

## JAGAT PRAKARAṆAM

The nature of Jagat will be determined in this section. The different theories in this connection posited by different systems/Darśanās have been refuted through their own logic. Afterwards, the thesis that ‘the Svarūpa of Jagat is indeed Brahman’ is propounded. In the process, the argumentation Kārya Kāraṇa Ananyatvam (non-difference of cause and effect) of the Védānta Siddhānta, adopted by Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra Śāṅkara, is very elegant and very powerful. This is the crest jewel of the whole Siddhānta. In this Nyāya, world is the effect and Brahman is the cause. According to Śruti, the world is a manifestation of the unmanifest Brahman and the form Vikāra through which Brahman becomes manifest is just a word and name only. The two descriptions that the Jagat is a manifestation of Brahman and is just a word and a name, make it difficult to comprehend Brahman-Jagat relation. ‘Is Jagat different from Brahman? Or not different? Or something which defies either of these descriptions?’ are the questions which arise. To get definite answers for these questions we must remember the following. All the statements of the Śruti in this connection have to be reconciled without bias. This is because the Śruti is free from delusion, carelessness or deceitfulness as noted already (See 4.6). The law of effect-cause relation of non-difference is the result of this reconciliation. Through this relation does it become clear in what sense Jagat is different from Brahman? In what sense is it non-different? In what sense it defies either of these descriptions? This relation being the cardinal point and the very life breath of Védānta, special effort has been made here to convey its unambiguous significance. Subsequently, the objections that could be raised against this theory have been answered. Further still, Māyā which is the link between कार्य जगत् (world-effect) and its very dissimilar कारण ब्रह्मन् (Brahman-Cause) and the manner of creation-sustenance-dissolution of this Jagat thereof through this Māyā are discussed.

## CHAPTER 5

### OTHER THEORIES

In the previous chapters were discussed the Pramāṇam which generate the cognition. Now we will deal with the topics of Jagat, Brahman and Jīva and their Svarūpa with the help of these Pramāṇas. We will start with the discussion of the Svarūpa of the Jagat.

#### 5.1 An Unperceived Cause of the Jagat exists

Svarūpa means its own Rūpa (form/feature), that Rūpa which is never abandoned by it. We know that Jagat is changing from one form to another. Therefore, the form of the Jagat as determined by direct perception cannot be its Svarūpa. Further it is a universal experience that changes in any particular thing are not brought about without the existence of a basic entity. Therefore, it is easy and natural to infer that some basic entity in the Jagat is appearing in different forms while retaining its own intrinsic nature. What we directly perceive are only the forms, but the basic entity which is the plenum of these forms is not available for Pratyakṣa Pramāṇam. It is determined only by other Pramāṇams. For example, an ice-block melts into water and water becomes steam. Here what we directly perceive are the ice-block, water and steam. Nevertheless there must be a basic object which is assuming these three forms at different times while retaining its inherent nature that is not directly perceptible. The Science of Physics is necessary to determine what that is.

#### 5.2 Three causes

Behind every effect, there are two causes **Upādāna (material)** and **Nimitta (efficient)**. That entity which remains as it is but appears in different forms is called Upādāna Kāraṇa and the different forms are called the Kāryas of this Kāraṇa. That is, the Upādāna Kāraṇa is the swarupa of the Kāryas. For example, bricks, tiles and pots are the Kāryas, their Upādāna Kāraṇa is clay. Though the Kāryas are changing

from one form to another, the clay remains unchanging. Therefore, the clay is the Upādāna Kāraṇa of the Kāryas and it is their Svarūpa. Gold is the उपादान कारण of the ornaments. Therefore gold is the Svarūpa of the ornaments.

The material cause उपादान कारण may not always be able to appear in the form of Kārya by itself; there should be another Kāraṇa to put it up as a Kārya. That is called the Nimitta Kāraṇa of the Kārya. Examples: It is the potmaker who turns the clay in the forms of pot, jug etc. Therefore he is their Nimitta Kāraṇa. The goldsmith is the Nimitta Kāraṇa, the efficient cause, shapes the gold in the form of ornaments.

Besides these two Kāraṇas, Śāstra mentions another Kāraṇa also. That by whose assistance the Nimitta Kāraṇa poses the Upādāna in the form of Kārya is called the Sahakāri Kāraṇa (Auxiliary cause). For example, the wheel and axle used by the potmaker to make pots out of the clay; The hammer and the anvil used by the goldsmith to prepare the ornaments.

Nayyāyikās call the Upādāna Kāraṇa by a different name— Samavāyi Kāraṇa. According to them, the Kārya is non-existent before its creation and after its dissolution. With creation, the Kārya is produced in the Samavāyi Kāraṇa through a connection called Samavāyi (inherence) and is also destroyed during dissolution. Védānta does not accept this. What it accepts is Tādātmya Sambandha (relation of identity) between Kārya and Kāraṇa. Its meaning becomes clear in section 6.5.

Further, in order to determine the Svarūpa of the Jagat, its Upādāna Kāraṇa is to be determined and so also its Nimitta Kāraṇa. Before coming to know the Védānta Siddhānta about this, we will sketch briefly what the other theories say in this context and also refute them by their own logic.

### 5.3 Buddhists' view

There is one group among the Buddhists called Śūnyavādin (Nihilists). Their contention is that the Jagat never exists; there is only

शून्य (the void). Therefore there is no point in discussing its Nimitta or Upādāna Kāraṇa. Nobody accepts this contention and therefore we will not discuss it. But there is another group among them called Vijñānavādin (upholders of the theory of phenomena of consciousness) who argue as follows: “We imagine that there is an external Jagat due to our own beginningless Samskāra—impressions acquired from past lives. Really Jagat doesn’t exist at all.” How can you say that there is no external world at all when it is being experienced through the senses? “It is true it is being experienced. Nevertheless it is not possible to assert on this ground that an external world exists. In our dreams, where we know an external Jagat doesn’t exist, don’t we experience it as if it is there? Therefore, there is no point in discussing the cause of a non-existent Jagat.”

This is wrong. It is impossible to deny the existence of the Jagat which is being experienced. It is obvious even in their own argument, when they say ‘though an external Jagat doesn’t exist in dreams, it is experienced as if it is there’. Does it not already imply existence of the external Jagat experienced in the wakeful state on their part? Not only that, everyone also performs actions in accordance with the knowledge of external objects; one goes in search of food outside to pacify internal hunger. Besides that, when you know that food is not available in a place, you don’t go either. And it is also fallacious to deny the external Jagat on the basis of the analogy between the external world and the dream world. There are mighty differences between them notwithstanding the similarities. When a person says I saw a friend in the dream and now I desire to see him directly, he would certainly know the difference between the friend outside and the memory experienced in the dream. Therefore external world exists and its cause must be known (Sū.Bh.2.2.28-29).

#### 5.4 Mīmāṃsaka’s Logic

In the foregoing section the logic of the Nāstikas with regard to the cause of the Jagat has been presented and refuted. Next we consider the logic of the Mīmāṃsakas who are followers of the Vēda, unlike the

Nāstikas. Their contention is that “It is not correct to say that the world is created. It has been existing since infinite past. Therefore the question of its cause does not arise at all.” But this is not correct. We will demonstrate it on the basis of the Véda which is a valid Pramāṇa for the Mīmāṃsakas. The Véda tells very clearly that the world has been created and that it has an unperceivable cause. ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ previously this was all Sat only without a second’ (Ch.Bh. 6.2.1), ‘आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्’ this was previously Ātman only’ (Ai. 1.1.1), etc.

Not only that. It undergoes the cycle of Sṛṣṭi, Sthiti and Laya. While speaking about creation, it states अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि entering into this JīvĀtman I will carve out the Nāma Rūpas (Ch.Bh.6.3.2). Notice that JīvĀtman here is referred to as ‘this JīvĀtman.’ Obviously this JīvĀtman should have existed even before the carving out of the world. A forthcoming Jīva cannot be referred to as ‘this JīvĀtman.’ Now, Jīva’s pre-existence obviously implies that the world must have existed before the present creation. The world also undergoes dissolution after some time. ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते | येन जातानि जीवन्ति | यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति – Brahman is that from which all these things emanate and live for sometime and afterwards merge into’ (Tai.3.1.3). ‘It is like the spider producing the cobweb and absorbing it back into itself — यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च’ (Mu. 1.1.7) In fact the Ṛgvéda Samhitā states unambiguously: ‘सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् दिवं च पृथिवीं चान्तरिक्षमथो स्वः’ Īśvara created Sūrya (the Sun), Candra (the Moon), Dyulōka (Astral world), the Pṛthivī (Earth), Antarikṣa (Ether space) and the Svarga (heavenly worlds) as they were there previously (Ṛgvéda Samhitā. 10.190.3). These prove that the Jagat has creation and dissolution (Sū.Bh. 2.1.36).

Present day science has also considered a similar view. After a long discussion, the scientists have given up the idea that the world has been existing as such since the infinite past. The birth of new stars has been noticed and they move very fast in space and their dissolution is also observed. Bhagavān Śaṅkara refers precisely to this in his

commentary on the Bhagavadgīta ‘लोकत्रयं प्रव्यथितं भीतं प्रचलितं’ the three worlds are scared, they are scattering away (G. 11.20). The Purāṇas also describe this phenomenon. Of course, science currently is not aware of the Védic assertion about the cycle of creation and the destruction of the universe as a whole. But some scientists have started pursuing this idea also. However, what has already been concluded by science about the creation of the universe, is sufficient to deny its perennial existence.

## 5.5 Vaiśeṣikas’s Theory

From now on we will take up for discussion the theses of others who agree that the world undergoes creation— dissolution cycle. Vaiśeṣikas are our ancient scientists. Their theory, very much resembling modern science is as follows: The gross observed world is constituted of four elements which have parts. These elements are the gross Pṛthvī with the four qualities of Gandha (smell), Rasa (taste), Rūpa (colour) and Sparśa (touch); subtle Jala (water) with the qualities of Rasa, Rūpa and Sparśa; the subtler Tējas (light) with the qualities of Rūpa and Sparśa; the subtlest Vāyu (air) with a single quality of Sparśa. At the time of dissolution the parts go on separating till that stage when they have no more size that is, they become dimensionless particles. These are called Aṇus, the atoms. In other words, these atoms are the ultimate cause of the universe that is, the inherent nature of the Jagat. Just like these elements, the atoms also have got the comparative differences in their subtlety as in the gross universe, namely gross, subtle, subtler and the subtlest with 4,3,2 and 1 gunas respectively. During creation they once again assemble together to produce the gross world. These atoms, which they call Parāmāṇus, are eternal.

This theory is not correct for many reasons. The conceived process of creation or of dissolution or their conception of the conjunction of the atoms together or even the properties of the atoms are all irreconcilable.

i) Creation of the world is not possible because the atoms cannot conjoin with each other by themselves since they are all inert. To

overcome this objection to their theory, the Vaiśeṣikas infer an Ātman as existing even before creation. He is a Kartā (doer) and a Bhóktā (enjoyer). He is the Nimitta for the atoms to come together. But this is not reasonable because, in order to juxtapose these atoms, this Ātman must already have a body and a mind. But the body and the mind themselves have to come into existence through a conglomeration of atoms. Therefore, he cannot have a body, mind etc., before creation. Therefore, obviously he cannot put forth any effort to effect the process of conjunction.

ii) Even the process of dissolution is not logical. Granting that 'somehow' this Ātman has acquired the body and the mind, he could perform dissolution. But he would not, because the world is created precisely for his own needs. It would be unreasonable to say that what has been created for himself, by himself, is also destroyed by himself.

iii) Even the process of the combination of the atoms is faulty for the following reasons: the combination of the atoms can either be total or partial. It cannot be in any other way. If it is total, then the two dimensionless atoms will merge and produce only another dimensionless atom. Therefore, atoms combining in this way can never give rise to three dimensional objects. To avoid this objection if it is said that the combination is partial, then it will imply that the atoms have parts. But this would go against their own assertion that the atoms are partless/dimensionless.

iv) Their statement that the four atoms have comparative subtlety and that they are eternal are mutually contradictory. Experience tells us that objects with qualities of touch etc., are only effects and not ultimate causes. For example, a cloth with properties of touch, and so on is an effect of threads and the threads with these properties are effects of cotton fibres. On this basis we will have to infer that the atoms with these qualities could only be effects, but not ultimate causes. If they are only effects they are obviously not eternal because all effects are transient compared to their causes. For example, the cloth is more

transient than the thread; the thread is more transient than the cotton fibre (Sū.Bh. 2.2.12-17)

The above is only an extremely brief summary of the discussion in the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya. After rejecting the theory, Bhagavān Śāṅkara comments at the end: ‘This atomic theory is based on insipid logic, not in accordance with Śruti and not accepted by stalwarts like Manu. Therefore, wise people should discard it.’ Some modern people who are not able to understand the nuances in the foregoing criticism, have commented that Śāṅkara’s attack on the atomic theory weakened the growth of scientific thought in the country. But Śāṅkara has not discarded the atoms. He makes mention of them very clearly in many places. He has only denied the claim that their atoms are the primordial cause of the universe and shown that the features of the atoms propounded by them are contradictory. On the other hand, it is our belief that had the scientists taken guidance from Śāṅkara’s criticism of the Vaiśeṣika theory, many of the modern scientific thoughts could have been anticipated earlier.

## 5.6 Naiyyāyika’s Theory:

Naiyyāyikas are our ancient logicians. They are otherwise known as Tārīkikas. They, the Yōgis and often others too of course, accept Īśvara. But this concept of Īśvara is based on inference and not according to Vēda. All these Dārśanikas or philosophers accept the Sāṅkhya system partially and propound the following theory: There are three categories in the universe—Purūṣa, Īśvara and Prakṛti. That they are mutually independent and infinite. The particular difference is that Prakṛti is inert and Īśvara is Omniscient (Sarvajña). Further the Purūṣas are Bhoktas (enjoyers).

This Prakṛti is the Upādāna of the Jagat and Īśvara is the Nimitta. Though the logicians depend totally on inference, they quote the Vēdas whenever they have to argue with the Vaidikas. They do not take the Vēdas as an independent Pramāṇa. Now their thesis will be refuted by their own logic in the spirit of the Uṣṭra Laguḍa Nyāya that

is, when the camel carrying sticks of firewood on its back just sits down and refuses to move, its master pulls out one stick from its own load, beats it and make it get up and move ahead.

Prakṛti cannot assume the form of the world by itself because it is nonsentient. It is only when Īśvara takes it under his control that this can happen. But in that case, the independence of the Prakṛti will be lost. Further, their statements such as (a) the Purūṣa, the Prakṛti and Īśvara are mutually different and independent and infinite, (b) that Īśvara is Sarvajña, do not also match. The reason is the following: Creation is possible only after determining the extent of the available Prakṛti and also how many Purūṣas require the creation. Therefore, Īśvara will have to determine the number of Purūṣas and also the extent of the Prakṛti. If he cannot determine them, he cannot be Sarvajña. Suppose he can, other contradictions will crop up: this determination implies that the Prakṛti and Purūṣas are finite. This contradicts their being infinite. Further, when all the finite number of Purūṣas get Mukti in due course, the creation becomes unnecessary. Consequently Īśvara will have to stop creation. Then his Sarvajñatva itself stands refuted because, it is inferred only from the complexity of the creation. None of their assertions is satisfactory. (Sū.Bh.2.2.39-41)

## 5.7 Sāṅkhya Thesis

The Sāṅkhya philosophy in the Bhagavad Gītā is entirely Védānta. But the Sāṅkhya thesis under discussion at present is different. This is propounded by Śrī Kapila. This Sāṅkhya theory is considered the best among the dialectic systems. The Sāṅkhya dialectic outwardly appears very similar to the Védānta. Therefore, ordinary people will not be able to understand the difference. That is why Śankara refutes them with special attention in the spirit of the maxim प्रधान मल्ल निबर्हण न्याय — ‘vanquishing the main opponent’. One who has won all the wrestlers in the tournament is the Pradhāna Malla. Defeating him would amount to defeating all the others. Sāṅkhya refutation is widely spread over the

Śāṅkara Bhāṣya. What follows is only a brief sketch of the relevant portion.

The Sāṅkhyas also depend only on inference and not on the Vēda. But when arguing with the Vēdāntins they quote Vēdic statements either twisting them a little or out of context. Their thesis is as follows: It is a matter of direct perception that the world contains only two categories—Jaḍa and Cētana. It is also observed that Cētana does not cause Jaḍa nor Jaḍa cause Cētana. Therefore the Upādāna of the Jaḍa Jagat should be Jaḍa only. Further, since the Jagat is intertwined with Satva, Rajas and Tamas, its Upādāna should also be such. They call this Upādāna, Pradhāna (Prakṛti). The other category is the Cētana Purūṣa (Jīva). He is only Sākṣi-witness, actionless (निष्क्रिय), qualityless (निर्गुण), unattached (असङ्ग) and devoid of initiative (प्रवृत्ति). Pradhāna by its own nature takes the form of the Jagat to satisfy the needs of the Purūṣas. When the three Guṇas—Satva, Rajas and Tamas of the Pradhāna—undergo changes, creation occurs and when they attain equilibrium dissolution occurs. In this way there is no Īśvara in the Sāṅkhya thesis.

Let us now see how this thesis is not satisfactory.

i) If the Pradhāna is inert it cannot change into Jagat all by itself.

“Why not? Don’t we see water flowing by itself?” One may ask.

No. Flowing is not the inherent nature of water. It requires a slope for it to flow. That is the reason why people construct sloping canals to carry water from place to place. Nowadays it is made to flow even upwards by the use of motors. This means that the initiative for the flow of water is coming from somewhere else; it can come only from the Cētana. **Where there is initiative, there is no Jaḍatva (inertia), and where there is Jaḍatva, there is no initiative.**

“In that case let the initiative come from the Cētana Purūṣa for the Pradhāna to transform into the Jagat”. But the Sāṅkhyas have already said that the Purūṣa is devoid of Pravṛtti. So he cannot provide the initiative.

ii) Further they are to be asked for what purpose should the Pradhāna transform into the Jagat? If it is said for the sake of the enjoyment (Bhóga) of the Purūṣa, that is not possible because the Purūṣa is Asañga (unattached). So there is no question of Bhóga for him.

“In that case, let the purpose be to facilitate the Purūṣa to attain Mókṣa in due course.”

There is no question of Mókṣa for the Purūṣa because he is already Asañga.

There are many such inconsistencies in the Sāṅkhya thesis.

## 5.8 Modern Arguments

Many intelligent people who are influenced by modern science nowadays believe, like the Sāṅkhyas, that the cause of the Jaḍa Jagat should also be Jaḍa. There is only one difference: The examples given by the Sāṅkhyas like the flow of water are merely replaced by examples from modern science. They say that there is a continuous motion of molecules in gases or radioactive elements split spontaneously without the intervention of any Cétana. Suppose this is true; then the gas molecules will have to be moving perpetually if that is their intrinsic nature. But we know that when the temperature in the gas reduces, the motion is also reduced. This shows that their motion is controlled by the temperature. Further, the temperature is controlled by the Cétana Purūṣa. So, eventually, their motion depends on the Cétana and is not their inherent nature.

“But nobody can fully stop their motion. When the temperature has attained a certain minimum value they continue to move, though with much less vigor. Can't we say that at least that motion is the intrinsic nature of the molecules?”

The above argument does not hold water. If the Purūṣa is controlling it upto that extent, there must be another Cétana who must be responsible for its weak motion. Similar arguments apply to the other examples of the splitting of radioactive materials also.

Science defines the Jaḍa object as one which cannot move by itself or if it is already in motion, it cannot change either its speed or its direction of motion by itself; and that its state can change only under the application of an external force. Further, this force also does not choose its point of application or its direction and magnitude. Therefore, to say that the inert molecules move by their own intrinsic nature is to contradict the definition provided by themselves. Therefore, it is impossible to deny the initiative of a Cétana behind the activities of an inert object by even the best scientists.

## 5.9 The Role of Logic in this discussion

After demonstrating the faults of the various theories in connection with Upādāna Kāraṇa of the Jagat, we have to propound the Védānta conclusion. The important thing to be noticed in this connection is the following. Though the Jagat is Pratyakṣa, its cause (Kāraṇa) is not. Therefore Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa cannot be of help in its determination. The ultimate cause has not left any traces of itself in the Jagat. Therefore, inference (Anumāna) and presumption (Arthāpatti) also cannot determine them. Further the ultimate cause being only one, it does not have analogies—just as the sky or the ocean do not. None of the above Pramāṇas can determine it, but only Śruti can. Just as Dharma and Adharma are determined on the basis of Śruti only, the ultimate cause of the universe is also determinable only on the same basis (Sū.Bh. 2.1.6) The Vēda itself exclaims को अद्वा वेद क इह प्रवोचत् इयं विसृष्टिर्यत आवभूव — who knows it well? Who can tell it here? From where this mysterious creation has come into being? (R̥gvēda Saṁhitā 10.129.6-7) to give us an idea of the complexity of this issue. Śruti also warns that नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया Its knowledge cannot be obtained through logic (Ka. 1.2.9).

## 5.10 The Limitations of Logic

For that matter, logic can never analyse completely any complicated system. The reason is as follows: Such an analysis needs the information of all its parts. This is so huge that it is impossible for anyone to have it on hand. Therefore, people generally take into account only some information and propose a logic for its analysis. It is true that it will lead to some clarity about the system. But soon new information from other parts comes to their notice and their own logic creates some new problems also. In order to analyse these things further, we are forced to either refine our logic or extend it or do both. Once again the problem may become more knotty. Nonetheless, with this process of refining and extending the logic becomes unavoidable making the situation increasingly complicated. In this way the final solution can never be found. It is the biggest lacuna inherent in logic [as pointed by the Sūtrakāra and explained by the Bhāṣyakāra (Sū.Bh.2.1.11)].

The matter can be made amply clear if we look into the development of modern science which is based on inference. A few centuries ago the atomic theory was first propounded to explain the features of the various objects around us. It is true that it was successful to a large extent. But soon the logic of the atomic theory itself gave rise to new questions and, besides, new problems cropped up independently due to new information. Solutions to them demanded improvisation of the previous logic of that time and extending it too from the atoms to their nuclei. Of course, some problems were resolved leading to greater clarity. However, the problems became more and more complicated and a complete solution to them is still eluding science. In this way the inherent feature of logic is that it is either inconsistent or incomplete, or both, at every stage of its development.

## 5.11 The complete Logic

Therefore, the big question is, when does logic come to an end? We can get an answer to this big question when we analyse the reasons for its limitations. Notice that whether Pratyakṣa or Anumāna or

Arthāpatti or Upamāna—all these Pramāṇas are based on plurality. In every Pramāṇa there is obviously the triad (Tripuṭi) of the knower, the knowledge and the knowable. The things to be known in particular are countless. No knower can comprehend all the knowables exhaustively at any one time. He can observe only as many as affordable. Hence the above mentioned limitation is there in every stage of logic. This implies that only he who can observe all the knowables at once can possibly give the final answer. Who can do this apart from the omniscient Parāmātman? ‘न हि ईदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादि लक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञात् अन्यतः संभवोऽस्ति’ – None other than the omniscient be the source of the complex Śāstra of Rigvéda, etc. (Sū.Bh.1.1.3). Therefore, we Vaidikas rely totally on the supremacy of the Śruti that has originated from Parāmātma as the most authentic Pramāṇa (see 4.6 for the divine origin of the Véda).

The above comments about the validity of the Véda are related to the transactional world coming under Tripuṭi. But its greatness goes even beyond. That is, it tells about even things which do not come under the Tripuṭi. The first four Pramāṇas cannot reach them at all. Therefore, there is no other way except to rely on the Védas with regard to these matters. ‘Can there be matters not coming under the Tripuṭi?’ Certainly there are. We can know them by reflecting on our own experience. If one is asked “Who are you?” He will easily introduce himself as the son of so and so, basing on his identification with the body. Suppose he is asked “Who were you in your dream yesterday?” he would be confused.

Nevertheless he might say “I was flying in the air” and or whatever, on the basis of the mental activity during that time. Next suppose he is asked “Who were you in your deep sleep yesterday?” Who ever can say anything? He has no doubt about his existence at that time. However, he cannot describe how he was. He cannot use any logic either to know it because deep sleep is a state beyond Tripuṭi, a state which transcends the mind. In other words his own intrinsic nature at that time is not accessible to logic. How then can the primordial cause of the world—from where even mind emanates—be available for logic?

Thus, the deep and mysterious Brahman is inaccessible to logic; it is to be understood only through the Śruti – ‘श्रुत्यवगाह्यमेव इदमतिगंभीरम् ब्रह्म, न तर्कवगाह्यम्’ (Sū.Bh.2.1.31). However, this does not mean that one must silently accept the Védic statements about the primordial cause of the world without any argument. In fact the Śruti itself tells us that it is to be listened to and then cogitated about ‘श्रोतव्यः मन्तव्यः’ (Br.Bh.4.5.6).

Therefore, we have to use logic for this discussion. But a person who spontaneously identifies himself with the body will naturally have more faith in his own intelligence than in the Védas. Therefore, he is bound to base the discussion on his own logic. Keeping such persons in view the compassionate Sūtrakāra and Bhāṣyakāra have indeed used such logic too to the extent it is possible. Encouraged by this if somebody thinks that he can prove the ultimate cause of the universe with his own logic, he is only day-dreaming. So, one should not indulge in dry logic (Sū.Bh.2.1.6).

“When it has just now been demonstrated that the human logic has no finality, why should one adopt it at all?”

No; we adopt it only to give up wrong logic and take to the correct one. If one’s ancestors were foolish there is no reason for him also to be foolish — न हि पूर्वजो मूढ आसीदिति आत्मनापि मूढेन भवितव्यमिति किञ्चिदस्ति प्रमाणम् | (Sū.Bh. 2.1.11) But it must be remembered that logic should always proceed according to the Śruti and not contradict it. Even after having explained so much, one should not feel as if his freedom to argue has been snatched away by the Védas. Anyhow the Védic conclusions definitely culminate in self experience. Therefore, if we rein in our excessive passion for logic for some time and study and practice the Védic thesis in the light of its own logic, we ourselves can ultimately realize its completeness.

## CHAPTER 6

### The Védic Theory

We have seen in the previous chapters that there must be an imperceivable cause for the world. That cause is Brahman. जन्माध्यस्य यतः — It is that through which the creation and the cycle of dissolution of the Jagat happens (Sū.Bh. 1.1.2). This is the definition of Brahman. We have also defined (see 5.2) the two causes—the Nimitta and the Upādāna. In this chapter we shall demonstrate that the primordial cause of the universe is at once the Nimitta and also the Upādāna in accordance with the Śruti.

#### 6.1 Brahman is the Nimitta of the Jagat

We have already seen in section 5.7 that for any effect to occur the initiative is invariably from a Cétana. The initiative for making the pot is found only in the potter, the initiative for making an ornament is found only in the goldsmith. Similarly, the initiative for the creation of the Jagat has to be found only in a Cétana. That Cétana in which it is found is the Nimitta Kāraṇa of the Jagat and that is Brahman. Prior to the creation there was only the Brahman and nothing else. ‘Before creation’ here means ‘before the creation in each Kalpa’ (a period of 432 million years of mortals) because the creation does not take place only once. The world undergoes the cycles of creation and dissolution धाता यथा पूर्वमकल्पयत् – Dhātā (creator) created the world as before (R̥gvéda Saṁhitā 10.190.3) says the Vēda. This Brahman सोऽकामयत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति – desired to be born as many (Tai.2.6.4). “Brahman has nothing to gain from anything at any time. So, why should it take the initiative for creation?” It created the world for the sake of the Jīvas (embodied souls). All the Upaniṣads say that the creation was according to Īśvara’s desire. For whose sake is this desire? For the sake of the Jīvas who need the world according to their Karma —

‘सर्ववेदान्तेषु च ईश्वरहेतुका एव सृष्टयो व्यपदिश्यन्ते | तदेव च ईश्वरस्य फलहेतुत्वं यत् स्वकर्मानुरुपाः प्रजाः सृजतीति’ (Sū.Bh 3.2.41). They would have done diverse Karmas during the previous Kalpa and merged in Brahman during its dissolution along with the seeds of their Karma. In order to experience the fruits of that Karma, Brahman has to create this Jagat in this Kalpa. It is something like the father getting a doll to pacify. Similarly, Brahman got motivated to do this creation. Then स ईक्षां चक्रे चक्रे - he thought and looked (Pr.6.3); सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरः | नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन् यदास्ते | He created all forms, named them and He is calling them by their names (Tai.Āraṇyaka 3.12.7). स ईक्षत लोकान्सृजा इति - He thought of creating the worlds and saw (Ai. 1.1.1). What did He see when he was alone? He saw the Karmas of the forthcoming Jīvas. It is just like an architect seeing mentally the forthcoming construction. As Brahman thought and planned the creation in this way, It is the Nimitta Kāraṇa of the Jagat.

## 6.2 Brahman is the Upādāna Kāraṇa of the Jagat

We have understood Brahman as the Nimitta of the Jagat. However, this does not help us in understanding the intrinsic nature of the Jagat. It is like not understanding the intrinsic nature of an ornament by knowing the goldsmith; it is because the goldsmith is different from the ornament. The intrinsic nature of the ornament is known only when the gold is known. Similarly, the intrinsic nature of the world is known only when its Upādāna is known. “What stuff did Brahman use as material to create the Jagat?” is the question. Śruti answers it indirectly and also directly.

Pointing at the world in front of him Śaunaka asks Āngirasa: “कस्मिन्नु भगवो विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवति” — Bhagavān, what is that by knowing which all these are known?” (Mu.1.1.3). Āngirasa answers — ‘यथा पृथिव्यां ओषधयः संभवन्ति .....तथाक्षरात् संभवतीह विश्वम्’ — just as plants emanate from the earth, all these emanate from Brahman (so all this is known by knowing Brahman) (Mu 1.1.7). In another place Āruṇi

asks his son Śvétakétu: ‘तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतम् भवत्यमतं मतम् अविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्?’ — Have you heard that teaching by listening to which all unheard things will be heard, undiscussed things will become discussed and understood things will be understood? (Ch.Bh.6.1.3). Śvétakétu had not heard about such a thing. So the father himself answers the question: ‘यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वम् मृत्तयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ — Somya, just as by understanding one lump of clay all clay articles are understood; effect is a distortion, a name caused only by speech. Only clay is Satya (Chā 6.1.4). After giving this example he says: ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्’— Somya, all this was only the one Brahman without a second (Ch.Bh.6.2.1). Apart from this, the Śruti states it even directly: ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते | येन जातानि जीवन्ति | यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति | तद्विजिज्ञासस्व | तद् ब्रह्मेति’ — comprehend clearly ‘That as Brahman from where all the beings are born, and in which they live and later merge also’ (Tai 3.1.3); सोऽकामयत् बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति — He desired to be born as many — ‘सत्यमभवत् | यदिदं किञ्च ’(Tai 2.6.4); Whatever is here, He became all these (Tai 2.6.6); ब्रह्मैवेदं पुरस्तात् ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वम् — Everything in front is Brahman, the whole universe is Brahman (Mu.2.2.11), and so on.

Brahman is seen to be the Upādāna of the Jagat through many such Mantras. The purpose of the above conversations is of course to show Brahman. But what is being shown directly is the world. Therefore, the answers are reconciled only when the world is not different from Brahman. This is possible if, and only if, Brahman is the Upādāna of the Jagat. That is why all effects are understood the moment their Upādāna is understood. Since it has already been established that this is also the Nimitta Kāraṇa, it is customary to refer to Brahman as the efficient–cum–material cause अभिन्न निमित्तोपादान कारण of the Jagat.

### 6.3 Upādāna or Antaryamin?

Now there could arise a doubt: Brahman's Upādānatva may not be established from the foregoing teacher-student dialogues. This doubt arises because the Śruti says in another place: तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्रविशत् — After creating the world He entered into it. (Tai.2.6.6) Therefore, Brahman might have used the Prakṛti, which is different from it but under its control, as the Upādāna and It could only be the Nimitta; after creation It has entered into the world and is controlling it from within. Therefore, the above conversations may imply that Brahman is only an internal controller of the world and the world is different from it.

There is no room for this doubt. As the effect is filled only with its Upādāna we can say that Brahman entered into the world, just as we say that gold has entered into the ornament. In other words, the Upādāna can also be described as Antaryāmin. On the other hand if we interpret the above Mantra to mean that Brahman entered into the world different from Itself just like water into a wet cloth, it would contradict many other statements:

a) In the example, water is different from the cloth. But nowhere it is mentioned that Prakṛti existed different from Brahman before the creation. Brahman is actually described as One and only One existing without a second (Ch.Bh.6.2.1).

b) In the very next sentence after stating 'He entered', Taittirīya Śruti states: यदिदं किं च | तत्सर्वमभवत् - all that is here became Brahman only. (Tai.2.6.7). But just as water entering into the cloth does not become the cloth itself, the Brahman cannot become the Jagat just by entering into it.

c) Again, the Taittirīya itself describes the Brahman as limitless: 'सत्यम् ज्ञानम् अनन्तं ब्रह्म' (Tai.2.1.1). If the Jagat is different from Brahman, then it cannot be existing within the Jagat. Such a Brahman cannot be limitless. Not only that; if Brahman is only the Nimitta of the Jagat the Vēda cannot say ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वम् - this Jagat is indeed Brahman only (Mu.2.2.11) just as one cannot say that the ornament is indeed the

goldsmith. Because of several such reasons it cannot be said that Brahman is only Antaryamin and not the Upādāna. It is the Upādāna and, therefore, Antaryamin also.

#### 6.4 Vācārambhaṇa –Nāmadheya

Question: “In section (6.2) above it has been said that if the Upādāna is known then all its effects are automatically known. How is this possible? We have not heard anywhere that by knowing one thing another thing is known.”

Answer: True. If the other thing is different from this one, knowing this will not make the other known. But the effects are not different from the cause. Therefore, if the cause is known, all its effects are automatically known (Ch.Bh.6.1.6). What does it mean to say ‘knowing the effect?’ By just recognizing the form with the help of sense organs, we do not say that the effect is known. Knowing the effect indeed only means knowing its inherent nature that is, its cause. That is why if the cause is understood through one of its effects, all its effects are automatically known. This feature of effect-cause relation is similar to that between Dṛṣṭānta (example) and Dārṣṭānta (that for which the example is given). a) One learns multiplication through some specific multiplication problems. Then all the multiplication problems become automatically known to him. Of course, the problems are countless. However, when a new problem is given to one who knows multiplication, he will not say ‘I don’t know this’. (b) When one understands the cowness through one cow all cows are automatically known to him. In these examples one problem may be 8x3 and another 13x29. Similarly, one cow may be brown and another white that is, problems may differ, but the multiplication is same; the cows may be different, but the cowness remains the same. Therefore, the problems and the cows are described as Vācārambhaṇa — examples supporting the speech necessary to make the multiplication and the cowness known. ‘वाचारंभणम् वागारंभणम् वागालंबनम् इत्येतत्’ (Ch.Bh. 6.1.4). They are only ‘Nāmadheya’ that is, names. There is no purport in themselves if viewed

independently. The purport is in the multiplication and in the cowness. Similarly, all the effects are only Vācārambhaṇa, special shapes and names, to make the cause known. It is only through them we can understand the cause. ‘यदि हि नामरूपे न व्याक्रियेते तदा अस्यात्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिख्यायेत’—If only name and form were not distinguished, then the adjunctless nature of this Prajñānaghana (mass of intelligence) Ātman would not have been known’(Br.Bh.2.5.19). Of course, we reiterate that the effect of forms viewed independently by themselves have no content. The content is only in their cause. ‘वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयम् मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ — The special form is only a name supporting the speech. It is only the clay which is the Truth (Ch.6.1.4).

## 6.5 Cause-Effect Non-difference

From the above discussion the reader will have an inkling of the relationship of the effect with its cause. In this section we will discuss it further because it is the foundation of the Védic theory. ‘सर्वं च नामरूपादि सदात्मनैव सत्यं विकारजातं स्वतस्तु अनृतमेव’

i) If the cause is destroyed, the effect will not exist at all. Example: Thread is the cause and cloth is its effect. If the thread is removed, then the cloth will never exist. Similarly, if the cotton fibre is removed from the thread, the thread will never exist. This shows that the effect is not different from its cause. On the other hand, if the effect is destroyed, the cause continues to exist. Example: The thread continues to exist even if the cloth is no longer there; the cotton fibre continues to exist even if the thread is no longer there. This means that the cause is different from the effect. ‘अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम्’ — Though we speak of the non-difference of the cause and the effect, it only means that the effect is only a form of the cause; but its converse does not apply, that is, the cause is not a form of the effect (Sū.Bh.2.1.9)

ii) Question: In the presence of the effect we can actually see that it is not different from its cause. Ex. the ornament that we see

is not different from the gold. But how to know, that the cause is different from the effect?

Answer: True; it is not really possible to separate the two and verify that the cause is different from the effect. But it can be separated in thought. For example, consider the mirror image of an ornament. This is only a shape, only a name. It is not really an ornament because it is only an image which is independent of gold. That is why an image ornament is termed as an illusion — that is, an appearance while really not existing. Bhāṣyakāra Śankara describes it as: ‘सर्वं च नामरूपादि सदात्मनैव सत्यं विकारजातं स्वतस्तु अनृतमेव’ — All the names and forms are real only with reference to their cause, but independently by themselves, they are unreal’(Ch.Bh.6.3.2).

iii) Cause is different from the effect in another sense also; namely, the effect is available for Vyavahāra (transaction) but not the cause. For example, a pot is created- small or big- it holds water, and is destroyed after some time; but the clay is not created, not small or big, does not hold water and it is not destroyed. Also, indeed pot would not be available for Vyavahāra if it were independent of clay. This mysterious relationship between the cause and its effect is conveyed through two phrases as the cause-effect non difference. Remember this pair of sentences.

**6.5a The effect is not different from the cause;  
But the cause is different from the effect.**

When the above pair is applied to the case of Brahman as the cause and the Jagat as its effect, it reads as

**6.5b Jagat is not different from Brahman;  
But Brahman is different from the Jagat.**

In other words: ब्रह्म स्वभावो हि प्रपञ्च स्वभावं ब्रह्म - The world is of the nature of Brahman; but Brahman is not of the nature of the world (Sū.Bh.3.2.21). These pairs of sentences are extremely important for the

Védic thesis. Therefore, one should ponder over them to arrive at a clear understanding.

iv) “Before the appearance of the effect and after its disappearance only the cause remains. Therefore it is obvious that the cause is different from the effect. But during the time of dissolution, how to understand whether or not the effect is different from the cause?”

For this, the answer is that there is non-difference between them even then. But before proving it, we have to first ascertain whether or not the effect exists at all when it is not seen. This is done as follows: When the effect is manifest, it obviously exists because we are perceiving it. Therefore, it should have been present even before, because nothing can come into existence that did not exist earlier. Similarly, even when it is not perceived during dissolution it cannot be non-existent because, nothing which exists can cease to exist.

“Where does the effect exist before its appearance and after its disappearance?” It exists as one with its cause.

“Then does it mean that it is not one with the cause while we are perceiving it?” No. Even now it is one with the cause. But now it **appears** as if it is different. Therefore, when we say that ‘the effect is produced’ we mean that it **appears** as if it is different from the cause; when we say ‘the effect is lost’ we mean that the effect which was **as if** different from its cause became one with the cause. The Bhāṣya tells about the Jagat as follows: ‘प्रागुत्पत्तेः अव्याकृतनामरूपभेदम् आत्मभूतम् आत्मैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरं जगत् इदानीं व्याकृत नामरूपभेदत्वात् अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरम् आत्मैकशब्दप्रत्यय गोचरं च’ — Before its creation when the forms and names were not yet distinguished, the Jagat was available only for one expression and understanding, namely Ātman. Now, at the time of sustenance after the forms and names are carved out, it is at once available not only for several expressions and understandings, but also for the single expression and understanding, namely Ātman (Ai.Bh.1.1.1) ‘सत एव इदं शब्दबुद्धि विषयतया अवस्थानात्.....अवतिष्ठते —

Brahman(Sat) itself becomes available for expressions and understandings such as ‘this’(Ch.Bh. 6.2.2). ‘यथैव हि इदानीमपि इदं कार्यं कारणात्मना सत् एवं प्रागुत्पत्तेरपि इति गम्यते | न हि इदानीमपि इदं कार्यं कारणात्मानम् अन्तरेण स्वतन्त्रमेव अस्ति’ — just as the effect is real as a form of its cause, similarly it is real before its creation also. Even now, the effect is not different from its cause, it is not independent. (Sū.Bh. 2.1.7)


Therefore, just as the cause is ever existing in the past in the present and in the future, the effect is also ever existing—existing non-differently from its cause. Similar is the relation between the Jagat and the Brahman. ‘यथा च कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति एवं कार्यमपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति’ — just as the cause Brahman exists in the three times, so also the Jagat exists in the three times (Sū.Bh. 2.16). ‘कार्यकारोऽपि कारणस्य आत्मभूत एव अनात्मभूतस्य अनारभ्यत्वात्’—Even the manifest shape of the effect is of the nature of its cause because that which is not of its innate nature can never come into being. ‘न च विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति | न हि देवदत्तः सङ्कोचितहस्तपादः प्रसारित हस्तपादञ्च विशेषेण दृश्यमानोऽपि वस्त्वन्यत्वं गच्छति’ — The manifest form of the effect is only an attributive model of its cause and is not anything different. An object will not become different just because it appears in a special form. Dévadatta with folded limbs will not be different from himself when he appears with stretched limbs. (Sū.Bh. 2.1.18)

v) We shall again reiterate: Thus the essential nature of the effect is its cause. This cause-effect relation is called Tādātmya Sambandha, that is, non-difference relation. (कार्य कारण संबन्धः) ब्रह्मवादिनः कथम् इति चेत् ? तस्य तादात्म्य लक्षणसंबन्धोपपत्तेः — What is the cause-effect relation for the Brahmavādin (Vedāntin)? It is of the nature of non-difference (Sū.Bh.2.2.38). Therefore, the Brahmavādin who has realized this is not confused when the cause appears as the effect in manifold forms. His understanding of the cause–effect non-difference is not shaken by the perception of special forms not existing in the cause. Therefore, this relationship is called भेद सहिष्णु अभेद — non-difference which is unopposed to and tolerant of the difference.

vi) Question: When it was being demonstrated that the effect is not different from the cause, it was told that the effect is never lost and that it exists in all the three times — in the past, in the present and in the future (6.5.iv). When it was being demonstrated that the cause is different from the effect, it was stated that though the effect is lost, the cause continues to exist (6.5.i). Does it mean that there is one effect which is not lost and another which is lost? Are there two such effects?


Answer: Yes, two. One pot described by the Śruti is never lost; another pot talked about by the logicians is the one that is lost (5.2). ‘The Védic (cited) pot’ which is not different from the clay exists in it in unmanifest form even when it is not seen directly. In this way it is never lost. So, the pot is not different from the clay either when being seen or not seen. Therefore ‘for one who has clearly understood the clay, the word and the idea of the pot, and so on will drop off — ‘मृद्विवेक दर्शनां तु घटादि शब्दबुद्धि निवर्तेते’ (Ch.Bh.6.2.3). Of course this pot is Asatya, that is, of changing nature; that is it becomes manifest and unmanifest. (Satya and Asatya are technical words which will be clearly explained later in 9.4). But the mirror image of the pot which is unconnected with the clay is the logician’s pot which gets destroyed and is born anew in the clay with Samavāya (Inherence) connection (5.2). This is illusory (its meaning is later explained in 9.5.i) because the clay is different from it. Just as the mirror image of the pot is only a word, a form and a name. It is this effect which is later rejected as illusion born out of Avidyā.

vii) Now, we will supply the proof of the statement that the effect mentioned in the latter half of the statement about cause-effect non-difference is non-existent and the one mentioned in the former half is in keeping with what the Śruti says. There can be four alternatives for the effect: It is (1) of the nature of the cause; (2) not of the nature of the cause; (3) it is in its own form; (4) it is not in its own form. Which of this is right and which is not is to be determined. Notice that if one of the possibilities in (1) or (2) and in (3) or (4) is agreed upon  the other is automatically rejected . When the effect is manifest, only



(Fig.6.5.i)

After having fixed this much, it should be noticed that the asymmetry in the two halves of the cause-effect non-difference relation can arise only from the remaining four vacant positions shown in the figure. Fig Distributions of ✓ and ✗ have four possibilities as shown below in Fig.6.5.ii



(Fig.6.5.ii)

In (a) and (b) the possibility (3) has been accepted during dissolution. But this precludes dissolution because effect can not retain its form in that state. Therefore both are unacceptable. Further, in (c) the features of the effect on both the sides are identical. Therefore, this distribution does not conform to the asymmetry in FH and LH of the non-difference relation. So this possibility is also to be discarded. But in (d) dissolution is accounted for and also the asymmetry of the two halves of the non-difference relation. For this reason (d) is the only satisfactory choice among the four. However, even here, the features are the same in dissolution state. How to understand this? It should be noted that, because the choices (1) and (4) are accepted for FH, when it is told according to (4) that ‘the effect is not in its own form’, it is to be interpreted as ‘it is in the form of the cause’ according to the choice (1). This implies that this effect in the FH is what is according to the Śruti. That is why during the existent state it appears as the manifest form of the cause — ‘कार्यकारोऽपि कारणस्य आत्मभूत एव | अनात्मभूतस्य अनारभ्यत्वात्’ (Sū.Bh. 2.1.18). But in the latter half, the choice (4) is accepted and (1) is not accepted. Here a reinterpretation of the effect during the existent state is therefore not possible as done above. That is to say, during the existent state the effect of LH continues to be consistent with (4). This means that, contrary to direct perception, this effect is non-existent as cause during existence and non-existent in any form during dissolution. In this manner, this effect is non-existent throughout, except appearing independently of the cause during the manifest state. This is the logician’s effect. But we know that a non-existent thing cannot come into existence and an existent thing cannot become non-existent — नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः (G.2.16). Therefore, this effect which is independent of its cause is really non-existent. Śaṅkara puts it as follows: ‘कार्यम् आकाशादिकं बहुप्रपञ्चं जगत् कारणं परं ब्रह्म | तस्मात् कारणात् परमार्थतोऽनन्यत्वं व्यतिरेकेण अभावः कार्यस्य अवगम्यते’ — ‘The manifold Jagat of Ākaśa etc. is the effect; Parabrahman is the cause. The effect is invariably non different from its cause. If it is different it is non-existent

(Sū.Bh. 2.1.14). In this way, the existence of a Jagath independent of Brahman is impossible. Nevertheless, Ajnānis—ignorant people—imagine it to be different. That Jagat which is the object of their wrong understanding is called Mithyā — illusory or Avidyākalpita —imagined due to ignorance, etc. by the Bhāsyakāra.

Similarly, Māyā in the non–difference relation of Śakti–Śakta and Jīva in the non–difference relation of Jīva–Brahman are existent realities as non–different from Brahman; but non–existent illusions, if considered independently — ‘सर्वं च नामरूपादि सदात्मनैव सत्यं विकारजातं स्वतस्तु अनृतमेव वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं इत्युक्तत्वात् | तथा हि जीवोऽपीति’ (Ch.Bh.6.3.2). This becomes clearer as we go further.

Question: “Pots and ornaments are clearly seen to be non-different from clay and gold respectively; it is obvious that they do not exist independently. When this is so, what is the necessity of proving with great difficulty that they are non- existent if they are independent?”

Answer: No! The cause-effect non-difference is directly visible only in the examples. But in the case of Jagat and Brahman, only the Jagat is visible and not Brahman. Therefore, it is not possible to ascertain whether the Jagat is causally related to Brahman or something else — सति हि इन्द्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः इदं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं कार्यम् इति गृह्यते | कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह्यमाणं किं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं किमन्येन केनचिद्वा संबद्धम् इति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम् (Sū.Bh.1.1.2). That is why we come across people who go on discussing this issue making all sorts of guesses in the belief that the Jagat is independent of Brahman. But such an independent Jagat is non-existent like the goldless ornament or the clayless pot. In order to clarify this, the example of the mirror image has also been proposed in (6.5.ii)

Question: “It is not the experience of anyone that the effect exists even during dissolution. Therefore, why can’t we say that the effect exists only now and that a special Śakti like Māyā in the cause creates the effect?”

Answer: No! It is not possible. Just because the effect is not seen during dissolution, it cannot be held that it was non-existent at that

time. If it was so, then there is no question of its coming into existence now. This has already been mentioned repeatedly. Even the Śruti rules it out by telling कथमसतः सजायेत – how can a thing which is existent come out of non-existence? (Ch.Bh.6.2.2). No Śakti can either destroy something that is existent or bring into existence something which is non-existent. Therefore, instead of accepting mysterious Śakti in the cause as responsible for the creation of the effect, the responsibility could be directly attributed to the cause itself. However, if such a Śakti is proposed for the convenience of our understanding, we have to say that the effect is non-different from the Śakti and the Śakti is non-different from the cause. Similarly, even if we accept Māyā or Prakṛti as an agent in between the Jagat and Brahman, the Jagat is nondifferent from the Śakti and the Śakti is non different from Brahman. The soul of the Śakti is the cause and the soul of the effect is the Śakti — कारणस्य आत्मभूतशक्तिः शक्तेश्च आत्मभूतं कार्यम् (Sū.Bh.2.1.18); that Śakti is Brahman, that is, Me because Śakti and Śakta are not different — सा शक्तिः ब्रह्मैव अहं शक्तिशक्तिमतोः अनन्यत्वात् (G.Bh 14.27) My Māyā whose soul is Myself — मम स्वरूपभूता मदीया माया (G.Bh 14.3); that Mūlaprakṛti accepted by you is indeed our Brahman — या मूलप्रकृतिः अभ्युपगम्यते तदेव च नो ब्रह्म (Sū.Bh. 2.3.9).

## CHAPTER 7

### BRAHMAN – THE CAUSE

In chapter 5, the theories of various thinkers about the cause of the Jagat were discussed and refuted. In the previous chapter, the Védānta theory that Brahman is the cause of the Jagat was delineated. Now, the objections that are raised against this thesis are discussed and cleared. This will make the Védic theory stay firmly in our minds. It is just like occasionally shaking and hitting a peg to fix it in the ground firmly. This is called Sthūṇā Nikhanana Nyāya.

#### 7.1 Idea to be remembered

‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ — Somya, this was previously Brahman alone, only one without a second’ (Ch.Bh.6.2.1) is the basic Védic statement which establishes the non-difference of the effect from the cause (6.5). Thus, it was concluded that the Jagat is non-different from Brahman. One more idea follows as a corollary to the statement: If there was Brahman alone before the creation, then whatever is present now should be non-different from It. In other words, not only the Jagat is non-different but also the Jīva. This discussion is taken up in full detail later on. But for our present purpose we postulate the Jīva-Brahman non difference as follows;

**(7.1) Jīva is not different from the Brahman; but Brahman is different from Jīva.**

The non-difference relation of Jagat-Brahman and Jīva-Brahman, assures that there is no multiplicity in content, but multiplicity is not independent of content. This provides the basis to clear any objection against the Védic thesis. This is because, in that case, the Védic thesis distinguishes itself from logic which has the fault of multiplicity without content (5.10). It is based on oneness. Now, we shall discuss the objections one by one.

## 7.2 Non difference of Eater(enjoyer)-Eaten(enjoyed)

“The Védic thesis asserts that nothing is different from Brahman. The food that is eaten which belongs to the category of Jagat is Brahman; so too the Jīva who eats it. This implies that the eaten food and the eating Jīva are the same. But the difference between them is a universal experience. Therefore, the Védic thesis that Brahman is the cause of everything is untenable” (Sū.Bh. 2.1.13).

Answer: This objection is not correct. Though both the Jagat and the Jīva are same in their nature, the two are certainly different in their appearances. Further, the transaction of eating is only at the level of appearance and not in the Svarūpa. See an example: The Svarūpa of the hammer is steel and so also the anvil. The hammer and the anvil have therefore the same Svarūpa. However, in appearance they are certainly different. The hammer is not the anvil and the anvil is not the hammer. Therefore, there is no hindrance for transactions between them. Hammer goes on hitting and the anvil is only being hit. Also, notice that there is neither hitting nor being hit in the steel itself. Similarly, the eater Jīva and eaten food are both Brahman in their Svarūpa and are different in their appearance. Therefore, the transaction between them is not hindered by their common Svarūpa.

## 7.3 Unachieved Self Interest

i) “If nothing is different from Brahman, the suffering Jīva is also Brahman. Since Brahman is the creator of the universe, it will follow that it is Jīva’s creation. Then, it would mean that the Jīva is creating the Jagat against his own interest. This is unreasonable. Therefore the Védic thesis is unacceptable” (Sū.Bh.2.1.Adhikaraṇa.7).

Answer: Remember that though the grieving Jīva is **not different from Brahman, but Brahman is certainly different from Jīva**. Though he is Brahman in his Svarūpa, he certainly does not have the same capacity of Brahman. This need not be doubted because there are many supportive examples. According to science both diamond and charcoal are only carbon. Therefore the charcoal is not different from

the diamond in its Svarūpa. However, the diamond is certainly very superior to charcoal. Similarly, Brahman is very superior to Jīva. Creation, sustenance and dissolution are the works of this Brahman which is different from Jīvas. These functions can never be executed by Jīvas. न यथोक्त विशेषणस्य जगतः यथोक्तविशेषणम् ईश्वरं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः ..... संसारिणो वा उत्पत्त्यादि संभावयितुं शक्यम्- It is impossible for the Saṁsāri Jīva to execute the creation etc. of the universe. Except the great Īśvara none else can handle them. (Sū.Bh. 1.1.2) Therefore this objection is not right.

ii) Question: “But the Chāndógya Śruti says ‘सेयं देवतैक्षत हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्त्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति’ — Right. I will enter into these three Dévatas in the form of Jīvātma and carve out the forms of the world—thought the Dévata (Ch. 6.3.2).” This statement seems to indicate that the carving out of the world is the act of Jīva. How to understand this?

Answer: Here ‘In the form of Jīva’ refers only to ‘entering’ and not to ‘carving out the forms of the world’. For this carving out it is necessary to acquire that qualified Jñāna of the world of forms. For that purpose connection with the three Dévatas of Téjas, Ap and Anna is necessary because the qualified Jñāna is possible only in the Jīva. Therefore, Parāmātmā enters into these Dévatas, obtains the required qualified Jñāna and then does the carving. It is impossible for un- Īśvara Jīva (who is not Īśvara) to carve out the world forms of mountains, rivers, oceans, etc. — ‘न च गिरिनदीसमुद्रादिषु नानाविधेषु नामरूप अनीश्वरस्य जीवस्य व्याकरणसामर्थ्यमस्ति’ (Sū.Bh. 2.4.20). Not only that; the creation of the Jagat is not possible even for those exalted souls who may have Aṇimādi (becoming atomic, etc.) Siddhis to their credit. It is exclusively the job of Īśvara — ‘जगदुत्पत्त्यादि व्यापारं वर्जयित्वा अन्यदणिमाध्यात्मिकम् ऐश्वर्यं मुक्तानां भवितुमर्हति | जगद् व्यापारस्तु नित्यसिद्धस्यैवेश्वरस्य’ (Sū.Bh. 4.4.17).

## 7.4 Objection that Brahman has no Sahakāri

“In our experience, the creation of anything by the Cétanās (sentient beings) must have invariably a Sahakāri Kāraṇa that is

accessories. For example, the potmaker uses a wheel and an axle, etc. and the goldsmith, the hammer, anvil etc., in producing the pots and the ornaments respectively. But Brahman does not have any such implements and so it cannot be the cause of creation (Sū.Bh.2.1.Adhikaraṇa.8). (We will know later that Brahman does not possess any accessories)

**Answer:** There is no rule that everyone should have a Sahakāri for every job. The jobs can take place even without them. For example, we need light, the eyes, and the mind as accessories in order to see things. But nocturnal animals need only the eyes and the mind. Indeed, the Yōgis have only the mind as an accessory for seeing things (Br.Bh.1.4.2). Similarly, there are also exceptions in the production of things: to roll out chapatis a novice may need the rolling stick and the board as accessories. But experts do it with their bare hands. The spider creates the web all by itself without any external accessories. Dévatas and the Yōgis etc. are known to have made great creations without any accessories. When such is the case, it is not correct to insist that Brahman should also have some Sahakāri to create the Jagat.

## 7.5 The objection that the Brahman has no limbs

“Though accessories may be unnecessary for some, Brahman should have at least the mind, the body, the Indriyas and limbs as in the examples given above to execute the creation. But Brahman is eyeless, earless, speechless, mindless—‘अचक्षुष्मकम् अश्रोत्रम् अवाक् अमनः’ (Br.Bh.3.8.8). This means that Brahman does not have even a body. So it cannot create the world (Sū Bh. 2.1. Adhikaraṇa.10). (Later on we will see that Brahman actually has no body either)”

**Answer:** Remember that the same Śruti which has stated that Brahman is without a body, also states that It is the cause of the world. Therefore it has to be accepted as such; we cannot accept one statement of the Śruti and reject another. That would be like eating half the hen and retaining the other half to lay eggs. This is called Ardha Kukkuṭiya Nyāya. The Śruti tells that the prowess of omnipotence of Brahman is

exactly that it creates the universe even without auxiliaries. Therefore, putting limitations on Brahman on the analogy of ordinary creatures is not acceptable.

“Then how is it that the Vaiṣeṣika theory of the process of creation was objected by Védānta on the ground that their Ātman did not have a body to execute that job?” (5.5.i).

Answer: Their Ātman is an inferred concept and it was possible to reject it by means of inference. Thus it was rejected. But in the Védānta, Brahman is postulated by the Śruti. Therefore, an objection has to be raised only on the basis of Śruti.

## 7.6 Objection of Purposelessness of creation

“Any Cétana indulges in activity only if there is some benefit; otherwise it does not. Therefore we ask, for what benefit did Brahman create the world? If it is told ‘for its own satisfaction’ it would imply that without the world, that is, before the creation, It would be dissatisfied. This goes against the Védic contention that Brahman is Āptakāma that is Self- satisfied. Suppose it is told ‘it has acted without any reason’, it would mean that Brahman is crazy, because only a mad person will act without any purpose. This would go against Brahman being Sarvajña. So, in either way, Brahman cannot be the cause of creation (Sū Bh.2.1 Adhikaraṇa.11).

Answer: No. During the dissolution of the previous Kalpa the Jīvas would have merged in Brahman along with their Karma. Brahman has to create the world and give them appropriate bodies to experience the fruits of their Karma. ‘Being subservient to Brahman, the Prakṛti with three Guṇas transforms into the objects and the Indriyas and assembles in the form of the bodies for the Bhóga and the Mókṣa of the Jīvas — ‘प्रकृतिश्च त्रिगुणात्मिका सर्वकार्यकरणविषयाकारेण परिणता पुरुषस्य भोगापवर्गार्थकर्तव्यतया देहेन्द्रियाध्याकारेण संहन्यते’ (G.13 Sambandha Bhāṣya). Self-satisfied Brahman does not gain anything by creation. Sṛṣṭi, clearly is not without a purpose. Thus, Brahman’s creation cannot be a crazy act either.

## 7.7 Is the Brahman biased and cruel?

“There is much inequality in the world. Some Jīvas are extremely happy. Some others are in extreme grief. Many human beings experience a mixture of both. This implies that Brahman has prejudice. Besides, during dissolution all the animals experience intense pain. This shows that Brahman has not only bias but also cruelty. This does not match with the description of Brahman given in Śruti. So, Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe (Sū.Bh. 2.1.Adhikaraṇa 12).

Answer: The differences in the degrees of happiness of the Jīvas are not due to Brahman. They are in conformity with the Karma of the Jīvas. So, this cannot be deemed as a fault of Brahman. In all the Védāntas the creation has been described as ‘Īśvara hētuka – Īśvara is hētu’ meaning that He creates the Jīvas only in accordance with their own Karma – सर्ववेदान्तेषु च ईश्वरहेतुका एव सृष्टयो व्यपदिश्यन्ते | तदेव च ईश्वरस्य फलहेतुत्वं यत् स्वकर्मानुरूपाः प्रजाः सृजतीति (Sū Bh. 3.2.41). Why does the unbiased, self-satisfied Parāmésvara make asymmetric creation? He does it only for the sake of Jīvas. ‘Īśvara’s asymmetric creation is only relative. Relative to what? It is relative to the Dharma and Adharma of the Jīvas that the creation is asymmetric. Therefore it is not a fault on the part of Īśvara – ‘सापेक्षो हि ईश्वरः विषमां सृष्टिं निर्ममीते | किमपेक्षते इति चेत् ? धर्माधर्मौ अपेक्षते इति वदामः | अतः सृज्यमानप्राणिधर्माधर्मापेक्षा विषमा सृष्टिः इति नायम् ईश्वरस्य अपराधः’ (Sū.Bh 2.1.34). Would it not be wrong to give the same remuneration to all the employees of a company instead of giving it according to the work performed by them? Next about the objection ‘cruelty’: The dissolution occurs only according to the Samaṣṭi Karma. Therefore, the charge of cruelty on the part of Īśvara also does not stand. ‘But prior to the first creation there is neither Dharma nor Adharma. Then why was there asymmetry even in the first creation?’ Dharma and Adharma are beginningless, so also the creations. There is nothing like a first creation.

## 7.8 Objection regarding distinctiveness

There are two parts in this objection:

i) “When the effect is destroyed it is told that it merges in its Upādāna. Therefore, during dissolution all the distinctions of the world will merge in Brahman. Then obviously its Svarūpa will be polluted. But Brahman is said to be ever pure. So It cannot be the Upādāna of the Jagat” (Sū.Bh.2.1.9)

Answer: When the ornaments merge in the gold, we know that their distinctions do not spoil the gold. The four types of bodies namely the bigger animals, birds, plants and creatures taking birth in sweat – are all dying and merging in the Pṛthvī which is their cause, since immemorial times. But the earth has not got spoiled. Similarly, when any effect merges in its Upādāna it is not spoiled. For that matter the gold does not get spoiled by the distinctive features of the ornaments even when they are present. How can they spoil the gold when they are absent? They cannot. One may say about the ring is big, is small, is produced, is broken, or whatever, but not of the gold. Indeed, this is the special feature of the Upādāna Kāraṇa. This shows that the distinctions of the Jagat cannot pollute Brahman when Jagat dissolves in it.

ii) “Since Brahman is Cétana, it is not difficult to agree that it is the Nimitta Kāraṇa (Efficient cause) of the Jagat. But it is difficult to accept that the Cétana Brahman is the Upādāna for the inert Jagat. How can a Cétana give rise to the inert Jagat which is opposite to its own nature? The effect cannot have features opposed to the cause. The features of the cause must be brought with it. ‘कारणगुणपूर्वकः कार्यगुणो सृष्टः’ (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 2.1.24). But the Jagat does not have any feature of Brahman. Therefore Brahman cannot be its Upādāna.” (Sū.Bh.2.1.Adhikaraṇa 3)

Answer: This objection is divided into three parts by Bhāṣyakāra for the convenience of discussion:

a) ‘To object that all the features of Brahman have not followed in the Jagat.’

- b) 'To object that even a single feature of Brahman has not followed in the Jagat.'
- c) 'To object that in particular the Caitanya feature of Brahman has not followed in the Jagat.'

Refutation of each of these objections is as follows:

a) If all the features of the cause follow in the effect, then there would be no distinction at all between the cause and the effect. It means that even the appearance of the effect has not occurred. Therefore, it is wrong to expect that all the features of the cause should follow the effect. Similarly, if all the features of Brahman follow in the Jagat, there would not be any distinction between the two. This implies that Jagat is not even created. Therefore this objection is untenable.

b) The expectation that at least one feature of Brahman should follow in the Jagat is reasonable. If not even one feature follows, then causeness cannot be established. Consider the example: Juice (Pānaka) is a sweet soft drink. Water and sugar are its Upādāna. But we cannot notice the features of sound, touch and colour of the sugar grains in the soft drink. Therefore we cannot know whether sugar is its Upādāna or not. But when we recognize its taste, the causeness of the sugar is known. Similarly, it is necessary that atleast one feature of Brahman should follow in the Jagat. So the question is which feature has followed. The answer is obtained as follows: Brahman **is** of an unchanging form, the Jagat **is** of a changing form. The Brahman **is** Cétana, the Jagat **is** Jaḍa (inert) etc. From this it follows that the **is-ness** of Brahman is the feature that has followed in the Jagat. 'ब्रह्मणोऽपि तर्हि सत्ता लक्षणस्वभावः आकाशादिषु अनुवर्तमानो दृश्यते' — The nature of the is-ness of the Brahman has followed in the Ākaśa, etc., (Sū.Bh. 2.1.6); 'ब्रह्मस्वरूपानुगमाय च आकाशाध्यन्नमयान्तं कार्यम्' — The Svarūpa of Brahman has followed in the creation starting from the Ākaśa upto the gross body' (Tai.2.6.6). Therefore, it is not right to say that not even a single feature of Brahman has followed in the Jagat.

c) Next, the expectation that the Caitanya feature of Brahman in particular should follow in the Jagat is not correct. How is it possible to make a rule that the Caitanya feature in particular has to follow mandatorily? Is it possible to say that one will not agree that sugar is the cause of the sweet soft drink unless its sand like tactile feature has not followed in it? One cannot say this. Therefore this objection is also not correct.

## 7.9 Can inert objects come out of Cétana?

Though it is demonstrated on the basis of Śruti that the Cétana Brahman is the Upādāna of the inert Jagat, it is difficult to believe that something could come out of another with opposite features. In order to clear this doubt we give an example of elementary science: According to science two gases are Upādāna of water, namely hydrogen and oxygen. Hydrogen is an inflammable gas that is, it burns when it comes into contact with fire and oxygen is a supporter of combustion that is, it helps burning. However, the water which is their effect does not possess either of their features. A flame dipped in it gets extinguished! In this example, the feature of the liquidity which is not present in the Upādāna is present in the effect. The feature of gasness in the Upādāna is not in the effect. The feature of inflammability in the Upādāna is not in the effect; but in contrast, it has the feature of extinguishing the flame. **Therefore, between the cause and the effect, the feature not existent in one may exist in the other, features existing in one may not exist in the other and features in one may be opposed to the features in the other.** Therefore, we need not be scared when the Śruti tells that the Cétana Brahman is the Upādāna of the inert Jagat.

## 7.10 Whose thesis is to be accepted?

“Védānta thesis is opposed to the Sāṅkhya and the Yóga Darśanas. These Darśanas have been propound by very great persons. The propounder of Sāṅkhya, namely Kapila, is indeed known as an

incarnation of Nārāyaṇa. Therefore, there is hesitation to accept Brahman as the Upādāna of the universe” (Sū Bh. 2.1. Adhikaraṇa 1, 2, 4).

Answer: No. Many other great men like Manu, Vyāsa, Āpastamba have accepted in their Smṛtis that Brahman is the cause of the universe. Moreover, the propounder of Sāṅkhya, namely Kapila, is not accepted by everybody as the Avatāra of Nārāyaṇa. There are many Kapilas in history. Moreover, we cannot first decide that someone is great and someone is ordinary and then accept or reject a particular thesis. It becomes acceptable only if it is according to the Śruti. It does not matter if it is opposed to any other Smṛti. All the smṛtis outside of the Vēda are fruitless — ‘या वेदब्राह्म्यं स्मृतयः सर्वास्ता निष्फलाः’ (Manusmṛti 19.25). Of course, those aspects of Sāṅkhya Smṛti, etc. which are not opposed to the Vēda should be accepted by all. Smṛtis based on inference but opposed to the Śruti are not acceptable. On the other hand, they can be accepted if not opposed to the Śruti — (श्रुति) विरोधेत्वनपेक्षं स्यादसतिह्यनुमानम् (Jaimini Sūtra 1.3.3).

### 7.11 Objection of Brahman having parts

“Pointing at the Jagat the Chāndōgya Śruti says, तावानस्य महिमा अतो ज्यायान्श्च पूरुषः पादोऽस्य सर्वभूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि — This much is his greatness. Purūṣa is greater than this. All the Bhūtas (created) are his quarter. The remaining three quarters are in the celestial sphere (Ch. 3.12.6). This means that the Jagat is one part of Brahman and Brahman is more than (beyond) the Jagat. This will further imply that Brahman has parts. But a few other Śrutis describe Brahman as without parts. स एष नेतिनेत्यात्मा — He is ‘not like this’ ‘not like this’ Ātman (Br.Bh.3.9.26), अस्थूलमनणु — not gross, not atomic (Br. 3.8.8). It is impossible to establish the causality of the Brahman in the light of these two irreconcilable statements. Therefore, the Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.”(Sū.Bh. 2.1 Adhikaraṇa 9)

Answer: The two sentences, namely ‘the Brahman has become the Jagat, the Brahman is more than the Jagat’ are not irreconcilable

when they are understood properly. This becomes clear with the example of the gold ring: The shape of the ring has appeared in the gold. Gold continues to be gold whether this shape exists or does not exist. This means that the shape does not affect the gold in any way. We know from arithmetic that zero is that number which when added to, or subtracted from, any number, will not change its value. Since the gold remains unchanged whether the shape of the ornament is given to it or removed, if the ever existing gold is one, the appearing and disappearing shape of the ornament is indeed zero. Now 1 is greater than 0. This means that the gold has become the ornament but also more than it. The ornament in itself is only a word, a shape and just a name. That is, the gold is present in the ornament and is also different from it (See 6.5), in other words gold has become the ornament and also transcends the ornament. It would not be correct however to interpret this sentence in the following manner: A part of gold has become the ornament and the remaining part is as it is. If the ornament were really a part of the gold, it should increase the gold by its appearance or decrease it by its disappearance. We know that such a thing does not happen. On the basis of this example we conclude that what the Chāndógya Śruti quoted above means is: Brahman has become the Jagat but also transcends it. This is only a different way of putting what we have already seen in 6.5. We should never interpret it as: one part of Brahman has become the Jagat and another part remains as it is; so Brahman has parts. The fact is that the Brahman has no parts, nevertheless it is the Upādāna of the Jagat. This becomes clearer in the next section.

## 7.12 Upādhi

The foregoing arguments to answer various objections may appear a little complicated. They will now be simplified by using a technical term, namely Upādhi. We shall explain it through the example of gold and necklace.

i) The necklace helps us to recognize the gold. Therefore it is Vācārambhaṇa for gold (6.4). It is only a name and a shape. This means that the shape of the necklace does not affect the gold in any way. The gold is totally independent of the necklace though we recognize it only through the necklace. That is why the knowledge of gold is not influenced by the necklace. The knowledge might come from a necklace or a bangle or a ring. Through whatever ornament it comes, the knowledge is the same. The distinction in the ornaments does not make them different from the gold. It is a distinction without difference. This situation is stated as: the necklace is an Upādhi for the gold. that is **Upādhi (an adjunct) is the thing which distinctly shows up an otherwise unknowable object while being not a part of it.** Upādhi is only an index for the object. It appears to keep its Dharma in the object by its proximity. The one and only one stuff appears as many through many different Upādhis; for example, it is only through the Upādhis of necklace, bangle, ring etc. that the one and only one gold appears as many ornaments. Similarly the one and only one Brahman without a second appears as countless number of objects through the countless Upādhis of special forms. This is because, as we have already seen, the Upādhis are only zero in relation to the one Brahman.

ii) Unlike the necklace in the example, the Upādhi may not be clinging to the object; it may also be separate. For example, one cannot see a perfectly transparent crystal. It can be seen clearly if a red flower is kept behind it. But it is seen red because the flower apparently keeps its Dharma of redness in the crystal. Since it has shown us the transparent crystal without being a part of it, the flower is its Upādhi. Though the crystal appears red in its association, it has not become red. This can be verified by replacing the red flower by a blue one in which case the same crystal appears blue. In this way the one and the same crystal appears in different colours in contact with flowers of different colours; therefore, we conclude that it is inherently transparent. By 'inherently' we mean 'when alone — not in association with any Upādhis'. Though of course

the transparent crystal cannot be seen at all, we conclude its transparency by this experiment. The service that the Upādhis render to us is to show us the object which we cannot see otherwise. Nevertheless, we have also to be cautious about them, because they show the thing in a wrong way. This is a disservice. Therefore, after having made use of this service we have to reject the Upādhis to understand the inherent nature of the object. Notice that, **though the Upādhi appears to be clinging to the object it is not clinging; though it appears in the object, it is not in it.**

iii) Question: In the foregoing two parāgraphs two types of Upādhis have been described; a necklace which is a form of the gold having cause-effect relation and a flower which shows the transparent crystal colourful having only a proximity relation. The two are of very different features. What is the purpose?

Answer: The purpose of our discussions is firstly to recognize the existence of Brahman and, secondly, to ascertain its inherent nature. According to the Śāstra, Brahman is both the cause of the universe and at the same time totally attributeless in Itself. Therefore, we are forced to recognize its existence only through the Jagat on the basis of the cause- effect non-difference. Had the Brahman not created the world at all, we would never have known its inherent Svarūpa as Prajñānaghana — यदि हि नामरूपं न व्याक्रियते तदा अस्यात्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिख्यायेत (Br.Bh. 2.5.19). For this purpose the Śruti itself gives the examples of mud-pot, gold-ornament, etc (Ch. 6.1.4-6). But we cannot stop the discussion here because, Brahman recognized in this way is understood as undergoing transformation into several forms of Jagat. But Brahman does not undergo any such transformation according to Śruti. In order to remove this wrong impression about Brahman and visualize it as it is, that is free from the Upādhi of the Jagat, the Bhāṣyakāra uses the transparent crystal-flower, rope-serpent, the shell- silver etc as examples. The detailed discussion on it is found later in the 10<sup>th</sup> chapter (10.2-4).

iv) The service or the disservice of the Upādhis is only to us; The Brahman is unaffected by them. All the Bhūtas are in Brahman; the Bhūtas are also not in Brahman! This Svarūpa of the Brahman is its mystery and grandeur — मत्स्थानि सर्वभूतानि ..... न च मत्स्थानि भूतानि पश्य मे योगमैश्वरम् (G.9.4-5). In this background, the answers given in 7.8.i and 7.11 can be stated briefly as follows:

The statements:

(a) The multiplicity of the Jagat never affects Brahman in the three periods of time, and

(b) Brahman has become the Jagat and at the same time transcends it, amount to stating that the Jagat is only an Upādhi to Brahman.

## CHAPTER 8

### MĀYĀ

In the previous chapter we expounded that Brahman is the material-cum-efficient cause of the Jagat and then refuted the objections raised against this theory. Now, we take up the process of creation, the sustenance and the destruction of the Jagat. This is a difficult task. Therefore, we will resume the discussion with the example of hydrogen and oxygen combination resulting in water.

#### 8.1 The example

We know that hydrogen is an inflammable gas and oxygen is a gas supporting combustion. Their combination is the Upādāna of water whose features are opposite. Obviously some peculiar agency is necessary to conceal the inflammable and the gaseous natures of the hydrogen and the oxygen respectively and present the same combination in a distinctly different form as water. Science tells that this agency is of the nature of electricity. This agency is not just a mental construct of the theorist; it has an objective existence. Similarly, in any Śāstra propounding a cause-effect relation, there is bound to be a peculiar agency which will conceal the features of the cause and present it in a very different way as the effect. For example, the Mīmāṃsakas talk of the Apūrva which connects Karma and its fruit with very different features.

#### 8.2 What is Māyā?

Similar is the situation in Védānta which talks of the Brahman-Jagat causal relation. Brahman is known to be Cétana, without limitation of space and time, actionless and attributeless. On the other hand, the Jagat is inert, limited in space and time and full of attributes. Nevertheless, Brahman is the Upādāna of the Jagat. Therefore, a peculiar agency must exist between them also. This is called Māyā. It is that power of Brahman which conceals It from us and projects in a very

different way- 'माया नाम बहिरन्यथा आत्मानं प्रकाशय अन्यथैव कार्यं करोति सा माया' (Pr.Bh.1.16) (This sentence is taken from the commentary which explains the word Māyā in the Śruti as the deceitful nature of the Saṁsāries (worldly people). Here it has been adopted for Brahman's power Māyā. This is because projecting oneself as different is common in both). It is only through this Māyā that the Sarvajña Īśvara becomes the cause of the Jagat. 'If this Māyā is not accepted, Parāmésvara cannot become the creator at all, because without this Śakti there is no motivation in Him for the act of creation — 'न हि तया विना परमेश्वरस्य स्रष्टृत्वं सिद्ध्यति | शक्ति रहितस्य तस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः' (Sū.Bh. 1.4.3). In His own intrinsic nature Parāmātman is unconcerned, but in relation to Māyā, He is motivated into action — 'परमात्मनस्तु स्वरूपव्यपाश्रयम् औदासीन्यं मायाव्यपाश्रयं च प्रवर्तकत्वम्' (Sū.Bh. 2.2.7). Though such a Māyā-Śakti is admitted between the cause and the effect it also belongs to Brahman only, because there was only Brahman without a second before the creation.

### 8.3 Synonyms of Māyā

Some seem to be under the impression that it was Śrī Śaṅkarācārya who has proposed the idea of Māyā in the Védānta. This is not correct. Both Śruti and Smṛti use this word to denote this Śakti of Brahman. इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते — Indra (Brahman) appears in many forms due to His Māyā (Br.Bh. 2.5.19); मायां तु प्रकृतिं विध्यात् मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् — Know that the **Prakṛti** is Māyā and Mahésvara is Māyāvi (Śve. 4.10) दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया — My divine Māyā is comprised of three qualities and is unconquerable (G. 7.14); etc. This divine Māyā has been described as the Parāmātman himself in some Purāṇas. Therefore girls are given the name Māyā. This Māyā has also been designated as **Prakṛti, Vaiṣṇavī Māyā, Mūlaprakṛti, Akśara, Avyakta, Avyākṛta**, etc. वैष्णवीं स्वां मायां मूलप्रकृतिम् वशीकृत्य — keeping His Mūlaprakṛti, also called Vaiṣṇavī Māyā under His control (G. Bhāṣya Introduction); एतस्मिन्नु खल्वक्षरे गार्ग्याकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्च —

O Gargi, **Ākaśa** is accommodated criss-cross in this **Akśara** (Br.Bh.3.8.11) This is Akśara—not destructible—not Kśara like the Jagat; महत्: परम् अव्यक्तम् — Avyakta is greater than the Mahat (Ka.1.3.11), etc.

#### 8.4 Aparā and Parā Prakṛtis

Lord Kṛṣṇa describes this Māyā as two-fold namely **AparāPrakṛti** and **ParāPrakṛti** (G.7.4-5). Brahman camouflaged in the AparāPrakṛti and in the ParāPrakṛti appears as the Jagat and Jīva respectively. Aparā means inferior, Parā means superior. The AparāPrakṛti consists of Avyakta, Mahat, Ahankāra and the five Tanmātras (subtle elements). In order to put up the Tanmātras in the form of Jagat, Buddhi (intellect), Manas (mind) and Ahankāra (ego) are necessary. So, collective Buddhi and collective Manas are produced respectively from Mahat and Ahankāra. Along with these is born **Hiraṇyagarbha** — the first Jīva. Further, his Avidyā coupled with Avyakta is his collective Ahankāra which gives rise to motivation in him for creation. ('Avidyā' is explained in chapter 12). It means that the AparāPrakṛti contains Avidyā inside it. In other words, it is of the form of the bondage of the Saṁsāra. Therefore it is Aparā. It consists of the three Guṇas—Sattva, Rajasa and Tamasa. So it is described as Trigūṇātmika. But the ParāPrakṛti is unlike it. It is through this Śakti that the all-pervāding Brahman expresses Itself in the form of the Jīva through Prāṇadhāraṇa, that is breathing (G.7.5) In the statement 'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि'—entering through this Jīvātma form I will differentiate all the names and forms' (Ch.Bh.6.3.2), names and forms are the effects of the AparāPrakṛti and the entry as the Jīvātman is the power of the ParāPrakṛti. This is Parā because, as distinguished from the Aparā, it is unrelated to Avidyā. It only holds the whole Jagat. The whole Jagat is borne only by this. It is through this two-fold Māyā that Brahman executes the creation, the sustenance and the destruction of the Jagat. Brahman identified through this Māyā is called Īśvara.

## 8.5 Māyā Subservient to Brahman

The Jīvas experience the fruit of their Karma living in the Jagat which has come into existence by the power of the Īśvarī Māyā. Further, enchanted by the Jagat, they do good and bad Karmas and as a result, accumulate Dharma and Adharma (G.7.12). Thus the Jīvas are under the rule of the Māyā, enticed by Māyā. However, this Māyā is subservient to Īśvara (that is Brahman) (G.7.25) When Dharma degenerates and Adharma increases, Īśvara can take Avatāras (assume incarnation) to do good to the people. This is also done through the Māyā (G.Bh.4.6). Though he takes up human forms, Dharma-Adharma do not affect in any way his omniscience (G.7.24) though they do hinder the mind power of the humans. Therefore, this Māyā is not like the independent Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas.

## 8.6 Four-faced Brahma

The attributeless non-doer Brahman becomes the maker of the universe only through the Upādhi of Māyā, that is the world operations are done directly through Īśvara. This is difficult to understand. So the Purāṇas unfold the idea allegorically in a simple way. Nārāyaṇa is Parabrahman. He always resides in deathless nectar of the milk ocean. He reclines on the serpent which represents the Saṁsāra. However, it cannot harm him. He is always reclined representing his non-doership. He is not sleeping, only reclining with open eyes. Brahman who is Jñāna Svarūpa does not sleep. The moment the thought of creation in each Kalpa comes into Nārāyaṇa, the quadra faced Brahmā appears on the lotus coming out of His navel and it is this Brahmā who directly takes charge of the job of creation later. He is, indeed, the active representative of Īśvara mentioned above. However, when Brahma created the human body, it was enlivened only when Nārāyaṇa entered into it. This amounts to saying that the real power behind all the activities of Brahma is only of Nārāyaṇa. Therefore, Nārāyaṇa alone is the cause of the universe. It is just like the land lord being recognized as the builder though it is the mason who actually builds it.

“There is no place or time unoccupied by Paramātman. So, just as describing the all-pervading Ākaśa as entering into the house has no meaning, the Paramātman entering into the body has also no meaning. So, what does the statement ‘Paramātman entered into the body’ mean?” It is true that the all pervading Paramātman entering somewhere in finite objects is not feasible (Br.Bh.1.4.7). But the Paramātman unlimited in space – time is recognized in the cave of the intellect of the human being as jñāna. By virtue of this feature it is described figuratively as entering.

## 8.7 Process of Creation

i) Now, we will deal with the topic of the process of creation. Śabda (sound), Sparśa (touch), Rūpa (form), Rasa (taste), Gandha (smell) are the five Tanmatras. ‘Tanmātra’ means ‘only that.’ Śabda Tanmātra, for instance has only the characteristic of sound etc. As the idea of creation arises in Īśvara, samaṣṭi Buddhi, Manas and Ahankāra appear. Hiraṇyagarbha who is born along with them has identity with this collective intellect as himself. He is Aparabrahma (Su.Bh.4.3.7-10). It is he who creates the five bhūtas from the Tanmātras. With these five Bhūtas Prajāpati is born. He is called Virāṭ Puruṣa (Ai.Bh.3.1.3). The future process of creation is accomplished by Him. One cycle of the four Yugas—Kṛta, Tretā, Dwāpara and Kali—is called a Mahāyuga. One thousand Mahāyugas are a Kalpa, that is Hiraṇyagarbha’s day (G. 8.17). During this time he manifests the latent inert name-forms concealed in himself and then conducts the dissolution during his night (G.8.18). During the time of sustenance of the world, it is he who creates the bodies of all Jīvas from the Dévatas down to the lowest creatures, according to their Karma.

ii) This process of the creation of five Bhūtas from the five Tanmātras is called **Pañcikaraṇa**—five fold compounding of the tanmātras. The resulting products after Pañcikaraṇa are Pañcikṛta Bhūtas—compounded elements. This process is as follows:

iii) First the Ākaśa (space) is created. This has the characteristic quality of Śabda (sound) only and also provides space for the

forthcoming elements. This gets mixed with the touch Tanmātra giving rise to the Pañcikṛta Vāyu with two characteristics of Sparśa (touch) and Śabda. This Vāyu gets mixed with the Rūpa Tanmātra giving rise to the Pañcikṛta Agni with three features of Śabda, Sparśa and Rūpa. This Agni gets mixed with Rasa Tanmātra giving rise to the Pañcikṛta Jala with the four features of Śabda, Sparśa, Rūpa and Rasa. Finally this Jala mixes with the Gandha Tanmātra giving rise to the Pañcikṛta Pṛthvī with the five features Śabda, Sparśa, Rūpa, Rasa and Gandha. In this way Vāyu was born out of Ākaśa, Agni out of Vāyu, Jala out of Agni and Pṛthvī out of Jala. This is the process mentioned in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad. This is the same as what the Chāndógya says तत्तेजोऽसृजत् — that, namely, the Vāyu created the Téjas (Ch.Bh.6.2.3, Sū.Bh. 2.3.10), तदपोऽसृजत् — that, namely, Agni, created the Jala (Ch.6.2.3, Sū.Bh. 2.3.11). Both are indeed the descriptions of the five Mahābhūtas (elements) only, that is the perceptible Pañcikṛta Bhūtas — अधिकारस्तावत् तत्तेजोऽसृजत् तदपोऽसृजत् इति महाभूतविषये वर्तते (Sū.Bh. 2.3.12). It is to be remembered that though the Bhūtas get mixed as above, they will continue to have their inherent nature of being Brahman. This is understood when the Śruti states that ता आप ऐक्षन्त बह्वयः स्याम् प्रजायेमहि — the water thought of taking up many forms (Ch.Bh.6.2.4, Sū.Bh.2.3.7-13). If this water were independent of Brahman and inert, it cannot think. This means that Brahman's nature is permeating in water. Further, trees and plants emanate from the Pṛthvī and from them the food in the form of seeds. Finally the food transformed into semen, gives rise to the Puruṣa that is, humans and animals with the head, the trunk and the limbs (Tai.2.1.2). Starting from the Hiraṇyagarbha down to the creatures—all are Jīvas of the previous Kalpa (aeon 432 million years of mortals) who get their bodies in accordance with their Karma (deed/act).


iv) The process of Pañcikaraṇa described above finally resulting in the name-forms and the bodies of Jīvas according to their Karma (past deeds) has to be preceded by a propensity in Īśvara to create them. “How does it come about when Īśvara is inherently motiveless?” Motivation for creation only occurs in Hiraṇyagarbha. This is his

Ahankāra. But superimposing this on Īśvara, Śāstra tells it as Īśvara's Ahankāra. This motivation comes from the seed of the Avidyā (ignorance)–Kāma (desire)–Karma (deed) of Hiraṇyagarbha concealed in the Avyakta – अविद्याध्यनेकसम्सार बीजम् अन्तर्दोषवत् माया (G.Bh.12.3) Though in His own innate nature He is motiveless, He is prompted by the Karma done by the Jīvas due to their Avidyā (7.6-7) – प्रवृत्तिरहितोऽपि ईश्वरः .....प्रवर्तयेत् | अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापित-नामरूप-मायावेशवशेन.....संभवति प्रवृत्तिः (Sū.Bh. 2.2.2). In this way the innate ability of Īśvara, namely, Avyakta combined with the Avidyā of the Jīvas, generates the motivation. This motivation is of the nature of ego. Therefore, the combination of Avidyā and Avyakta is termed the Ahankāra—a bad cliché indeed. The reason for this name is the following: Just as the food mixed with poison is also called poison, the primordial cause Avyakta mixed with the Ahankāra-Vāsanā(latent impression) of Hiraṇyagarbha is called the Ahankāra – “ अहंकारः इति अविद्यासंयुक्तं अव्यक्तम् | यथा विषसंयुक्तम् अन्नं विषम् इति उच्यते एवम् अहंकारवासनावत् अव्यक्तं मूलकारणम् अहंकार इत्युच्यते | प्रवर्तकत्वात् अहंकारस्य | अहंकार एव हि सर्वस्य प्रवृत्तिबीजं दृष्टं लोके ” (G.Bh. 7.4) Perhaps, this concealing of the poison in the form of the Avidyā of the Jīvas in His Avyakta is the well known drinking of poison by Parāmesvara! It should never be forgotten that though the motivation for the creation comes from the Avidyā of Jīvas, the ability of creation lies only in Avyakta, Parāmesvara's power.

## 8.8 Dissolution

The Jagat (world) created in the sequence mentioned above remains all through this Kalpa giving scope for the Jīvas to experience their Karma and finally undergoes dissolution at the end of the Kalpa. The sequence of dissolution is the reverse of the sequence of creation. The five Bhutas merge back into the elements from which they had emanated. The physical creation dissolves in the Pṛthvī, the latter in the Bhuta of Jala, this in the Bhuta of Agni, this in the Bhuta of Vāyu, this in the Bhuta of Ākaśa and this Ākaśa in the supreme Brahman (Sū.Bh. 2.3.14). The world is therefore **Tajja**—born out of Brahman, **Talla**—

dissolves in Brahman, **Tadana**—stays in Brahman. Therefore the Śruti describes the Jagat by the acronym Tajjalān. It means that the Jagat is non-different from Brahman during creation, sustenance and after destruction (Ch.Bh.3.14.1)



(Fig 8.9) Beginingless & Endless cycles of Creation, Sustenance & Dissolution

## 8.9 Māyā is Eternal

The creation of Jagat is solely for the sake of the Jīvas to experience the fruits of their Karmas. There is no other reason. This means that the Jagat of this Kalpa is for the sake of the Jīvas of the previous Kalpa. Therefore there is no beginning for the Kalpas. There is nothing like the first Kalpa. Some Jīva may give up his association with the Karma and become liberated; eventually, he may not have another birth. So, he does not need the Jagat. But the number of Jīvas is actually

infinite. शतं सहस्रमयुतं न्यर्बुद मसङ्ख्येयं स्वमस्मिन् निविष्टम् – hundreds, thousands, millions... countless Jīvas are contained in him (Atharva Saṁhitā 10.8.24). Therefore, there will always be Jīvas in need of the Jagat even though any number of them become liberated. The Kalpas have to be continued for their sake. Thus the Kalpas are also endless. They continue from the infinite past to the infinite future. This Jagat of the movable and immovable objects *continuously* emanates from the Ātman like sparks and submerge like bubbles in water in Him and stay during sustenance also in Him – “आत्मनः स्थावरजङ्गमं जगदिदम् अग्निविस्फुलिङ्गवत् व्युच्चरति अनिशं यस्मिन्नेव च प्रलीयते जलबुद्बुदवत् यदात्मकं च वर्तते स्थितिकाले” (Br.Bh. 2.1.20) This shows that the Māyā needed for the creation of the Jagat is Nitya, eternal. Some people interpret the word ‘Nitya’ as ‘a very long period’. It is not correct. Because नित्येश्वरत्वात् ईश्वरस्य तत्प्रकृत्योरपि युक्तं नित्यत्वेन भवितुम् | प्रकृति द्वयवत्त्वमेव हि ईश्वरस्य ईश्वरत्वम् – Īśvara is always Īśvara, *His Prakṛtis should also be eternal*; being endowed with these two Prakṛtis determines the Īśvarahood of Īśvara (G.Bh.13.19). Suppose Nitya means a long period, it would mean that after that period Īśvara will cease to be Īśvara. But Bhagavān is always endowed with Jñāna, Aiśvarya, Śakti, Bala, Vīrya and Téjas – स च भगवान् ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजोभिः सदा संपन्नः (G.Bh.Introduction). Yōgis acquire the abilities for direct perception of events of the past and the future only by the grace of Īśvara. If this were so, what to talk of *the eternal Jñāna of the eternally present Īśvara* about the process of creation, the sustenance and the destruction – यत्प्रसादात् हि योगिनामपि अतीतानागतविषयं प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानम् इच्छन्ति योगशास्त्रविदः किमु वक्तव्यं तस्य नित्यसिद्धस्य ईश्वरस्य सृष्टिस्थितिसंहति विषयं नित्यज्ञानं भवति इति ? (Sū.Bh.1.1.5). This Māyā is immovable. Since it is immovable, it is permanent, meaning eternal— ‘अचलम् | यस्मादचलं तस्माद्भुवं नित्यमित्यर्थः’ (G.Bh.12.3). Māyā transforms into the Jagat during creation and becomes unmanifest during dissolution. This eternality of the Māyā is changing eternality (Pariṇamīnīyatva). But that of Brahman is unchanging eternality

(Kūṭastha Nityatva) — कूटस्थं च नित्यं ब्रह्म सर्वविक्रियाप्रतिषेधात् (Su.Bh.2.1.14). More of this is given in section 10.3.

Question: Does this Prakṛti which is eight-fold and comprised of the three qualities (Triguṇātmika) exist during Praḷaya or not? If it exists it contradicts the statement: previously this was all one and only one existence without a second — सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् (Ch.Bh.6.2.1). If not, it contradicts its own eternality. Therefore how to reconcile the two?

Answer: Not like that. It is true that there was only Brahman in Praḷaya. Nevertheless, the Prakṛti is eternal. These two ideas are not contradictory How ? Consider the following example: Is it not obvious that the Karma of Jīvas exists in deep sleep? How does it exist? It exists in an unmanifest form and one with the Jīva. In the waking and the dream states it becomes manifest. Though it is unmanifest in deep sleep it has to be said that it does exist only on the basis of its manifest form in the waking and the dream states. The Jīvātma's association with the Buddhi exists in the unmanifest form during the deep sleep and the Praḷaya. Later it becomes manifest during the waking state and creation because nothing can come into existence by accident — 'अयमपि बुद्धिसंबन्धः शक्त्यात्मना विद्यमान एव सुषुप्तिप्रलययोः पुनः प्रबोधप्रसवयोः आविर्भवति| .....न हि आकस्मिकी कस्यचित् उत्पत्तिः संभवति' (Sū.Bh. 2.3.31). Similarly, we have to agree that the unmanifest Prakṛti does exist during the Praḷaya, because of its manifestation during the creation. Otherwise, creation would be impossible. प्रलीयमानमपि चेदं जगच्छक्त्यवशेषमेव प्रलीयते शक्तिमूलमेव च प्रभवति | इतरथा आकस्मिकत्व प्रसंगात् | The Jagat during dissolution retains its seed form. It is born only from that seed form. Otherwise it would lead to the fault of accidental creation (Sū.Bh. 1.3.30) Therefore, though there is only Brahman during Praḷaya, Prakṛti is eternal. This does not contradict the statement that only Brahman exists because the Prakṛti is not different from Brahman. When it has been told repeatedly that even the name-forms are eternal and non-different from Brahman, does it not automatically follow that Māyā which is their

cause is also eternal and non-different from Brahman? It is eternal, because it is non-different from Brahman, and there was Brahman alone.

## 8.10 Māyā is Anirvacanīya

i) After going through the foregoing sections carefully one may get a doubt: In 8.2 while describing the concept of Māyā it was told it is Brahman's power, that is the Śakti which cannot be separated from It; That is because Śakti is not different from the Śakta — शक्ति शक्तिमतोः अनन्यत्वात् (G.Bh. 14.27). But while describing Īśvara in 8.4 Māyā is mentioned as the Upādhi (Adjunct) of Brahman. This means that it is an index which helps to recognize the attributeless Brahman without affecting it in anyway. In other words, Māyā would only be different from Brahman. Are not the two descriptions contradictory to each other? Does Māyā belong to Brahman or is it different from Brahman? To resolve this question, we should notice the following: One does not need any Śāstra to explain the directly perceptible effects. It is necessary only to analyse their cause which is imperceptible and distinctly different. The purpose of the Śāstra is to delineate this cause-effect relation. Further, establishing the link between the two is the most complicated issue. This link invariably has the following peculiar feature: When viewed from the angle of the effect, it appears to belong to that realm; when viewed from the angle of the cause, it appears to belong to the realm of the cause. It is like the maxim of the central bead — Madhyama Maṇi Nyāya: the central bead of a necklace can be apportioned either to the left or to the right side.

ii) The Śakti proposed as a link between a cause and its effect would always be subject to this ambiguity in any theory. Here too, Māyā is of the same feature when viewed from the two angles, namely Brahman and the name-forms. For this reason Māyā has been described by the Bhāṣyakāra as Avyakta — अव्यक्ता हि सा माया | तत्त्वान्यत्वनिरूपणस्य अशक्यत्वात् — Māyā is A-vyakta, that is defying any unambiguous

description whether it belongs to Brahman or is different from It. (Sū.Bh.1.4.3)

iii) Besides, this feature is found also in the name-forms, which are the modifications of Māyā. This can be demonstrated on the basis of the cause-effect non difference relation as follows: Effect is non different from the cause (Former half) but the cause is different from the effect (Latter half). In LH of the relation, the cause is clearly told to be different from the effect. So the question whether the effect belongs to the cause or is different from it can never arise in LH. However, it is not so in the FH. There both the effect and the cause are together. We are also aware that the cause itself is appearing in the form of the effect. Further, we observe that the transactions are found in the effect, but not in the cause. Therefore, an unambiguous description of the effect as 'only one with the cause' or as 'different from it' is not possible. For example, the transactions like holding water, etc cannot occur in the clay, but occur only in the pot. If we view the pot from the point of transaction it is Upādhi; but no transaction is possible in the clay as such. Therefore, it can not be described unambiguously whether the pot is clay only or is different from it. This ambiguity is the Anirvacanīyatva of the name-forms. What is that which Īśvara perceives before the creation? It is the name-forms which cannot be described unambiguously whether they are Brahman or different from It, the unmanifest but to be manifested later — किं पुनस्तत् कर्म यत् प्रागुत्पत्तेः ईश्वरज्ञानस्य विषयो भवति इति? तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्याम् अनिर्वचनीये नामरूपे अव्याकृते व्याचिकीर्षिते (Sū.Bh. 1.1.5). In this sentence it may be noticed that name forms are being viewed only in the light of the Śāstra. Therefore no reference is made to the Nāma Rūpa of the LH in the non difference relation. सर्वज्ञस्य ईश्वरस्य आत्मभूते इव अविध्याकल्पिते नामरूपे तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्याम् अनिर्वचनीये संसारप्रपञ्चबीजभूते सर्वज्ञस्य ईश्वरस्य माया शक्तिः प्रकृतिः इति च श्रुतिस्मृत्योरभिलष्येते | The name forms which are the Svarūpa of the Ātman (FH), which are illusion due to Avidyā (LH), which cannot be described

unambiguously as Himself or different from Him(FH) which are the seeds of the Saṁsāra (LH) are termed as the Māyā or the Śakti or the Prakṛti of the omniscient Īśvara in the Śruti and smṛti (Su.Bh.2.1.14). The presently unmanifest Avyākṛta which is to become manifest later is the illusory name forms (LH) and not describable unambiguously as Brahman Itself or different from It. (FH) – अविध्याकल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्याम् अनिर्वचनीयेन ब्रह्म परिणामादि सर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते (Sū.Bh.2.1.27). In these two sentences where the Bhāṣyakāra uses the name forms in the light of the Śāstra and also in the light of the people with ignorance, he is referring to both the FH and LH name-forms in Brahman-Jagat non-difference relation. In this way the ambiguity in the description of the name forms (or Māyā) as Brahman itself or different from It is the Anirvacanīyatva of the name forms (or Māyā). Nirvacanīya means unambiguously describable, Anirvacanīya means not Nirvacanīya. It should be clearly remembered that wherever the Bhāṣyakāra talks of Anirvacanīyatva, he is invariably referring only to this ambiguity in the description whether it is Brahman only or different from it. It is not anything else.

### 8.11 Māyā is non different from Brahman

The Anirvacanīyatva of Māyā is implicit in the non-difference relation of Śakti-Śakta. The Anirvacanīyatva of name forms is implicit in the non-difference of Jagat-Brahman. Māyā or the name forms are Upādhis for Brahman from the transactional view and non-different from Brahman from the transcendental view. When it has been established that the Jagat which is an effect of Brahman is itself non-different from Brahman, does it not follow automatically that Brahma Māyā is not different from Brahman? It is not different. The Bhāṣyakāra puts it as follows: ननु अव्याकृतं स्वयमेव व्याक्रियत इत्युक्तम्? कथमिदम् इदानीम् उच्यते पर एव तु आत्मा अव्याकृतं व्याकुर्वन् इह प्रविष्टः इति? नैष दोषः | परस्यापि आत्मनः अव्याकृतजगदात्मत्वेन विवक्षितत्वात् – Once it is told that the Avyākṛta (the unmanifest) itself became manifest and now it is told that

Paramātma Himself made the unmanifest manifest; How is it right? It is not wrong. It is because the unmanifest Jagat is Paramātma Himself (Br.Bh.1.4.7). It must be accepted that Brahman is the Prakṛti that is the material cause and also the efficient cause – ‘प्रकृतिश्च उपादानकारणं च अभ्युपगन्तव्यं निमित्तकारणं च’ (Sū.Bh.1.4.23). Also notice several other sentences elsewhere. ‘कारणस्य आत्मभूता शक्तिः शक्तेश्च आत्मभूतं कार्यम् – the essential nature of Śakti is the cause and the essential nature of the effect is the Śakti (Sū.Bh.2.1.18); सा शक्तिः ब्रह्मैव अहं शक्ति शक्तिमतोः अनन्यत्वात् – that Śakti in Brahman that is, Myself; because Śakti and Śakta are not different (G.Bh.14.27); मम स्वरूपभूता मदीया माया – the Māyā which is of My own Svarūpa (G.Bh. 14.3); या मूलप्रकृतिः अभ्युपगम्यते तदेव च नो ब्रह्म – that which you are accepting as Mūlaprakṛti is our Brahman (Sū.Bh.2.3.9). Not only that; the word Akṣara which is a synonym for Māyā is also used as a synonym for Brahman. This Akṣara being indestructible and all pervading is indeed Brahman only – न क्षरति अश्रुते च इति नित्यत्व व्यापित्वाभ्याम् अक्षरं परमेव ब्रह्म (Sū.Bh.1.3.10). Akṣara is the unseen seer, the unheard listener (Br.Bh. 3.8.11). He merges in the Paramātman called the Akṣara (Pr.4.9) etc. If this is remembered it would be easy to follow the further presentation of the Védānta theory.

Question: At one stage (8.4) of this chapter Māyā is described as Brahman’s adjunct implying that it is different from Brahman. At another stage (8.10) it is described as Anirvacanīya that is not describable unambiguously as Brahman itself or different from it. Yet at another stage (8.11) it is clearly told that it is Brahman only. These three descriptions are mutually irreconcilable. How to explain this?

Answer: The first two descriptions of Māyā mentioned above namely as Upādhi and as Anirvacanīya are in terms of the disciple’s subjective understanding. The third description that it is Brahman is the objective understanding of Māyā. The reason is this: the disciple in the beginning will have known that Brahman is only the Nimitta Kāraṇa of the Jagat. Therefore, he views the Māyā only as an Upādhi to Brahman.

Later, as he progresses in the study of the Śāstra he listens to the statement that the Māyā is the Śakti of Brahman and so, not different from It. He compares this new information with his old understanding that Māyā is only an Upādhi. As a result he gets into a dilemma, whether it is Brahman or different from Brahman. This doubtful understanding of the Māyā is its Anirvacanīyatva. Progressing further he abandons the idea of Upādhi which is responsible for all the transactions and views Māyā in its Svarūpa, that is, Māyā as it is. Then he realizes that it is non-different from Brahman. Thus, understanding Māyā as an adjunct is its wrong knowledge; its Anirvacanīyatva is its doubtful knowledge and its Ananyatva from Brahman is its right knowledge. Similar is the situation in the case of the name-forms also.

## SUMMARY OF JAGAT PRAKARAṆAM

Multiplicity is not the inherent nature of the Jagat; its inherent nature is only its material cause. Prior to determining this we considered the various theories—such as of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṅkhyas, etc., who talk of atoms, Pradhāna, etc. as the material cause of the Jagat. We also briefly referred to the arguments of modern Science. All of them were found to be unsatisfactory. Indeed, we recognize that any theory based on multiplicity is inherently defective and incapable of explaining the cause of the universe. Abandoning all of them, the Vedāntic theory was considered. Then we understood that Brahman is at once both the efficient and the material cause of the Jagat. We also cleared the logical objections raised against Vedāntic theory. It was finally established that this Jagat with bewildering multiplicity of name forms of wide variety is Brahman itself in its inherent nature. The mysterious power of Brahman, namely Māyā, is responsible for the creation of this bewildering multiplicity. This is made of three Guṇas—Satva, Rajas and Tamas and subservient to Brahman and is eternal. Inherently it is non-different from Brahman. Brahman creates the Jagat in a regular sequence, starting from the Ākaśa down to the gross-bodies of creatures and withdraws it in the reverse order. The cycle of the creation, its sustenance and dissolution has neither a beginning nor an end. The mysterious relation between the name forms and Brahman is governed by the cause-effect non-difference relation. The Bhāṣyakāra has used the same word ‘Effect’ in its postulation in the former half and the latter half with different meanings, that is as found in the Śruti and as found in common parlance respectively. This relation forms the basis of seminal importance for the Védānta. This is a highly potent postulation in which he starts introducing Brahman from the level of the misconception of disciples, taking it through the ambiguous understanding and finally leads them to the right understanding of Jagat as Brahman itself.