessness of *śruti* sentences not talking about *karma*, *śāstra* answered by saying that those sentences are to be understood in relation to action. The gist of these sentences is: Injunction and prohibition are the principals. Other sentences are either praise and denigration or subsidiary to injunction. The same rule applies to Vedānta also because Upaniṣads are part of Veda only. So, knowledge of *Brahman* is a part of the *upāsanā* of *Brahman*. Other sentences concerning *Brahman* are subsidiary to this injunction. Later on, the *Mīmāṃsaka* replies to a counterargument of the Vedāntin, and extends his arguments of the same nature.

५. नन्विह जिज्ञास्यवैलक्षण्यम् उक्तम् कर्मकांडे भव्यो धर्मो जिज्ञास्यः, इह तु भूतं नित्यनिर्वृत्तं ब्रह्मजिज्ञास्यमिति? तत्र धर्मज्ञानफलात् अनुष्ठानापेक्षात् विलक्षणं ब्रह्मज्ञानफलं भवितुमर्हति। नार्हत्येवं भवितुम्। कार्यविधिप्रयुक्तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात् "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः" (बृ. २.४.५) इति। "य आत्मा अपहतपाप्मा सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः" (छां. ८.७.१), "आत्मेत्येवोपासीत" (बृ. १.४.७), "आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत" (बृ. १.४.१५), "ब्रह्मवेद ब्रह्मैव भवति" (मुं. ३.२.९) इत्यादि विधानेषु सत्सु कोऽसौ आत्मा? किं तद् ब्रह्म? इत्याकांक्षायां तत्स्वरूप समर्पणेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुक्ताः "नित्यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वगतः नित्यतृप्तः नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः", "विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म" इत्येवमादयः। तदुपासनाच्च शास्त्रदृष्टोऽदृष्टः मोक्षः फलं भविष्यतीति।

5. (Vedāntin's counter argument): Was it not said that the topics of discussion are different: viz. the topic in *karmakāṇḍa* is dharma which is yet to happen, but here (in *jñānakāṇḍa*) the topic is existent eternal *Brahman*? Of these, should not the fruit of the knowledge of *Brahman* be different from the fruit of the knowledge of dharma which requires observance? (*Mīmāṃsaka* says) It cannot be that.. *Brahman* is taught only for injunction: “*Ātman* is to be seen”, “That *Ātman* which is free from sin is to be sought for and discussed”, “Meditate on it as *Ātman*”, “Meditate on the world as *Ātman*”, “Knower of *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* Itself”, etc. When there are such injunctions, there will arise a desire to know ‘Who is *Ātman*?’ ‘What is that *Brahman*?’ All Vedāntas are useful in intimating Its nature as “Eternal, omniscient, all pervasive, eternally contented, eternally pure and enlightened and free by nature, knowledge, bliss” and so on. From that *upāsanā* will result the unseen fruit of *mokṣa* shown in the *śāstra*.

(5) **Vedāntin's Question:** The topics discussed in the *karma* / *jñāna* parts of the Veda are *dharma* / *Brahman* respectively. In this part, *dharma* is yet to happen, since it needs performance of *karma*. But *Brahman* is eternal. This has already been said. Therefore, their fruits should also be different. Is it not?

Mīmāṃsaka's Reply: No. In the *karma* part, first comes the knowledge of *karma*, then its performance and finally the fruit. So also in the *jñāna* part: first is knowledge of *Brahman*, then *upāsanā* and finally the unseen (*adrṣṭa*) fruit of *mokṣa*. After clearly stating the injunction for *upāsanā* ‘Meditate on it as *Ātman*’, as subsidiary to it, *śruti* says: ‘He is unhit by *pāpa*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger thirst etc’, ‘*Brahman* is pure *jñāna*’ describing *Brahman* which is to be meditated upon. In this way, adjusting the meaning of Upaniṣadic sentences to the act of *upāsanā*, the *Mīmāṃsaka* takes his objection further by saying that the narration of an existing thing unrelated to action is futile.

६. कर्तव्यविध्यननुप्रवेशे वस्तुमात्रकथने हानोपादान असंभवात् “सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती”, “राजासौ गच्छति” इत्यादि वाक्यवत् वेदान्तवाक्यानाम् आनर्थक्यमेव स्यात्। ननु वस्तु-मात्रकथनेऽपि “रज्जुरियं नायं सर्पः” इत्यादौ भ्रान्तिजनितभीतिनिवर्तनेन अर्थवत्त्वं दृष्टम्? तथा इहापि असंसार्यात्मवस्तुकथनेन संसारित्वभ्रान्तिनिवर्तने अर्थवत्त्वं स्यात्। स्यादेतदेवं

यदि रज्जु स्वरूपश्रवणे इव सर्पभ्रान्तिः संसारित्वभ्रान्तिः ब्रह्मस्वरूप श्रवणमात्रेण निवर्तेत। न तु निवर्तते। श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं सुखदुःखादि संसारिधर्म दर्शनात्। “श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः” (बृ. २.४.५) इति च श्रवणोत्तरकालयोः मनननिदिध्यासनयोःविधिदर्शनात्। तस्मात् प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया एव शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म अभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति।

6. Disallowing injunction of duty, (and making a) mere statement of a thing where there is no give and take, the Vedānta Sentences too will be meaningless like the sentences “The earth has seven islands”, “There goes the king” etc. (Vedāntin intervenes): Even the case of a mere statement of fact as in “This is a rope, this is not a snake” etc, meaningfulness is seen because of the removal of fear generated by delusion. So also here, the statement of the fact that *Ātman* is not a *saṁsārī*, could be meaningful through the removal of the delusion of his being a *saṁsārī*. (*Mīmāṁsaka* retorts): This would be so, if the delusion of his *saṁsārī*'s nature is removed by merely hearing about the nature of *Brahman*, like the delusion of snake by merely hearing about the nature of the rope. But it is not removed. Even in him who has heard of *Brahman*, the attributes of a *saṁsārī* like happiness and grief are found as before. That is why subsequent to hearing, the injunction of reflection and meditation are found (in *śāstra*) as in “He is to be heard, reflected and meditated upon”. Therefore, it must be concluded that *śāstra* is *pramāṇa* for *Brahman* only as the object on the injunction of *upāsanā*.

(6.1) ‘This is a rope, this is not a snake’ etc (**Doubt**): The fear generated by the snake goes only with the knowledge of the rope and not just by saying ‘this is a rope, not a snake’. How can this be a counter objection?

(**Reply**): True. After listening to that statement, the listener has to examine the rope and get its true knowledge to get out of fear. But what happens by the teacher, is only the narration ‘this is rope, not snake’. Similarly, after listening to *śruti*'s narration of the nature of *Brahman*, those specially intelligent who are free from ignorance, doubt and wrong knowledge may experience the meaning of the sentence You are That - ‘येषां पुनः निपुणमतीनां न अज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययलक्षणः पदार्थविषयः प्रतिबन्धः अस्ति ते शक्नुवन्ति सकृत् उक्तम् एव तत्त्वमसिवाक्यार्थम् अनुभवितुम्’ (Sū. Bh. 4.1.2). But the less intelligent

have to do thinking and meditation. We will reserve to a later part the discussion whether they are injunctions or not. For the present, according to the opposite opinion, 'Just listening to the message is fruitless. The *Brahman* listened to should be meditated on for fruit. So, thinking and meditation told by *śruti* are injunctions for *upāsanā*. In this way, *śāstra* is *pramāṇa* for *Brahman*'s knowledge only as subsidiary to the injunction of *upāsanā*'.

(6.2) Next, each of *Mīmāṃsaka*'s objections are refuted and the final verdict is given. This is the list of objections: (1) The rules of argument for fixing the meaning should be the same in both parts of *karma* and *jñāna*, because both are parts of Veda only. (2) Such an application is possible through the injunction of *upāsanā* (3) Upaniṣads have indeed spoken of *upāsanā*. (4) *Mokṣa* is the unseen fruit of *upāsanā*. (5). Mere narration of an existent thing is purposeless. (6) Worldly activity is seen even after the knowledge of *Brahman*; it is not lost.

७. अत्राभिधीयते न। कर्मब्रह्म-विद्याफलयोः वैलक्षण्यात्। शारीरं वाचिकं मानसं च कर्म श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धं धर्माख्यम्, यद्विषया जिज्ञासा "अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा" (जै. सू. १.१.१) इति सूत्रिता। अधर्मोऽपि हिंसादिः प्रतिषेधचोदना लक्षणत्वात् जिज्ञास्यः - परिहाराय। तयोः चोदनालक्षणयोः अर्थानर्थयोः धर्माधर्मयोः फले प्रत्यक्षे सुखदुःखे शरीरवाङ्मनोभिरेव उपभुज्यमाने विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगजन्ये ब्रह्मादिषु स्थावरान्तेषु प्रसिद्धे। मनुष्यत्वादारभ्य ब्रह्मान्तेषु देहवत्सु सुखतारतम्यम् अनुश्रूयते। ततश्च तद्धेतोर्धर्मस्य तारतम्यं गम्यते। धर्मतारतम्यात् अधिकारतारतम्यम्। प्रसिद्धं च अर्थित्वं सामर्थ्यादि कृतम् अधिकारितारतम्यम्। तथा च यागाद्यनुष्ठायिनामेव विद्यासमाधिविशेषात् उत्तरेण पथागमनम्, केवलैः इष्टापूर्तदत्तसाधनैः धूमादि क्रमेण दक्षिणेन पथागमनम्, तत्रापि सुखतारतम्यं तत्साधनतारतम्यं च शास्त्रात् "यावत्संपातमुषित्वा" (छां. ५.१०.५) इत्यस्मात् गम्यते। तथा मनुष्यादिषु नारकस्थावरान्तेषु सुखलवः चोदनालक्षणधर्मसाध्य एव इति गम्यते तारतम्येन वर्तमानः। तथा ऊर्ध्वगतेषु अधोगतेषु च देहवत्सु दुःख-तारतम्यदर्शनात् तद्धेतोर्धर्मस्य प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणस्य तदनुष्ठायिनां च तारतम्यं गम्यते। एवम् अविद्यादि दोषवतां धर्माधर्मतारतम्यनिमित्तं शरीरोपादानपूर्वकं सुख-दुःखतारतम्यं अनित्यं संसाररूपं श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धम्। तथा च श्रुतिः "न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोः अपहतिरस्ति" (छां. ८.१२.१) इति यथावर्णितं संसाररूपम् अनुवदति।

7. Here is the reply: No, because there is difference in the fruits of knowledge of *karma* and knowledge of *Brahman*. *Karma* performed by body speech and mind is well-known as *dharma* in *śruti* and *smṛti*. The discussion of which is in the *sūtra* “Then, therefore, the discussion of *dharmā*”. *Adharma* too, like killing etc, are to be discussed for rejection. Directly noticeable happiness/grief—resulting from good/evil (acts)—which are fruits of *dharmā/adharma* as defined by Vedic Sentences are born out of object/sense contact and are felt by body, speech, mind; this is well-known in (beings) right down from *Hiraṇyagarbha* to the unmoving (plants). A gradation of happiness is heard (in scriptures) in all embodied beings starting from man to *Brahmā* (*Hiraṇyagarbha*). And therefrom can be understood the gradation of its cause *dharma*. From the gradation of *dharma* follows the well-known gradation of eligible persons brought about by the desire for fruit, capacity, learning etc. Thus, only those who perform *yāga* etc can go by the Northern Path on account of the excellence of knowledge and mental poise. Through only *iṣṭa* (*agnihotra* etc), *pūrta* (like constructing water tank etc which bring happiness to others and eventually to oneself), *datta* (giving away wealth to appropriate people), persons go by the Southern Path through smoke etc. Here too the gradation of the means for that are understood from *śāstra* “Living there till the fruit of *karma* is expended”. Similarly, it is understood that the gradation in the little bit of happiness is possible for beings starting from man down to those in *naraka* (hell) and plants only due to *dharmā* defined by *śāstra*. In the same way, the gradation of grief for embodied beings who go upwards or downwards show a gradation in its cause viz *adharma* defined by prohibitory injunctions and also in those who committed them. In this way, those who have defects of *avidyā* etc experience by embodiment the gradations of happiness/grief due to gradations of *dharmā/adharma* in impermanent worldly life. This is well-known from *śruti*, *smṛti* and logic. Following this “For the embodied person there cannot be the destruction of pleasure/displeasure” says the *śruti* about the worldly life described above.

(7) There is a great difference between the fruits of *karma* and the knowledge of *Brahman*. Details of the fruits of *karma* are given here. *Karma* happens through body, speech and mind. *Śruti* defines good/bad *karma* as *dharma/adharma*. Their fruits are directly experienced as happiness/grief - through body, speech and mind. They have gradations. There is also gradation in the eligibility for doing *karma*.

The reason is: The eligible person must have desire, knowledge, ability and be unprohibited by the *śāstra* - 'अर्थी समर्थः विद्वान् शास्त्रेण अविपर्युदस्तः' - There is certainly a gradation in desire, knowledge and ability. In this way, there cannot be the destruction of pleasure/displeasure. Here, *saśarīrī* means the one embodied - one who has *adhyāsa* in the *śarīra* (body). It is he who does *karma* and experiences its fruits. He is never free from pleasure/displeasure.

८. “अशरीरं वावसन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः” (छां. ८.१२.१) इति प्रियाप्रिय-स्पर्शनप्रतिषेधात् चोदनालक्षणधर्मकार्यत्वं मोक्षाख्यस्य अशरीरत्वस्य प्रतिषिध्यते इति गम्यते। धर्मकार्यत्वे हि प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधो नोपपद्यते। अशरीरत्वमेव धर्मकार्यमिति चेत्? न। तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वात्। “अशरीरं शरीरेषु अनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम्। महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति” (क. १.२.२), “अप्राणोह्यमनाः शुभ्रः” (मुं. २.१.२), “असंगोह्ययं पुरुषः” (बृ. ४.३.१५) इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः। अत एव अनुष्ठेय कर्मफलविलक्षणं मोक्षाख्यम् अशरीरत्वं नित्यमिति सिद्धम्।

8. On the other hand “Pleasure/displeasure do not touch the unembodied.” That this unembodiment, called *mokṣa*, is not an effect of *dharma* defined by injunction, is confirmed by this denial of contact of pleasure/displeasure with the unembodied. If it were an effect of *dharma*, the denial of contact of pleasure/displeasure is not reconciled. (Question) ‘If it is said that unembodiment is the effect of *dharma*?’ No, because, it is natural. *Śruti* says “Knowing *Ātman* which is unembodied residing in the changing bodies, great, all-pervasive—the wise man does not grieve”, “He is indeed without *prāṇa*, without mind, pure”, “This person indeed is unattached”. Therefore, unembodiment called *mokṣa*, which is distinct from the fruit of performed *karma*, is established to be eternal.

(8) In the previous section it was said that 'for the embodied person there cannot be destruction of pleasure/displeasure'. Therefore, the word 'unembodied' here cannot mean 'when the body is lost, i.e. after death', because, these sentences are comparing unliberated and liberated *jīvas*. Also, others cannot know whether there is displeasure/pleasure after death. Not only that, unembodiment is not the fruit of the observance of *dharma* because, *dharma* does generate the fruit of pleasure. Further, it is clear from the quoted *śruti* sentences that unembodiment is indeed *mokṣa*. So, *mokṣa* is not unseen fruit - nor something that is got after death, Further, it is eternal too; because, if it were to decrease with experience like the fruit of karma, grief should come back. But the Katha *śruti* which is quoted rules out grief for the liberated.

९. तत्र किञ्चित् परिणामिनित्यं यस्मिन् विक्रियमाणोऽपि तदेवेदमिति बुद्धिः न विहन्यते। यथा पृथिव्यादि जगन्नित्यत्ववादीनाम्। यथा च सांख्यानां गुणाः। इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थनित्यं व्योमवत् सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यतृप्तं निरवयवं स्वयं-ज्योतिः स्वभावम्। यत्र धर्माधर्मौ सहकार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तेते। तदेतत् अशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम्। “अन्यत्र धर्मात् अन्यत्राधर्मात् अन्यत्रास्मात् कृताकृतात्। अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च” (क. १.२.१४) इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः। अतः तद् ब्रह्म यस्य इयं जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता। तद्यदि कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन उपदिश्येत, तेन च कर्तव्येन साध्यश्चेत् मोक्षो अभ्युपगम्येत, अनित्य एव स्यात्। तत्र एवं सतिः यथोक्तकर्मफलेष्वेव तारतम्यावस्थितेषु अनित्येषु कश्चित् अतिशयो मोक्षः इति प्रसज्येत। नित्यश्च मोक्षः सर्वैः मोक्षवादिभिः अभ्युपगम्यते। अतः न कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्तः।

9. Of these, some are eternal though changing; i.e. though subject to change, the cognition 'This is but that' is not destroyed: like earth etc for those believers in the eternality of the universe, or as the *guṇas* for the Sāṅkhyas. This (*mokṣa*) however is absolute without change, all-pervasive like *ākāśa*, devoid of all modifications, eternally contented, without parts, self-luminous by nature, where *dharma/adharma* with action do not apply in the three times (past, present and future). This is unembodiment called *mokṣa* because *śrutis* say 'Different from *dharma*, different from *adharma*, different from effect (and) cause, different from what has been and what has to be.' Therefore, such is

Brahman whose discussion is presented (here). If that be taught as subsidiary to duty, if *mokṣa* is agreed to be a result of duty, it would amount to *mokṣa* being only something special among the graded non-eternal fruits of *karma* described above. But *mokṣa* is accepted to be eternal by all who discuss about *mokṣa*. Therefore, (to say that) the teaching of *Brahman* is subsidiary to duty is not correct.

(9) In this section, *Bhāṣyakāra* is speaking about the nature of the eternality of *mokṣa*. The river, for example, is eternal though changing i.e., though the water is different in each place, the cognition of the sameness of the river - its eternality - is not lost. *Mokṣa* is not like that. It is eternal without change. Like *ākāśa*, it is all pervading and is the same anywhere at any time etc. These being precisely the features of *Brahman*, *mokṣa* is *Brahman*. Had *Brahman* been subsidiary to *karma* or *upāsana* and *mokṣa* were their fruit, it would be transient like the fruit of *karma*. Therefore, knowledge of *Brahman* can never be subsidiary to any type of action.

१०. अपि च “ब्रह्मवेद ब्रह्मैव भवति” (मुं. ३.२.९), “क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे” (मुं. २.२.९), “आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चन” (तै. २.९), “अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि” (बृ. ४.२.४), “तदात्मानमेवावेत् अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति, तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत्” (बृ. १.४.१०), “तत्र को मोहः कः शोकः एकत्वमनुपश्यतः” (ई. ७) इत्येवमाद्याः श्रुतयः ब्रह्मविद्यान्तरं मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यः मध्ये कार्यान्तरं वारयन्ति। तथा “तद्धैतत् पश्यन् ऋषिर्वाग्देवः प्रतिपेदे अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च” (बृ. १.४.१०) इति ब्रह्मदर्शन-सर्वात्मभावयोर्मध्ये कर्तव्यान्तर वारणाय उदाहार्यम्। यथा “तिष्ठन् गायति” इति तिष्ठति गायत्योर्मध्ये तत्कर्तृकं नास्तीति गम्यते।

10. Further, there are *śrutis* showing that *mokṣa* follows the knowledge of *Brahman*, precluding any other action to be done in between: “He who knows *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* Itself,” “His *karma* perishes when He—the higher cause and the lower (effect) is seen”, “He who knows the *ānanda* of *Brahman* has no fear from anywhere”, “Verily, Oh Janaka you have obtained fearlessness”, “It understood itself as ‘I am *Brahman*’ and so it became everything”, “What delusion is there and what grief for one who has seen oneness” etc.

Similarly, “Ṛṣi Vāmadeva seeing It realized, ‘I am Manu and also the Sun’ would also be quoted to preclude some other action between realizing *Brahman* and the oneness of the Self with all—just as in “He sings standing”, there is nothing else for him to do between standing and singing.

(10) After explaining that the knowledge of *Brahman* is not subsidiary to duty, *Bhāṣyakāra* is establishing to make it firm that *mokṣa* results immediately with the knowledge of *Brahman* and between the two there is nothing to be done. But the *upāsaka* cannot become *Brahman* by Its *upāsanā*. When by ‘*kṣiyante (karmas) perish*’, the *śruti* is clearly speaking of the complete destruction of all *karma*, how can there be scope for *karma* at all? In the sentence, ‘knower of the *ānanda* of *Brahman* has no fear’, the destruction of fear is for the *jñānī* who is alive. In the sentence ‘Oh Janaka, you have obtained fearlessness’ says that fearlessness is obtained immediately with realization; it does not say ‘*prāpsyasi - you will obtain (in the future)*’. Similarly in other sentences also, refutation of any duty between knowledge and *mokṣa* is clear.

११. “त्वं हि नः पिता योऽस्माकमविद्यायाः परं पारं तारयसि” (प्र. ६.८), “श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्यः तरति शोकमात्मविदिति, सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि तं मा भगवान् शोकस्य पारं तारयतु” (छां. ७.१.३), “तस्मै मृदितकषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान् सनत्कुमारः” (छां. ७.२६.२) इति चैवमाद्याः श्रुतयः मोक्षप्रतिबंध-निवृत्तिमात्रमेव आत्मज्ञानस्य फलं दर्शयन्ति। तथा च आचार्यप्रणीतं न्यायोपबृंहितं सूत्रम् “दुःख-जन्म-प्रवृत्ति-दोष-मिथ्याज्ञानानाम् उत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायात् अपवर्गः” (न्या.सू. १.१.२) इति। मिथ्याज्ञानापायश्च ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानात् भवति।

11. “You are indeed our father who carries us to the other side of *avidyā*”, “I have heard from those like your reverence that knower of the *Ātman* crosses grief. Your reverence I am in grief. You should take me across grief”, “The revered Sanatkumāra shows the other side of darkness to him whose sins are destroyed”—these and such other *śrutis* show that the fruit of *Ātmajñāna* is only the removal of the obstacles to *mokṣa*. There is also one *sūtra* written by the *ācārya* supported by reason: “Grief, birth, motivation, defect and illusory cognition—(is the sequence in which) the destruction of the subsequent, causes

the destruction of earlier one, resulting in *mokṣa*”. And destruction of illusory cognition results only from the knowledge of the oneness of *Brahman* and *Ātman*.

(11.1) After refuting duty in between knowledge and *mokṣa* in the previous section, how exactly *mokṣa* results directly from the knowledge of *Brahman* is being said here. The sentence ‘you carry us to the other side of *avidyā*’ makes it clear that *avidyā* - lack of the knowledge of *Brahman* is the only obstruction for *mokṣa* and so, knowing *Brahman* is itself *mokṣa*. That ‘Sanatkumāra taught Nārada’ etc also means the same thing. Gautama, the teacher of logic, tells us the sequence of the steps of *mokṣa* in the *sūtra*: The ignorance of one’s nature is the cause of wrong knowledge about oneself; wrong knowledge leads to the defects of love and hate; these defects cause motivation for *karma*; from that results birth and consequently grief. Therefore, destruction of *avidyā* leads to destruction of wrong knowledge and in that sequence the destruction of defects, of motivation, of birth and grief, leading to *mokṣa*.

Question: The Gautam *sūtra* is saying that the destruction of birth leads to destruction of grief; does it mean that *mokṣa* results only after death?

Answer: Not like that. The destruction of *adhyāsa* equals destruction of birth because, the body of the knower of *Brahman* is already ‘dead like the slough of a snake which is cast off on the ant-hill’ (Br. 4.4.7). So, *mokṣa* is even while alive.

१२. न च इदं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं संपद्रूपम्। यथा “अनन्तं वै मनोऽनन्ता विश्वे-
देवा अनन्तमेव स तेन लोकं जयति” (बृ. ३.१.९) इति। न च अध्यासरूपम् यथा
“मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत” (छां. ३.१८.१), “आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः” (छां. ३.१९.१)
इति च मन आदित्यादिषु ब्रह्मदृष्ट्यध्यासः। नापि विशिष्टक्रियायोगनिमित्तम् “वायुर्वाव
संवर्गः” (छां. ४.३.१) “प्राणो वाव संवर्गः” (छां. ४.३.३) इतिवत्। नापि
आज्यावेक्षणादि कर्मागिसंस्काररूपम्। संपदादिरूपे हि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्व विज्ञाने अभ्युपगम्यमाने
“तत्त्वमसि” (छां. ६.८.७), “अहं ब्रह्मास्मि” (बृ. १.४.१०), “अयामात्मा
ब्रह्म” (बृ. २.५.१९) इत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्व वस्तुप्रतिपादनपरः
पदसमन्वयः पीड्येत। “भिद्यते हृदयग्रंथिः छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः” (मुं. २.२.८) इति
चैवमादीनि अविद्यानिवृत्तिफलश्रवणानि उपरुध्येरन्। “ब्रह्मवेद ब्रह्मैव भवति” (मुं.

३.२.९) इति चैवमादीनि तद्भावापत्तिवचनानि संपदादि पक्षे न सामञ्जस्येन उपपद्येरन्। तस्मात् न संपदादिरूपं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानम्।

12. This cognition of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness is not of the nature of *sampadrūpa* (*śāstra* imposed identification) as in the case of “Mind is indeed infinite, the *viśwedevatās* (gods of this name) are infinite. (Meditating on this identification) he conquers an infinite world”. Nor is it of the nature of superimposition (done by *śāstra*) as in “Meditate (on the identity that) the mind is *Brahman*”, “The sun is *Brahman*, this is the teaching” in which contemplation involves in viewing mind, sun etc as *Brahman*. Nor is it (an identification) with a distinctive action as in “*Vāyu* (air) is the devourer” “*Prāṇa* is the devourer”. It is also not of the nature of a subsidiary act of purification like looking at the ghee. If the knowledge of the *Brahman-Ātman* oneness is admitted to be of the form of *sampadrūpa* etc, it would violate the syntactical relation of words in sentences like “That you are”, “I am *Brahman*”, “This Self is *Brahman*” etc which assert the oneness of *Brahman* and *Ātman*. It would contradict (scriptural passages) like “The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are cleared”, which declare the fruit of the removal of *avidyā*. If it were of *sampadrūpa* etc, the statements of (*jñānī*) becoming *Brahman* in “He who knows *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* Itself” would not satisfactorily reconcile. Therefore, the knowledge *Brahman-Ātman* oneness is not of the nature of *sampadrūpa* etc.

(12) **Another Point:** Though Bhāṣyakāra is quoting a *sūtra* of logic for *mokṣa*, the theses of logicians and Vedānta are very different. According to the logicians, knowing *Ātman* as unātman is wrong knowledge and separating the two is right knowledge. If here, by *Ātman* is meant the *kṣetrajña* who is *prājña* and *unātman* is the body and the rest of the world, their indiscrimination is certainly wrong knowledge. This is made explicit in the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣyā*. However, this *Ātman* is getting separated from ‘*unātman*’ everyday in deep sleep; this is everyone’s experience. But no enlightenment has dawned. Wrong knowledge is returning as soon as one gets up. So ‘*Ātman-unātman*’ discrimination in the logician’s thesis is not the knowledge that Vedānta speaks of. Discrimination arises because of not

knowing *Brahman*. Both 'Ātman' and 'unātman' are *Brahman*. So, the moment one realizes the *Brahman-Ātman* oneness, *avidyā* is lost and there arises the realisation that 'unātman' is not different from me, but I am different from 'unātman'. This is *sarvātmabhāva* which is *mokṣa* - already spoken of in a previous section (Sūtra 1.1.1, sec 11-14). *Sarvātmabhāva* is *sarva-ātma-bhāva* - the realisation that everything is 'Ātman'. This does not, however, involve the multiplicity of the world; it is sublated. This is called *prapañca-vilaya*. Therefore, it is not different from the inherent non-dual oneness of *Ātman*.

(12) That knowledge of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness destroys wrong knowledge - this has already been explained. Now it is shown that this knowledge is not a mental action. Mental action can be of four types: *sampadrūpa*, *adhyāsarūpa*, *kriyayogarūpa*, *samskārārūpa*.

Details of *Sampadrūpa*: There is similarity between the inferior mind and the superior *viśvedevatās*; both are infinite. On this basis, mind is meditated upon as *viśvedevatās*.

Adhyāsarūpa: Thinking of the mind or the sun as *Brahman* and meditating on them. This is not wrong knowledge born out of indiscrimination. The difference between the mind or the sun and *Brahman* is known.

Kriyāyogarūpa: In *suṣupti* (deep sleep), speech etc of one's self are devoured by *prāṇa*; in *pralaya* i.e., dissolution of the world, the presiding deities of speech etc viz., *Agni* - i.e., fire etc are devoured by *Vāyu*. Based on the similarity of this special action, *śāstra* prescribes meditation on the presumed oneness of *prāṇa*; and *Vāyu*.

Samskārārūpa: By looking at it, the wife purifies the ghee to be used in the *yāga* as a subsidiary act. But knowledge of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness is not any of these types of mental actions, because there is duality in all of them till the end.

१३. अतः न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या। किं तर्हि? प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तु-
ज्ञानवत् वस्तुतन्त्रा। एवंभूतस्य ब्रह्मणः तज्ज्ञानस्य च न कयाचित् युक्त्या शक्यः
कार्यानुप्रवेशः कल्पयितुम्। न च विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वेन कार्यानुप्रवेशो ब्रह्मणः। “अन्यदेव
तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि” (के. १.४) इति विदिक्रियाकर्मत्व प्रतिषेधात्, “येनेदं
सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्” (बृ. २.४.१४) इति च। तथा उपास्ति क्रिया-
कर्मत्वप्रतिषेधोऽपि भवति यद्वाचाऽनुभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते (के. १.५) इत्यविषयत्वं

ब्रह्मण उपन्यस्य “तदेव ब्रह्मत्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते” (के. १.५) इति। अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्। न। अविद्याकल्पित-भेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य। न हि शास्त्रम् इदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयिषति। किं तर्हि? प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन अविषयतया प्रतिपादयत् अविद्याकल्पितं वेद्य-वेदितृवेदनादि भेदमपनयति। तथा च शास्त्रम् “यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः। अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातम-विजानताम्” (के. २.३), “न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः” (बृ. ३.४.२) इति चैवमादि। अतः अविद्याकल्पितसंसारित्वनिवर्तनेन नित्यमुक्तात्मस्वरूप-समर्पणात् न मोक्षस्य अनित्यत्व दोषः।

13. Therefore, the knowledge of *Brahman* is not subjective. What then is it? It is objective like the knowledge of the objects of the sense perception etc. Imagining the allowance of action in such *Brahman* or Its knowledge is impossible by any reasoning. *Brahman* cannot be deemed to come into the field of action though It is an object for the act of cognition, because of the denial of Its being an object of knowing in “It is different from the known and also the unknown”, “By whom one knows all this, by what one can know Him?” Similarly, there is also the denial of Its being an object of the act of *upāsana*: after telling the non-objectness of *Brahman* in “That which is not expressed by speech, that by which speech is expressed” *śāstra* says “Know then that alone is *Brahman* (and) not as ‘this’ whose *upāsana* is done”. (Objection) ‘If it be said that *Brahman* is not an object, (then) *śāstra* cannot be the source (for its knowledge)?’ No, for *śāstra* has the purport of removing the difference imagined by *avidyā*. Indeed, the *śāstra* does not intend to propound *Brahman* as an object like ‘this’. What then? It propounds *Brahman* as the non-object inner self and removes the differences like known-knower and knowledge imagined in the inner self by *avidyā*. Thus says the *śāstra*: “By whom It is not known, for him It is known, by whom It is known, for him It is not known. (It is) not known to them who know, known to them who do not know”, “You cannot see the seer of sight, cannot know the knower of the knower”, etc. Because of the restoration of *Ātman*’s nature of eternal freedom through the

removal (in this way) of *saṁsāra* imagined (in Him) due to *avidyā*, *mokṣa* is free from the fault of non-eternality.

(13.1) All the *sampadrūpa* etc actions are dependent on the one who has to perform them, i.e., they are subjective. Unlike them, knowing *Brahman* is objective, i.e., dependent on the object, which has to be understood as it is - just as in understanding a pot only as a pot. 'Is knowing also not a mental act?' In the case of *Brahman*, it is not even that because, It is different from the known and the unknown. It is not an object for the mind to understand. Since It is the inherent nature of the knower, It cannot be an object for knowing. Kenopaniṣad clearly states that It cannot be an object for *upāsanā* either. 'Then what is meant when it is said that *śāstra* is the *pramāṇa* for knowing It?' Indeed, even *śāstra* cannot teach *Brahman* directly. *Śāstra*'s validity is only up to the point of telling one that *Brahman* is not that which one is seeing. Knowledge of *Brahman* is to be obtained only in this manner. The seeker first searches for *Brahman* in something which It is not. In this action of searching there is multiplicity of the known-knower-knowledge. This difference is seen due to *avidyā*. *Śāstra* only prevents him from entertaining this illusory difference and provokes him to look at himself. Since the ever-present *Ātman* is *Brahman*, *mokṣa* is eternal.

(13.2) The sentence, 'अविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदम् अपनयति' - Which removes the differences like known-knower-knowledge imagined in the inner self by *avidyā*, needs a closer look. None among the three is imagined due to *avidyā*; only the difference seen in them is due to *avidyā*. The ignorant person, only looking at the forms, sees differences and understands only what he sees. The *jñānī* will also see the differences with his senses, but he understands the oneness permeating all of them which is himself. The seeker takes support of *Ātman* to remove the sense of difference in outside forms - 'बाह्याकारभेदबुद्धिनिवृत्तिः एव आत्मस्वरूपालम्बनकारणम्'। (*Gītā* Bh. 18.50). In this way, *sarvātmabhāva* itself is *mokṣa*.

१४. यस्य तु उत्पाद्यो मोक्षः तस्य मानसं वाचिकं कायिकं वा कार्यमपेक्षते इति युक्तम्। तथा विकार्यत्वे च। तयोः पक्षयोः मोक्षस्य ध्रुवम् अनित्यत्वम्। न हि दध्यादि विकार्यम् उत्पाद्यं वा घटादि नित्यं दृष्टं लोके। न च आप्यत्वेनापि कार्यापेक्षा। स्वात्मरूपत्वे सति अनाप्यत्वात्। स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणो नाप्यत्वम्। सर्वगतत्वेन नित्याप्त-स्वरूपत्वात् सर्वेण ब्रह्मणः आकाशस्येव। नापि संस्कार्यो मोक्षः येन व्यापारम् अपेक्षेत।

संस्कारो हि नाम संस्कारस्य गुणाधानेन वा स्यात्, दोषापनयनेन वा। न तावत् गुणाधानेन संभवति, अनाधेय अतिशय ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वात् मोक्षस्य। नापि दोषापनयनेन, नित्यशुद्धब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वात् मोक्षस्य।

14. For him (who says) *mokṣa* is produced, it is reasonable that for him, there is the need for mental, verbal or physical action. So also, if it be a modification. (But) for these two views, the non-eternality of *mokṣa* is certain. Neither modifications like curd etc, nor things produced like pot etc are found to be eternal in the world. Even for attainability (of *mokṣa*), there is no need for action, because, it is of the nature of one's own Self. Even if it is different from one's own nature, *Brahman* is not what is to be attained because, being all-pervasive, *Brahman* by nature is ever-attained by all like *ākāśa*. Nor is *mokṣa* (a result of) purification in which case it expects an activity. Indeed, what is called purification may be either of merit or by subtraction of defect. It cannot be addition of merit since *mokṣa* is the unsurpassed excellence of *Brahman* to which no merit can be added; nor by the removal of defect, since *mokṣa* is of the nature of eternally pure *Brahman*.

(14) Fruit of *karma* is of four types: Obtained by producing, modifying, attaining or purifying. *Mokṣa* is like none of them. It is not produced like a pot. If it were, it should be absent earlier and lost later and so non-eternal. *Mokṣa* being eternal, it is not produced. It is not modified like milk into curd. The *Mīmāṃsakas* say that *karma/upāsanā* modify to the form of *apūrvā* - something unseen, and are then experienced as fruit in due course. This is also non-eternal. So *mokṣa* is not of this type. It is not something to be attained either, like *swarga* (heaven). It being one's own inherent nature, it is not attained. Even granting it is different, it is still not attainable because *Brahman* is all-pervading. *Mokṣa* is not something to be purified. Purification means adding a merit or removing a demerit. But *Brahman*, which is of unsurpassed excellence, is faultless. So, *mokṣa* is not a result of purification. Next is a long analysis of this last feature.

१५. स्वात्मधर्म एव सन् तिरोभूतो मोक्षः क्रियया आत्मनि संस्क्रियमाणे अभिव्यज्यते। यथा आदर्शे निघर्षणक्रियया संस्क्रियमाणे भास्वरत्वं धर्मः इति चेत्? न।

क्रियाश्रयत्व अनुपपत्तेः आत्मनः। यदाश्रया क्रिया तम् अविकुर्वती नैव आत्मानं लभते। यदि आत्मा क्रियया विक्रियेत, अनित्यत्वम् आत्मनः प्रसज्येत। “अविकार्योऽयमुच्यते” (गी. २. २५) इति चैवमादीनि वाक्यानि बाध्येरन्। तच्च अनिष्टम्। तस्मात् न स्वाश्रया क्रिया आत्मनः संभवति। अन्याश्रयायास्तु क्रियायाः अविषयत्वात् न तथा आत्मा संस्क्रियते। ननु देहाश्रयया स्नान-आचमन-यज्ञोपवीतादिकया क्रियया देही संस्क्रियमाणो दृष्टः? न। देहादि संहतस्यैव अविद्यागृहीतस्य आत्मनः संस्क्रियमाणत्वात्। प्रत्यक्षं हि स्नानाचमनादेः देहसमवायित्वम्। तथा देहाश्रयया तत्संहत एव कश्चित् अविद्यया आत्मत्वेन परिगृहीतः संस्क्रियते इति युक्तम्। यथा देहाश्रयचिकित्सानिमित्तेन धातु साम्येन तत्संहतस्य तदभिमानिन आरोग्यफलम् “अहमरोगः” इति यत्र बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते। एवं स्नान-आचमन-यज्ञोपवीतादिना अहं शुद्धः संस्कृतः इति यत्र बुद्धिः उत्पद्यते स संस्क्रियते। स च देहेन संहत एव। तेनैव हि अहंकर्त्रा अहंप्रत्ययविषयेण प्रत्ययिना सर्वाः क्रियाः निर्वर्त्यन्ते। तत्फलं च स एव अश्नाति। “तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति अनश्नन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति” (मुं. ३.१.१) इति मन्त्रवर्णात्, “आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः” (क. १.३.४) इति च। तथा च “एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा, कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च” (श्वे. ६.११) इति। “स पर्यगात् शुक्रमकायमव्रणम् अस्नाविरं शुद्धमपापविद्धम्” (ई. ८) इति चैतौ मन्त्रौ अनाधेय अतिशयतां नित्यशुद्धतां च ब्रह्मणो दर्शयतः। ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः। तस्मात् न संस्कार्योऽपि मोक्षः। अतोऽन्यन् मोक्षं प्रति क्रियानुप्रवेश-द्वारं न शक्यं केनचित् दर्शयितुम्। तस्मात् ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा क्रियाया गंधमात्रस्यापि अनुप्रवेशः इह नोपपद्यते।

15. ‘If it be said that *mokṣa*, though being one’s own nature, yet being obscured is manifested by a purification act, just as the luster of a mirror purified by the act of scrubbing?’ No; because, (saying that) the Self is an object of action—is irreconcilable. An action which does not modify its object cannot exist. If *Ātman* is modifiable by action, its results in non-eternality of *Ātman*. Sentences like “This is spoken of as non-modifiable” would be affected. That is unacceptable. Therefore, *Ātman* being an object of action is not possible. If something else is the object of action, *Ātman* is not purified since it is not the

object (for purification). (Details:) 'Is not the embodied seen to be purified by body-based acts such as bathing, *ācamana* (sipping of water) and wearing *yajñopavīta* (the sacred thread etc)?' No. Only that *Ātman* is purified which is associated with the body etc under the grip of *avidyā*. Indeed, it is clearly seen that bathing, *ācamana* etc inhere in the body. It stands to reason that what is purified by the body-based act is something that is associated with it and is accepted as the Self due to *avidyā*. It is like this: With equilibrium of the humours brought about by the body based treatment, there is fruit of health for him who is associated with the body and has the conceit of it as himself; in him arises the feeling "I am free from disease". Similarly, he who gets the feeling 'I am clean, purified' through bathing, *ācamana*, wearing of the *yajñopavīta* etc, is purified. He is certainly associated with the body. It is only by him who has the conceit 'I am the doer', who is the object of the concept 'I' and supporter of all thoughts—that all actions are performed. Their fruit he alone enjoys, because *mantra* passage says "One of them eats the fruit, the other looks on, not eating" and also "One associated with the body, senses and the mind is called the enjoyer by wise men". Similarly, "The one God concealed in all beings and pervading all beings, the watcher of actions, living in all beings, the witness, the intelligent, alone and free from all qualities", "He pervades all, is effulgent, unembodied, free from wounds, free from nerves, pure and unafflicted by sin". These two *mantras* show that *Brahman* cannot have anything (excellence) added to It and that It is eternally pure. Becoming *Brahman* is *mokṣa*. Therefore, *mokṣa* is not one to be purified. Other than these (four) no one can show a door for action to enter into *mokṣa*. Therefore, apart from (this) one knowledge, there cannot be an entrance here even for a smell of action.

(15) Objection: Can the inherent nature of *Ātman* which is eternal *mokṣa* be revealed by purification, just like the mirror which when scrubbed shows its shine?

Answer: No; because scrubbing modifies the mirror. If *Ātman* is modified like that by *karma*, He becomes non-eternal.

Further Objection: 'What if by scrubbing we mean the wiping of the mirror?'

Answer: In that case, the purification is not of the mirror. Similarly, purification is there by bathing and *ācamana* for one who has *adhyāsa* in the body. He is *prājñā* who is the object of the *aham-pratyaya* and is the witness of all *pratyayas*. It is he who, with the adjuncts of body mind etc, does all the actions in wakeful and dreaming states and experiences their fruit. But the *Ātman* who is his witness is untouched by these purification processes. Really speaking, even *prājñā* is untouched by them. Since *prājñā*, due to *avidyā*, does not know that he is *Ātman*, he appears to get purified. This *avidyā* is the only obstruction to *mokṣa* and is not lost by any purificatory action. *Avidyā* is lost only by *vidyā* - knowledge.

१६. ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी क्रिया? न, वैलक्षण्यात्। क्रिया हि नाम सा यत्र वस्तुनिरपेक्षैव चोद्यते, पुरुष चित्तव्यापाराधीना च। यथा “यस्यै देवतायै हविः गृहीतं स्यात्तां मनसा ध्यायेद्विषट्करिष्यन्” (ऐ. ब्रा. ३.१.८), “सन्ध्यां मनसा ध्यायेत्” इति चैवमादिषु। ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसं, तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुमकर्तुम् अन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यम्। पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात्। ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम्। प्रमाणं च यथाभूतवस्तुविषयम्। अतः ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुम् अन्यथा वा कर्तुमशक्यम्। केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्। न चोदनातन्त्रम्, नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम्। तस्मात् मानसत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य महद्वैलक्षण्यम्। यथा च “पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः” (छां. ५.७.१) “योषा वाव गौतमाग्निः” (छां. ५.८.१) इत्यत्र योषित्पुरुषयोः अग्निबुद्धिर्मानसी भवति। केवल चोदनाजन्यत्वात् क्रियैव सा पुरुषतन्त्रा च। या तु प्रसिद्धे अग्नौ अग्निबुद्धिः, न सा चोदनातन्त्रा नापि पुरुषतन्त्रा किं तर्हि? प्रत्यक्षविषयवस्तुतन्त्रैव इति ज्ञानमेवैतत्, न क्रिया। एवं सर्वप्रमाण-विषय-वस्तुषु वेदितव्यम्। तत्रैवं सति यथाभूत ब्रह्मात्मविषयमपि ज्ञानं न चोदनातन्त्रम्। तद्विषये लिङ्गादयः श्रूयमाणा अपि अनियोज्य-विषयत्वात् कुण्ठी भवन्ति, उपलादिषु प्रयुक्तक्षुरतैक्षण्यादिवत्। अहेय-अनुपादेय वस्तुविषयत्वात्।

16. ‘Is not knowledge a mental act?’ No, because of difference. An act is that which is enjoined without regard to the nature of the thing and dependent on mental activity. For example: “That deity for whom oblation is to be offered, should be contemplated in mind and then should be uttered, the word *vaṣat!*”, “The evening (deity) should be contemplated in the mind” etc. Contemplation, viz. thinking about, is mental; it may be done or not done or done in a different

way by the person since it is subjective. Knowledge, on the other hand, is generated by *pramāṇa* i.e. valid means of knowledge. *Pramāṇa* objectifies the thing as it is. Therefore, knowledge—though mental—is very different in nature (from an act). In cases like “Man is fire, oh Gautama”, “Woman is fire, oh Gautama”, there arises the cognition of fire in man and in woman. This however, is an act generated solely by injunction and subjective. But the cognition of the well-known fire is not dependent on imagination nor is it subjective. What then? It is knowledge only, not an act, because, it is objective (knowledge) of an object of perception. The same is to be understood in respect of all things which are objects of *pramāṇa*. This being the case, even knowledge of *Brahman* which is the Self as it is, is not dependent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative etc referring to the knowledge of *Brahman* are found in the Vedic texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied to a stone. The reason is that It is a thing where there is no giving and taking.

(16) That *jñāna* is not a mental act is being demonstrated in this section. Action is injunctory - prescribed independent of the nature of the object and dependent on the mind. For e.g., the meditation prescribed in the sentence ‘after meditating in the mind on the *devatā*, when the *hotā* shouts ‘*vaṣaṭ*’, the *adhvaryu* should offer the oblation to the *devatā*’ is subjective.

Doubt: Quoting the same *mantra* ‘the deity for whom.’ etc the *Bhāṣyakāra* has said ‘Injunctions prescribing the oblations expect Indra etc *devatās* to have an inherent form. *Devatās* like Indra etc cannot be grasped by the mind if they don’t have a form - ‘विधिभिः एव इन्द्रादि दैवत्यानि हवीषिं चोदयद्भिः अपेक्षितम् इन्द्रादीनां स्वरूपम्। न हि स्वरूपरहिता इन्द्रादयः चेतसि आरोपयितुं शक्यन्ते’। (Sū. Bh. 1.3.33). Since the mental form during meditation has to be similar to the inherent form of the *devatā*, is it not *jñāna* - knowledge of the *devatā*? If it is *jñāna*, it cannot be an injunction. Therefore, what does it mean to say that ‘injunction is prescribed independent of the nature of the object?’

Answer: Not like that. In the sentence above, the meditation implies a mental form similar to the inherent form of the *devatā*. But the *adhyāsarūpa* meditation (see sec. 12) is dissimilar to the form of the object. Therefore, meditation could be similar

or dissimilar to the form of the object. This is the implication when it is said that the injunction of meditation is without regard to the nature of the object of meditation. Therefore, meditation is not *jñāna*. The *jñāna* that is produced when the *devatā* is actually seen is not subjective. But the meditation of remembering the *devatā* not in front, is subjective.

Doubt: When seeing the pot, its mental form that is produced is subject to change. Therefore, isn't knowing the pot also an action?

Answer: No; because there is no effort on part of the knower in knowing the pot. Production of the mental form of the object as a consequence of the object-sense contact is the nature of the *kṣetra*. This is subject to change. The one who notices it is the knower. Knowing is not his action; it is his nature.

Doubt: Let not *jñāna* of sense perception be an act. Is not effort involved in knowing things by inference and Veda?

Answer: It is not so. Whatever may be the *pramāṇa*, *jñāna* obtained has to be right knowledge. But effort is needed, while knowing things beyond perception, to remove the doubts obstructing right knowledge. But this does not mean that *jñāna* is produced by this effort; because the object of the effort is not *jñāna*, but the removal of doubt. One who does not distinguish the role of *pramāṇa* in this way, may imagine that *jñāna* is obtained by effort like cooking. This is not correct. If one remembers that the knower is *prājñā* who is adjunctless, it is easy to understand the *jñāna* is not his action, but his nature. Therefore, *Brahman-Ātman jñāna* also is neither injunctive nor subjective.

१७. किमर्थानि तर्हि “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः” (बृ. २.४.५) इत्यादीनि विधिच्छायानि वचनानि? स्वाभाविक-प्रवृत्तिविषय-विमुखीकरणार्थानि इति ब्रूमः। योहि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः इष्टं मे भूयात्, अनिष्टं मा भूदिति, न च तत्र आत्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तम् आत्यन्तिकपुरुषार्थवाञ्छिनं स्वाभाविक-कार्यकरणसंघातप्रवृत्ति-गोचरात् विमुखीकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतस्तया प्रवर्तयन्ति “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः” इत्यादीनि। तस्य आत्मान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तस्य अहेयमनुपादेयं च आत्मतत्त्वम् उपदिश्यते “इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा” (बृ. २.४.६), “यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत् केन कं विजानीयात्”, “विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्” (बृ. ४.५.१५), “अयमात्मा ब्रह्म” (बृ. २.५.१) इत्यादिभिः।

17. 'What then are the meanings of passages like "Ātman should be seen, should be heard about" etc which have the shade of injunctions?' We say, they are intended to turn back (the mind) from objects of natural inclination. The person who is inclined outwards (thinks) 'Let me have desirable things, let me not have undesirable things' but does not attain the final goal there. (When the same person) desires the final goal, passages like "Ātman is to be seen" etc turn him away from the objects of natural inclination which attract the union of the body and the senses and make his (attention) flow towards the inner Ātman in a continuous current. For him who engages himself in the quest of Ātman, śruti teaches the true nature of Ātman which is free from any giving and taking: "All this is Ātman", "Where all of this is only Ātman, by what whom can we see? By what whom can one know!" "By what one can the knower?" "This Ātman is Brahman" etc.

(17) Which have the shade of injunctions etc: Should be done, to be done, must be done have injunctory meaning. Though the word 'to be seen, to be heard, to be thought about, to be meditated on' are injunctions, they cannot be injunctions when used in the case of Ātman. 'Then what is their purpose?' It is this: Man by nature is extrovert in trying to get happiness and getting rid of grief. One who is in search of Ātman knows that the ultimate happiness is not obtained from outside. Nevertheless, his mind is frequently pushed outside due to the power of the impressions acquired from previous lives. His mind is to be withdrawn from outside and turned inwards towards the Ātman. Who is this Ātman? It is he who is all this. Therefore, when he comes to know that he is the all pervading Ātman, the mind stops going outside. These injunctive words are used to turn his attention towards the Ātman. Rest of the discussion in this connection is in the end section.

१८. यदपि अकर्तव्यप्रधानम् आत्मज्ञानं हानाय उपादानाय वा न भवति इति, तत् तथैव अभ्युपगम्यते। अलंकारो ह्ययम् अस्माकं यत् ब्रह्मात्मावगतौ सत्यां सर्वकर्तव्यता हानिः कृतकृत्यता च इति। तथा च श्रुतिः "आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयात् अयमस्मीति पूरुषः, किमिच्छन् कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत्" (बृ. ४.४.१२) इति। "एतद् बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान् स्यात् कृतकृत्यश्च भारत" (गी. १५.२०) इति स्मृतिः। तस्मात् न प्रतिपत्ति-विधिविषयतया ब्रह्मणः समर्पणम्।

18. (As for the objection that) the knowledge of *Ātman* which is free from action does not have any giving and taking—we accept it as it is. This indeed constitutes our glory that with the realization of *Ātman* as *Brahman*, there is the destruction of all duties and the accomplishment of everything that is to be accomplished. So too says *śruti*: “If man realizes that *Ātman* is himself (then), desiring what for who’s sake will he suffer in sympathy with the body?” *smṛti* also says “Knowing that, one becomes intelligent and would have accomplished all that is to be accomplished, oh Bhārata”. Therefore, *Brahman* is not said as subsidiary to *upāsanā*.

(18) That there is no giving and taking in the knowledge of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness, is not a defect; it is our glory. We accept this feature of the realisation of *Ātman* as it is because, what give and take could be there in that bliss whose tiny fractions are the happiness of beings starting from man upto the supermost *devatā* Brahma? (Tai. 2.8; Br. 4.3.33). With this, all duties come to an end and all the work is over. That there is no higher bliss is indicated even to the unrealised in blissful and griefless deep sleep where connection with outside world is completely snapped. Therefore, it is obvious that the realised one has no connection with either *karma* or *upāsanā*.

१९. यदपि केचिदाहुः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधितच्छेषव्यतिरेकेण केवल वस्तुभागे नास्तीति, तन्न। औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्य अनन्यशेषत्वात्। योऽसौ उपनिषत्स्वेव अधिगतः पुरुषः असंसारी ब्रह्म उत्पाद्यादि-चतुर्विध-द्रव्यविलक्षणः स्वप्रकरणस्थः अनन्यशेषः नासौ नास्ति नाधिगम्यते इति वा शक्यं वदितुम्। “स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा” (बृ. ३.९.२६) इति आत्मशब्दात्। आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुं अशक्यत्वात्। य एष निराकर्ता तस्यैव आत्मत्वात्। ननु आत्मा अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वात् उपनिषत्स्वेव विज्ञायते इति अनुपपन्नम्? न, तत्साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात्। न हि अहंप्रत्यय विषयकर्तृव्यतिरेकेण तत्साक्षी सर्वभूतस्थः समः एकः कूटस्थनित्यः पुरुषः विधिकाण्डे तर्कसमये वा केनचित् अधिगतः सर्वस्य आत्मा। अतः स न केनचित् प्रत्याख्यातुं शक्यः विधिशेषत्वं वा नेतुम्। आत्मत्वादेव च सर्वेषां न हेयः नापि उपादेयः। सर्वं हि विनश्यत विकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति। पुरुषो विनाशहेत्वभावात् अविनाशी। विक्रियाहेत्वभावाच्च कूटस्थनित्यः, अत एव नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः। तस्मात् “पुरुषान्नपरं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा

परागतिः” (क. १.३.११), “तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि” (बृ. ३.९.२६) इति च औपनिषदत्वविशेषणं पुरुषस्य उपनिषत्सु प्राधान्येन प्रकाश्यमानत्वे उपपद्यते। अतः भूतवस्तुपरो वेदभागो नास्तीति वचनं साहसमात्रम्।

19. Some say, there is no portion of the Veda telling about mere things different from injunctions which motivate and demotivate and what is subsidiary to them. That is not so because, the Person (*Ātman*) propounded in the Upaniṣads is not subsidiary to anything else. This Person is understood from the Upaniṣads alone; He is not *samsārī*; He is of the nature of *Brahman*, who is distinct from the four kinds of substances which are produced etc, Who occurs in a topic of His own, not subsidiary to another. It cannot be said that such a one does not exist or that He cannot be known, because there is the word ‘*Ātman*’ in “That *Ātman* is not like this, not like this” and it is not possible to deny *Ātman*, for he who denies is himself *Ātman*. (Objection) ‘Since (it has been said) that *Ātman* is the object of ‘I-thought’, is it not wrong to say that He is to be understood from the Upaniṣads alone?’ No, because, it has been said that He is the witness of the *Ātman* grasped as ‘I’. As distinct from the doer *Ātman* grasped as ‘I’, His witness who is present in all, equal, one, immutably eternal, the Person who is the self of all, is not known by anyone either in the injunctive part (of the Veda) or in the system of logic. Therefore, He cannot be refuted by anyone, nor link (him) as subsidiary to injunction. Being the *Ātman* of all, He is not something either to be given up or taken up. All the produced effects perish leaving this Person. This Person is imperishable because, there is nothing in Him to perish. He is immutably eternal because, there is nothing to be modified (in Him). For this reason, He is by nature eternally pure, enlightened and free. Therefore, in (sentences like) “There is nothing higher than this Person: that is the limit, that is the highest goal”, “But I ask about the Person propounded in the Upaniṣads”,—the qualification ‘propounded in the Upaniṣads’ predominantly speak about this Person. Therefore, the statement that there is no part of the Veda dealing with existing things is mere rashness.

(19) It is wrong to say that the Vedas do not teach anything which has no

connection with *karma*; Upaniṣads do teach of such a soul. In this section it is shown with evidence that He is to be taught only by the Upaniṣads because, He is not related to *karma*. The sentence since *Ātman* is the subject of the *aham-pratyaya* - 'ननु आत्मा अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वात्...' has already been discussed in *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* (25.1).

Doubt: Till now it has been said that the inner self is the subject of the I-thought (*aham-pratyaya*) and is well-known in everyone's experience. Now suddenly it is being said that 'उपनिषत्सु एव विज्ञायते' - He is to understood only through the Upaniṣads. How is it?

Answer: Not like that. The inner Self, spoken of previously, is *kṣetrajñā-prājñā* -doer-enjoyer - who could be purified by action - discussed in logic and also the part of the Vedas dealing with *karma*. He is not one; he is different in each body. The one being said by the Upaniṣads is the same in everyone, the President without attributes and the witness to all *karma*. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the Vedas do not speak of existent things*.

२०. यदपि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदाम् अनुक्रमणम् “दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्” (शा. भा. १.१.१) इत्येवमादि, तत् धर्मजिज्ञासाविषयत्वात् विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्राभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्। अपि च “आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यम् अतदर्थानाम्” (जै. सू. १.२.१) इत्येतत् एकान्तेन अभ्युपगच्छतां भूतोपदेश आनर्थक्य प्रसंगः। प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधिव्यतिरेकेण भूतं चेत् वस्तु उपदिशति भव्यार्थत्वेन, कूटस्थं नित्यं भूतं नोपदिशति इति को हेतुः? न हि भूतम् उपदिश्यमानं क्रिया भवति। अक्रियात्वेऽपि भूतस्य क्रियासाधनत्वात् क्रियार्थ एव भूतोपदेशः इति चेत्? नैष दोषः। क्रियार्थत्वेऽपि क्रियानिर्वर्तन शक्तिमद् वस्तु उपदिष्टमेव। क्रियार्थत्वं तु प्रयोजनं तस्य। न च एतावता वस्तु अनुपदिष्टं भवति। यदि नाम उपदिष्टं किं तव तेन स्यादिति? उच्यते। अनवगत-आत्मवस्तूपदेशश्च तथैव भवितुमर्हति। तदवगत्या मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संसारहेतोः निवृत्तिः प्रयोजनं क्रियते इति अविशिष्टम् अर्थवत्त्वं क्रियासाधनवस्तूपदेशेन।

20. (The sayings of) those who know the purport of the *śāstra* viz, “The visible use of Veda is the teaching of action” etc refer to the discussion of

*The sentence 'ननु आत्मा अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वात्... प्रत्युक्तत्वात्' - Makes it crystal clear that 'अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचर' - the first word in the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* refers only to *kṣetrajñā* and not to his witness, the fourth *Ātman*.

dharmā. Therefore, they have to be understood as the opinion of the *śāstra* of prescriptions and prohibitions. Further, for those who accept unexceptionally (the statement) “Since the purpose of the Veda is action, (sentences) not conveying that meaning are futile”, the teaching of existents become futile. If it teaches existent things different from injunctions for motivation and demotivation for the sake of dharma which is yet to occur, what is the reason for saying that it does not teach the immutable eternal existent? The existent that is taught is not an act. ‘If it is said that though the existent itself is not an act, its teaching is for the sake of an act, because it is instrumental to an act?’ This is not a defect. Though for the sake of an act—the thing which has the capacity to perform an act is certainly taught; that it is for the sake of an act is its usefulness. Just because of that, the thing does not turn out to be untaught. ‘Agreeing it is taught, what do you gain from it?’ We will say: The teaching of the unknown *Ātman* is also of the same kind. By its knowledge the use would be the removal of the wrong knowledge which is the cause of *saṁsāra*. Hence, it is the same as the teaching of objects that are instrumental to an act in respect of its usefulness.

(20) That the Vedas do not speak of existent things was rejected in the previous section. Now it is being shown, using the *Mīmāṃsaka*’s arguments, that the Vedas do speak of about things unrelated to *karma*. Do they not speak of *yūpa*, *āhvanīya* etc? ‘They do, but for the sake of action’. Though its usefulness is in action, it is an existent. So, the teaching of an existent object without use could be meaningless; not if it has use. ‘Then what is the use for teaching about *Ātman*?’ It is that Its knowledge destroys the *adhyāsa* which is responsible for all evil.

२१. अपि च “ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः” इत्येवमाद्या निवृत्तिः उपदिश्यते। न च सा क्रिया, नापि क्रियासाधनम्। अक्रियार्थानामुपदेशः अनर्थकश्चेत् “ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः” इत्यादि निवृत्त्युपदेशानाम् आनर्थक्यं प्राप्तम्। तच्च अनिष्टम्। न च स्वभावप्राप्त-हन्त्यर्थ-अनुरागेण नञः शक्यम् अप्राप्तक्रियार्थत्वं कल्पयितुं हनन-क्रियानिवृत्ति-औदासीन्य व्यतिरेकेण। नञश्च एष स्वभावः यत् स्वसंबन्धिनोऽभावं बोधयति इति। अभावबुद्धिश्च औदासीन्यकारणम्। सा च दग्धेन्धनाग्निवत् स्वयमेव उपशाम्यति।

तस्मात् प्रसक्तक्रियानिवृत्ति-औदासीन्यमेव “ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः” इत्यादिषु प्रतिषेधार्थं मन्यामहे अन्यत्र प्रजापतिव्रतादिभ्यः । तस्मात् पुरुषार्थ-अनुपयोगि-उपाख्यानादि-भूतार्थ-वाद विषयम् आनर्थक्याभिधानं द्रष्टव्यम्।

21. Further, “A *brāhmaṇa* is not to be killed” etc teach desisting from action. This is not an act or even a means to act. If the teaching of not acting is futile, then the teachings of desisting from activity like “A *brāhmaṇa* is not to be killed” would also be futile. That is not desirable. The word ‘not’ related to the act of killing which is naturally inherent (in one), makes (him) desist from killing and (eventually) generates (only) a passivity in him. Therefore, imagining a meaning of non-existent act (for the word ‘not’) is not possible. The nature of the word ‘not’ is that it teaches the non-existence to which it is related. The cognition of non-existence is the cause of passivity. That subsides on its own accord like the fire whose fuel has been consumed. Therefore we think that the passivity generated by desisting from the act for which there is scope, is the meaning of the prohibition “A *brāhmaṇa* is not to be killed” etc, in all cases other than the *Prajāpati* - vow etc. Therefore, the claim of futility must be understood in the case of legends which are praises of the existent not serving the human goal.

(21) That sentences unrelated to action are futile is the opponent’s view in the sūtra ‘Since *śāstra* is for the purpose of action’. The counter question of the Vedāntin is this: Right. It is true in the case of injunctory sentences intended to motivate person to action. What about prohibitory sentences intended to demotivate?

Opponent: Even in the prohibitory sentences, connection with action is implied. For e.g., in *Prajāpati* vow, the *brahmacārin* is prohibited to see the sun while it is setting or rising. *Purāṇas* prohibit seeing the moon on a certain day of the year. In these prohibitions, effort is needed by the person not to see the sun or the moon.

Vedāntin: What about the prohibitory sentence ‘A *brāhmaṇa* should not be killed’? It is neither action nor an implement for action.

Opponent: No; there is the action of effort not to kill.

Vedāntin: But this sentence is not an injunction for making that effort. The

only use of the sentence is to produce the awareness of not killing. Later on, even this awareness ends up in being passive. As for e.g., if the intention of killing is the fuel, then this awareness is fire. Just like fire gets extinguished after burning the fuel, this awareness also ends up in passivity after removing the motivation to kill. This means that there are Vedic passages which are useful things not related with action. Similarly, sentences about *Brahman* have the use of removing *adhyāsa* which is responsible for all worldly problems.

२२. यदप्युक्तम् कर्तव्यविध्यनुप्रवेशम् अन्तरेण वस्तुमात्रमुच्यमानम् अनर्थकं स्यात् “सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती” इत्यादिवत् इति, तत्परिहतम्। “रज्जुरियं नायं सर्पः” इति वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि प्रयोजनस्य दृष्टत्वात्। ननु श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं संसारित्वदर्शनात् न रज्जुस्वरूपकथनवत् अर्थवत्त्वमित्युक्तम्? अत्रोच्यते। न अवगत-ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथा-पूर्वं संसारित्वं शक्यं दर्शयितुम्, वेदप्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मभावविरोधात्। न हि शरीराद्यात्माभिमानिनः दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं दृष्टमिति तस्यै वेदप्रमाणजनित-ब्रह्मात्मावगमे तदभिमान निवृत्तौ तदेव मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं भवतीति शक्यं कल्पयितुम्। न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानिनः धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं दृष्टमिति तस्यैव प्रव्रजितस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं भवति। न च कुंडलिनः कुंडलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं दृष्टमिति तस्यैव कुंडलिवियुक्तस्य कुंडलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुंडलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति। तदुक्तं श्रुत्या “अशरीरं वावसन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः” (छां. ८.१२.१)।

22. It was said that the speaking of a bare thing without entry of injunction is futile like (saying) “The earth has seven islands” etc. This has been refuted; because, use is seen even in the narration of a bare objection like “This is rope, this is not a snake”. (Opponent)—‘Even in him who has heard about *Brahman*, the features of a *saṁsārī* (worldly person) is seen as before; therefore, it is not purposeful as in the narration of the nature of the rope.’ Here we say: It is not possible to show features of *saṁsārī* as before in one who has realization of *Brahman* as himself; because it is opposed to the realization of *Brahman*—*Ātman* identification generated by *Veda pramāṇa*. In a man with the conceit of self in the body etc, association with grief, fear etc are found. Because of that, it is not

possible to imagine in the man the association of grief, fear etc caused by illusory knowledge, after the *Brahman-Ātman* realization produced by *Veda pramāṇa* (and so) the conceit is removed. The grief of theft of wealth is found in the rich house-holder with the conceit of wealth; the same grief caused by the theft of wealth is not produced in the same man when he renounces and becomes freed from the conceit of wealth. Happiness is seen in one having earrings who has the conceit of having earrings; for the same person, the happiness in having earrings is not there, when he gives up the earrings and is freed from the conceit of having earrings. This is declared by *śruti*: 'Him who is unembodied, pleasure and displeasure do not touch.'

(22) Earlier the objection was raised that the narration of an existent thing is useless, like the sentence 'The earth has seven islands'. Countering it, the Vedāntin said that the narration of the rope has the use of removing the fear of the serpent (see the same *adhikaraṇa*, sec. 6). Continuing it, the effect of the realisation of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness on the *jñānī* is being discussed. A detailed commentary on this has already been made in the *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* (21.1-3). The gist is: 'शरीराम्भकस्य कर्मणो नियतफलत्वात् सम्यग्ज्ञानप्राप्तौ अपि अवश्यम्भाविनी प्रवृत्तिः वाङ्मनःकायानाम् लब्धवृत्तेः कर्मणो बलीयस्त्वात् मुक्तेष्वदिप्रवृत्तिवत्' (Br. Bh. 1.4.7). Though activity takes place in body, speech, mind etc, one with this realisation is aware that he is unrelated to it. There is no meaning in others finding a contradiction in it. Since there is no *adhyāsa* in him, pleasure/ displeasure do not touch him even when the body is alive. The objection of the opponent who does not agree with this and the Vedāntin's answer to it is as follows:

२३. शरीरे पतिते अशरीरत्वं स्यात् न जीवतः इति चेत्? न, सशरीरत्वस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात्। न हि आत्मनः शरीरात्माभिमानलक्षणं मिथ्याज्ञानं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः सशरीरत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम्। नित्यं अशरीरत्वं अकर्मनिमित्तत्वादिति अवोचाम। तत्कृत धर्माधर्मनिमित्तं सशरीरत्वमिति चेत्? न, शरीरसंबंधस्य असिद्धत्वात् धर्माधर्मयोः आत्म-कृतत्वासिद्धेः। शरीरसंबंधस्य धर्माधर्मयोः तत्कृतस्य च इतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसंगात् अन्ध-परंपरा एषा अनादित्वकल्पना। क्रियासमवायाभावाच्च आत्मनः कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः। सन्निधानमात्रेण राजप्रभृतीनां दृष्टं कर्तृत्वम्, इति चेत्? न, धनदानादि-उपार्जित भृत्यसंबंधित्वात् तेषां कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेः। न तु आत्मनः धनदानादिवत् शरीरादिभिः स्वस्वामि-

संबंधनिमित्तं किञ्चित् शक्यं कल्पयितुम्। मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षः संबंधहेतुः। एतेन यजमानत्वम् आत्मनः व्याख्यातम्।

23. 'If it is said that unembodiment happens when the body is lost (and) not when alive?' No, because, embodiment is due to illusory knowledge. It is not possible to imagine embodiment for *Ātman* in any other way than through illusory knowledge of the conceit of *Ātman* as the body. We have already said that unembodiment is eternal since it is not caused by action. 'If it is said that embodiment is due to *dharma* and *adharmā* acquired by him?' No. That *dharma* and *adharmā* are acquired by him is not established because, his relation with the body is not established. (To avoid this difficulty) assuming beginninglessness (of the relation between body and *dharma* / *adharmā*) is (like) a chain of blind men, because there is mutual dependence between the relation with the body, and the acquisition of *dharma* and *adharmā* by him. *Ātman*'s doership is also irreconcilable since he has no *samavāya* relation - with action. 'Is not mere proximity seen as causing doership in kingly persons?' No; their doership comes through their relationship with the servants procured through gifting of money etc. It is not possible to conceive of any relation produced by gifting of money which could produce master-servant relationship between *Ātman* and the body etc. It is directly seen that illusory conceit is the cause of relation. With this is also explained the doership of *Ātman* in sacrifice.

(23) The opponent's view is that unembodiment is only after death and not while alive. But this is wrong. Whether *Ātman* has pleasure/displeasure after the fall of the body or not, cannot be determined by others; only the Vedas can tell it. The Vedas say that after death *jīva* goes to heaven/hell. This means that even after death there is no freedom from pleasure/displeasure. Therefore, the opponent's view is not correct. But it is the direct experience of everybody that in *suṣupti* one is untouched by pleasure/displeasure. The reason for this feature is that *jīva* is one with *Brahman* at that time. *Śruti* says - 'सता तदा सम्पन्नो भवति स्वमपीतो भवति' - He is one with *Brahman*, he is dissolved in his *Ātman* (Cā. 6.8.1). 'पर आत्मनि संप्रतिष्ठते' - He is one with *paramātman* (Pr. 4.7). Therefore, it is clear that the embodiment experienced in the wakeful state is only because of wrong knowledge.

Opponent: There is another way to reconcile embodiment; we say, it is the result of *dharmā/adharma*.

Vedantin: That is not possible; because, body is caused by *dharmā/adharma* and *dharmā/adharma* are caused by the body. This mutual dependence prevents us from deciding which of them is the cause which is the effect. You cannot also overcome this difficulty by saying that this mutual relationship is beginningless like that of seed and tree; that would be like a chain of blind men: One blind man says that 'milk is white' to another blind man. When the latter asks for *pramāṇa*, he is told that 'another blind man told me'. This cannot prove that embodiment is due to *dharmā/adharma*. But in *suṣupti* there is neither body nor *dharmā/adharma*. If one remembers the reason for this given by the *śruti* quoted above, it is conclusively proved that the embodiment of *Ātman* is only because of *mithyā-jñāna*.

Doubt: Is it not possible that *karma* can happen by the mere presence of *Atman*?

Answer: No. *Śruti* trumpets that the *Ātman* is non-doer. Indeed, non-doership experienced in *suṣupti* is due to his oneness with *Brahman* at that time. But it reappears the moment he gets back to wakefulness. It is because of *adhyāsa* that *Ātman* gets doership in a sacrifice.

२४. अत्राहुः देहादिव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनः आत्मीये देहादौ अभिमानः गौणः, न मिथ्या इति। तन्न, प्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य गौणत्वमुख्यत्वप्रसिद्धेः। यस्य हि प्रसिद्धो वस्तु-भेदः यथा केसरादिमान् आकृतिविशेषः अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययभाक् मुख्यः अन्यः प्रसिद्धः ततश्च अन्यः पुरुषः प्रायिकैः क्रौर्यशौर्यादिभिः सिंहगुणैः संपन्नः सिद्धः तस्य पुरुषे सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययौ गौणौ भवतः, न अप्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य। तस्य तु अन्यत्र अन्यशब्दप्रत्ययौ भ्रान्तिनिमित्तावेव भवतः, न गौणौ। यथा मन्दान्धकारे स्थाणुरयमिति अगृह्यमाण विशेषे पुरुषशब्दप्रत्ययौ स्थाणुविषयौ। यथा वा शुक्तिकायाम् अकस्मात् रजतमिति निश्चितौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ। तद्वत् देहादिसंघाते अहमिति निरुपचारेण शब्दप्रत्ययौ आत्मानात्मविवेकेन उत्पद्यमानौ कथं गौणौ शक्यौ वदितुम्? आत्मानात्मविवेकिनामपि पंडितानाम् अजाविपालामिव अविचित्तौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ भवतः। तस्मात् देहादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मास्तित्वादिनां देहादौ अहंप्रत्ययो मिथ्यैव, न गौणः।

24. Here it is said 'The conceit of 'I' in his own body etc. of *Ātman* which is different from the body etc, is secondary (and) not illusory.' No. It is well-

known that secondariness and primariness are (only) for him to whom the difference between the things is well-known. For example: A particular form with mane etc known through—*anvaya-vyatireka*—co-presence and co-absence, as the meaning of the word and concept 'lion' is *mukhya*—primary; and as different from that is a man possessing mostly lionine qualities of cruelty, courage etc. For this latter one, however, the word and concept of one (thing) in place of (the word and concept) of another (thing) is only due to delusion, not secondary. In twilight, when it is not clearly grasped as 'This is a post', the word and concept of 'man' in the post or the word and the concept of silver occurring accidentally in shell—are illusory. In the same way, how can the non-figurative use of the word and concept of 'I' in the bundle of the body etc, born out of indiscrimination of *Ātman* and *un-Ātman*, use the word and concept indiscriminately just like goatherds? Therefore, for those who agree that *Ātman* is distinct from the body etc, the concept of 'I' in the body etc is illusory and not secondary.

(24) *Mīmāṃsakas*, who disagree with this conclusion about the cause of embodiment, object like this: 'As the *śāstras* speak about heaven/hell after death, *Ātman* has to be different from the body. Even a common man does not say 'I am eyes, I am legs'. He says only 'my eyes, my legs'. Therefore, the use of 'I-ness' in the body is in the secondary sense, it is not wrong knowledge.' This is not correct. If one looks into the situation where the secondary usage is employed, it will be clear that the 'I' description of the body is not secondary. For e.g, looking at a man with cruelty and courage similar to that of a lion, he is addressed as 'lion'. One who uses this word is fully aware of the differences between the man and lion. Here the word 'lion' is in secondary sense because of the similarities of the qualities in him. This is a figurative usage. But while calling a stump as a man or a shell as silver, the person will not be knowing the difference between stump/man and shell/silver. Therefore, that usage is not secondary, it is clearly wrong knowledge. Similarly, not knowing the difference between the Self and the body when one says 'I am a man', it is wrong knowledge only. Even intelligent persons who know about *prājñā*-body difference talk like this. Therefore, it can never be in the secondary sense.

२५. तस्मात् मिथ्याप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वात् सशरीरत्वस्य सिद्धं जीवतोऽपि विदुषः अशरीरत्वम्। तथा च ब्रह्मविद्विषया श्रुतिः “तद्यथा हि निर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीत एवमेव इदं शरीरं शेते। अत अयमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव” (बृ. ४.४.७) इति, “सचक्षुरचक्षुरिव सकर्णोऽकर्ण इव सवागवागिव समना अमना इव सप्राणोऽप्राण इव” इति च। स्मृतिरपि “स्थितप्रज्ञस्य का भाषा” (गी. २.५४) इत्याद्या स्थितप्रज्ञलक्षणानि आचक्षणा विदुषः सर्वप्रवृत्त्यसंबंधं दर्शयति। तस्मात् न अवगत-ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वम् यस्य तु यथापूर्वं संसारित्वम्, नासौ अवगतब्रह्मात्म-भावः इति अनवद्यम्।

25. Therefore, embodiment being due to illusory knowledge, it is established that for the *jñānī*, even while alive there is unembodiment. Thus there is *śruti* about the one who knows *Brahman*: “Just as the slough of a snake lies dead and cast off on the ant-hill, in the same way lies this body; then that un-embodied is immortal, is *prāṇa*, is *Brahman* alone, is light alone”; “Though with eyes, he is like without eyes, though with ears, like without ears; though with speech, like without speech; though with mind, like without mind; though with *prāṇa*, like without *prāṇa*”. Speaking of the features of *sthitaprajña*—one steady in knowledge—*smṛti* also says “What is *sthitaprajña*’s language”? etc, showing that the knower is unconnected with all actions. Therefore, with the realization of *Brahman* as *Ātman*, there is no *saṁsāra* as before. The one who remains *saṁsārī* as before has not realized *Brahman* as *Ātman*, Therefore (our stand) is faultless.

(25) As wrong knowledge is destroyed by the realisation of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness, the imagined relation with the body is lost. Even while alive one becomes unembodied. Just as the snake loses relation with the slough after its detachment, the *jñānī* too loses body-relation and becomes *Brahman*. This does not however mean that there was a relation earlier. It was not there even earlier. Therefore, there is no scope for imaginations like ‘trace of *avidyā*, true liberation is after death’ etc. *Śruti* says - ‘ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्नोति’ - Being *Brahman* he merges in *Brahman*. ‘Even with eyes, he is like without eyes’, i.e. his eyes too see multiplicity like the eyes of an ignorant person; but do not recognise multiplicity and so are like the one without eyes. Some people have interpreted this as ‘Though without eyes, he is like with eyes’,

i.e., though he is the adjunctless *Ātman*, he appears as if working with adjuncts. The first literal interpretation is the *jñānī*'s personal experience; the second is his appearance for others. These are the features of the *sthitaprajña* (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 21.3). One without the realisation of *Brahman-Ātman* sees multiplicity outside and considers himself as observer. The one with realization, though seeing multiplicity with physical eyes, does not understand himself as observer of multiplicity, but as the *Brahman* which is the cause of both, observed and observer. That is, the *jñāna* of multiplicity produced by sense-object contact is the feature of the *kṣetra* - the observable; and *Ātman* is its real nature (*swarūpa*). The feature is not independent of the *swarūpa*; but the *swarūpa* is featureless. Therefore, the *adhyāsa* relation with the *kṣetra* produces motivation for action in the ignorant; with the snapping of the *adhyāsa* relation, motivation drops off in the *jñānī*. *Kṣetra* is not non-existent, it is *Ātman*; *adhyāsa* with it is non-existent, imagined.

२६. यत् पुनरुक्तम् श्रवणात् पराचीनयोः मनननिदिध्यासनयोः दर्शनात् विधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः न स्वरूपपर्यवसायित्वमिति। न, अवगत्यर्थत्वात् मनननिदिध्यासनयोः। यदि हि अवगतं ब्रह्म अन्यत्र विनियुज्येत, भवेत्तदा विधिशेषत्वम्। न तु तदस्ति। मनन-निदिध्यासनयोरपि श्रवणवत् अवगत्यर्थत्वात्।

26. Again it was said: 'Since reflection and meditation are seen subsequent to hearing, *Brahman* must be subsidiary to injunction and does not stop with (the teaching of) its nature.' It is not so; because like hearing, reflection and meditation are for the purpose of realization. If the realized *Brahman* were used elsewhere, then there would be subsidiariness to injunction. But it is not so, because like hearing, reflection and meditation are also for the purpose of realization.

(26) In the opinion of the opponent, 'reflection (*manana*) after hearing (*śravaṇa*) is for clear understanding of *Brahman* and *nididhyāsana* is nothing but *upāsana* (meditation). After death the fruit of *upāsana*, i.e., *mokṣa* is obtained'. This is not correct; because, after *śravaṇa*, the understood *Brahman* is not used for something else; there is no scope for that either, because, the process yields the realisation of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness and the distinction of meditator-meditated upon is lost. How can *upāsana* happen? Therefore, reflection and meditation are for realisation only.

२७. तस्मात् न प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं ब्रह्मणः संभवति। इत्यतः स्वतन्त्रमेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकं वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयात् इति सिद्धम्। एवं च सति “अथातो ब्रह्म जिज्ञासा” इति तद्विषयः पृथक् शास्त्रारंभः उपपद्यते। प्रतिपत्ति-विधि-परत्वे हि “अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा” इत्येव आरब्धत्वात् न पृथक्शास्त्रम् आरभ्येत। आरभ्यमाणं च एवमारभ्येत “अथातः परिशिष्टधर्मजिज्ञासा” इति। “अथातः क्रत्वर्थं पुरुषार्थयोर्जिज्ञासा” (जै. सू. ४.१.१) इतिवत्। ब्रह्मात्मैक्यावगतिस्तु अप्रतिज्ञाता इति तदर्थोयुक्तः शास्त्रारंभः “अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा”।

27. Therefore, *śāstra* is not *pramāṇa* for the knowledge of *Brahman* as subsidiary to an injunction of *upāsanā*. So now, that *śāstra* is the *pramāṇa* for *Brahman* independently is established because of the uniformity in the meaning of the Vedānta sentences. This being the case, the commencement of a distinct *śāstra* dealing with that in the form “Then therefore the discussion of *Brahman*” is reconciled. Had it been for an ‘injunction of *upāsanā*, then since this had been already stated in the *sūtra* “then therefore the discussion of *dharma*” a different *śāstra* would not have been commenced. Or if it had been begun, it should have been commenced with “Then therefore the discussion of rest of *dharma*” like “Then, therefore, the discussion of what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice and of the goal of man”. The realization of *Brahman-Ātman* oneness is not propounded (in that *śāstra*); hence it is but right that (another) *śāstra* is begun for that purpose in “Then, therefore, the discussion of *Brahman*”.

(27) ‘*Śāstra* is not *pramāṇa* for *Brahman* through injunction; it is *pramāṇa* directly’ - this is proved by logic in this section. *Upāsanā* being a mental *karma*, it has to come under the discussion of *dharma*. So, it could have come there as a subsidiary to injunction of *upāsanā*, ‘अथातः परिशिष्ट धर्मजिज्ञासा’ - Another *śāstra* is not needed. Suppose one says ‘No, context being different, *upāsanā* cannot be discussed under *dharma*’. In that case, *upāsanā* being *karma* of a different type, it could have been dealt with in another sub-section within *dharma-jijñāsā*. Instead, a separate *śāstra* has been formulated. Why? Because, *Brahman-Ātman* oneness cannot be discussed in that *śāstra*; that *śāstra* is based on duality.

२८. तस्मात् “अहं ब्रह्मास्मि” इत्येतदवसाना एव सर्वे विधयः सर्वाणि च

इतराणि प्रमाणानि। न हि अहेय-अनुपादेय-अद्वैतात्म-अवगतौ निर्विषयाणि अप्रमातृकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितुमर्हन्ति। अपि च आहुः

28. Therefore all the injunctions and *pramāṇas* terminate with (the realization) "I am *Brahman*". With the realization of non-dual *Ātman* where there is no rejecting and taking, *pramāṇa* cannot but drop because objects and the knower drop out. Further they say:

(28.1)Therefore, all the injunctions etc: 'The knowledge of *Ātman*' (*Ātma-jñāna*) will become non-eternal if it is a fruit of injunction. Imperative etc used in respect of it become blunt, they have only the shade of injunction'- this shows that *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are not injunctions.

Doubt: But they too drop out after the realization of the oneness of *Ātman - Brahman*. In that case, does the first sentence in this section not imply that these three have once again been treated as injunctions?

Answer: It is not explicit here that it is so. The sentence may be referring to injunction of *dharmasāstra* only. It is because of the word 'vidhi' that this doubt has arisen. So it will be discussed again: Meaning of 'knowledge of *Brahman*' has been explained by saying 'The intellectual knowledge of *Brahman* is the *pramāṇa* through which experience is gained' (see *Jijñāsā-adhikaraṇa*, sec. 11). The end result of experience starts with hearing (*śravaṇa*) of *sāstras*. Experience is not produced immediately after hearing. Śvetaketu is an example of this. After *śravaṇa*, reflection (*manana*) of the knowledge of *Brahman* is necessary. In this knowledge obtained after *manana*, *Brahman* is the known and *prajna* is the knower. This is duality. But the *śruti* says '*Prājñā* is *Brahman*' and *Ātman* is *prājñā*, who is in fact, *Brahman* only. Therefore, the knower (of the wakeful state) should keep his mind continuously flowing towards *Ātman*. This is meditation - *nididhyāsana* - which has to end in experience. How long should one meditate? Till experience is got! Whether the first or the last, whether (meditation is) continuous or discontinuous, the grasp that ends in total removal of the defects of *avidya* etc is experience - 'य एव अविद्यादिदोषनिवृत्तिफलकृत्प्रत्ययः आद्यः अन्त्यः सन्ततः असन्ततो वा स एव विद्या' (Br. Bh. 1.4.10). There is nothing wrong in treating *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* as injunctions till then.' This is just like getting the fruit of *karma* according to the injunction of the *karma* part of the Veda.

Doubt: Then why are they described as ‘with shade of injunction? Why not say injunction itself?’

Answer: The reason for not treating it as injunction is this: Injunctive karma and fruit are very different. Here it is not so. *Manana* and *nididhyāsana* do not yield a knowledge different from what was heard. Nevertheless, experience does not come without them. So ‘they have the shade of injunction’.

(28.2) With *Ātman*-experience, knowership of *prājñā* drops off. **It is wrong to say it drops off because the known (world) ceases to exist due to this experience. It drops off because of the knowledge that the known is not different from the knower.** As a result of the teaching of the *śāstras* by the guru, when one reminds oneself that everything is the unborn *Brahman*, then he ceases to see duality which is its opposite, because such duality is non-existent - ‘अजं ब्रह्म सर्वमित्येतत् शास्त्राचार्योपदेशतः अनुस्मृत्य तद्विपरीतं जातुं नैव तु पश्यति, अभावात्’ (Mā. Kā. 3.43). With the realisation of the non-dual *Ātman*, nothing appears different from oneself. One obtains the world-sublated *sarva-ātma-bhāva*, the experience of everything as himself, while there is no giving or taking. Quoting the songs of the realised souls, this is explained below.

(28.3) Due to the sublation of son, body etc: Here sublation does not mean that son, body etc become invisible, get destroyed. If such a thing happens to the body, the tradition of Vedanta cannot continue. **Sublation of the world means the realisation that its inherent nature is *Ātman* itself.** In this awareness of *sarva-ātma-bhāva*, son etc are ‘not his’ and body etc are ‘not himself’. Son etc are secondary atmans and body etc are illusory *ātman*s. They are non-existent in *sarva-ātma-bhāva*. Since all actions take place on the premise of secondary and illusory *ātman*s which are absent on realisation, they (actions) cease to exist.

(28.4) Prior to cognition etc: *Ātman* being different from and unknown to the ignorant person He is to be sought, He is to be discussed - ‘सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः सः विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ (Cā. 8.7.1); The ignorant person has to search for Him. After He is realised, naturally, knowership of the seeker drops off. Since sin and virtue occur only when there is knowership, they too drop off with *Ātman*’s realization.

(28.5) The cognition of *Ātman* etc: *Pramāṇa* is the base for the knower-known *vyavahāra* of knowing. The validity for *pramāṇa* comes from experience, which is based on identifying the body as the knower, i.e., *adhyāsa*. This is natural only as

long as there is knowership. When this is lost with *Ātman's* realisation, one comes to know that the validity of the *pramāṇa* and of the activities was illusory.

(28.6) What does it mean to say that the 'validity of *pramāṇa* is illusory?' If *śruti pramāṇa* is illusory, how is it possible to have faith in the transactionless *Ātman* it teaches? Even granting that somehow one gets the knowledge of the *Ātman* taught by *śruti*, how to verify that it is right knowledge? - These are the questions; here are the answers:

Vyavahāra is found only in the effects and not in the cause. And the effect cannot exist without the cause. *Vyavahāras* like 'the pot is big, small, broken' etc are possible only in the pot, not clay. But at the same time, a pot without clay is non-existent - 'न हि निरात्मकं भूतं किञ्चित् व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते' (G. Bh. 9.4). So, also, the *vyavahāra* of knower-known-knowledge is possible only between *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā*; not at all in the *Ātman*. *Vyavahāra* is impossible in a *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā* who are independent of *Ātman*, since they would be non-existent - 'कारण व्यतिरेकेण अभावः कार्यस्य' (Sū. Bh. 2.1.14). When the *pramāṇa*, the eye, comes in contact with the object, the knowledge of the latter is produced in the *buddhi*. All this is *kṣetra dharma*. One who has *adhyāsa* in the body, senses and *buddhi*, feels that he is the knower. Since the knowledge of an object is the same for all knowers, including the one who has realised the *Ātman*, this *vyavahāra* between *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā* is true - not illusory. What is illusion? 'अन्यस्य च अविद्याकृतत्वे विद्यया अवस्तुत्वदर्शनोपपत्तिः । तद्धि द्वितीयस्य चन्द्रस्य असत्त्वं यदतैमिरिकेण चक्षुष्मता न गृह्यते' - Another thing (different from *Ātman*) which is imagined due to *Avidyā*, is non-existent; it can be understood as non-existing by *vidyā*. Is not the second moon, not seen by one without cataract, the non-existent? (Tai. Bh. 2.8). 'If so, what exactly is illusory in the transaction between *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajñā*?' - Knowership of *Ātman*. 'Who is this *Ātman*?' *Prājñā*, also called *kṣetrajñā*. 'Why?' - Because *prājñā* is really not *prājñā*; he is the *Ātman* without knowership. Therefore, the moment *prājñā* realises that he is *Ātman*, all transactions stay bound in the *kṣetra*; in no way do they touch him.

Question: In that case, after one obtains *jñāna*, who handles the activity seen in the inert *kṣetra* of the *jñāni*?

Answer: It is *Īśvara*, who is passive in His *swarūpa*, but active in association with *māyā* - 'परमात्मनस्तु स्वरूपव्यपाश्रयम् औदासीन्यम् । मायाव्यपाश्रयं च प्रवर्तकत्वम्' । (Sū. Bh. 2.2.7), who handles the body of the *jñāni* according to his *prārabdha* - which is the *karma* brought with him to be experienced in this life (*Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* 21.1-3).

Question: The *vyavahāra* of creation etc of the world are of *Īśwara*, not of a *jñānī*. Is this not a difference between *jñānī* and *Īśwara*?

Answer: No. The aforesaid answer is given keeping in view the ignorant (*ajñānī*) who sees difference. Actually, *jñānī* is Paramatman only, without any difference. Prior to the realisation of *Ātman*, the creation and destruction of the world, starting from *prāṇa* upto the (objects with) names, were happening by one different from himself. With the realisation of *Ātman*, they were all by himself - In this way, for the *jñānī*, all transactions are by *Ātman* only - 'प्राक् सदात्मविज्ञानात् स्वात्मनः अन्यस्मात् सतः प्राणादेः नामान्तस्योत्पत्तिप्रलयौ अभूताम्। सदात्मविज्ञाने तु सति इदानीं स्वात्मत एव संबृत्तौ। तथा सर्वोऽप्यन्यो व्यवहारः आत्मन एव विदुषः'। (Cā. Bh. 7.26.1).

गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्र देहादि बाधनात्।
 सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधे कार्यं कथं भवेत्॥१॥
 अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात् प्राक् प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः।
 अन्विष्टः स्यात् प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः॥२॥
 देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः।
 लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात्॥३॥
 इति चतुःसूत्री समाप्ता।

(1) Due to the sublation of son, body etc, the secondary and the illusory *Ātmans* becoming non-existent and with enlightenment 'I am *Brahman* of the nature of sheer existence'—how can there be action?

(2) Prior to the cognition of the '*Ātman* to be known', there is knowership for *Ātman*. After knowing, the knower himself becomes free from sin, defect etc.

(3) The cognition of *Ātman* as the body is imagined to be *pramāṇa*. So also is this wordly (transaction imagined to be) *pramāṇa* until the ascertainment of *Ātman* (as *Brahman*).

Thus ends the catuḥsūtrī

