

JEEVA PRAKARAṆAM

In the Jagat Prakaraṇa it was shown that the Svarūpa of the Jagat is Brahman Itself and in the previous Prakaraṇa Its Svarūpa was analysed. Now the third topic namely, the Jīva mentioned in the Anubandha Catuṣṭaya, remains for discussion. This discussion requires more effort than in the case of the Jagat. The reason is that this Jīva is one's self. While a person remains quite unbiased while discussing the Jagat, it is very difficult to be unbiased while discussing himself. Even an intelligent scientist who rightly searches for the cause behind the Jagat, commits the mistake of treating the activity of the Jīva as his Svarūpa. He appears to think that by dissecting and probing live animals with the help of instruments he could find their intrinsic nature. Leave him aside. We the Vaidikās (the followers of Vedās) decide about this only through the Āgama Pramāṇa. We will also show that there is no other way. We will follow a procedure similar to Adhyārōpa-Apavāda. We start from the wrong understanding of oneself, investigating it and dispelling it to show Jīva his own Svarūpa using the arguments of the Śruti.

This misunderstanding about oneself expresses in three ways—doership (**Kartṛtva**), knowership (**Jñātṛtva**) and enjoyership (**Bhōktṛtva**). His ignorance alone is responsible for this misunderstanding. This ignorance is called **Avidyā**. In order to remove it, the Jīva (embodied soul) has to separate himself from the gross and the subtle bodies, from the three states of wakefulness, dream and deep-sleep, the five Kóśas and then understand that he is Brahman Itself. Whether it is the two bodies or the three states or the five Kóśas, all of them are only the effects of the Īśvarimāyā. But one's identification with them is wrong understanding about oneself due to Avidyā since, doership, knowership and enjoyership are the effects of Avidya. The removal of this effect of Avidyā is possible by the destruction of Avidyā.

With its destruction even the two bodies (gross and subtle) will be destroyed in due course. That is to say Avidyā's destruction also results in the destruction of the effects of Māyā in due course. Therefore, there seems to be room for the wrong idea that Māyā and Avidyā are synonyms. But even the most erudite scholar cannot treat them as synonyms and propound his theory. Sometimes he may have to treat them as synonyms and sometimes as different according to convenience. This makes the whole narration incoherent. He is forced to commit the fault of giving up what has been told (Śrutahāni) and imagining what is not told (Aśrutakalpana) in the Bhāṣya. Therefore, for an unambiguous understanding of the Śāstra unfolded by Bhagavatpāda, we have given some importance to show clearly how Māyā and Avidyā are mutually distinct and different.

CHAPTER 11

ANALYSIS OF THE THREE BODIES

When we see the various parts of a complicated machine working in cohesion, we can easily conclude that it is serving the purpose of someone else. Similarly, the mysterious machine of the physical **gross body (Sthūla Śarīra)** should be working only for the sake of someone else. That is the Jīva (Ai.1.3.11). In this machine there is another subtler machine called the **subtle body (Sūkṣma Śarīra)**. Next, Avidyā itself is referred to as the **causal body (Kāraṇa Śarīra)**. Further we are going to show that the Jīva is distinctly different from all these three bodies and determine his Svarūpa on the basis of the Śruti. A doubt may arise in this context: Why is Śruti necessary? Even with the help of simple inference, is it not possible to show that one who is hearing and thinking is himself the Jīva? The Answer is No. It is because we know that while listening one cannot think, and while thinking he cannot listen. Therefore, we can never determine by inference that both are done by the one and the same Jīva. Not only that, one who is thinking is totally absorbed in it and, therefore, it is not possible at all for him to decide who the thinker is at the same time. Thinking is '**Manana**'. One who thinks is the '**Mantr**'. The thing to be ascertained by thinking is the '**Mantavya**'. Determining one's own nature by one's own thinking would therefore imply that the Mantr himself is the Mantavya. This is impossible because Manana implies ipso facto the distinction between the mantr and the Mantavya. Further, in deep sleep where there is no Tripuṭi of the Mantr, Manana and the Mantavya, it has already been shown that the Jīva is incomprehensible for inference (5.11). Therefore, the determination of the intrinsic nature of the Jīva has to be done only on the basis of the Śruti (Ai.1.3 Last part).

Some people resort to the method of discrimination of the observer and the observed to determine Jīva's nature and posit as follows: "The external world, the gross body and the subtle body—all belong to the category of the observed. Therefore, the nature of the Jīva

is that he is only a witness—the observer of all these. If one practices mind control and achieves Samādhi, this intrinsic nature of his own Svarūpa comes to his experience”. Had there been an objective relation between the observed and the observer just as in the causal relationship of the Jagat and Brahman, this belief could have been true. But it is not so. The relationship is only illusory. Therefore, this cannot be the right understanding of the actionless Ātman as described in the Śruti. It is also seen that immediately after coming out of Samādhi, there is bound to be transaction between the two. To escape from this shortcoming, some others say that the observed Jagat is an illusion due to Avidyā and if one understands this, he will get the right knowledge about oneself. Suppose you counter them that you have not come across any Jñānī for whom the Jagat ceases to appear as a result of this Jñāna, they will tell you as follows: Even a realized soul continues to have Avidyā; he becomes free from bondage only with death! This answer implies that there is no release from the Jagat even for a Jñānī as long as his body exists. Then what is the use of this imagination that the Jagat is an illusion due to Avidyā?

Enough of these fanciful fabrications and conjectures. The realization of the actionless Ātman comes about in a very different way according to the Śruti. First and the foremost step is that the existence of Brahman has to be established only through the Jagat; there is no other way. Brahman determined in this way is bound to appear with attributes which is not correct. Therefore, one has to understand through the Jagat-Brahman non-difference relation that Brahman alone exists. In this transcendental level Brahman is realized to be attributeless. With this understanding the transactional view of Jagat drops off. In the second step we must decide the PratyagĀtman that is, the inside Ātman distinctly separated from the gross and subtle bodies. This can be done through any of the discussions on the discriminative understanding of the three bodies or the three states or the five Kośas. Even though this PratyagĀtman is established, his Svarūpa can never be known. So we have to resort to the third step wherein we listen to the Śruti statements like Tat-Tvam-Asi and ponder over its meaning. With this, one

intellectually understands that he is Brahman. This understanding is to be kept firmly in the mind through perpetual meditation until the realization of the oneness of the Jīva and Brahman. Once this is got, he will never look at the world from the transactional view; its transcendental view becomes natural to him. Then he will have the realization of the actionless Ātman unintermittently though transactions are taking place between his body and the external world. In this way determining the attributeless Brahman through the Jagat-Brahman non-difference relation, determining the PratyagĀtman through the discrimination of the three bodies, and then establishing the Jīva-Brahman identity through the Védic statements like ‘Thou art that’—are the three steps in that order to be taken for self realization. Therefore, we have considered the three categories Jagat, Brahman and Jīva in the same order. Further consideration will confirm the advantage of the choice of this order.

11.1 Gross Body

शीर्यते इति शरीरम् — That which perishes is called Śarīra, the body. The one that is physical and tangible with the head, the trunk and the limbs is the gross body. Everyone thinks that this is oneself. The name, the community and the gender etc, are all only for this. This is born from food, grows by food and also merges into food. Therefore, this is called Annamaya body — an effect of the cause anna, food. This contains nine outlets, seven ingredients and undergoes six transformations. The two eyes, the two nostrils, the two ears, the mouth and the two outlets below for discharging excrement and urine — are the nine outlets. The skin, the blood, the flesh, the fat, the bone, the marrow and the semen are the seven ingredients. Existing (Asti) as foetus in the womb; taking birth (Jāyate), growing (Vardhate), becoming old (Pariṇamate), degeneration (Apakṣīyate) and death (Vinaśyati) are the six transformations. This body is made of five elements. So its Upādāna is Brahman because, in all the effects from the Ākaśa upto the gross body the Brahma Svarūpa has followed — ब्रह्मस्वरूपानुगमाय च आकाशाद्यन्नमयान्तं कार्यम् (Tai.2.6.6)

The gross body is animated by the Prāṇa and the Manas in all the animals. But in the plants there is only Prāṇa and no Manas — ओषधि वनस्पतिषु रसो दृश्यते चित्तं प्राणभृत्सु प्राणभृत्सुत्वेव आविस्तारम् आत्मा तेषु हि रसोऽपि दृश्यते न चित्तम् इतरेषु (Ai.Āraṇyaka 2.3.2.3), However, with respect to gross body there is much similarity between the man and the trees: His body hair are its leaves, his skin is its external bark, his blood is its fluid, his flesh is its inner bark, his nerves is its fibre, his bones are its wood, his marrow is its marrow.(Br.Bh.3.9.28).

This gross body is given by God to the Jīva to expend his Karma (good and bad deeds) done in his previous lives. Similarly the body in the previous life comes as a result of the Karma done by him in the life previous to it. In this way his births are beginningless that is, there is nothing like the first birth. If one realizes this, he gets rather disenchanted and the mind turns to God from worldly matters in due course. After a long time he becomes a Jñānī. The Jñānī uses his body only for exhausting his previous Karma. On the other hand, the Ajñānī accumulates more Karma and makes way for getting another birth. From virtuous deeds he gets divine bodies; from the sinful deeds he gets lowly bodies like trees etc; with a mixture of virtuous and sinful deeds, he gets a human body. Trees are also Jīvas; they are not inanimate as told by the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists (Ch.Bh.6.11.2) Three further divisions are made in each of them depending upon the variations in virtue (punya) and sin (papa) (see the following table).

Virtue	Maximum-Virtue	Medium-Virtue	Ordinary-Virtue
Divine Body	Hiraṇyagarbha	Gods - Indra,etc	Yakṣas,Gandharvas,etc
Sin	Maximum-Sin	Medium-Sin	Ordinary-Sin
Lowly Body	Thorny trees,Snakes,etc	Big trees	Small plants,Cow,etc
Mixture of Virtue & Sin	More Virtue	Medium	More Sin
Human Body	Mumukṣu	Ordinary	Dull

11.2 The Gross Body is not me

The Jīvātma with features opposed to the body stays in it (Sū.Bh. 3.3.54). If new bodies are coming to him to experience the fruit of Karma, obviously the experiencer Jīva must have to be different from it. The Jīva gives up the dilapidated body and takes new bodies just as a person gives up old clothes and takes to new one — वासांसि जीर्णानि यथा विहाय नवानि गृह्णाति नरोऽपराणि यथा शरीराणि विहाय जीर्णान् अन्यानि संयाति नवानि देही (G.2.22). Therefore, just as man does not change by changing his clothes, the Jīva does not change by changing his body.

This is, of course, known only from the Śāstra. But even from direct perception and inference it can be understood by examining the nature of the present body; whether the body is in childhood or in youth or in old age, one is himself; he does not change. Not only that, when the limbs of the body are amputated they are replaced by matching metallic limbs and organs, are replaced by someone else's corresponding organs, the Jīva continues to be himself, that is, he remains unchanged however much the body changes. This is known universally. It is clear from this that the gross body is only an instrument for the Jīva to experience the world. Infact, it is also well known that under anesthesia during surgery, Jīva is made to lose his contact with the gross body so that he does not experience the pain of surgery. This is true to some extent even during sleep. Therefore we can conclude that the Jīva is one who can snap his connection with the body and so obviously, he should be different from it.

With this it is shown that the habitual identification of the Jīva with his gross body is erroneous knowledge of oneself.

11.3 Subtle Body

There is a subtle body within this inert gross body which is responsible for the animation in the gross body. It is subtle because it cannot be seen. This is an index to recognize the Jīva in the gross body. Therefore, this is also called the **Linga Śarīra** that is, index body. During

sleep it recedes very much inside from the gross body. That is why many of the activities of the gross body stop during that time. When it recedes totally the gross body dies. However the subtle body continues to exist. The fruit of all the Karma of the Jīva done during his wakeful state accumulates only in this subtle body. After death when it has left the gross body it acquires another gross body in due time according to his accumulated Karma.

Prāṇa and Indriyas are the parts of the subtle body. They are: the five sense organs, the five motor organs, the five Prāṇas and the Antaḥkaraṇa. The last one has four divisions: Thus there are nineteen parts in all in the subtle body. They are all created out of the five subtle elements. Therefore the Upādāna of the subtle body is also Brahman, just as in the case of the gross body. अयं वै हरयः — he is the Indriyas (Br.Bh.2.5.19). The structure of the nineteen parts of the subtle body have already been described in 8.7.

Among the activities of the subtle body, some are motor activities and some are sensory activities. Motor activities are done by the motor organs and the perceptual activities are done by the sense organs. Each one of them is called the Ādhyātmika, its activity is Ādhibhautika and the Dévata behind it is the Ādhidaivika. Since these 19 elements are inert, they cannot act independently. It is only the Adhidévatās who are responsible for their activities, whether they are under our control or not. They can never function without their grace. Each of these parts is discussed in the following section.

11.4 The Five Prāṇas

i) The Prāṇa Vāyus are five: Prāṇa Vāyu, Apāna Vāyu, Vyāna Vāyu, Udāna Vāyu and Samāna Vāyu. The Sāṅkhya and Yōga Sāstras describe their positions in the body as follows: हृदि प्राणे गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिसंस्थितः उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः — Prāṇa is in the heart, Apāna in the anus, Vyāna is all over the body, Udāna is in the throat and Samāna is in the naval. According to them their functions are respectively inhaling and exhaling; expansion and contraction of the

anus and the private organs responsible for evacuating the excrement and urine; the movement of limbs; swallowing, coughing, etc. and digestion; But these descriptions are not according to the Vēda (Ch.1.3.3).

ii) According to the Vēda, all the five Prāṇas are only five functional aspects of Vāyu. The location of Prāṇa is in the face. Exhaling through the mouth, the nose, the ears and the eyes is its function (Sū.Bh.2.4.12). This is like the king to the other four aspects. Therefore, this is also called Mukhya Prāṇa (Prime Prāṇa) (Pra.3.5).

The location of Apāna Vāyu is anus and the private part. Breathing in, urination and defecation are its functions (Br. 1.5.3, 3.2.2; Ch.1.3.3; Pr 3.5). Bhāsyas mention the same functions in all places. But in one place in Sutrabhāṣya the reverse is said प्राणः प्राग्वृत्तिः उच्छ्वासादि कर्मा | अपानः अर्वाग्वृत्तिः निःश्वासादि कर्मा (Sū.Bh.2.4.12). This could be a slip of the writer who has copied the Bhāṣya.

The location of Vyāna Vāyu is the Nāḍis (tubular organs like veins, arteries) which originate from the right side hole of the heart spreading all over the body (Pra.4.3). They are 101 in the heart. One of them is named Suṣumnā Nāḍi passing through the topmost part of the head. Each one of them branches out into one hundred branches. Each one of these hundred branches branch out into 72,000 which spread all over the body. This network is the location of Vyāna Vāyu. Its function is the one between inhaling and exhaling that is retaining the breath. Difficult functions like speaking, lifting of weights, churning of fire for Yajña, etc. are all done by this. (Pra.3.5-7; Ch. 1.3.3-5).

The location of the Udāna Vāyu is along the Suṣumnā Nāḍi, extending from the top of the head to the feet. Its function is to take the animals to deep sleep; also to take the Jīva to the next birth, according to his Karma. (Pra.3.9-10).

Finally, the location of the Samāna Vāyu is the navel. Its function is the distribution of the digested food and fluids equitably to all the parts of the body (Pra.3.5).

iii) The fluids consumed contain the food for all Prāṇa Vāyus. They divide into three parts: The crude part becomes the urine, the middle part goes to the blood and the subtle part goes as food to the Prāṇa — आपः पीतास्त्रेधा विधीयन्ते तासां यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तन्मूत्रं भवति यो मध्यमस्तल्लोहितं योऽणिष्ठः स प्राणः (Ch. 6.5.2). In other words the consumed fluids are Triṣṭkrta, three-fold. If one does not take food the activities of the Antaḥkaraṇa and the gross body may become weak; but animals do not die. Instead, if they are drinking water they can continue to live for several months without food. Without water animals die quickly.

iv) The Ādhidaivikas of these Vāyus are respectively Āditya, Varuna (Ti.Bh.1.1), Vāyu, Tējas and Ākaśa (Pra.3.8-9).

v) Some people say that there are five subsidiary Prāṇas also: Nāga for vomiting, Kūrma for moving the lips and the eyelids, Kṛkara for sneezing, Dévadatta for yawning, Dhananjaya which causes the swelling of deadbody (Amarakośa 1.76). But these are not found anywhere in the Śruti.

11.5 The Antaḥkaraṇa

The instrument that is necessary for the activity of the Jīva is called **Karaṇa**. The five sense organs are external instruments. They grasp the information of sound, touch, sight, taste and smell from the external world. Before offering it to the Jīva, it has to be analysed. The instrument which performs this dissection is the **Antaḥkaraṇa** that is, the internal instrument. The mind is one of its aspects. Its existence can be demonstrated as follows:

i) Many times the eyes may be scanning the lines for reading, but they will not have been read, the ears may receive the sound of words, but they will not have been heard. This is because the mind would have been engaged else where instead of analysing the information (Sū.Bh.2.3.32) This is described by the Śruti as follows: अन्यत्र मना अभूवं नादर्शम् अन्यत्र मना अभूवं नाश्रौषं मनसा ह्येव पश्यति मनसा ह्येव शृणोति — the

mind was elsewhere, so not seen; the mind was elsewhere, so not heard; one sees only through the mind, one hears only through the mind (Br.Bh.1.5.3). The Nyāya Sūtras describe this as follows: युगपत् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः मनसो लिङ्गम् — the indication for the existence of the mind is that we cannot get several cognitions simultaneously (Nyāyasūtra. 1.1.16).

ii) The strength for its function comes from the food we eat. After digestion the eaten food divides into three parts: the gross part becomes excrement, the middle part goes to the flesh and the subtle part becomes the food for the mind — अन्नमशितं त्रेधा विधीयते तस्य यः स्थविष्ठो धातुः तत्पुरीषं भवति यो मध्यमस्तन्मांसं योऽणिष्ठं तन्मनः (Ch.6.5.1). Therefore the Manas is physical; The food consisting of the three parts is called the three—fold food—**Trivṛtkṛta food**, just as we refer to the world as five-fold that is, **Pañcīkṛta**. If one does not take food at all, activities like understanding, deciding and remembering will become weak. The function of Antaḥkaraṇa depends also on the type of food. Sātvic, Rājasic, Tāmasic feelings/thoughts are activated by taking Sātvic, Rājasic and Tāmasic food respectively. That is why spiritual aspirants follow strict rules regarding the food to keep the mind Sattvik. Even the sense perceptions of sound, touch, etc. coming from the external world for the experience of Jīva also act as food for the mind — आहियत इत्याहारः शब्दादि विषयज्ञानं भोक्तुर्भोगाय आहियते (Ch.Bh.7.26.2). Therefore it is very necessary that one restricts one's perceptions to only those which will not create bad impressions.

iii) **Manas** (mind), **Buddhi** (intellect), **Citta** (memory) and **Ahankāra** (ego) are the four functions of Antaḥkaraṇa. Their location in the body is respectively the throat, the face, the navel and the heart. Their functions are respectively thinking (सङ्कल्पविकल्पात्मकं मनः), analysing thoughts and deciding right and wrong among them (निश्चयात्मिका बुद्धिः), memory and retrieval of input information (धारणात्मकं चित्तम्), the sense of I-ness in thoughts (अहंभावात्मको अहंकारः) I am a man, I am a woman, I go, I eat, etc. If the I-ness grows into feelings like

I am big, I am rich and so on it is bad ego. Ādhidaivikas of these four parts are respectively: the Moon, Caturmukha Brahma, Viṣṇu and Rudra. Any Karma starts from the desire to do it and ends with the feeling 'I have done it'. Therefore the fruit of Karma gets accumulated in the Antaḥkaraṇa. If the aspirant acquires realization after a lot of good practice, the fruit of that realization also stays in it.

11.6 The Five Jñānēndriyas

The ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose are the five Jñānēndriyas. Their Ādhibhautikas are respectively hearing, touching, seeing, tasting and smelling. Thus sound, touch, sight, taste and odour are the corresponding objects of experience. Their places are respectively the physical organs of the body — the ears, the skin, the eyes, the tongue and the nose. Their food is the same as that of Antaḥkaraṇa. These organs of the gross body are not themselves the Indriyas; they are only their locations from where they function. Their Ādhidaivikas are respectively Dig Dévatas (divinities of quarters), Vāyu, Sūrya, Varuṇa and the twin Aśvini gods by names Nāsatya and Dasra. Each Indriya grasps only the corresponding object — that is, the ear can only hear but not see, the eye can only see but not hear, and so on. When one Indriya is working the others will not. For example, one may be enjoying the sound, the touch, the sight, the taste and the smell while eating a pretzel. But here when a person is experiencing one of them, he does not experience any other. The reason is the following; the Mind is, of course, able to process all the five bits of information. But this Manas, being only one, can function only through one of the sense organs at a time. Therefore, the Jīva experiences only one of the five items at a time. But the mind is so fast in changing its channel from one sense organ to another that, it is not easy to notice it. It can be understood if we carefully observe that, after all, the mind can get only one thought at a time. This is already seen in Sec. 11.4.i.

11.7 The Five Karméndriyas

These five Ādhyātmikas are respectively the Vāk, Pāṇi, Pāda, Pāyu and Upastha. Their Ādhibhautikas are respectively — speaking, taking and giving, walking, excreting and urinating. The Ādhidaivikas are respectively Agni, Indra, Upéndra, Mṛtyu and Prajāpati. The food for them comes from the consumed fat. The consumed fat splits into three parts: the crude part goes to bones, the middle part to the Manas and the subtle part to the Vāk — तेजोऽशितं त्रेधा विधीयते तस्य यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तदस्ति भवति यो मध्यमः स मज्जा योऽणिष्ठः सा वाक् (Ch. 6.5.3). Though only Vāk is mentioned in the Mantra, it represents all the Karméndriyas. The details of the 19 parts of the subtle body delineated above according to the Śruti can be seen at a glance in the following table.

Ādhyātmika	Ādhibhautika	Location	Ādhidaivika
Antahkaraṇa			
Mind	Thinking	Throat	Moon
Intellect	Decision	Face	Brahma
Memory	Storing and retrieval of information	Navel	Viṣṇu
Ego	Sense of I-ness	Heart	Rudra
Prāṇas			
Prāṇa Vāyu	Exhaling	Face	Āditya
Apāna Vāyu	Inhaling	Anus & Private organ	Varuna
Vyāna Vāyu	Holding the breath	Nadi network	Vāyu
Udāna Vāyu	Taking to next birth and to deep sleep	Suṣumnā extending from top to toe	Téjas
Samāna Vāyu	Distribution of food	Navel	Ākaśa

Ādhyātmika	Ādhibhautika	Location	Ādhidaivika
Jñānēndriyas			
Ear	Hearing	Ears	Dig Dévatas
Skin	Touching	Skin	Vāyu
Eye	Seeing	Eyes	Sūrya
Tongue	Tasting	Tongue	Varuṇa
Nose	Smelling	Nose	Aświni Twins- Nāsatya & Dasra
Karmēndriyas			
Vāk	Speaking	Chest,Throat,Face	Agni
Pāṇi	Giving-Taking	Hands	Indra
Pāda	Walking	Legs	Upēndra
Pāyu	Defecating	Anus	Mṛtyu
Upastha	Urinating	Private organ	Prajāpati

11.7 Parts of Subtle Body according to Vēda

Among the 19 parts of the subtle body the five Jñānēndriyas, the mind, the Vāk and the Pāṇi — these eight are called Grahas by the Śruti. The five items of sense perception for the Jñānēndriyas, sound, touch, sight, taste and odour — the Kāma which is craved by the Manas, the vulgar and untrue words which the Vāk is restlessly ready to utter and the bad actions performed by the hands are called Atigrahas. The grahas are under the grip of the Atigrahas. This Graha-Atigraha combination is indeed the death of the Jīva that is, his bondage (Br. 3.2.2-9). It is only Īśvara who is the death of this death. So, it is said that one who attains Īśvara will conquer death.

11.8 The Subtle body is not me

In order to establish that the subtle body is not me, the same procedure is followed as when showing that the gross body is not me. Notice that all the parts of the subtle body are inert, but working in mutual co-operation. Therefore, all their activities are harnessed to the enjoyment of the sentient Jīva. The Jīva therefore has to be separate from them. That is why he knows whether they are functioning satisfactorily or not satisfactorily or not functioning at all. The Prāṇas

are under the control of even common people to a considerable extent. We can, of course, see the Yógis who can control them fully. Therefore it is clear that all of them are instruments for the Bhóga of the Jīva. Thus Jīva must be separate from them.

The same is true with regard to the Antaḥkaraṇa also. However, a difficulty arises here. It is true that the thoughts of the mind, the decisions of the intellect, the memories of the citta and the ego are all observed by me and therefore they are different from myself. 'I am their observer' also appears to be a thought in the mind only and the 'I' in this thought appears to be the ego. Therefore, it is not clear how 'I' can be different from the Antaḥkaraṇa. The situation is as if the mind is both the seer and the seen. For example, touching himself one feels that he is touching and is also being touched. In fact, the dream activity too is the same and not different: the impressions of the mind constitute the dream world and the mind is also the seer. Therefore, it will not be clear from this analysis whether I am different from the Antaḥkaraṇa. It appears that I am only the mind and not someone transcendental to it.

We can further analyse the same example of touch to clear the doubt and draw the right conclusion. Consider a paralytic patient. When his unafflicted hand touches the afflicted part of the body, he knows he is touching, but will not know that he is being touched. When the afflicted palm comes into contact with the unafflicted part of the body, he will know that he is being touched, but will not know that he is touching. In this way touching and being touched are separated. But who is it who is knowing this distinction? It is obviously the mind which is different from the skin. This means that something which goes out of cognition once and comes to be cognized later has to be a cognized entity. That has to be Jaḍa. As opposed to it, the observer has to be different from it. On the basis of this example we should now fix the observer of the mind. Consider the deep sleep experience when nothing is observed as in wakefulness or dream. This is due to the absence of the mind. Who is observing this absence? It is obviously myself. Therefore I must be existing at that time. This cannot be doubted because after waking up I myself say "I had a sound sleep, I did not know anything."

This statement would be impossible if I were absent at that time. Therefore it is clear that the Antaḥkaraṇa is absent in deep sleep and that I am myself present to testify its absence later. In this way the Antaḥkaraṇa observed once, and being unobserved at another time, has to be only an observable entity; and as opposed to it, one who is always observing is the observer who is oneself. He is distinctly different from the observed.

In this way, it has been demonstrated that all the parts of the subtle body are only observables and 'I' am the observer; therefore 'I' am clearly different from the subtle body. With this the wrong understanding of oneself that he is the subtle body is cleared.

11.9 Causal Body

In this way I am neither the gross body nor the subtle body. It is clear from this that I am not what I have understood to be myself till now. Indeed I do not know who I am. This is Ajñāna — the ignorance of the Jīva. As a result of it, he has wrong understanding about himself. He considers the gross body as himself and thinks he is a man or a woman, a Brāhmaṇa or a Śūdra, etc, according to the gender and the caste or colour of the gross body. Furthermore he develops likes and dislikes based on those differences and indulges in good and bad Karma. All this Karma goes on accumulating in the Antaḥkaraṇa. Obviously, he cannot spend all the Karma in the same birth. Therefore, he has to get another birth. In this way, ignorance about himself is the basic cause for the cycle of birth and death in which the subtle body continues to exist and the gross body is acquired again and again. Since ignorance is destroyed by knowledge, it is appropriate to call it a Śarīra, body. (see the definition of Śarīra in 11.1). Therefore Ajñāna is called Kāraṇaśarīra—Causal body (Īśa.Bh.8). The appropriateness of this name will become more clear in (12.17.ii). We will also know that the Jīva has no relation with this. (12.15.iii)

11.10 Vidyā Karma Pūrva Prajñā

The Jīva does not keep quiet even for a moment in his wakeful state. In accordance with his likes and dislikes, he goes on knowing something or doing something. All the knowledge acquired in this way is called **Vidyā** and all that is done is called **Karma**. Both of them contain the prescribed, the unprescribed and also the forbidden and the unforbidden aspects — all according to the Śāstra. Also this Vidyā and Karma give rise to a **Samskāra**, an overall tendency/proclivity in the Antaḥkaraṇa. This is called **Pūrvaprajñā**. It is also called **Vāsana**. This motivates the person to know something more and to do something more of the same nature of what he has known and done. All the three — Vidyā, Karma and Pūrvaprajñā — are carried by the Jīva in his journey from one birth to another. In other words these three residing in the Antaḥkaraṇa form the blue print for the next birth — 'तं विद्या कर्मणे समन्वारभेते पूर्वप्रज्ञा च' (Br 4.4.2).

11.11 Sancita, Prārabdha, Āgāmi

Births are occurring to the Jīva since beginningless past. The Karma performed in the given birth may not always be exhausted in the same birth because of the necessity of special space-time-opportunities for its experience. As he goes on getting the opportunities he will spend the fruit of it. Therefore, there is bound to be a part of the Karma unused in each life. The sum total of all such Karma is called **Sancita Karma** that is, accumulated Karma. This cannot be spent in one single life span because according to the Śāstra, several births are necessary to spend some particular Karmas. Therefore, Īśvara takes only a part of this Karma and allots it to be spent in this birth. This part of the Karma to be spent in the present life is called the **Prārabdha Karma**. The Karma that is performed in this birth is called **Āgāmi Karma**. At the moment of death when Prārabdha has been completely spent the Āgāmi gets added to the Sancita. In this way the Karma that one accumulates is often more than what is spent in a given birth. May be some fraction of the Prārabdha and perhaps the Sancita may be annulled by Prāyascitta

and Puṇya Karma. But this does not ensure birthlessness because one has to be born again to spend at least the Puṇya Karma.

11.12 Process of Death

The life span in each birth is (pre-) determined according to the Prārabdha. This may, however, increase due to Prāyascitta and Puṇya Karma or decrease by Pāpa done in this birth. Whatever it may be, in the last stage of the allotted lifespan the body is afflicted with old age, fever, etc. and the person takes to bed. At the time of the death the painful process of the subtle body withdrawing from the gross body causes unconsciousness. Therefore, he cannot do anything for his own good at the last moment. The Vidyā, Karma and the Pūrvaprajñā already acquired by him will determine the next course of his journey (Br. 4.3.35). Therefore, the aspirants are advised to make effort during their lifetime to acquire Puṇya giving up bad conduct (Br.Bh.4.4.2).

The first of the body functions to be affected during death is the Vāk, that is speech. This takes the Vṛtti (mode) appropriate to his speech faculty in the next birth and merges in the mind. Then he cannot speak. Here, Vāk represents not only the speech but all the other four motor functions. That is to say all the Karmēndriyas merge in the mind. Afterwards the Jñānēndriyas also merge in the mind. This is similar to what happens in the dream state. But now, they withdraw totally from the gross body unlike in the dream state. Then the Adhidēvatas of the Indriyas will stop favouring the Jīva and merge in their original forms of Sun etc. Then the mind carrying the Indriya-forms will enter into the heart. This causes cessation of all the Indriya transactions (Br.4.4.1-2). Afterwards this mind will acquire the vṛtti appropriate to the next birth and merge in the Prāṇa (Pra.3.10). In the next stage the Prāṇa takes the vṛtti appropriate to the next birth and merges in the Jīvātma. Now, the Jīvātma would have sucked into himself the forms of the speech, the mind and the Prāṇa and will get out through one of the nine outlets of the gross body in the form of a heat pulse (Sū.Bh.4.2.1-11).

11.13 The Process of Rebirth

The body abandoned by the Jīva in this way dies; the Jīva does not. (Ch.6.11.3). After giving up the body, he goes to the Brahmaloḥa if he was an Upāsaka; to the heaven etc if he had done some special Puṇya Karma told in Śruti; to the Pitṛloḥa if had done some special Karma told in Smṛti; and to the hells Raurava, etc. if he had done severe Pāpa (Sū.Bh.3.1.8-17). The process of getting next birth starts even from the previous life. Just as the caterpillar moves by holding the stick in front and only then leaves the stick behind, the Jīva holds to the next birth through his Vāsana and only then he leaves the previous body (Br.4.4.3). Nevertheless, he brings from the previous body the essential seed which acts as the Upādāna for the present body (Sū.Bh. 3.1.1). When he returns to this world through rain water, he first enters into the foodgrains and then into the male body in the form of semen and finally lands in the mother's womb (Ch.5.10.1-8). At the time of death from the previous life, he will have carried with him according to Īśvara's will the three Vṛttis (modes) of speech, the mind and the Prāṇa in accordance with Vidyā, Karma and Pūrvaprajñā. The three forms of speech, mind, and Prāṇa act as blue print of the present life. According to them he may be born as lustrous or lack lustre, lustful or lustless, angry or peaceful, pious or impious.

CHAPTER 12

AVIDYĀ

The Ajñāna that was called the causal body (in 11.9) is now elucidated in this chapter.

12.1 Jīvā's wrong identification

We have just now seen that the Jīva is neither the gross body nor is the subtle body his intrinsic nature. However, he very naturally identifies himself with the gross body and thinks he is a man, a woman, a eunuch, lame, blind and so on. Getting a little inside into the body, identifies himself with the Upādhis like intellect and considers himself as happy, unhappy, intelligent, foolish, virtuous, sinful, lustful, etc. Going outwards, he thinks he is a father, a mother, son, daughter, friend, etc., in relation to the other bodies. Worse than this, identifying himself with the external objects like wealth and lands totally unrelated to him, he thinks he is rich, poor, landlord, etc. This brings about restlessness in him. Never for a moment does he reflect that all these features get thrust on himself by himself only in relation to the various adjuncts. All these adjuncts are inert observables and he himself, being the sentient observer, is distinctly different from them. How is it at all possible that there can be any connection effected between him and the rest? One may feel that he is at least the knower of everything. Can we therefore say that knowership is his Svarūpa? Even that is not correct. Svarūpa is that intrinsic nature of a thing which does not leave it at all. The Svarūpa of the Jagat was determined to be Brahman only on this basis. But in Suṣupti even knowership is absent. That is because knowing and not knowing are the only two features of knowership; at that time there is neither knowing nor not knowing. So, even that cannot be his Svarūpa.

12.2 Where else to find Jīva Svarūpa?

It can be found only in deep sleep. During that time all the imagined relationship with any of the adjuncts, namely the external objects or other bodies or even his own gross body or the subtle body, is totally absent. He is all alone. Therefore, his real Svarūpa is as what he is in Suṣupti.

‘But isn’t even this disturbed the moment one wakes up? How then can it be his Svarūpa?’ This doubt is not proper because, he who is in Suṣupti is himself in the wakeful and in the dream states also. Then he was without adjuncts, but now with them. Left to himself he is always what he is. ‘Since one is not aware of anything in Suṣupti, not even himself, could it be said that he was non-existent then?’ No. because after waking up he himself says, ‘I enjoyed sound sleep. I was not aware of anything.’ If he were not existing at that time, he could make this observation. He was certainly present. Therefore, it can be concluded that Jīva is really unrelated to anything that he notices while awake. Even the coming and going of their relationship is witnessed by him. The collection of all these adjuncts is called the Kṣétra and the one who is witnessing them, namely the Jīva, is the Kṣétrajña. When he is totally free from all these adjuncts he is the seer of the sight, he cannot be seen; he is the hearer of the heard, he cannot be heard; he is the thinker of the thoughts, he cannot be thought of; he is the knower of the known, he cannot be known — ‘न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येर्न श्रुतेः श्रोतारम् श्रुणुया न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्विथा न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः’ (Br. 3.4.2). Therefore, he is not able to recognize himself in deep sleep. He has been habituated to recognizing himself only in relation to the adjuncts! So, he is not able to recognize himself when he is all alone. It is like not recognizing one’s own house when all the houses in the neighbourhood are absent. It is only when he knows his Svarūpa that he will not get confused whether he is in association with the adjuncts or without them.

12.3 Determination of the Svarūpa

The big question is: ‘How to understand this adjunctless Svarūpa of the Jīva?’ It is obvious that it is not determinable by direct sense perception because the implements necessary for perceiving namely, the Jñānēndriyas, have been left at the doorstep of the wakeful state. It cannot be determined by Anumāna either because the necessary implement to infer namely, the mind, is left at the threshold of the dream state. Moreover, as the Jīva in Suṣupti does not have any signs through which recognition is possible, the mind and Indriyas would be of no use even if they are present. Therefore, its understanding does not fall within the domain of logic: नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया (Ka.1.2.9). For that matter Bhagavān Vyāsa cautions that the nature of Jīva should never be taught to the one whose intellect has been charred by logic: न वाच्यं तर्कशास्त्रदग्धाय’ (Mókṣa Dharma Parva 247.18). Then how to know it? Remember the same predicament was faced while fixing the Svarūpa of the Jagat (5.9). Anything that is beyond the Prakṛti can never be determined by any other Pramāṇa than the Āgama which is of non-human origin—Apouruṣeya. Jīva Svarūpa is also one such thing which transcends the Prakṛti. Therefore, it has to be understood only through Āgama from an Ācārya who is Brahmaniṣṭha (resting in Brahman).

12.4 Āgama’s Answer

Just as the Śruti sprung a surprise when it spoke about the Svarūpa of the Jagat as Brahman, it springs surprise even now when it speaks about the Svarūpa of the Jīva. To the questions: “Where will be the Jīva in Suṣupti? How will he be?” The Vēda replies as follows: सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति स्वमपीतो भवति — then he is one with Brahman, he will have dissolved in his Ātman’ (Ch. 6.8.1.); ‘पर आत्मनि संप्रतिष्ठते’ — he will be one with the Paramātmā. (Pr. 4.7); ‘अन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते’ — he will be sleeping in the Ākāśa of his inner heart.’ (Br.2.1.17); प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः — he is embraced by the Prāññatmā (Br.4.3.21) etc. In short, it says he was one with Brahman. If he should become one with

Brahman in Suṣupti experienced daily, then his Svarūpa has to be identical with Brahman only. Otherwise this complete merger is impossible. This does not mean that the Jīva is Brahman only during the Suṣupti; he is Brahman even in Jāgrat and Svapna. 'त्वं स्त्री त्वं पुमानसि त्वं कुमार उत वा कुमारी | त्वं जीर्णो दण्डेन वञ्चसि त्वं जातो भवसि विश्वतोमुखः' —you are woman, you are man. You are a boy or a girl. You only become old and walk with a stick in hand. You are born in multifarious forms (Śve. 4.3.). The same thing is told very explicitly in Chāndógya. After analysing the features of Paramātman it says at the end 'स य एषोऽणिमैतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो' — that this minute subtlety, all this is that Satya, that is the Ātman. Oh Śvétakétu, thou art that (Ch.6.8.7). Likewise it says, 'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा नान्योऽतोऽस्ति श्रोता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति मन्ता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति विज्ञाता' — there is no seer apart from Him, no listener apart from Him, no thinker apart from Him, no knower apart from Him (Br.3.7.23); 'स वा एष महान् अज आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः' — this Vijñānamaya that is, one who is understanding things during wakefulness and dreams, is indeed the great birthless ĀTMAN (Br.Bh. 4.4.22); etc. Not only that. The Śruti also condemns very strongly any idea of difference between Brahman and the Ātman. 'अन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद यथा पशुरेवं स देवानाम्' — One who says 'I am different, He is different' does not know. He is only like a beast to those Dévatas (Br.Bh. 1.4.10); 'मृत्योस्स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति' — He who sees plurality here suffers death after death (Br.Bh. 4.4.19); etc. The forthcoming discussions are intended only to confirm this.

12.5 Is Jīva an Amśa of Brahman?

Doubt: 'The Śruti has declared the Jīva-Brahman identity in some places. But in some other places it talks of their difference also. 'सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' — He is to be searched for, he is to be understood (Ch.Bh. 8.7.1). Therefore, it is clear that Brahman is different from the one who is its seeker. In another place it says —

‘यथाग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्ति एवमेव अस्मादात्मनः.....
सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति’ — just as the sparks come out of fire, all these
creatures have issued out of this Ātman’. (Br. 2.1.20, Mu. 2.1.1). Here
some similarity is indicated and at the same time the difference is also
implied. In the Gīta it is said ‘ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः’ — It is
my ancient fragment in the Jīvalóka that has become the Jīva’ (G. 15.7).
How to reconcile all these statements?’

Answer: The Śruti teaches the central doctrine Siddhānta in
stages keeping in view the competence level of the aspirants. This has
been already verified in the foregoing pages while determining the Svarūpa
of Brahman. Similarly here also we have to decipher the meaning of
difference and the meaning of the word ‘fragment’ so as to reconcile
with other statements. For the beginner aspirant, who does not know
Brahman, It is after all different from Him. Therefore, the statement
‘सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः’ — Brahman has to be searched’ is apt in his case. Further,
the individual intellect of the Jīva is indeed a fragment of the collective
intellect of Hiraṇyagarbha. Therefore we can say that the Jīva is the
fragment of Aparabrahman. But, when viewed without any adjuncts, the
Jīva cannot be said to be apart of Brahman like an organ of a body. It is
because, in that case, just as the pain in the organ causes pain to the body
itself, the grief and pain of the Jīvas should cause grief and pain to
Brahman Itself. Since grieving Jīvas are infinite in number, it would
imply that Brahman’s grief should also be infinite. But this is obviously
wrong. Alternatively one may think of this idea; “Let the fragmentary
nature of the Jīva be like that of the sparks in relation to the fire. These
sparks are clearly different from fire from where they emanated. So they
will not affect the fire by what happens to them. Suppose the Jīvas are
fragments of Brahman in this way, their grief would not touch It.” Jīvas
are fragments of Hiraṇyagarbha in this sense. But as fragments of
Brahman, even this will not be correct because, in that case, where there
are Jīvas there cannot be Brahman. This would violate the limitlessness
of Brahman. Moreover, since Brahman is partless, Jīvas fragmentariness
cannot be of this type at all. Therefore the Sūtrakāra proposes the

answer to this problem in the sutra ‘प्रकाशादिवनैवं परः’ like light. In this way (Paramātman is not afflicted by grief)’ (Br.Sū.2.3.46). The light or the blue sky that is spread everywhere appears in different shapes when viewed through holes of different shapes. These shapes of light are definitely fragments of the omnipresent light. However, the shapes of holes will not affect the omnipresent light in any way by the changes the holes undergo. The application of this example is as follows. The omnipresent light stands for Brahman. The body, the intellect, and Indriyas of different people are represented in the example by the holes. When viewed through them, all the Jīvas will indeed be fragments of Brahman only. The Jīva wrongly identifying himself with the body, etc. may experience grief in relation to the body. But this grief does not touch Brahman at all. This is indeed verifiable in Suṣupti because the connection with the body is snapped in Suṣupti and the grief experience of wakeful and dream states is totally absent. In this way the Jīva identifying himself with the body may appear like a fragment of Brahman; but in his true nature he is Brahman only. Therefore, the Śāstra tells first about the identity of Jīva with Brahman and conveys this message through examples of sparks and fragments, ultimately concludes this identity. In this way, if we understand the consistency in meaning of the teaching of Śruti by comparing the statements in the beginning and at the end, we can come to the conclusion of absolute identity (Br.Bh.1.2.20).

12.6 Definition of Avidyā and Adhyāsa

i) We understood in the Jagat Prakaraṇa that though the Jagat appears mysteriously variegated, it is only the ‘not this, not this’ Brahman in its Svarūpa. The situation is the same in the case of the Jīva also. He is seen to be constantly shuttling between Jāgrat, Svapna and Suṣupti, cognising different things in Jāgrat and Svapna with the help of the intellect, doing Puṇya and Pāpa prodded by likes and dislikes and going from one birth to another as a result of it. All this terrific activity is his appearance in relation to the adjuncts, but when free from all of

them, his own intrinsic nature is seen to be the pristine state of Brahman. But the Jīva does not know this. This ignorance of the Jīva about himself is called **Avidyā**. Védānta Śāstra calls it Ajñāna or Agrahaṇa also. This is the clear and unambiguous description of Avidyā. Avidyā is this and solely this. It is neither different nor more than this.

ii) This Avidyā makes room for wrong understanding in the Jivātma of himself and this wrong understanding is termed as **Adhyāsa**. It is also called Anyathāgrahaṇa. In other words, Adhyāsa is the result of Avidyā. Instead of knowing himself as the faultless Brahman, Jivātma thinks that he is the body which he is not. In this way, the Buddhi of that one which is not that, is Adhyāsa — (अ-तस्मिन् तद्बुद्धिः). Sometimes, Adhyāsa is also designated as Avidyā. This is like mad action being termed as madness. This wrong understanding is the root of all sorrows. Instead of knowing himself as the formless (immutable) Brahman, he thinks he is the body. Similarly, instead of recognizing others as Brahman he wrongly recognizes them as different people through their bodies. In reality he is himself existing everywhere. But because of wrong identification he finds multiplicity and becomes a victim to lust, fear etc. An example: One's own image in the mirror appears as many when it is broken. So, one who thinks that one in the mirror image is different from oneself — as for instance, a sparrow — is confused and scared by this multiplicity. Similarly, he who is ignorant of his Svarūpa sees multiplicity, experiences pain and pleasure and is frightened.

iii) In this way the Jīva pursues material happiness due to Adhyāsa and entangles himself in the cobwebs created by himself. In order to give the right knowledge which removes this Adhyāsa, the Śāstra gives the example of rope-snake, shell-silver etc. Consider the rope-snake example. Here is the Adhyāsa — erroneous understanding of snake in the rope which is not a snake. This Adhyāsa is based on four things: (a) darkness, (b) rope, (c) rope-snake similarity, and (d) the impressions of snake. Here the darkness should not be total; there must be a little light also. Next, a person might not have seen the snake directly; he could have seen it in a picture or heard about it. That is

sufficient to give him the impression of the snake. Thus, seeing the rope he gets the idea of snake; he thinks it is the snake. The rope is to be properly examined to get to the correct understanding that it is a rope. In the subject corresponding to this example (a) the darkness stands for Avidyā. Nobody will have total ignorance of oneself. Though he does not know his Svarūpa, he has at least the simple awareness of his existence in deep sleep though he does not know who exactly he is. This corresponds to the darkness combined with a little light (b) the rope stands for Brahmānanda (c) the similarity in the rope and the snake stands for the similarity between material pleasure and Brahmānanda. (d) the snake impression is analogous to the impression of material happiness. The enjoyership of this material happiness has been the death of the Jīva. In order to get liberated from this death, he has to analyse the material happiness thoroughly and get introduced to Brahmānanda. This is done in the next chapter.

iv) Some people at this juncture may get a doubt: If the cause of Adhyāsa is Avidyā, what is the cause of Avidyā? This is not an intelligent question. See how: A boy answers $3 \times 4 = 22$ in place of $3 \times 4 = 12$. His ignorance of the right answer has given room for the wrong answer. In this sense, ignorance is the reason for the wrong answer. But suppose, someone asks further ‘What is the reason for this ignorance?’ will it not be a wrong question? Therefore, one should not ask the reason for Avidyā. It should simply be accepted and efforts should be put forth to get rid of it.

12.7 Effect of Māyā is the support of Adhyāsa

Adhyāsa is only understanding something as something else which it is not. Therefore, understanding his self as the body which he is not is Adhyāsa. Similarly, understanding others through their bodies and seeing multiplicity is also Adhyāsa. Thinking of oneself as husband, wife, son, daughter, etc., in relation to their bodies is its consequence. Thinking oneself as a landlord in relation to a piece of land is also similar. All these wrong apprehensions about oneself, come only in relation to one’s body, the bodies of others, a piece of land and so on. These

adjuncts have not been created by himself. He is only recognizing himself wrongly through them that have all been created by Brahman. Brahman by its power of Māyā has created them for the sake of Jīva to experience the fruit in accordance with his Karma. If they did not exist he could not experience his Karma phala at all. Therefore, the basis for the Adhyāsa resulting from Avidyā is the Jagat which is an effect of Māyā. In fact, this basis serves not only the purpose of mundane life but also Mókṣa of Jīva. Jīva is gripped by Adhyāsa and hence unable to differentiate himself from the world. This leads to doing action with a sense of doership and enjoyership. The mundane life has been created by Īśvara who is the ultimate witness and the indweller of all creatures and presides over all Karma. It is only from his grace that one can get even the knowledge which leads one to Mókṣa —

‘अविद्यावस्थायां कार्यकरणसंघाताविवेकदर्शिनो जीवस्य अविद्यातिमिरान्धस्य सतः परस्मादात्मनः कर्माध्यक्षात् सर्वभूताधिवासात् साक्षिणः चेतयितुः ईश्वरात् तदनुज्ञया कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वलक्षणस्य संसारस्य सिद्धिः | तदनुग्रह हेतुकेनैव च विज्ञानेन मोक्षसिद्धिर्भवितुमर्हति’ (Sū.Bh.2.3.41). This is because Mókṣa is possible only when Puṇya is accumulated and Pāpa is got rid of. This accumulation of Puṇya is possible only when there is the world. Not only that, one should certainly acquire the knowledge of Brahman for Mókṣa and this knowledge has to be obtained only through the world. Had this world not been created by Brahman, there would have been no way to get the knowledge of Its attributeless Svarūpa — ‘यदि हि नामरूपे न व्याक्रियेते तदा अस्यात्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिख्यायेत’ (Br.Bh. 2.5.19). Therefore in summary, Jagat is the effect of Māyā and all the worldly and spiritual transactions of the Jīva done due to Avidyā are possible only on the basis of the Jagat.

12.8 Adhyāsa is the cause of danger

Though Avidyā is the cause of Adhyāsa, the danger befalls the Jīva only from Adhyāsa and not just from Avidyā. For example, there is no danger for a blind man who is ignorant of a pit near by. But if some desire prompts him to approach that side, there is the danger of his

falling into it. “Is it not the ignorant man who is extrovert that is motivated to act outwardly?” The ignorance is not at all the motivator. It is only of the nature of concealing the Svarūpa of things. Of course, just as blindness may result in falling into a pit, it may indirectly be the motivator. In that case which exactly is the direct motivator for action? The answer is given in the Śruti. That is Eṣaṇā, Kāma, the desire — ‘ननु अविद्यावान् हि बहिर्मुखीभूतः प्रवर्तते? साऽपि नैव प्रवर्तिका । वस्तुस्वरूपावरणात्मिका हि सा । प्रवर्तकबीजत्वं तु प्रतिपद्यते । अन्धत्वमिव गर्तादिपतनप्रवृत्तिहेतुः । तर्हि एवम् उच्यताम् । किं तत् यत्प्रवृत्तिहेतुरिति ? तदिह अभिधीयते एषणा कामः सः’ (Br.Bh. 1.4.17). Similarly, Avidyā is not directly the cause of danger; instead, its effect, Adhyāsa, is the direct cause on account of which one thinks that he is the body, then sees the distinction of male and female and then adds lust to it, he will fall in mundane life and move from one birth to another. That is, Avidyā is not responsible for differentiation (in Jīvas) because it is uniform (in all the Jīvas). It is only when coupled with desire, etc. leading to Karma, it would become responsible for differentiation — ‘न च अविद्या केवला वैषम्यस्य कारणम् एकरूपत्वात् । रागादिक्लेशवासनाक्षिप्त कर्मापेक्षा तु अविद्या वैषम्यकरी स्यात्’ (Sū. Bh. 2.1.36). Though Avidyā may be present, it is only the attachment to the pains and pleasures that is, the feeling that he himself is the experiencer of them, that is mainly responsible for getting another birth — सत्यामपि अविद्यायां सुखदुःखमोहेषु गुणेषु भुज्यमानेषु यः सङ्गः आत्मभावः स प्रधानं कारणं जन्मनः (G. Bh. 13.21).

12.9 Is Avidyā an existent entity or merely absence of Vidyā?

i) The above statement abruptly made by Bhagavān Śāṅkara alerts us to know the nature of Avidyā: it is एकरूपा — uniform in all Jīvas; so it cannot be responsible for the differences in Jīvas. ‘Why is it uniform?’ because, it is the absence of the knowledge which cannot be different in different Jīvas. The directly experienced pains and pleasures are existing entities. Therefore their cause, the Adhyāsa, should also be a positive entity. It is a thought existing in the intellect, though it may,

of course, be wrong. On the other hand the reason for the wrong thought is the absence of the right thought in the mind, namely “I am Brahman.” In other words, Avidyā is only the absence of Vidyā. There are very strong reasons why this should be so. They will be elucidated in (13.28) and in 14.11.ix. It is precisely because it is not an existent stuff that Ajñāna cannot be directly the cause of grief. Śaṅkara explicates it as follows: ‘यदि ज्ञानाभावः यदि संशयज्ञानं यदि विपरीतज्ञानं वा उच्यते अज्ञानमिति सर्वं हि तत् ज्ञानेनैव निवर्त्यते’ — whatever is called Ajñāna, whether it be the absence of Jñāna or the doubtful Jñāna or the wrong Jñāna, it will all be gone the moment Jñāna comes. (Br.Bh.3.3.1).

‘अविद्या विपरीतग्राहकः संशयोपस्थापकः अग्रहणात्मको वा’ — Avidyā is of the nature of causing a wrong knowledge or creating a doubt, or not knowing anything (G. Bh. 3.2). In some places the absence of Jñāna itself is called Ajñāna by Śaṅkara. ‘येषाम् एतौ पदार्थौ अज्ञानसंशयविपर्यय प्रतिबद्धौ तेषां तत्त्वमसीत्येतद्वाक्यं स्वार्थे प्रमां नोत्पादयितुं शक्नोति’.....To those to whom the two entities ‘thou’ and ‘that’ are impeded by absence of knowledge, doubt and wrong knowledge, the sentence ‘thou are that’ does not convey its meaning. On the other hand, those intelligent people for whom this meaning is unimpeded by absence of knowledge, doubt and wrong knowledge, will be able to experience the meaning of the sentence thou art that! — ‘येषां पुनर्निपुणमतीनां नाज्ञानसंशय विपर्ययलक्षणः पदार्थविषयः प्रतिबन्धोऽस्ति ते शक्नुवन्ति सकृदुक्तमेव तत्त्वमसिवाक्यार्थम् अनुभवितुम्’ (Sū. Bh. 4.1.2). This Avidyā is not a natural feature of the Ātman — ‘सा च अविद्या नाऽऽत्मनः स्वाभाविको धर्मः’ (Br.Bh. 4.3.20). Since this Ātman is pure, faultless and free from Avidyā it is said that he has no causal body — ‘आत्मा शुद्धं निर्मलम् अविद्यामलरहितमिति कारणशरीर प्रतिषेधः’ (Īśa.Bh. 8). People experience grief caused by actions done with desire which is itself caused by their Avidyā superimposed by them on themselves. But that Avidyā does not really exist in their Ātman — ‘लोको हि अविद्यया स्वात्मन्यध्यस्तया कामकर्मोद्भवं दुःखं अनुभवति न तु सा परमार्थतः स्वात्मनि’ (Ka. Bh. 2.2.11).

Not only that. ‘Just as the darkness in the night vanishes the moment sun rises, Avidyā is totally lost the moment Vidyā dawns —

विद्यायां हि सत्याम् उदिते सवितरि शार्वरमिव तमः प्रणाशमुपगच्छत्यविद्या (G. Bh.2.69). 'If it were an existent stuff, it would not be destroyed so tracelessly — 'न हि भावानां निरन्वयो निरूपाख्यो विनाशः संभवति' (Sū.Bh. 2.2.22). 'An existing thing can never go out of existence — नाभावो विद्यते सतः (G.2.16). If Avidyā has objective existence it should be somewhere else after exiting from the intellect of one who throws it out by his Vidyā. A Jñānī would not be willing to impart Vidyā because he would be frightened that the disciple's Avidyā which will be pushed out of him by his teaching could enter into himself! Therefore, Avidyā described by Śāṅkara as Jñānābhāva — the absence of Jñāna and as Agrahaṇa — not knowing can never be an existing stuff.

ii) But some people query in the following way with regard to the question whether Avidyā is an existent stuff or just the absence of knowledge: When a person speaks of the absence of a pot it is obvious that he has the knowledge of the pot. This is their example. Similarly, it is only he who has the knowledge of Ātman who can say that Ajñāna is the absence of Jñāna. But there will be no Ajñāna at all in one who has Ātmajñāna! Therefore, it is not possible to say that Ajñāna is the absence of Ātmajñāna. Then how is it to be described? Like this: Whatever we come to know as existing is existent. Now, the Ajñāni knows that he has Ajñāna. Therefore it must be existent. But because it is lost by Jñāna, Ajñāna is certainly opposite to Jñāna.

In this train of thinking, the following is to be noticed: In the example, it is clear that there is no opposition between the absence of the pot and the knowledge of the pot. Next, it is explicitly stated that unlike in the example, there is direct opposition between Ajñāna and Ātmajñāna. Therefore, the example is inept. In order to make amends to this fault and maintain a similarity with the example, an objectivity for Ajñāna as distinctly different from the objectivity of the pot is concocted on the basis that it is perceived by the Ajñānī as existing. But the whole Pramāṇa Śāstra (Epistemology) is meant only for examining the existence of things. After analysis on this basis, we may consequently find that a thing seen to be existing may not be existing objectively and

at times some thing thought to be non-existing may also be found to be existing objectively. If someone thinks that something exists, it could well be a subjective feeling. Therefore, it would be immature to certify Ajñāna as having objective existence based on the belief of the Ajñānī. Even temporarily granting its existence based on his subjective feeling, Śāṅkara has averred on the basis of Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śruti that it does not at all exist in the Kṣétrañña. Therefore it is totally wrong to speak of its objective existence. (G. Bh. 13.2).

iii) Instead of beating about the bush circuitously as above, it is better to ask directly what is objective existence? And what is not objective existence? The answer to this is as follows: Whatever is in Ātman has objective existence since Ātman alone exists. Ātman's existence is transcendental Satya. All the name forms of the Jagat which have emanated from the Ātman have an objective existence of transactional Satyatva. Things like the mirage whose base is again the Ātman only, have also an objective existence of virtual Satyatva. (Sec 9.8-10). As opposed to all these three, that which does not at all exist in the Ātman is non-existent. Avidyā belongs to this last category.

Question: If Ajñāna is the absence of Jñāna it cannot be perceived. But how is it that the Ajñānī perceives it?

Answer: We can understand this with the example of the pot given above. What is the absence of the pot? When one who has the objective knowledge of the pot does not see the pot outside, he says the pot is absent. But, when one speaks of the Ajñāna of the pot there is some difference. One accepts on the basis of somebody's word that there must be an object called a pot. But when he is not able to get its picture in the intellect, he says he has the Ajñāna of the pot. Similarly, when the Guru speaks of the Ātman, the listener accepts its existence on the basis of his word. But, when he is unable to get its corresponding form in his intellect, he says that he has its Ajñāna. In this way, the non-existence of an external object in accordance with its objective knowledge is the absence of the object; the absence of the picture in the intellect of a thing heard through someone is called the absence of its

knowledge. In wrong knowledge the intellect has a form different from that of the object. In right knowledge the intellect has the right picture in accordance with the object. But notice that **in the case of the Ajñāna of anything, there is no picture of any kind in the intellect at all.**

iv) Now there may be another doubt. If Avidyā is non-existent how can it give rise to Adhyāsa which is existent? For an answer to this question, we will first understand that Avidyā is the cause of Adhyāsa not in the sense of Upādāna or Nimitta: it only gives room for Adhyāsa; it is an excuse, a pretext. This can be understood through an example. A house is vacant. The owner is absent for a long time. Other people like Sādhus (ascetics), amorous persons or lazy fellows come and take shelter in it and go away. The absence of the owner is the reason for their presence in the house. However, this does not mean that those people are produced by the absence of the owner. Rather, it only gives room for anybody to come and stay. The moment the owner arrives, they stop coming. In this example, the empty house is the Ajñāni's intellect. The owner is the Vidyā of realizing oneself as Brahman. The absence of this Vidyā is the emptiness of the house. Tāmasic (dull) thoughts like 'I am foolish' etc., Rājasic (passionate) thoughts like 'I am great' etc., Sāttvic (virtuous) thoughts like 'I am a devotee' etc., enter into his empty intellect. These existent thoughts are born out of the Māyā of the three Guṇas according to his Vidyā, Karma and Pūrvaprajñā — 'ये चैव सात्त्विका भावा राजसास्तामसाश्च ये मत्त एवेति तान्विद्धि' (G.7.12); 'भवन्ति भावा भूतानां मत्त एव पृथग्विधाः' (G.10.5). That is why it is stated above that the 'understanding' part in the 'wrong understanding' is an existing entity. This is induced Adhyāsa. Because it is existent, it can give rise to the existent pains and pleasures of mundane life. When the thought of Vidyā, namely 'I am Brahman,' enters into his intellect like the owner into his house, the wrong ideas of Adhyāsa will get out. "Where will they go?" Just as an ornament changes its form into another, the thoughts of Adhyāsa are transformed into thoughts of Vidyā. It should be noted that the Vidyā of Advaitajñāna is also a mental thought — 'अद्वैतज्ञानं मनोवृत्ति मात्रम्' (Ch.Bh.Introduction). Whether they be the thoughts of Vidyā or

Avidyā — both are Asatya that is, changing. One with the thoughts of Avidyā is called Ajñānī and one with thoughts of Vidyā is called Jñānī — ‘यथा बुद्ध्याद्याहृतस्य शब्दाद्यर्थस्य अविक्रिय एव सन् बुद्धिवृत्या अविवेकविज्ञानेन अविद्यया उपलब्धा आत्मा कल्प्यते एवमेव आत्मानात्मविवेकविज्ञानेन बुद्धिवृत्या विद्यया असत्य रूपयैव परमार्थत अविक्रिय एव आत्मा विद्वान् उच्यते’ (G.Bh. 2.21).

12.10 Buddhi is Dharmi, Vidyā is Pratiyōgi.

What has been explained above can be represented by two technical words. The place where a certain thing is absent is called the **Dharmi** of the absence, the certain thing which removes this absence is called **Pratiyōgi** of this absence. Let us consider the absence of milk in a vessel. The vessel is the dharmi of the absent milk and the milk is its Pratiyōgi. Similarly, the absence of the thought ‘I am Brahman’ in the intellect is Avidyā. The thought ‘I am Brahman’ is Vidyā. This thought is in the intellect. This means that the intellect is the dharmi of Vidyā and the thought ‘I am Brahman’ is the Pratiyōgi of Avidyā. Whether the first or the last, or continuous or intermintent, the intellectual thought which removes the Avidyā is Vidyā — ‘य एव अविद्यादिदोषनिवृत्तिफलकृत् प्रत्ययः आद्यः अन्त्यः सन्ततः असन्ततो वा स एव विद्या ’ (Br.Bh.1.4.10). Vidyā means Sarvātmabhāva, that is the thought that everything around is only himself. This is because Brahman is every thing and therefore one who realises that he is Brahman becomes everything. ‘That thought which deviates from Sarvātmabhāva and entertains even to the extent of the tip of a hair the idea that “I am not this” is Avidyā — ‘यतु सर्वात्मभावात् अर्वाग् वालाग्रमात्रमपि अन्यत्वेन दृश्यते नाहमस्मीति तदवस्था अविद्या’ (Br.Bh. 4.3.20). ‘This Avidyā is not natural to the Ātman. It is because it gradually decreases as the Vidyā increases and when it reaches its climax of Sarvātmabhāva, it is totally destroyed — ‘सा च अविद्या नाऽऽत्मनः स्वाभाविको धर्मः यस्मात् विद्यायाम् उत्कृष्यमाणयां स्वयम् अपचीयमाना सती काष्ठां गतायां विद्यायां परिनिष्ठिते सर्वात्मभावे सर्वात्मना निवर्तते’ (Br.Bh. 4.3.20). Therefore, Avidyā is not the natural feature of the Ātman. At any time the intrinsic nature is never destroyed just as there is no destruction for

the heat and the light of the sun. That is why it is possible to get rid of Avidyā — ‘तस्मात् नाऽऽत्मधर्मोऽविद्या । न हि स्वाभाविकस्य उच्छ्रित्तिः कदाचिदपि उपपद्यते सवितुरिव औष्ण्यप्रकाशयोः । तस्मात् तस्या मोक्षः उपपद्यते’ (Br.Bh.4.3.20). Avidyā is destroyable because it has no objective existence. If it had, it would never have gone. Even if it goes from one’s intellect, it will have to be existent somewhere else. This is not possible. Therefore, Avidyā is only darkness, the absence of light. As soon as the light of Vidyā comes it vanishes totally.

Some people say that darkness has an objective existence. The reason they give is that it is black. But no one even with an elementary knowledge of the eye is perturbed by this logic. It is known that the nerves in the eyes absorb the colour of an object entering into them. Therefore, that object appears in that colour. Since all the colours are present in the sunlight and all of them are absorbed by the nerves, sunlight appears colourless. In darkness there is no colour to be absorbed by the nerves. Therefore darkness appears black. Blackness is not a different colour. It is only the absence of all colours. The eyes get rest in darkness only because there is no work to be done by them. Had the blackness of the darkness been another existent colour, the eyes would have to be doing the job of seeing it. Therefore the eyes would have had no rest.

“Guṇa means property, Guṇi is the entity to which it belongs. It is well known that the observation of a Guṇa is impossible if the Guṇi is non-existent. Blackness is the property of darkness. Since this blackness is seen, the darkness must have an objective existence.”

What is the Pramāṇa (source of knowledge) to say that blackness is the property of darkness?

“Obviously the eyes”

Dear Sir. Isn’t darkness seen even if the eyes are shut? Darkness is darkness whether you keep your eyes open or shut. How can you say eyes are the Pramāṇa to say that darkness is an object? You cannot.

12.11 Avidyā is beginningless

If the Karma done because of Avidyā in this birth should give rise to the next birth, the question that comes immediately is, When did the Avidyā begin? The answer is that it has no beginning. The reason for this birth is the Karma done in the previous birth due to Avidyā and the reason for the previous birth is the Karma done in the birth previous to that. This way we have to be going backwards without a stop. This shows that the Avidyā has no beginning. In the present Śvétavarāha Kalpa, the reason for the first birth of a Jīva is the Karma done due to Avidyā in the previous Kalpa. He is born in this Kalpa only to expend that Karma. On the other hand, if we say that the Avidyā has a beginning, it would imply that he who was Brahman previously forgot about his Svarūpa and acquired Avidyā. If Brahman should lose the knowledge of its own Svarūpa, It cannot be Brahman at all. Therefore, Avidyā is beginningless but comes to an end on acquiring Vidyā.

“It is not like that. It is our experience that we forget what we had known and then, remember the same sometime later. Similarly, could not the same thing happen in the case of Ātmaavidyā also?”

No, it cannot. There is a lot of difference between Ātmajñāna and the qualified knowledge which is forgotten and later remembered. Ātmajñāna is not related to Buddhi, but qualified knowledge is related. The latter is the knowledge of objects which are non-Ātman. Due to various reasons, the object may be forgotten and because of its incidental connection with something else, it may be remembered again. But Ātmajñāna is not like that: all qualified knowledge ends at the level of the intellect. They will never go beyond the intellect. They do not even touch the Ātman. Indeed, they do not touch even the Suṣuptātman. That is why even an Ajñānī easily knows that he is totally free from all the adjuncts during Suṣupti and he does not forget this experience. But because he does not have the experience of the pure Ātman being himself, he wakes up through the same intellect containing Adhyāsa. But a Jñāni has the experience of pure Ātman which is beyond intellect as much as an Ajñānī has the experience of Suṣupti. This

experience will have destroyed the previous Adhyāsa in the intellect. Therefore, when he gets up from Suṣupti, he enters the intellect which is free from Adhyāsa. Thoughts in the intellect are only the expressions of one's experiences. Therefore, once there is the experience of the Ātman, only that will be expressed through thoughts. Forgetting and remembering are the features of the mind; not of the Ātman, not even of the Suṣuptātman. Both are beyond the mind.

12.12 Avidyā is endless

Question: Māyā has been stated to be eternal (Sec 8.9). Therefore it should have neither beginning nor an end in time. Further, its only role is to run the Jagat. Therefore, the Jagat should also be created and destroyed in cycles forever. Further, it is said that the Jagat is created only for the sake of the Jīvas who have Avidyā. This implies that Avidyā should also be beginningless and endless. Even the Bhāṣyakāra tells that the Adhyāsa is beginningless and endless — अनादिरनन्तः नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासः (Adhyāsa Bhāṣya). Therefore, how can Avidyā be destroyed?

Answer: It is like this. One Jīva may acquire Jñāna and lose his Avidyā. When his body dies, he will not get another birth. There is no need of the Jagat for him. But the remaining Jīvas will be there even in the infinite future. Therefore the Bhāṣyakāra has said that the Adhyāsa is beginningless and endless. Avidyā can come to an end in individuals; but collectively it exists for ever.

Question: If all the Jīvas get Mukti in due course, shouldn't the collective Adhyāsa also come to an end?

Answer: If it ends the Jagat becomes unnecessary. Therefore, Māyā should also become redundant. But Māyā is eternal according to Śruti. Therefore, the collective Adhyāsa has to be eternal. As a consequence, we will have to agree that either (a) some specific Jīvas are in eternal bondage, or (b) the Jīvas are countless. Which is the more likely of the two? Suppose we agree on (a) then it would imply that Īśvara has faults like partiality and cruelty. Therefore it cannot be correct. So,

we have to accept the possibility (b). In fact, the Śruti endorses this choice. 'शतं सहस्रमयुतं न्यर्बुदमसङ्ख्येयं स्वमस्मिन् निविष्टम्' — hundreds, thousands, millions, billions, infinite member of Jīvas are contained in Him (Atharva Samhitā. 10.8.24).

Question: If the Jīvas are endless and countless, does it not violate the statement that Brahman alone exists?

Answer: No, we have seen that the eternity of Māyā does not violate the oneness of Brahman (8.9). Similarly, even when the Jīvas are endless and countless, it will not violate. It is not correct to say that the oneness of Brahman can exist only in the total absence of the Jīvas and the Jagat. Just as we say 'There is clay only' even in the presence of several clay articles, Brahman alone exists even in the presence of the Jīvas and the Jagat. This has been clearly explained already in (10.2).

12.13 Avidyā belongs to whom? Māyā belongs to whom?

i) In this section we discuss as to whom do Avidyā and Māyā belong? Avidyā means the absence of Jñāna. If any person has Avidyā about something different from himself, it is clear that that Avidyā belongs to him. Nobody will have any confusion about this. He has the Avidyā of grammar; another has the Avidyā of arithmetic, etc. But for now the question is rather complicated. This Avidyā in Jīva is about Brahman which is his own Svarūpa. Therefore, the question arises "does it belong to Jīva or to Brahman." Let alone another Jīva, anyone will get the doubt "Is it my Avidyā or Brahman's Avidyā?" Next about Māyā: Māyā is the power of Īśvara. But the Śāstra says that the Jīva in his Svarūpa is Īśvara. Therefore, the question arises "Does Māyā belong to the Jīva or Īśvara?" The answers are taken from the Bhāṣya.

Arjuna thinks that Kṛṣṇa is also born just like himself. So, Kṛṣṇa explains, 'बहूनि मे मम व्यतीतानि व्यतिक्रान्तानि जन्मानि तव च हे अर्जुन । तानि अहं वेद जाने सर्वाणि न त्वं वेत्स्य जानीषे न धर्माधर्मादिप्रतिबद्ध-ज्ञानशक्तित्वात् । अहं पुनः नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्त-स्वभावत्वात् अनावरण ज्ञानशक्तिः.....यस्या वशे सर्वं जगत् वर्तते.....तां प्रकृतिं स्वाम् अधिष्ठाय वशीकृत्य संभवामि देहवानिव भवामि

जात इव’ — many births are over for me and for you. I know all of them because I am eternally pure, self-aware and liberated in my nature. There is no cover for my power of Jñāna. The Māyā under whose control all the Jīvas act is under my control. With this power of Māyā I appear to take birth, where as you are born as a result of your Karma’ (G. Bh. 4.5-6). Therefore, the creator of the Jagat is that Brahman which is omniscient, omnipotent, eternally pure self aware and liberated and greater than the Jīva. But the Jīva is not like that — ‘यत् सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिं ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं शारीरात् अधिकम् अन्यत् तत् वयं जगतः स्रष्टु ब्रूमः.....शारीरस्तु अनेवं विधः’ “Doesn’t Jīva possess the same Dharma as Īśvara at all?” It is not like that. Even though he has it, it is covered by the fault of Avidyā — ‘किं पुनर्जीवस्य ईश्वरसमानधर्मत्वं नास्त्येव । विद्यमानमपि तत् तिरोहितम् अविद्यादि व्यवधानात्’ (Sū.Bh.3.2.5). Īśvara is forever free from Avidyā — ईश्वरस्य.....नित्यनिवृत्ताविद्यत्वात् (Sū.Bh.3.2.9). From the above statements it is unambiguously clear that Avidyā is in the Jīva, not in Īśvara and Māyā is in Īśvara, not in Jīva.

ii) “What is this? Let Brahman become Īśvara in relation to Māyā. But how can Brahman become Jīva in relation to Avidyā? Is it not obviously wrong to say that Brahman has created Avidyā for Itself or that Brahman Itself in confused?”

The following dialogue will answer this question:

“Yes it is true that the superimposition of the Dharma not existing in Brahman is made in Brahman. But can I not say that Brahman is not responsible for this imposition and It is not the cause of Avidyā?” Let Brahman not be the cause of Avidyā and not Itself confused. But, the Jīva who has created Avidyā for himself and confused is not different from Brahman — ‘किं तर्हि न ब्रह्म स्वात्मनि अतद्धर्म-अध्यारोपण-निमित्तम् अविद्याकर्तृ चेति । भवत्वेवं नाविद्याकर्तृ भ्रान्तं च ब्रह्म । किं तु नैवाब्रह्म अविद्याकर्ता चेतनो भ्रान्त अन्य इष्यते’ (Br.Bh. 1.4.10) that is, though Jīva is of the nature of Brahman, Brahman is not of the nature of Jīva — ‘परमात्मनो जीवादन्त्यत्वम् । जीवस्य तु न परस्मादन्त्यत्वम्’ (Sū.Bh. 1.3.19).

iii) “May I say then, that the Avidyā is the nature of Jīva?”

No.

“How can you say no? I know that I have Avidyā.”

How do you know?

“Seeing the grief and pain recurring to me, I have inferred that I must have Avidyā.”

This is not possible; when you are absorbed in experiencing grief and pain, you cannot simultaneously understand that you have Avidyā. Moreover, as you have observed grief and pain, you must obviously be different from them. You are the observer and they are the observed. Otherwise, you cease to be their knower (9.13). That is, whether it is Avidyā or grief or pain—all belong to the class of the observed. They are all features of the body. You are only the knower. You are not related to them at all. Therefore, it is your illusion that you have Avidyā.

“May I then say that knowership is my nature?”

Not like that. In order to convey to you that you are different from Avidyā, grief, pain, etc., which are mental modifications observed by you, it was pointed out that you are their knower and so they are not your features. But remember that knowership is also the feature of the intellect and you are beyond that. If you free yourself from the gross and the subtle bodies and realize that you are Brahman, then you understand that you have always been Brahman (G. 13.2.). This proves that the Ātman is unrelated even to Avidyā.

iv) In this way the Jīva realizes that he is Brahman by giving up Avidyā or, equivalently, becomes Brahman by acquiring Vidyā. We cannot afford to reverse this sentence and say that Brahman becomes Jīva by acquiring Avidyā or by losing Vidyā. This has been already made clear. Vidyā can be acquired, but cannot be lost; Avidyā can be lost, but not acquired.

An example: A prince lost his parents even as he was just born. He was brought up by a hunter and became a hunter. The priest of the palace waited till the prince came of age and then disclosed to him that

he was the king of that country. He could not believe it. Then the priest pointed out to him that his features were very different from those of the (foster parents) hunter and his wife whom he considered as his parents. After hearing all that and thinking over it, he realized that he was a King and not a hunter. He became the King. (Br.Bh.2.2.20). Think and now tell: Is it not wrong to say that the King having acquired ignorance became a hunter? The right way of putting it is that the hunter gave up his ignorance and became the King. In fact, he was all through the King only. Similarly, by giving up Avidyā, the Jīva realizes that he is Brahman and he was Brahman all through.

12.14 Motivaton for Creation comes from Avidyā

It is told that the Jīva depends on the Jagat of names-forms for performing his Karma and also for expending his old Karma. But he cannot create his Jagat. Īśvara creates it and gives it to him. It is only Īśvara who is the creator; not the Jīva who has been identifying himself with the names-forms projected by Avidyā and superimposing their Dharma on himself. He cannot have the divine qualities found in Īśvara — ‘परमेश्वर एव भूतयोनिः नेतरो शारीरः.....नह्येतत् दिव्यत्वादि विशेषणम् अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापित-नामरूप-परिच्छेदाभिमानिनः तद्धर्मान् स्वात्मनि कल्पयतः शारीरस्य उपपद्यते’ (Sū.Bh. 1.2.22). It is impossible for the Jīva who is not Īśvara to create the various name-forms like mountains, seas, oceans, etc. — ‘न च गिरिनदीसमुद्रादिषु नानाविधेषु नामरूपेषु अनीश्वरस्य जीवस्य व्याकरणसामर्थ्यम् अस्ति’ (Sū.Bh.2.4.20).

Why does Īśvara create this unequal Jagat while himself being unbiased and self satisfied? He does it for the sake of Jīva. He remembers the Jīva who led a life in the previous creation and then carves out the names-forms — ‘ईक्षां पुनः कृतवती.....स्वबुद्धिस्थं पूर्वसृष्ट्यनुभूत प्राणधारणम् आत्मानमेव स्मरन्ती आह.....नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि व्याकुर्याम् इति’ (Ch.Bh. 3.2). Īśvara makes unequal creations only in relation to something. What is that? It is the Dharma and the Adharma

of Jīvas. This unequal creation Īśvara has done to meet the needs of the Dharma and Adharma of creatures —

‘सापेक्षो हि ईश्वरः विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते । किम् अपेक्षते इति चेत् ? धर्माधर्मौ अपेक्षते इति वदामः । अतः सृज्यमानप्राणि धर्माधर्मापेक्षा विषमा सृष्टिः’ (Sū.Bh. 2.1.34). The mundane life of the Jīva blinded by the cataract of Avidyā is sanctioned only by Īśvara. It is only by His grace that the Jīva has to attain Mókṣa — ‘जीवस्य अविद्यातिमिराम्धस्य.....ईश्वरात् तदनुज्ञया कर्तृत्व भोक्तृत्वलक्षणस्य संसारस्य सिद्धिः तदनुग्रहहेतुकेनैव.....मोक्षसिद्धिर्भवितुमर्हति’ (Sū.Bh. 2.3.41). In all the systems of Védānta, Īśvara is described as responsible for the creation. What is the responsibility? It is that He creates creatures according to their Karma — ‘सर्ववेदान्तेषु च ईश्वर हेतुका एव सृष्टयो व्यपदिश्यन्ते । तदेव च ईश्वरस्य फलहेतुत्वं यत् स्वकर्मानुरूपाः प्रजाः सृजतीति’ (Sū.Bh. 3.2.41). The Kalās (varieties) are created in accordance with the Avidyā of the Jīvas. They give up their distinctions as names-forms and merge again in the Puruṣa during the dissolution — ‘एताः कलाः प्राणिनाम् अविद्यादिदोषबीजापेक्षया सृष्टाः.....पुनः तस्मिन्नेव पुरुषे प्रलीयन्ते हित्वा नामरूपादिविभागम्’ (Pra.Bh. 6.4). In this way it is clear that Īśvara is motivated to create by the Karma of the Jīvas done because of their Avidyā and desire.

12.15 The Meaning of the Word Avidyākalpita. Illusion

i) We will now mention some features of the consequences of Avidyā. The mundane life resulting from it is based on mere fabrication. A Jīva with Avidyā is attracted by another due to desire. He calls that Śarīra as his wife and himself as her husband and starts the family life. Another body born along with that woman becomes his brother-in-law. Similarly, other relations like father-in-law, are all defined by himself. Suppose this Ajñānī develops Vairāgya and becomes a Sannyāsi by the grace of God. In one moment all the names like husband, wife, brother-in-law, etc. drop off immediately. In this way the whole Saṁsāra is based on some relations conceived and defined by the Jīva. All this is therefore just his illusion.

ii) Question: “If we accept that the Saṁsāra is only a superstructure of imagined names based on the inert and limited forms of the world, then it implies that the names-forms are all non-Brahman because Brahman is not inert or limited. If so, they must all be only illusory, that is imagined due to Avidyā.”

It cannot be. If they are illusory, they must be lost by Vidyā.

“Yes; they should. That is why the Śruti says ‘नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति’ — He does not perceive another, He does not hear another, He does not come to know another’ (Ch. 7.24.1). This means that all transaction is ruled out for the Jñānī who has realized his oneness with Brahman.”

In that case would you interpret the sentence ‘अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः’ — good and bad will never touch the bodyless Jñānī (Ch. 8.12.1) that everything including the body of the Jñānī would die immediately after realization?

“Even that is also right; because Avidyā remains as long as the body exists. Otherwise, any transaction by him is impossible. When Avidyā is completely lost, the body dies. It is only the Mukti obtained after death that is the true Mukti”.

In that case how is it possible to decide the cause of his death? Does he die because his Prārabdha Karma ended or because his Vidyā attained completion? Which of the two is the reason? If one dies by acquiring total Vidyā, how would others know the features of Vidyā? Who would like to have Vidyā if it causes death? Moreover, if true Mukti implies the death of the body and the rest of the world and if we agree that at least one has attained it by now, then this Jagat should not be existing now and no body should also be alive. How is it that the world exists and the people are living as well? We ask you, Sir! Is the One-ness of Brahman determined by Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa or Śāstra Pramāṇa? It is clear that the first alternative is impossible because only the Jagat is accessible for perception and Brahman is not. So, the oneness of Brahman is not at all a matter of Pratyakṣa. It has to be determined only

by a different Pramāṇa. Therefore, why should the multiplicity of the Jagat be denied at all for the One-ness of Brahman? 'One Pramāṇa will never contradict another Pramāṇa, because what could not be known through one Pramāṇa, the other Pramāṇa makes it known. Without taking recourse to the words and objects of the world, it is impossible to convey an unknown thing even for Āgama — 'न च प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरेण विरूध्यते । प्रमाणान्तराविषयमेव हि प्रमाणान्तरं ज्ञापयति । न च लौकिकपदपदार्थाश्रयव्यतिरेकेण आगमेन शक्यम् अज्ञातं वस्त्वन्तरम् अवगमयितुम्' (Br.Bh.2.1.20). Not only that. 'By hearing what all unheard things become heard.... by knowing what all unknown things are known — 'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतम् अविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्' (Ch. 6.1.3), all this is that Ātman only — 'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा ' (Br. 2.4.6), everything in front of you is the deathless Brahman — 'ब्रह्मैवेदम् अमृतं पुरस्तात्' (Mu.2.2.1), etc. are the loud statements of the Śruti. Will they not be contradicted if you say that the world is an illusion due to Avidyā? Does it not amount to denying the validity of the Śruti? Or, are you charging that there are contradictions in the procedure of the Śāstra which establishes the One-ness of Brahman through the non-difference relation of the Jagat-Brahman starting from multiplicity of name-forms observed in the world? Don't you see that this procedure of the Śāstra is also in tune with the multiplicity of the world through Sarvātmabhāva? It is not proper for intelligent people to deny the multiplicity even in Pratyakṣa using perverse logic in order to keep to the Védic assertion that Brahman alone exists.

iii) Doubt: 'We know that different Pramāṇas determine different features of the same object. For example, the ear conveys the sound of an object and the eye its shape. But is it possible that different Pramāṇas can convey opposite features like one-ness and multiplicity of the same object?'

Answer: Yes, it is possible. Why different Pramāṇas? Even a single Pramāṇa can do this. For example, from perception alone multiplicity of pots is recognized; looking at them from the point of view of their cause their one-ness is also recognized. It is of course possible

from different Pramāṇas also. For example, when we look at a straight stick partly submerged in water, in a slanting position it appears bent for the eye. This is not wrong knowledge. It is correct knowledge only. But then it appears straight for touch. This is also right knowledge, not wrong. Therefore, the question now arises: When two opposing knowledges are obtained about the same object through two different Pramāṇas, which one is objectively valid and what is the reason for the other knowledge? By analysis we can know that the stick is indeed straight in itself, but appears bent in relation to water as adjunct. Similarly, Pratyakṣa will give rise to the cognition of multiplicity in the world, while the Śruti says it is all only One Brahman. There is no contradiction between the two. Both are right. But which one is Tattva, the objective truth and which is Atattva, not the objective truth? The answer is: The knowledge of something ‘as it is’, unrelated to anything else, is Tattva-the objective truth and the one in relation to something else is not. Here oneness is Tattva and multiplicity is not. Multiplicity is only a relative truth — ‘यद्धि यस्य नान्यापेक्षं स्वरूपं तत् तस्य तत्वम् | यदन्यापेक्षं न तत् तत्वम्’ (Tai.2.8.5). This is because it is dependent on another parameter like the name-forms, but the oneness depends on their cause Brahman alone.

iv) “In that case, does it not again mean that the name forms are illusory?” No. what is the meaning of illusion? It is that which will be understood as not existent by the means of right knowledge. For example, the second moon is non-existent because it is not seen by a person without cataract — ‘अन्यस्य च अविद्याकृतत्वे विद्यया अवस्तुत्वदर्शनोपपत्तिः | तत् हि द्वितीयचन्द्रस्य असत्त्वं यदतैमिरिकेण चक्षुष्मता न गृह्यते’ (Tai. 2.8.5). The Jagat is being seen even by Jñānīs who have knowledge. But they are seeing it as Brahman. Therefore it is wrong to say that the Jagat in front of us is illusory. Even though the Ajñānī does not see it as it is that is, as Brahman. He is seeing it as unBrahman. UnBrahman Jagat is therefore illusory; imagined due to Avidyā only. Therefore when one cognizes an object in front of him in a different way than ‘as it is’, then the different appearance is illusory. It exists only in his intellect, like the

goldless ornament seen within the mirror. The world in front of us is not like that. It is indeed comprised of the forms assumed by Brahman deliberately with a purpose. It is not a mere mental impression of the Jīva.

‘Anyhow the forms are being rejected ultimately in order to arrive at the oneness of Brahman. Therefore, we will say that Brahman’s desire to appear as many is only a ploy to establish the oneness of Brahman. The shapes are really illusory.’

My dear Sir, you give the status of objective existence for Avidyā to the reason that it is experienced by an Ajñānī; but you don’t hesitate to say that the world experienced by the Jñānī on the basis of Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Āgama, as illusory and non-existent. Are you yourself confused? Or are you trying to confuse others with your logic? Remember that if you reject the name-forms as illusory the existence of Brahman itself can never be determined.

‘Why not? The substratum (Adhiṣṭhāna) of this illusion is Brahman.’

This is wrong. If the serpent that is seen is only an illusion due to Avidyā, you can determine whether the Adhiṣṭhāna is a rope or a crack in the ground or a mark made by a urinating moving bullock by Pratyakṣa. Similarly, if Brahman were an object for Pratyakṣa then you could determine whether or not it is the Adhiṣṭhāna for the illusory Jagat. But Brahman is not a matter for Pratyakṣa at all and only the Jagat is seen. Therefore it is impossible to say whether its Adhiṣṭhāna is Brahman or something else — ‘सति हि इन्द्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः इदं ब्रह्मणासम्बद्धं कार्यम् इति गृह्यते | कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह्यमाणं किं ब्रह्मणासम्बद्धं किमन्येन केनचिद्वा संबद्धम् इति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम्’ (Sū.Bh.1.1.2). Moreover, the formless Brahman can never be the Adhiṣṭhāna for illusory forms, because there must be some resemblance between the illusion and its Adhiṣṭhāna (12.6.iii). When it is not possible to imagine a snake in a shell or silver in a rope, how can the forms of the Jagat be imagined in the formless Brahman? It cannot be imagined.

‘In that case what is the Adhiṣṭhāna for the forms of the world imagined by an Ajñānī?

Their Adhiṣṭhāna is actually the forms in front of him for which the Upādāna is Brahman. The imagined forms are without Brahman and the existing forms are with Brahman.

v) “Let the name–forms be not illusory. However, the oneness of Brahman demands their absence. So, can we say that the oneness of Brahman and the Ātman is found only in Nirvikalpa Samādhi in the light of the statement of the Śruti ‘यत्र नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा’ — that is Bhūmā where he does not see another, not hear another, not know another?” (Ch. 7.24.1).

It is not correct because, the Brahman-Ātman identity is not relative to a state of mind. The statement ‘thou art that’ does not refer to a state of mind — ‘न चायं व्यवहाराभावः अवस्थाविशेषनिबद्धोऽभिधीयते इति युक्तं वक्तुम्। तत्वमसि इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य अनवस्थाविशेषनिबन्धनत्वात्’ (Sū.Bh.2.1.14). If this identity was relative to some state of mind it would surely come to an end, but the wisdom contained in ‘thou art that’ is eternal. The above Chāndógya mantra does not describe the transactionlessness in a particular state of mind. The normal activity in the body of a Jñānī will go on as long as his Prārabdha lasts. The description in the Bhagavadgītā of the one who has equipoise with intellect steady in Samādhi (Sthitaprajña) testifies to this. The meaning of the mantra is only the description of Bhūmā where nothing else exists other than Atman and not the mental state of Nirvikalpa Samādhi. To say that the identity refers to the state of mind in Yóga Samādhi or that oneness of Brahman demands the absence of the Jagat is not Védānta Siddhānta.

Therefore nothing in front of us is non Brahman or fragmentary partite. They are not destroyed by Vidyā. But, unBrahmanness and fragmentation in whatever before us, are imagined due to Avidyā. That will be obliterated by Vidyā that is, with Vidyā, one will come to know that nothing in front of him is un-Brahman. It is not in conformity with

Brahma Vidyā to either create or destroy any object — ‘अविद्याकृत व्यतिरेकेण अब्रह्मत्वम् असर्वत्वं च विद्यत एवेति चेत्? न | तस्य ब्रह्मविद्यया अपोहानुपपत्ते:.....अब्रह्मत्वम् असर्वत्वं च अविद्याकृतमेव निवर्त्यतां ब्रह्मविद्यया | न तु पारमार्थिकं वस्तु कर्तुं निवर्तयितुं वा अर्हति ब्रह्मविद्या’ (Br.Bh.1.4.10). On the other hand, if one says that the gross world available for the transactions of the Jīvas is illusory, one will have to attribute more Avidyā to Īśvara who sees this world even in the unmanifest state before creation. ‘असंश्लेषद् भविष्यद्वटः ऐश्वरं भविष्यद्वटविषयं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं मिथ्या स्यात्’ (Br.1.2.1). That would be extremely absurd, when the Śāstra says that the name–forms are illusory, it means the following:

vi) We have come to the understanding that the Jagat of name-forms is Brahman in its Svarūpa. This knowledge is Vidyā. Before this Vidyā the Jagat appears to be un-Brahman. In the Avidyā state the name-forms of one’s understanding are illusory. This does not mean that his Avidyā was their Upādāna. If that were so, one could create name-forms according to one’s convenience and pleasure. But that is not possible. So when one says they are illusory, it merely means that they appear un-Brahman to him. When the un-Brahman forms are denied by Vidyā, their un-Brahmanness is lost. Or equivalently, their Brahman-ness is understood. ‘The Jagat in front seen by people through Avidyā as un-Brahman is indeed the Brahman... the whole Jagat is Brahman..... all un-Brahman mental apprehension is like the wrong mental cognition of rope as a snake — ‘ब्रह्मैव उक्तलक्षणम् इदं यत् पुरस्तात् अग्रे अब्रह्मेव अविद्या दृष्टीनां प्रत्यवभासमानम् |.....ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वं समस्तं.....अब्रह्माप्रत्ययः सर्वः अविद्यामात्रः रज्ज्वामिव सर्पप्रत्ययः’ (Mu.Bh. 2.2.12). Therefore, it is foolish to reject the world in front thinking that it is separate from Brahman. Bhagavān says in the Gītā “Though acting as a human being I am indeed the universal Ātman Īśvara, the supreme Paramātman. Foolish people degrade me without understanding this — मनुष्यदेहेन व्यवहरन्तं मम परमात्मतत्त्वम् ईश्वरं स्वमात्मानम् अजानन्तः मां मूढाः परिभवं कुर्वन्ति (G.Bh.9.11). Therefore to separate the Jagat which is really Brahman from Brahman and understand it as such is Avidyā. To understand it ‘as it is’ (in its true

nature) is Vidyā. Thinking of Śakuntalā as a woman belonging to another man is Duṣyanta's Avidyā; afterwards, recognizing her as his own wife, is his Vidyā. What has changed is not the person-wife Śakuntalā, but Duṣyanta's understanding of her. Similarly, with the onset of Vidyā the name-forms will not vanish. They continue to exist as they are. But the view about them will change with Vidyā. What vanishes is only his illusion. Likewise, the relationships of husband, wife, brother-in-law, etc. are lost for one who takes Sannyāsa, but none of those persons will die.

vii) Question: Śāstra describes Jagat as the mental forms of Brahmā (Ch. 8.5.4). This Brahmā of the name of Hiraṇyagarbha has the combination of Avidyā and Prakṛti as his Ego (G.Bh.7.4). Could it be that this Jagat is created by the Avidyā referred to here?

Answer: No, it is true that the Jagat is Hiraṇyagarbha's mental forms. The virāt Puruṣa born from Him has the whole world as His heart, that is, His mind — 'हृदयम् अन्तःकरणं विश्वं समस्तं जगत् अस्य' (Mu.Bh.2.1.4). He manifests it which already exists unmanifest in His mind. In other words, he makes it transactable for the Jīvas. The objects of the wakeful world are only transformations of Téjas, ap and anna caused by the sight of Brahman — 'जाग्रद्विषया अपि मानसप्रत्ययाभिनिर्वृता एव । सदीक्षाभिनिर्वृता तेजोऽब्रह्मयत्वाज्जागरित विषयाणाम्' (Ch.Bh. 8.5.4). Afterwards, He creates the great Prajāpatis, Marīci, Sanaka, etc. to run it. (G.Bh.Introduction). Many others like Bhṛṅgu and Nārada are also given birth to by Him. So, they are all referred to as mental sons of Brahmā. He is the representation of the whole Jagat supported by Brahman's knowledge-power and action-power — 'हिरण्यगर्भः ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानशक्तिक्रियाशक्त्यधिष्ठितः जगत्साधारणः अविद्याकामकर्मभूतसमुदायबीजाबीजाङ्कुरो जगदात्मा' (Mu.Bh. 1.1.8). The combination of Avidyā and Prakṛti is his ego. The Avidyā spoken about here belongs to the Jīvas and the Prakṛti to Himself. This has been mentioned several times. The Karma done by the Jīvas due to their Avidyā motivates Him for the act of creation. The Upādāna for this creation is the Prakṛti.

viii) Question: The ‘not-this, not-this’ Brahman is described as ‘Kūṭastha’ freeing it from all transactions — सर्वविक्रिया प्रतिषेधः श्रुतिभ्यो ब्रह्मणः कूटस्थत्वावगमात् (Sū.Bh.2.1.14). In some places the Śāstra says that Brahman Itself has become the Jagat just like clay becoming the pot. These two appear contradictory. Just as the clay transforms into the pot, Kūṭastha Brahman cannot get transformed into the Jagat. In order to reconcile them, don’t we have to say that the creation is illusory?

Answer: Not like that. The Śruti contains statements about Kūṭastha Brahman and also about the creation. It is true that they contradict each other when viewed at the outset. But in order to reconcile them, if one makes bold to say the creation is illusory, it would be foolhardy because the Śruti specifically states that Brahman created it by volition. It is the dignity of Védānta to say that the Jagat comprised of Prāṇa etc. is created by Parabrahman — ‘परस्माच्च ब्रह्मणः प्राणादिकं जगत् जायते इति वेदान्तमर्यादा’ (Sū.Bh. 1.4.18). We should also remember that all the transactions and the forms are also true when viewed transcendently — ‘सदात्मना सर्वव्यवहाराणां सर्वविकाराणां च सत्यत्वम्’ (Ch. 6.3.2). If the creation is denied there is no question of reconciliation. It is equivalent to rejecting the Védic statements about creation. This would be a tantamount to disregarding the Vēda’s Prāmāṇya. It is not correct to say that Śāṅkara Bhāṣya does not accept the creation; all the labour to convince the Mimāṃsakas that creation and destruction of Jagat do happen would be pointless and futile. Actually the point emphasised is, that had Brahman not created the name forms, there would have been no scope for us to understand its true nature — ‘यदि हि नामरूपे न व्याक्रियेते तदा अस्यात्मनो निरूपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिख्यायेत’ (Br.Bh. 2.5.19) Therefore the method of reconciliation has to be different. Just as the foregoing sentence of the Bhāṣya makes it clear that the purpose of the creation statements in the Vēda is not its physics; it is to convey the idea of immutable (Kūṭastha) Brahman. This purpose is served when we understand Brahman through the Jagat-Brahman non-difference relation and not by giving up the Jagat itself. An example: There is no sound form in the meaning. The same

meaning can be conveyed through different sound forms of a different language. This lesson is taught by the Guru to the disciple only through the sound form of speech. It would be wrong for the disciple to reject the Guru's speech itself as illusory, because then it is not possible at all to know the meaning the Guru wants to convey. Similarly, here it is impossible to know Brahman if the name forms are rejected as illusory. The name forms are the speech to convey Brahman and Brahman is their meaning.

Brahman is to be known only through the non-difference of this speech and its meaning. What is this non-difference? The Jagat is not different from Brahman, but Brahman is different from the Jagat. Notice that there are two Jagats here (6.5.vi). The latter half is illusory. Holding to this, we say that Brahman gives scope for the transaction of transformation — 'अविद्याकल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन.....ब्रह्म परिणामादि सर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते' (Sū.Bh.2.1.27). The reason is as follows: From the view of the Ajñānī, Brahman is only the Nimitta of the Jagat and the transformable Māyā is its Upādāna. In this way Brahman is thought to be different from the Jagat. Therefore, that Jagat is illusory. Now let us come to the Jagat in the former half of the relation. It is not different from Brahman at anytime—whether during its appearance or its dissolution. Even when it is accessible for the intellect as 'this', this is not different from Brahman without a second — 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं परमार्थतः इदं बुद्धि कालेऽपि' (Ch.Bh.6.2.2). This is because even the shape of the effect is not different from the cause — 'कार्याकारोऽपि कारणस्य आत्मभूत एव' (Sū.Bh.2.1.18). Therefore, it means that there is Brahman alone that is, even when the Jagat is available for sense perception there is no transaction when it is viewed transcendently. Therefore, from the transcendental view Brahman transcends all transactions, defies all transformations and exists by itself — 'पारमार्थिकेन च रूपेण सर्वव्यवहारातीतम् अपरिणतम् अवतिष्ठते' (Sū.Bh. 2.1.27). In this way what remains is the Pure Existence — Brahman alone. Thus Parabrahman is established which is one without a second. All the Pramāṇas terminate in this — 'ततः परं ब्रह्म एकमेवाद्वितीयं तत्र सर्वप्रमाणानां

निष्ठा (भावाच्चोपलब्धेः)' (Su.Bh. 2.1.15). This is Kūṭastha. Even after so much of explanation if an Ajñānī asks "In that case, from where did the Jagat come?," we will have to show the same Brahman as its cause. This is not wrong because though the **transactions** of creation sustenance, dissolution, omniscience, self luminosity, etc. are denied in this Brahman as illusory, remember that those potentialities are not denied. This has been clarified already in 9.12.

Question: That in which transformation is found, there is the transaction of transformation; in Him who causes the transformation, there is a transaction of causing it. Therefore, when it is told that Brahman is at once the Nimitta and the Upādāna of the Jagat, both these transactions should be present in it. How can it be Kūṭastha?

Answer: Not like that. What transforms is only the Prakṛti, not Brahman; transformation is brought about by Hiraṇyagarbha and not Brahman (7.3.ii). Therefore there is neither the transaction of getting transformed nor of bringing about the transformation in Brahman.

Question: Then why has Brahman been said to be both Nimitta and Upādāna?

Answer: It has been said adopting the transactional view of the Ajñānī. So it is not wrong.

Question: Even if it is not wrong, why should it be said?

Answer: Otherwise Brahman's existence cannot be established. And with this we are back to square one. 'Nobody can establish with the help of any other Pramāṇa the statements of the Śruti that Brahman is not only Kūṭastha, but also the cause of the Jagat.' Direct perception is not possible here in the case of Brahman because, it has no form. In the absence of any signs it is also inaccessible to inference. Therefore, if someone wants to prove it only by some other Pramāṇa, it is only his wishful thinking. Therefore one who has only the transactional view should accept what the Śruti has stated and reconcile the statements by his inner experience like this: Everyone knows that he is all alone in Suṣupti as Kūṭastha where his mind is merged in himself. But during

dream he conducts all transactions through the mind. In the same way, Brahman without the adjuncts is Kūṭastha and with Its own Māyā, he is also the cause of the Jagat — 'यत्तु उक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वात् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि संभवेयुः इति । तदपि मनोरथमात्रम् । रूपाद्यभावाद् हि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः । लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनाम् । आगममात्र समधिगम्य एव तु अयमर्थः धर्मवत् ।.....श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव हि अत्र तर्कः अनुभवाङ्गत्वेन आश्रीयते स्वप्नान्तबुद्धान्तयोरुभयोः इतरेतरव्यभिचारात् आत्मनः अनन्वागतत्वम् संप्रसादे च प्रपञ्चपरित्यागेन सदात्मना संपत्तेः निष्प्रपञ्च सदात्मत्वम् प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वात् कार्यकारणानन्यन्यायेन ब्रह्माव्यतिरेकः इत्येवं जातीयकः' (Sū.Bh. 2.1.6). This is the only way of reconciling. On the other hand, to retain only the Kūṭastha (statement) and drop the causality would make it impossible even to convey the existence of Brahman. To demonstrate its nature is therefore out of question. It is only through the effect that the cause can be known. Brahman known in this way is bound to be superimposed by the transactions of creation, etc. This superimposition has to be refuted in order to know its transactionlessness. Only later the Brahman-Ātman identity can be said to free the Jīva from the Saṁsāra (10.3ii). Therefore, one has to superimpose causality which is essentially ambiguous in the sense that one cannot say at the outset whether it is right or wrong. After its refutation with the use of the non-difference relation, one will know that Brahman is Kūṭastha. It is only later with the realization of ones' identity with it that makes him totally free from Saṁsāra.

ix) That is why there are two descriptions of the Jagat all through the Śāstras: once as an illusion due to Avidyā and, another time, as Brahman Itself. When viewed only from the appearance point that is, as independent of Brahman—it is the tree of Saṁsāra like a dream, the water of mirage, just false, just total illusion; its nature is only appearing and disappearing — 'अयं वर्णितः संसारवृक्षः.....स्वप्नमरीच्युदक मायागन्धर्वनगरसमत्वात् दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपो हि सः' (G.Bh. 15.3). Viewed from the causal effect, this is indeed Brahman. This is wrongly understood by the Ajñani because of its special appearance as if with duality. Nothing is non-existent at any time — 'सत एव द्वैतभेदेन अन्यथागृह्यमाणत्वान्नासत्त्वं

कस्यचित् क्वचित्' (Ch.Bh.6.2.3). All the created name-forms are true only in the transcendental view and untrue by themselves — 'सर्वं च नामरूपादि सदात्मनैव सत्यं विकारजातं स्वतस्तु अनृतमेव' (Ch.Bh.6.3.2). Nothing becomes Ātman after being unātman for anyone. Therefore unātman-ness is only imagined due to Avidyā; really speaking, there cannot be anything devoid of Ātman — 'न च अनात्मा सन् सर्वम् आत्मैव भवति कस्यचित् । तस्मात् अविद्ययैव अनात्मत्वं परिकल्पितं न तु परमार्थतः आत्मव्यतिरेकेण अस्ति किञ्चित्' (Br.Bh. 2.4.14).

12.16 Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti

There are many places in the Bhāṣya where the Prakṛti is described as Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti. The meaning of this phrase is determined in this section. Déhī means the Ātman in the body. He is truly a non doer himself and also does not get anything done. Now rises the question, who is doing and getting done all that is happening in the body? The answer is **Svabhāva**. The same has been described later on as **Bhūta Prakṛti** — the nature of creatures. Bhagavān Bhāshyakāra writes: Svabhāva means 'one's bhāva' that is, his nature — that Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti described later in the Ślōka 'Daivī Hyéṣā' — the divine Māyā. It is that which is motivating — स्वो भावः स्वभावः अविद्यालक्षणाप्रकृतिः माया प्रवर्तते 'दैवी हि' इत्यादिना वक्ष्यमाणा (G.Bh. 5.14). Therefore the meaning of this phrase is to be looked for there in that place. There, the description of the Prakṛti is as follows: 'भूमिरापोऽनलो वायुः खं मनो बुद्धिरेव च । अहङ्कार इतीयं मे भिन्ना प्रकृतिरष्टधा' — the five Tanmātras (finer elements) — earth, water, fire, air and Ākāśa, the mind, the intellect and the ego comprising the eight-fold Aparāprakṛti (G.7.4); another is the Parāprakṛti (G.7.5). Among these, the ego is the agent, prompting Īśvara to create the Jagat. This is exactly the same as the Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti referred to earlier in (G.5.14); so this term means Avidyā coupled with Prakṛti. The word Lakṣaṇa here, is used similar to describing a man whose behaviour is mixed with features of a woman as Strī lakṣaṇā Puruṣa. The prompting for the creation to be done later comes to Īśvara from this; ego is known to be the prompter for all activities in creatures. Therefore, this prompting agent in Īśvara is called by the inauspicious

name 'ego'. Just as food mixed with poison is called poison, the Prakṛti mixed with a sense of ego is called ego (8.7.iv). In other words, this Svabhāva defined as Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti which is the prompting agent in the Déhī is also the prompting agent in Īśvara for his creation. There, it is Jīvātma's ego; here it is Īśvara's ego. There chariots, houses, pots, etc. are his creations; here the name-forms of the Jagat are the creations of Īśvara. In this way Avidyā coupled with Prakṛti is the prompting agent for both the Jīva and Īśvara.

Gītā says, 'प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः । अहङ्कार विमूढात्मा कर्ताहमिति मन्यते'— though all the activities are occurring only by Prakṛti, the Jīva deluded by ego thinks he is the doer (G.3.27). Therefore, it is clear whether it is in the Jīva or in Īśvara, the ability for any action comes from the Prakṛti of Īśvara and the doership found in the Jīva is due to his Avidyā. This bifurcation is because the Prakṛti is not an adjunct for Jīva and the Avidyā is not an adjunct for Īśvara (12.13). This means that the motivation found in Jīva is with doer-ship and the motivation in Īśvara is without doer ship. Therefore, Avidyā is the motivator both in Jīva and Īśvara. That is why in all the places connected with the creation activity of Īśvara and the activity of the Jīva, the same Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti which is the seed of all creatures is mentioned. 'भूतग्रामबीजभूतात् अविद्यालक्षणात् अव्यक्तात्' (G.Bh. 8.20). Taking resort to Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti, I have created all the creatures — 'अविद्यालक्षणां प्रकृतिम् स्वां स्वीयाम् अवष्टभ्य आश्रित्य विसृजाम्.....भूतग्रामम्' (G.Bh. 9.8). Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti gives birth to the Jagat of all movables and immovables — 'अविद्यालक्षणात् सूयते उत्पादयति सचराचरं जगत्' (G.Bh. 9.10). Other than the Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti which is the seed of the manifest world — 'अव्याकृतात् अविद्यालक्षणात् व्याकृतबीजात्' (Ke.Bh.1.4), etc. are the sentences relating to the creation activity of Īśvara. Staying in Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti that is, one identifying himself with the Prakṛti is called Prakṛtistha — प्रकृतौ अविद्यालक्षणायां स्थितः प्रकृतिस्थः प्रकृतिम् आत्मत्वेन गतः इत्येतत् (G.Bh. 13.21). Getting rid of Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti along with its transforming Guṇas by Vidyā — 'प्रकृतिं च यथोक्तम् अविद्यालक्षणां गुणैः

स्विकारैः सह निवर्तिताम् अभावमापादितां विद्यया’ (G.Bh.13.23), Avyakta which is the Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti of the creatures — ‘भूतानां प्रकृतिः अविद्यालक्षणा अव्यक्ताख्या’ (G.Bh.13.34), etc. are all sentences relating to the doership of the Jīva.

12.17 Avidyātmikā Hi Bīja Śakti

(a) Introducing the topic:

From the statements, ‘मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्’ (Śve.4.10); Know that Māyā is the Prakṛti and the Māyāvi is Īśvara. ‘दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया.’ This divine Māyā of mine which is replete with Guṇas (G.7.14), etc. it is clear that Māyā is the Śakti of Īśvara. ‘अविद्याद्यनेकसंसारबीजम् अन्तर्दोषवत् माया’ — In this Māyā, seeds of the Saṁsāra like Avidyā etc of the Jīvas are hidden (G.Bh.12.3); ‘प्रवृत्तिरहितोऽपि ईश्वरः.....सर्वं प्रवर्तयेत् अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपमायावेशवशेन’ — Motivationless Īśvara is motivated to create by Māyā containing the Avidyā of the Jīvas which projects to them the name-forms as non-Brahman (Sū.Bh. 2.2.2.) ‘अहङ्कार इति अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम्|..... प्रवर्तकत्वात् अहङ्कारस्य’ — prompting is of the nature of ego and therefore Avidyā coupled with Māyā is called ‘Ego’. (G. Bh.7.4). All these sentences make it clear that the two adjuncts, the Māyā of Īśvara and the Avidyā of the Jīva are always together, ‘द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया’ (Mu. 3.1.1) one never without the other, and become responsible for all the transactions of the world. Further, it is told that this Avidyā residing in the Prakṛti is the cause of Saṁsāra — ‘प्रकृतिस्थत्वाख्या अविद्या..... संसारस्य कारणम्’ (G.Bh. 13.21). The cause of Saṁsāra is the coupling of Jīva with Prakṛti which is of the nature of Avidyā — प्रकृत्या.....अविद्यारूपः संयोगः.....संसारः (G.Bh.13.20). Therefore it is unambiguously clear that Māyā and Avidyā are exclusively different. It is our opinion that they can never be synonymous. Nevertheless some people say that they are synonymous. In order to

show that they are not, we further discuss once again some of the statements from the Bhāṣya of Ānumānika Adhikaraṇa.

(b) The First meaning of 'Avyakta':

Jīva is immersed in material pleasures. In order to pull him up from there and to merge him in the great Puruṣa, the Katha Upanishad gives an allegory: the body is the chariot. The Ātman is its resident. The intellect is the charioteer, the mind is the reins, the Indriyas are its horses, (the pleasurable sense) objects for the Indriyas are the gocaras. The wise people say this Jīva coupled with the body, the Indriyas, and the Manas is the enjoyer.

आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव तु
बुद्धिं तु सारथिं विद्धि मनः प्रग्रहमेव च ॥
इन्द्रियाणि हयानाहुर्विषयांस्तेषु गोचरान्
आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः ॥ (Ka.1.3.3-4)

This resident of the chariot with the help of the discriminating intellect and with the help of the mind should control the Indriyas (sensory organs) and reach the great Puruṣa. In this spiritual voyage, the objects are greater than the Indriyas, because these Indriyas are the Grahas which have been gripped by the objects (the Atigrahas) (11.7). The mind is greater than the objects, the intellect is greater than the mind, the Mahān Ātmā is greater than the intellect and the Avyakta is greater than him that is, these principles or elements are in the order of increasing subtlety. The great Puruṣa is the subtlest and the final destination of the Jīvas.

इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थभ्यश्च परं मनः
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः ॥
महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः
पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥ (Ka.1.3.10-11)

Therefore the aspirant should move step by step from the grosser to the subtler and finally merge in the great Puruṣa who is the subtlest.

There is a great deal of similarity between this allegory and the path of progress: Indriyas, objects, mind, and intellect — all these are common in both. Further, in the allegory, the resident Ātman is the same as the Mahān Ātmā mentioned in the path of progress. Therefore, only the ‘body’ in the allegory and the ‘Avyakta’ in the path of progress remain unmatched. If the ‘body’ is identified with ‘Avyakta’ the similarity would become total (Sū.Bh.1.4.1). Here, the word ‘Avyakta’ has been used in Yaugika Artha that is, the meaning as understood by the parts of the word, the etymological sense Avyakta as un-manifest (Sū.Bh. 1.4.2). Two meanings are given to it. One meaning keeping Mahān Ātmā as the enjoyer Jīva and another meaning keeping Mahān Ātmā as Hiraṇyagarbha. When the Mahān Ātmā is the Jīva, ‘अविद्या हि अव्यक्तम्’ — Avyakta is his Avidyā only that is his casual body, in which case, keeping Śarīra that is, the body in place of Avyakta is appropriate. Further ‘सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात्’ — it should be subtle to be rightly called Avyakta (Sū.Bh.1.4.2). Since Avidyā is of mental (cognitive) form it should be obviously subtle. Further still, Avidyā has to be greater than the Mahān Ātmā that is, himself also (Sū.Bh. 1.4.3). How is that? It is because all the transactions of the Jīva are occurring continuously because, of his subservience to it — ‘अविद्यावत्त्वेनैव जीवस्य सर्वः संव्यवहारः सन्ततो वर्तते’ (Sū.Bh. 1.4.3). Therefore, it is definitely greater than him! Further, when the Jīva transcends his enjoyership he stands one with the great Puruṣa. Then the chariot march of the Jīva which started from the objects of enjoyment, ends with the destruction of the chariot which is the casual body. It is just like the when moment Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa got down from the chariot, it was reduced to ashes.

(c) The Second meaning of ‘Avyakta’

However, the first meaning does not fulfil the requirements of the sūtras mentioned by the Sūtrakāra in connection with the above mantras of kaṭha. This is because the Sāṅkhya claims that the Mahān Ātmā, the Avyakta and the Puruṣa are respectively the Mahat, Pradhāna and the Puruṣa enunciated by him. On this account he claims he has the support of Śruti for his thesis. But this is totally opposite to the Védānta

Siddhānta. Therefore, the sūtrakāra has reserved one whole Adhikaraṇa of seven sūtras to refute the Sāṅkhya's claim. To meet this need of the Sūtrakāra the Bhāṣyakāra states as follows: After tallying the allegory with the path of progress the 'Śarīra' and 'Avyakta' were juxtaposed. Therefore when Mahān Ātmā is Hiraṇyagarbha we take the conventional meaning for Avyakta – Māyā subservient to Īśvara. This is the unmanifest collective seed of the bodies of the creatures; therefore it is a-vyakta, (un-manifest). Putting 'body' in its place is also meaningful because the body originates from this Avyakta. Finally, it is bigger than Hiraṇyagarbha who is the Mahān Ātmā because his intellect originates only from it.

Question: In the first meaning Mahān Ātmā is the resident of the chariot who is identical with the enjoyer Jīva. This association is reasonable since the path of progress is applicable to him. But in the second meaning Hiraṇyagarbha is the resident. How is it possible? He is described as Īśvara. The Śruti says he is Aparabrahma, he is Indra, he is Prajāpati, he is all the Dévatas — 'एष ब्रह्मैष इन्द्र एष प्रजापतिरेते सर्वे देवाः' (Ai.3.1.3). Obviously he does not possess Avidyā. Therefore, the path of progress is not applicable to him. How can he be made the resident in the allegory?

Intermediate objection: Oh! Not like that. Hiraṇyagarbha is indeed Jīva. The Śruti says 'हिरण्यगर्भं पश्यत जायमानम्' — see this Hiraṇyagarbha taking his birth (Śve.4.12). If he were Īśvara, the Śruti would not say he is taking birth. Therefore he must have Avidyā.

Answer: No. Hiraṇyagarbha may have been born, but his adjunct of the collective intellect is very pure and therefore it is not wrong to call Him Īśvara. The Jīvas are Samsāris because their adjunct is impure. Moreover he burnt all his sins (by Ātmajñāna) — 'सर्वान् पाप्मन् औषत्' (Br.Bh.1.4.1). Therefore, he is now Īśvara only. He is carrying on the Prārabdha of handling the creation of the Jagat. But there is no doership in him. Therefore, he is certainly not Jīva. That is the reason why all the Dévatas worship him as the eldest Brahman. Not only that. One who recognizes his identity with Him and does not shift into the

lower levels of the body, etc, even he will leave all his Pāpa in his body itself and obtain all the desires at once (Tai 2.5.1). In this way, you should decide that Hiraṇyagarbha has no Avidyā. Therefore, the question mentioned above does need to be answered.

Solution: True, the path of progress is to be traversed only by the Jīva and not by Hiraṇyagarbha. The Jīva progresses step by step, withdraws the Indriyas from the objects of enjoyment and absorbs them in the mind and that mind in the intellect. The next step is only the collective intellect of Hiraṇyagarbha from which his individual intellect originates. This Hiraṇyagarbha was previously a resident of the chariot moved in the same path of progress and occupied his present position. Therefore, in his Svarūpa he is Bodhātmaka, that is one devoid of Avidyā. But as he is also the collective intellect he is Abodhātmaka — not devoid of Avidyā — through the individual intellects. Therefore, the Bhāṣyakāra describes him as Bódhābódhātmaka. (Ka.Bh.1.3.10). Further, the aspirant Jīva keeps his individual intellect in this collective intellect of Hiraṇyagarbha. That is, giving up Avidyā he too becomes Bódhātmaka and stands in identification with Hiraṇyagarbha. From here onwards it would not be wrong to keep Hiraṇyagarbha in the place of the resident of the chariot. Further, still he spontaneously merges in Avyakta and then ultimately in the subtlest great Puruṣa.

(d) Avyakta is only Māyā, not Pradhāna:

Sāṅkhya: How do you say that this Avyakta is not pradhāna but only Māyā?

Siddānti: Unlike pradhāna, Māyā is not independent; it is subservient to Īśvara.

Sāṅkhya: Īśvara is self satisfied. Why should He create the world?

Siddānti: It is for the sake of the Jīvas. They are sleeping in this great slumber called Avyakta, without knowing their own Svarūpa — परमेश्वराश्रया मायामयी महासुप्तिः । यस्यां स्वरूपप्रतिबोधरहिताः शेरते संसारिणो जीवाः (Sū. Bh.1.4.3). This is the state of sleep of Prajāpati called Avyakta. It is

from this that all the movable and immovable creatures originate — ‘अव्यक्तं प्रजापतेः स्वापावस्था । तस्मात्.....स्थावरजङ्गमलक्षणाः सर्वाः प्रजाः प्रभवन्ति’ (G.Bh. 8.18). The previously described Avidyā Lakṣaṇa Avyakta is the root of all creatures. (The nature of Brahman is beyond that) ‘पूर्वोक्तात् भूतग्रामबीजभूतात् अविद्यालक्षणात् अव्यक्तात् अन्यः विलक्षणः भावः’ (G. Bh.8.20).

Sāṅkhya: How do you say that the creation is for the sake of the Jīvas?

Siddānti: It is like this. This seed called Avyakta is Avidyātmikā. अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजशक्तिः अव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देश्या (Sū. Bh.1.4.3) that is, it contains within it many faults of the innumerable seeds of Saṁsāra like Avidyā etc of the Jīvas and is denoted by the name Māyā, Avyākta, etc. अविद्याद्यनेक संसारबीजम् अन्तर्दोषवत् मायाव्याकृतादि शब्दवाच्यतया (G.Bh.12.3). These Jīvas have to depend upon the creation of Īśvara for expending their Karma. For some of them the Avidyā which is the seed of this body is destroyed by the power of the Jñāna of Paramātman. Ṛṣi VāmaDēva became liberated only in this way — ‘सः वामदेव ऋषिः.....यथोक्तम् आत्मानम् एवं विद्वान्.....शरीरप्रबन्धस्य परमात्म ज्ञानामृतोपयोगजनित-वीर्यकृतभेदात् शरीरोत्पत्तिबीजाविद्यादि-निमित्तोपमर्दहेतोः शरीरविनाशात्अमृतः समभवत्’ (Ai.Bh. 2.1.6). The liberated souls are not born again because the seed of their Karma due to Avidyā is burnt by this Vidyā. ‘मुक्तानां च पुनरनुत्पत्तिः । कुतः? विद्यया तस्या बीजशक्तेर्दाहात्’ (Sū. Bh. 1.4.3). But the unliberated Jīvas will continue in this Avyakta with their seeds of Karma of desire done due to their Avidyā. They have to take birth again. Therefore, the liberated and the unliberated Jīvas have to be separated because, the former should not be given births whereas the latter are to be given. Such discrimination cannot be done by the independent and inert Pradhāna. It is only the Māyā subservient to Īśvara that can do it and be the cause of the Jagat; certainly not Pradhāna.

(e) Avidyā and Māyā not synonymous

Question: In practice the word ātmā is used in the sense of Svarūpa. For example, Triguṇatmikā Māyā means Māyā whose Svarūpa is the three Guṇas. Therefore, the word Avidyātmikā in the above phrase ‘अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजशक्तिः अव्यक्तशब्द निर्देश्या’ should mean Avyakta of the Svarūpa of Avidyā. Not only this. The Bhāṣyakāra has also used Avidyā synonymously with Prakṛti. ‘तस्या अन्या असंभूतिः प्रकृतिः कारणम् अविद्या अव्याकृताख्या’ — Sambhūti means effect. The one different from that is Asambhūti also called Prakṛti, Kāraṇa, Avidyā, Avyākṛta (Īśa.Bh. 12). On the other hand, having treated Prakṛti and Avidyā as different and the relation of conjunction (SañYóga) is admitted between them in all the foregoing discussions. How is it?

Answer: There is no rule that the word Ātmā should be used only in the sense of Svarūpa. For example, when one says the script is Rékhātmaka Akṣara, nobody understands that the Svarūpa of Akṣara is lines. Lines are an object for the eyes and Akṣara an object for the ears. Moreover, if Māyā and Avidyā are treated as synonyms because of the word Ātmikā, many faults will crop up.

(1) Jīva will become Īśvara or Īśvara will become Jīva. Either way, the difference between the two will vanish. In either case the path of progress taught in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad above would be pointless.

(2) There is no rebirth for the liberated souls because Avidyā, which is the seed of their bodies, is burnt by Vidyā — मुक्तानां पुनरनुत्पत्तिः विद्यया तस्या बीजशक्तेर्दाहात्. Therefore, one who has by now become Mukta, will have already burnt Māyā which is the seed of the Jagat. Therefore, Jagat should not be existing now — ‘एकेन च आदिमुक्तेन पृथिव्यादि प्रविलयः कृतः इति इदानीं पृथिव्यादिशून्यं जगत् अभिविष्यत्’ (Sū.Bh. 3.2.21). But the Jagat exists.

(3) At the time of creation Īśvara sees the unmanifest seed of the Jagat. If this has already been burnt, then it would amount to saying that

the direct perception of Īśvara is wrong perception. 'असंश्लेषत् भविष्यद्वटः ऐश्वरं भविष्यद्वटविषयं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं मिथ्या स्यात्' (Br.Bh. 1.2.1).

(4) This body is born from Avyakta. It is called Kṣétra and has been the base for the fruit of Karma of the Jīvas. 'अयं हि.....अव्यक्तमूलप्रभवः क्षेत्रसंज्ञकः सर्वप्राणि कर्मफलाश्रयः' (Mu.Bh. 3.1.1). If this Avyakta is burnt by ones' Vidyā, the seeds of the bodies of all the creatures should have got burnt. Immediately, all of them should have become liberated. That has not happened.

(5) Īśvara's Īśvaratva is indeed that the two Prakṛtis are associated (with Him) 'प्रकृति द्वयवत्वमेव हि ईश्वरस्य ईश्वरत्वम्' (G.Bh. 13.19). If this Prakṛti is burnt by one's Vidyā, then Īśvara would cease to be Īśvara. But this cannot happen because Īśvara is always Īśvara — 'नित्येश्वरत्वात् ईश्वरस्य'(G.Bh.13.19), etc.

About the second apprehension that Avyakta has been used as a synonym for Avidyā in Īśāvāsya the explanation is as follows: In the previous mantras it is told 'अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते' — one crosses death with Avidyā and attains immortality through Vidyā. (Īśa.11). Here Avidyā is interpreted as Karma and Vidyā as Upāsanā. Further, it is told in the Gītā that the Māyā contains in it the seeds of Avidyā of the Jīvas — 'अविद्याद्यनेक संसारबीजम् अन्तर्दोषवत् माया' (G.Bh.12.3). Therefore, just as pointing at a closed box containing clothes one refers to the box itself as clothes, the Avyakta containing Avidyā can be called Avidyā. Or the following explanation could also be given. Everywhere in the Bhāṣya the phrase used is invariably Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Avyākṛtākhyā. (See the last part of 12.16). Therefore, it could be that the word Lakṣaṇā is missed by the writer in copying the Bhāṣya. (See para 1 above). Whatever it may be, we cannot say Māyā and Avidyā are synonymous because of one phrase in one place, forgetting the large number of places where they are used separately (above 12.17 a).

An opinion about the five objections raised above could be this. Avidyā will cause different veils in different Jīvas. Therefore when the Avidyā of one Jīva is destroyed, it need not mean that Māyā, which is

the body seed of all the Jīvas, is destroyed. In that case the faults pointed out will not arise at all. But notice that Māyā has no multiplicity. Therefore, the two cannot be synonymous. In order to preserve synonymy if one postulates multiplicity for Māyā also, then one Īśvara has to be postulated for each Jīva. This apart, it is told that Avidyā alone is not the reason for inequality, because it is uniform ‘न च अविद्या केवला वैषम्यस्य कारणम् एकरूपत्वात्’ (Sū.Bh.2.1.36). In the light of this statement if the multiplicity for Avidyā is withdrawn, there will be room for making Avidyā and Māyā synonymous. In that case it is not possible to escape from the faults pointed out.

(f) Avidyā not an effect of Prakṛti

Question: We don’t say that they are identical; there is a difference. But, both of them originate from the same Prakṛti. One aspect of Prakṛti is Vikṣépa Śakti (the power) responsible for the creation of name-forms. This is Māyā. This is the adjunct for Īśvara. Another aspect of Prakṛti is the Āvaraṇa Śakti, the veiling power which causes the veil of Avidyā to the Jīva. This is the adjunct for Jīva. Therefore Māyā and Avidyā are different as effects, but causally the same.

Answer: You cannot stop with just an assertion; that would mean nothing. You have to make the relation between Prakṛti and Avidyā specific. Is Prakṛti the Upādāna or the Nimitta for Avidyā? There cannot be any other causal relation. First consider the possibility of the Prakṛti being the Upādāna for Avidyā.

(1) Śruti describes the creation of name-forms in several places. But the creation of the veil of Avidyā is not mentioned anywhere.

(2) It is not possible to infer even a Samavāya (inherent) relation between Avidyā and Prakṛti, because that would mean the (Prāgabhāva) earlier absence of Avidyā. But Avidyā is beginningless.

(3) Name-forms of the wakeful world exist objectively — पारमार्थिकस्तु (नायं सन्ध्याश्रय स्सर्गो) वियदादिसर्गवत् (Sū.Bh.3.2.4) But Avidyā

has no objective existence. People impose it on themselves and get into grief on its basis 'लोको हि अविद्यया स्वात्मन्यध्यस्तया कामकर्मोद्भवं दुःखम् अनुभवति । न तु सा परमार्थतः स्वात्मनि' (Ka.Bh. 2.2.11).

(4) A thing having objective existence can neither be created nor destroyed by Vidyā. 'न तु पारमार्थिकं वस्तु कर्तुं निवर्तयितुं वा अर्हति ब्रह्मविद्या' (Br.Bh. 1.4.10) But Vidyā destroys Avidyā 'य एव अविद्यादिदोषनिवृत्तिफलकृत् प्रत्ययः.....स एव विद्या' (Br.Bh. 1.4.10).

(5) The name-forms never go out of existence in past, present and future. 'जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति'(Sū.Bh.2.1.16). Therefore, they are not destructible. But Avidyā is destroyed the moment Vidyā is born just as darkness is destroyed on sunrise. 'विद्यायां हि सत्याम् उदिते सवितरि शार्वरमिव तमः प्रणाशमुपगच्छत्यविद्या' (G.Bh. 2.69).

(6) If the veil of Avidyā is an effect of Prakṛti as Upādāna, it should also be a stuff like name-forms. Therefore, its removal is possible only by Karma or Upāsana (worship of god) just like the removal of cataract. There should be no necessity or use of the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman identity. But the Śruti says very clearly that it is only this knowledge that removes Ajñāna.

(7) Avidyā as an effect of Prakṛti is naturally non-different from it by the law of cause-effect non-difference. Therefore, in its manifest form Avidyā should be the adjunct of Īśvara himself, just as name-forms. Then he ceases to be Īśvara and becomes only Śārīra, that is, Jīva (embodied soul). This will also contradict the assertion that the Vikṣēpa Śakti responsible for name-forms is the Upādhi for Īśvara.

(8) In Praḷaya all the name-forms become unmanifest and one with Īśvara. Since Avidyā is also like a name-form, it would also become one with Īśvara. This implies that its relation with Īśvara is eternal making him an eternal Samsāri. But we know he is eternally free of all bondage.

(9) If the Avidyā is an effect of Prakṛti, then we should know the nature of the bhokta (enjoyer) Jīva also by knowing the Prakṛti,

because Jīva is bhokta only because of Avidyā. But this is certainly wrong.

(10) “One aspect of Prakṛti, dependent on Īśvara causes name-forms that become adjuncts for Himself and so he is omniscient, etc; another aspect of the same Prakṛti causes Avidyā which is an adjunct for Jīvas and they become stupid creatures.” What is this peculiar logical justice? This could only be a concept which will level the charges of selfishness and sadism in Īśvara and so on. Therefore, Prakṛti as Upādāna causing Avidyā is without sense.

The other alternative is that Prakṛti is the Nimitta for Avidyā: Here, the veil is the effect. Prakṛti cannot by itself be the Nimitta for this effect, because it is inert. So, Nimitta has to be only Īśvara. Therefore the question arises: Is the veil of Jīva a result of Īśvara’s motivation to create it? If so, he will be charged with cynicism. It also contradicts the statement of Bhagavān in the Gītā that Īśvara is not responsible for the doership and enjoyership in the Jīva which results from Avidyā. ‘न कर्तृत्वं न कर्माणि लोकस्य सृजति प्रभुः । न कर्मफलसंयोगं स्वाभावस्तु प्रवर्तते’ (G 5.14). It is also against the Bhāṣya which says that Brahman is neither the cause of Avidyā nor is it self-confused — ‘नाविद्याकर्तृ भ्रान्तं च ब्रह्म’ (Br.Bh. 1.4.10). Not only that. Īśvara is motivated to create the Jagat only by the Karma of the Jīva done owing to his Avidyā. If Īśvara should cause the veil of Avidyā to the Jīva and thereby make the latter perform Karma and through that get the motivation himself to creation of name-forms, what motivates Him to cause the veil of Avidyā to the Jīva? Could you answer it? You cannot. Therefore it is clear that the veil in the Jīva is not caused by a motivation in Īśvara. Therefore the only alternative is that the Jīva himself is responsible for his Avidyā. Bhagavān Vyāsa explains it clearly as follows:

सहवासं न यास्यामि कालमेतद्धि वञ्चनात् ।

वञ्चितोऽस्म्यनया यद्धि निर्विकारो विकारया ॥

(Mókṣa Dharma 307.33)

Though I am undeformed by nature, I have become deformed myself cheated by the Prakṛti which undergoes deformations. I will never again go to her.

न चायमपराधोऽस्या ह्यपराधो ह्ययं मम ।

योऽहमत्राभवं सक्तः पराङ्मुखमुपस्थितः ॥

(Mókṣa Dharma 307.34)

Of course, it is not her fault; the fault is only mine. I got interested in her because I was an extrovert.

In this way the statement that Avidyā is an effect of Prakṛti does not serve any purpose and there was absolutely no need for conceiving such an idea. In fact it only causes confusion.

(g) Meaning of Avidyātmikā

“In that case let there be difference between Māyā and Avidyā and also synonymity, because of the presence of both descriptions namely, Avidyā coupled with Avyakta and also Avidyātmikā Māyā. Let both of them be alternative approaches for the Siddhānta.”

How can synonymity be a proof for the Siddhānta?

“When Avidyā is lost by acquiring Vidyā, Māyā is also lost. With that the Jīva-ness of the Jīva and the Īśvaraness of Īśvara — both drop off and only the Ātman will remain. This is because everything is an illusion due to Avidyā.”

This may be a strange blend of Buddhism and Sāṅkhya, but not at all Védānta which speaks of the realization of Brahman-Ātman identity for the destruction of Avidyā. This destruction demands the determination of (the nature) of Brahman as a first step. This is to be done only through the Jagat. Had the Jagat not been created at all, Brahman’s intrinsic nature could never have been determined. ‘यदि हि नामरूपे न व्याक्रियेते तदा अस्यात्मनो निरूपाधिकं रूपं प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं न प्रतिख्यायेत’ (Br.Bh. 2.5.19). When it is said that Vidyā cannot destroy even the Jagat ‘न तु पारमार्थिकं वस्तु कर्तुं निवर्तयितुं वा अर्हति ब्रह्मविद्या’ (Br.Bh.1.4.10), how can

it destroy its cause Māyā which is eternal? Māyā is indeed non different from Brahman ‘मम स्वरूपभूता मदीया माया’ (G.Bh. 14.3). It is not a super imposition made by the Śāstra. Superimposition is only the transaction of Māyā. (9.12 & 12.15 viii) Moreover, can you explain how two opposite statements like difference and synonymity between Māyā and Avidyā can provide alternative approaches to the same Siddhānta?

“In that case let there be difference where it is mentioned and synonymity where that is mentioned.”

This is not possible, because it leads to doubt but not certainty. It would also lead to conflicting conclusions.

“But the word Ātmā in the phrase ‘Avidyātmikā hi bīja Śakti’ obstructs us to give up synonymity.”

True. But when Avidyā and Avyakta are used with different meanings everywhere, and Avidyā is compared to poison and Avyakta to food, it is not correct to imagine synonymity between them, just because of a phrase. One will then find it even difficult to develop faith in the Bhāṣya, in the face of such incongruity. Therefore, some great people in the tradition have explained the use of the word Ātmikā in having a secondary meaning: The gross and the subtle body dual which are adjuncts of the Jīva are indeed the effects of Māyā. Jīva has identification with them because of Avidyā. (12.7). Vidyā destroys this identification with the effect of Māyā. Therefore Māyā is termed Avidyātmikā — ‘जीवोपाधेः मायाप्रदेशस्य विद्यापनोद्यतया अविद्या शब्दवाच्यस्य माया तादात्म्यात् मायेऽपि अविद्यात्मिकेत्यर्थः’ (On Sū.Bh. 1.4.3 commentary by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya — Prakatārtha Vivaraṇa). Liberated souls do not have another birth because the Vidyā will have burnt the seed for the next body. ‘विद्यया तस्या बीजशक्तेर्दाहात् मुक्तानां च पुनरनुत्पत्तिः.’ In the statement of Bhāṣyakāra one gets a doubt how this seed which has objective existence can be burnt by Vidyā. Taking this doubt into account the seed has been described as Avidyātmikā because it is only due to Vidyā that they don’t get another body. ‘बीजशक्तेः वस्तुत्वात् विद्यया दाहो अनुपपन्नः इति अत आह अविद्यात्मिका हीति’ (On Sū.Bh. 1.4.3 commentary

by Cithsukhācārya, Bhaṣyabhavaprakāśika) Avidyā Lakṣaṇā is that which has Avidyā as its Lakṣaṇa (feature). This is also described as Avidyātmikā. The feature of Avidyā Lakṣaṇā is removability of the Avidyā by Vidyā. Just as Jñāna removes Avidyā, it simultaneously removes the sense of difference between Brahman and its Māyā. Therefore Avidyā Lakṣaṇā means Avidyātmikā. Further, the same thing is described as Avidyā coupled with Avyakta. Coupling is possible only between two different things. Therefore, the difference between Avyakta and Avidyā is demonstrated explicitly. `अविद्या लक्षणा यस्याः सा अविद्यालक्षणा अविद्यात्मकेति शब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते । विद्यया निवृत्तत्वम् अविद्यायाः लक्षणं यथा ज्ञानात् अविद्यायाः बाधो भवति तथैव ब्रह्ममाया भेदस्यापि बाधो भवति । अतः अविद्यालक्षणा अविद्यात्मिका । अग्रे अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम् इति उच्यते तत्र संयोगो भिन्नपदार्थयोः संभवति । तेन अविद्यायाः अव्यक्तात् भेदस्य स्फुटता प्रतिपादिता' (Mahéśānanda Giri).

(h) Ātmika implies only coupling

“In all the above explanations, after accepting the difference, synonymity is derived. Is the difference mentioned specifically anywhere in the Bhāṣya?”

Have you not noticed that one aspect of Māyā namely, Ahankara (ego) is explained as Avidyā coupled with Avyakta? `अहङ्कारः इति अविद्यासंयुक्तम् अव्यक्तम् ।' Have you not read the phrases, Māyā containing the fault of Avidyā in it — `अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजशक्तिः अव्यक्तशब्द निर्देश्या'? The Avidyā contained in the Prakṛti is the cause of Saṁsāra — `अविद्यादि अन्तर्दोषवत् माया,' `प्रकृतिस्थत्वाख्या अविद्या संसारस्य कारणम्,' `प्रकृत्या अविद्यारूपः संयोगः संसारः,' `अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपमाया' — Māyā containing the Avidyā of Jīvas that projects to them the name–forms as non–Brahman, `अविद्यालक्षणाप्रकृतिः' — Avidyā Lakṣaṇā Prakṛti, etc? Have you not noticed that the same word Avyakta being identified with Avidyā when applied to Jīva and identified with Māyā when applied to Hiraṇyagarbha in the Bhāṣya of the same sūtra? Have you not observed this glaring bifurcation? Can Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra commit the fault of such

extreme self contradiction by subscribing Māyā and Avidyā as different in one sentence and as not different in another sentence in the Bhāṣya for the same Sūtra? Moreover the root ‘vid’ from which the word Avidyā emanates conveys an objective meaning and the root ‘Kṛñ’ from which the word Prakṛti is derived has subjective meaning. How on earth can they be synonymous? What is the big gain to the Siddhānta by postulating synonymity? What is the loss if it is dropped? You cannot say that the word Avidyātmikā is responsible for so much of discussion because, ‘just as food coupled with poison is called poison, Avyakta coupled with ego is called ego’. Here the food coupled with poison is poisonous—Viṣātmaka food; similarly Māyā coupled with Avidyā is Avidyātmikā Māyā. In fact, just as food coupled with poison is called poison, one may designate Māyā coupled with Avidyā as even Avidyā. Perhaps, it is in this sense that Prakṛti has been referred to as Avidyā in Īśāvāsya Bhāṣya by Śāṅkara.

12.18 Which is the cause of Jagat – Māyā or Avidyā?

i) From chapter 6 to 10 mainly two things are established: (a) The creation, the sustenance and the destruction of the Jagat is an activity of Māyā. (b) This transaction of Jagat is superimposed on Brahman by the Śāstra to meet the requirements of the Avidyā of the student (10.5). Notice that we have walked on the razor’s edge in traversing from (a) to (b). Still some doubts are possible. Is the Jagat an effect of Māyā according to (a) or an effect of Avidyā according (b)? Which of the two is correct? Why then should the other be told? If both are correct does it not lead to the synonymity of Māyā and Avidyā? If one has clearly understood the method of Adhyāropāpavāda, there is no room for any doubt. However, this is an issue which has caused great vexation to the spiritual aspirants. So we will again summarize the discussion for final clarification.

ii) Vaiṣṇavīmāyā is the Upādāna for the Jagat and certainly not Avidyā. It is created by Brahman through this Māyā to meet the requirements of the Jīvas with Avidyā. Since the Jīvas are countless,

Brahman will continue the cycles of creation from infinite past to infinite future even though one here and one there may not get another birth because of one's Vidyā. The mysterious Jagat can never be created by Avidyā. The reasons are many and obvious.

(i) Every embodied soul knows clearly that he has not created the Jagat.

(ii) Each person's Karma is unique. It is impossible to reconcile all of them and create the same Jagat for all.

iii) Had it been possible, people would have created what is convenient for them and destroyed, what is inconvenient. Then every individual would rather cherish his Avidyā. No one will try to get rid of it.

iv) Since the reconciliation of the Avidyā of all the Jīvas is impossible, each would create and destroy according to his own desires and there would be chaos. One with great kindness will desire the removal of all Saṁsāra which is the cause of grief and another sadist would create Saṁsāra even for the liberated souls. Nothing checks desire. (Sū.Bh. 2.2.17).

v) Avidyā by itself is not able to cause even grief. It can do so only through Adhyāsa coupled with kāma. How can such mean Avidyā be the cause of the mysterious and objectively existing Jagat?

vi) Moreover every Jñānī who is without Avidyā like Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa who wrote the Brahmasūtras for the good of the society, has done transaction with the Jagat according to his Prārabdha. This means that the Jagat exists even for one without Avidyā. Then how can Avidyā be the cause of the Jagat? Therefore Jagat is only an effect of Māyā and never of Avidyā.

12.19 The two examples

i) Then why has the Jagat been described as Avidyākalpita in some places? What is its meaning? This has been clearly explained in (12.15). One may have or may not have Avidyā—Jagat is non-different

from Brahman always. For one with Avidyā it appears different from Brahman and for one with Vidyā it appears non-different. Once we develop the causal view, the whole world of name-forms is recognized as Brahman. As long as one has only the transactional view then the multiplicity is seen like seeing a non-existent snake in the rope (10.2.i). Once the non-difference is recognized, the individual realizes the ultimate truth of the unqualified Brahman. In other words Avidyā causes only wrong impressions about the already existing Jagat. It does not create the Jagat. Similarly Vidyā removes the wrong view of the already existing Jagat. It doesn't destroy it. Even what Vidyā cannot create or destroy, how can Avidyā create or destroy? 'न तु पारमार्थिकं वस्तु कर्तुं निवर्तयितुं वा अर्हति ब्रह्मविद्या' (Br.Bh.1.4.10). But the Jagat is called Avidyā Kalpita in some places where the person with Avidyā treated it as independent of Brahman. For the facility of communicating with the aspirant it is told that the Jagat is an effect of Māyā palatable to the aspirants' view. Then going a step further it established its non-difference with Brahman. When the aspirant obtains this Vidyā, his earlier wrong conception is removed. The Jagat which he had previously understood was rejected as Avidyākalpita.

ii) There are two stages in conveying Brahma Svarūpa: To establish the nondual Brahman through cause – effect non difference. Śruti gives the examples of clay-pot for this. (Ch. 6.1.4). Brahman understood this way is bound to appear with its attributes, because the aspirant will not have lost the transactional view of the Jagat. Therefore, he is bound to superimpose transactions in non-dual Brahman. The second step in communicating Brahmasvarūpa is to deny this transaction. Towards this end, the Bhāṣyakāra gives the examples of seeing one moon as two moons, shell appearing like silver etc.

iii) It is like this: There are two moons for a person with cataract. (In the case of an Ajñānī there are two Jagats) One of them is illusory, the other real (One is Avidyā Kalpita, the other is what the Śāstra says). After the cataract is removed, the illusion moon disappears. Only the real moon is seen (With Vidyā the illusory world ceases to exist, the

world non-different from Brahman alone stays) Now, the transaction is only with the Jagat non-different from Brahman.

Another example is shell-silver. The shell appears as silver due to wrong understanding. (The Jagat non-different from Brahman appears as different due to Avidyā) After examination it is realized as a shell appearing like silver. (After the study of Śāstra, the Jagat is understood as Brahman appearing like Jagat.) Now, the illusory silver is lost (now the Jagat viewed as independent due to Avidyā is gone) Only the transaction with the shell remains. (Only transaction with the non-different from Brahman remains).

In the above paragraphs the sentence “transaction for the Jñānī is only with the world non-different from Brahman” is to be understood properly. This is stated only from the view of Ajñānī. Actually the Jñānī with the realization of this identity with Brahman has no transaction of any sort. He does not have even the idea such as “Brahman and the Jagat as non-different from it.” For Him there is Brahman alone and that is himself.

iv) One must be careful in understanding these examples. It has already been told (4.4) that one should not imagine more than its intended similarity from an analogy. Therefore, one should not say “shell in the example stands for Brahman and silver for the world. As the silver is non-existent in the example, the world is also non-existent”. Bhāṣyakāra himself has cautioned about this. (10.3 ii) However, we will give the reason for the limitation of the application of the analogies: there is no causal relation as in pot-clay, in the examples of the two moons, silver-shell, etc. That the one in another is only a wrong understanding, a plain illusion. In the sentence, “the shell understood as silver” the word shell represents the shell but the word silver represents only the impression of its existence. This is because silver is just wrong understanding, there is no silver in it. ‘शुक्तिकां रजतमिति प्रत्येति इत्यत्र शुक्तिवचन एव शुक्तिकाशब्दः । रजतशब्दस्तु रजत प्रतीतिलक्षणार्थः । प्रत्येत्येव हि केवलं रजतमिति न तु तत्र रजतमस्ति’ (Sū.Bh.4.1.5).

Therefore, these examples are intended only to remove the misconceptions about Brahman gotten through the Jagat and not for fixing it through the name-forms as in the clay-pot example. A clever person may resist even such a straight and simple situation and say “there is causal relation even in the example. The snake is created from the rope, stays with rope and dissolves in the rope. Therefore, the rope is its Upādāna”. Perhaps he has forgotten the statement of Bhāṣyakāra viz ‘how is the causal relation for the Brahmvādīn? For him the relation is one of non-difference. (कार्यकारण संबंधः) ब्रह्मवादिनः कथम्? तस्य तादात्म्यलक्षण संबंधोपपत्तेः (Sū.Bh.2.2.38). So he should be asked for the Nimitta Kāraṇa for the snake. What can he say? It cannot be the rope itself because it is inert. But Brahman is at once the Nimitta and Upādāna of the Jagat. The cause and the effect come to our attention simultaneously. But in the example, when the serpent is seen the rope is not seen and when the rope is seen the serpent is not seen. Therefore, there is absolutely no causal relation between the serpent and the rope. Indeed both the Nimitta and the Upādāna for the illusory serpent is the confused mind of the seer, not the rope.

12.20 Māyā and Avidyā not synonymous

The summary of the discussion is this: Māyā and Avidyā are not synonymous. Māyā is in Īśvara, not in the Jīva; Avidyā is in the Jīva, not in Īśvara (G.4.5). Jagat is the effect of Māyā, the same for everyone; Adhyāsa is the effect of Avidyā, it exists only in his mind that is, it cannot be known by others. Man-woman difference is known even to a cat. Husband-wife is known only to themselves. Māyā is divine. It represents Brahman in the form of Jagat; so Māyā can be the name of a girl. But Avidyā is reprehensible and mean. It presents grief through the Saṁsāra; Avidyā cannot be the name for a girl. Māyā is food, Avidyā is poison (G.7.4). Though there is such a world of difference between them, somehow, there is a wrong impression that they are synonymous. In my opinion it is this mistaken notion which makes Vēdānta so fuzzy and un-understandable to the aspirants. Therefore, their difference has been

delineated in detail on the basis of the Upaniṣadic statements and Śaṅkara Bhāṣya. A bird's eye view of it can be had from the table below.

Sl No	Māyā	Avidyā
1	This is the power of Brahman (8.2)	This is the weakness of Jīva. (12.6)
2	This is not in Jīva (G.4.5)	This is not in Brahman (G. 4.5)
3	In Svarūpa this is non-different from Brahman. Therefore this is of existent nature (8.11)	In Svarūpa this does not exist at all. Therefore this is of non-existent nature (12.9)
4	This has no Pratiyógi	Its Pratiyógi is Vidyā (12.10)
5	By this Brahma is not damaged (8.5)	By this Jīva suffers total damage. (12.6)
6	This is helpful to Jīva, Brahman can be realized through this (7.12 iv)	This is an obstruction to Jīva in realizing Brahman (12.6).
7	Crossing over this is Mókṣa (G. 7.14)	By discarding this is Mókṣa (12.9)
8	This is inexplicable (8.10)	This is explicable (12.6)
9	Its effect is Jagat (8.2)	Its effect is Adhyāsa (12.6)
10	Its support is Brahman (8.5)	Its support is the Jagat. (12.6)
11	By this, creation and dissolution of the Jagat take place (8.2)	By this, creation dissolving of the Jagat do not take place (12.9.i)
12	In this only is the sustenance of Jagat (8.2)	In this only is the state of Saṁsāra (12.6)
13	This is commendable (G. 7.14)	This is censurable (12.20)
14	This can be the name of a girl (8.3)	This cannot be the name of a girl (12.20)
15	This is food (G. 7.4)	This is poison (G. 7.4)
16	Synonyms : Vaiṣṇavīmāyā, Prakṛti, Mūlaprakṛti, Avyakta, Akśara (8.3)	Synonyms: Ajñāna, Agrahaṇa (12.6. ii)
17	This is eternal—Nitya (8.9)	This is ephemeral (anitya since it is removed by Vidyā (12.10)

CHAPTER 13

JĀGRAT, SVAPNA AND SUṢUPTI

In the previous two chapters it was shown that oneself is different from the gross, the subtle and the causal bodies. Though one understands in this way what he is not, it is only through the Vēda that one can know what he is. According to Vēda one is Brahman. In what follows, we use the super logic of the Vēda to analyse the three states of wakefulness, dream and deep sleep to establish that Jīva, in his Svarūpa, is the self effulgent non dual limitless Ānanda. (Br. 4.3.1 connecting Bhāṣya)

13.1 Wakefulness

Jīva experiences the three states of Jāgrat (wakefulness), Svapna (dream) and Suṣupti (deep sleep). The speciality of the wakeful state is that all the nineteen principles of the subtle body activate the gross body. In this way all of them act as openings for his experiences. Therefore he is termed **Ēkōnavimśatimukha** that is, nineteen-faced. He is **Bahiṣprajña** that is, one who gets cognitions of the external world through the sense organs. He is **Sthūlabhuk**, one who experiences the gross things in accordance with the knowledges got from outside. He is **Jāgaritasthāna**, one who is placed in wakefulness — 'जागरितस्थानो बहिष्प्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्गः एकोनविंशतिमुखः स्थूलभुक् वैश्वानरः प्रथमः पादः' (Mā. 3). The eyes are open during wakefulness, in Jāgrat, and closed during sleep. Therefore, sometimes he is also called **Nétrasthāna** that is, placed in the eye. The objects experienced and the activities done in Jāgrat remain as Vāsanā in his citta. This Vāsanā motivates further activity. In this way, wakefulness is the base of wordly (Loukika) and spiritual (Vaidika) Karma, grief and happiness, Dharma and Adharma, bondage and Mókṣa.

13.2 Jyóti

No transaction is possible without light. What is that light which is necessary for the activities in Jāgrat? In day time it is of the sun; in sun's absence during night it is of the moon and the stars; when they are also absent it is of Agni, fire. When Agni is also absent how do we get cognitions? We get them from Śabda, Sparśa, Rasa and Gandha. For instance, during pitch darkness we may reach a village guided by the barking dogs or the sound of drums. We recognize the match box by touch, etc. In this way, transactions take place even in darkness through sound, touch, taste, and smell. That is why Śruti calls all of them as Jyóti that is light. Jyóti is defined as that without which we cannot get an awareness (Sū.Bh. 1.1.24).

“How can we call sound, etc. Jyóti? We cannot recognize shapes from them.”

True, we cannot know the shape with the help of sound. We cannot also recognize taste or smell with light. Each of them illuminates a particular attribute of the object Śabda illuminates its acoustic feature. Sparśa its hardness, temperature etc., Rūpa its shape and colour, Rasa its taste and Gandha its smell. Therefore each one of them must be containing Jyóti. So they are called Śabda Jyóti, Sparśa Jyóti, Rūpa Jyóti, Rasa Jyóti and Gandha Jyóti. Any Jyóti brings us the qualified knowledge as “the object is like this”. Here the knowledge of the attribute ‘like this’ comes from Śabda, etc. and the knowledge ‘the object’ comes from the Jyóti in it. Therefore, each of these Jyótis is qualified Jyóti.

13.3 What is Svapna?

Further now we start the analysis of dreams to bring out the nature of this Jyóti. When we discussed about the world experienced in Jāgrat our purpose was not the physics of it, but to know its Svarūpa as Brahman. Similarly, the present discussion of dream state is not to understand the psychology of it, but the intrinsic nature of Jyóti. During Jāgrat, the Indriyas act through the gross body and carry out transactions. In due course, Jīva is tired by this (Ch 6.8.1). Then, the Jīva

leaves his position in the eyes and descends to the heart. The Jñānēndriyas leave their locations in the gross body, get into the mind and that mind enters into the heart. Then the external transactions with the outside objects come to a stop. However the mind does not stop its function (Pra. 4.2). This is Svapna. The experience of Svapna (dream) is that where the Indriyas are resting, but the mind continues to experience without resting. 'इन्द्रियाणाम् उपरमे मनोऽनुपरतं यदि । सेवते विषयानेव तद्विद्यात् स्वप्नदर्शनम्' (Mókṣadharmā 274. 24). However, the Prāṇa Vāyus will not leave their places. They continue to protect the gross body as in the wakeful state (Pra. 4.3-4). That is why a sleeping body does not appear like the inauspicious corpse; it continues to be auspicious.

The mind continues to supply from inwards the awareness to the Jīva during Svapna, according to the Vāsanās (latent impressions) contained in it. Therefore, in this state, the Jīva is **Svapnasthāna** and **Antahprajña**. These awarenesses are only vibrations of the Manas without outside stimuli. Even here, he has nineteen openings as in Jāgrat. Therefore, he is also **Ēkōnavimśatimukha** that is, nineteen-faced. But all these are only of the Vāsanā type except the Manas; though the body is sleeping here, the body in the dream may be walking. Indriyas are resting here, but acting there. Breathing of Prāṇa is regular here, but there it may be gasping. Gōpīs who were sleeping by the side of their husbands in the dead of night, run away to the forest to meet the flute playing Kṛṣṇa in their dream giving up all activities like washing of clothes, cooking food, feeding of family members etc. Further, the enjoyments in Svapna are not gross as in Jāgrat. They are प्रविविक्त (well–Pra, separated–Vivikta) from the gross enjoyments. That is, the content of the dream world is only the Vāsanā experienced inwardly in the mind, 'अन्तःकरणवृत्तिः अस्य लोकस्य वासनामात्र (Br.Bh.4.3.10). Therefore, the Jīva here is called **Praviviktabhuk** 'स्वप्नस्थानोऽन्तःप्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः प्रविविक्तभुक् तैजसो द्वितीयः पादः' (Mā.4). In a different place the Śruti calls this Jīva as **Praviviktahāratarā**. Its meaning is as follows: In Jāgrat he has the gross body and his food is the middle part of what he eats which goes to his muscles. But in dreams where he is transacting only with the

mind, his food is the subtlest part of what he has eaten (11.4. ii). This food is Praviviktatara—more separated. Therefore, he is called Praviviktahāratara (Br.Bh. 4.2.3).

13.4 The Dream Jagat

There are all transactions in dreams as in Jāgrat. There is the whole world. There are chariots, horses to pull them and roads. But they are visible only for the person dreaming, not for others. “Then does it mean that the dream Jagat is Prātibhāsika Satya?” No, it is not. Here the world is not objective like the Ākāśa etc. seen in Jāgrat which is the creation of Īśvara — ‘पारमार्थिकस्तु नायं सन्ध्याश्रयः सर्गो वियदादि सर्गवत्’ (Sū.Bh. 3.2.4). The dream world is false. There is not even a trace of objectivity in it. ‘मायैव सन्ध्ये सृष्टिर्नपरमार्थ गन्धोऽप्यस्ति’ (Sū.Bh. 3.2.3). The content of the world is only the mental modifications of the sleeper; not the Pañcabhūtas created by Īśvara which are experienced by one and all. (Sū.Bh. 3.2.3). Therefore, the dreaming Jīva is untouched by the Puṇya and the Pāpa done there. This is described at the end of the Rāsa Pañcaka in Bhāgavatam as follows: There is no blemish for the Tējīyān — ‘तेजीयसां न दोषः’ Tējīyān means more Tējasvi that is, more lustrous. Bahiṣprajña is Tējasvi and Antahprajña is more Tējasvi that is, Tējīyān. Here he only sees the Puṇya and the Pāpa, that is, the fruit of Puṇya and Pāpa. He doesn’t actually do them ‘दृष्ट्वैव न कृत्वा इत्यर्थः | पुण्यं च पुण्यफलं पापं च पापफलं’ (Br.Bh.4.3.15). Not only that. Even the pain and pleasure experienced here are only Vāsanā. The transactions which took place in the Jāgrat world are seen in the dream world, by the dreamer, staying within the body (Br.Bh. 2.1.18). That is why the Śruti describes the dream world as the creation of the Jīva. There are no chariots there, no horses, no roads. But he creates the chariots, horses, and the roads — ‘न तत्र रथा रथयोगा न पथानो भवन्त्यथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजते’ (Br. 4.3.10).

There is no activity of the gross body in Svapna; but from the point of view of the activity of the mind, there is no difference between Jāgrat and Svapna. This is easily determined by scientists using some instruments. But the god given world puts a leash on the mind during

Jāgrat. One cannot forget oneself while moving on the road, living in one's own mental world. The external objects pull him towards them. But since the external sense organs are inactive during Svapna, the leash of the external world is snapped and the mind has a free play. There is 'Kārtsnya' orderliness and completeness in the wakeful world created by Īśvara that is, it is well ordered through place time and causal connections. But the dream world has no 'Kārtsnya' (Sū.Bh. 3.2.3). It is totally false. There is no order there with regard to space-time and causality. A man now, becomes a tree the next moment, and then the tree becomes an animal. Dream is only a recall of the memory of what has happened in Jāgrat. There is no rule that one should see what has been seen earlier in the wakeful state. One can add one's own imagination to the memory of what was seen in Jāgrat and see the sights. In Rāsālilā gopis can see bloomed lotuses in midnight. They can see that seven year boy Kṛṣṇa behaving like an adult including munching of Tāmbūla. But what is beyond imagination can never be seen in a dream. The world of Jāgrat is true, the world of Svapna is false.

13.5 Dream: Junction of the worlds here and hereafter

Though dream experience is largely a memory recall of Jāgrat transactions, sometimes something special may also be seen according to the Vidyā Karma and Pūrva Prajñā. He may also see the other worlds where he has to go after death. He does not directly experience the pleasures and pains of the other worlds in his dreams; but he simply sees them. Therefore, the dream is described as the junction of this world and the next (Br. 4.3.9). Not only that, he can see in dreams even the future events of this life. For example, one who does Sakāmakarma, not at all entertaining even the thought of a woman, will see the fruition of that Karma in the dreams through the sight of woman (Ch. 2.8). If one sees a dark person with black teeth in his dreams it is the indication of his death (Ai. Āraṇyaka 3.2.4). The woman or the dark man with black teeth, of course are mental forms, but the fruition of Karma and death are real, not unreal (Sū.Bh. 3.2.4).

13.6 Who creates Dreams?

Now, we will discuss about who creates the dreams. There are different statements about this in different Upanishads. The Brhadāraṇyaka indicates that the Jīva is himself the creator. He creates the chariots the horses and the roads for himself `अथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजते' (Br.Bh. 4.3.10). But Kaṭha tells that Īśvara is its creator. When they are all sleeping that Puruṣa who is awake creating different sights in the dream is the divine Brahman — `य एषु सुप्तेषु जागर्ति कामं कामं पुरुषो निर्मिमाणः। तदेव शुक्रं तद्ब्रह्म तदेवामृतमुच्यते' (Ka. 2.2.8). Further, the Praśnópaniṣad attributes it to the mind. All the Indriyas will have merged during dreams in the great Déva of the mind. This Déva experiences this grandeur in the dreams — `अत्रैष देवः स्वप्ने महिमानमनुभवति' (Pra. 4.5). Therefore a discussion is necessary to fix the creator of the dream.

When we stated that the Vēda is a Pramāṇa (see 4.6. iv), remember that we declared that it does not have contradictions anywhere. Therefore the vaidikas treat it as an independent Pramāṇa. We will see how the Ācārya has reconciled these apparently differing statements about the creator of dreams.

The creator is indeed the Jīva only because it is told 'Sṛjate'— creates for himself. This is indeed correct because it is only the Vāsanā of Jīva that appears as the dream world. "But he gets even undesirable dreams. How can he be the creator? He has no control over his dreams." Yes, of course; he does not have control because it is Īśvara who shows up the dreams contained in his Vāsanā. "Then we have to say that Īśvara is the creator." That is not right. Suppose one eats too much and gets gripes, nobody says that the Vaiśvānara (Agni) in the intestines is responsible for this; people say he has caused it himself. It is true that he doesn't want gripes. He has no control over it either. But still he is himself responsible for that. He has no control over it after over-eating. Had he control while eating, he would not have had gripes at all. In that case, how is it that the Praśnópaniṣad attributes the

responsibility to the mind”? It is because the Jīva gets Svapna only through the Manas as Upādhi. Without Upādhi he is a non-doer. Though there is a person who is pounding, we say “this pestle pounds well”. Similarly the responsibility for the dream world is attributed to the mind as Upādhi. Vēda adopts a style of direct teaching of the Guru to Śiṣya; the Guru uses the expressions according to the situation. One who cannot understand this, may think that it could be a contradiction.

13.7 Does Jyóti Belong to the body?

In (13.2) above we read about the Jyóti that facilitates transactions during Jāgrat. There it comes from the sun or the moon etc., and from the Indriyas. But in the dreams there is no scope for any one of these. “The sun does not shine there. The moon, the stars, the lightning do not shine there.” From where can this Agni come? ‘न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः’ (Ka. 2.2.15). But the Jīva gets all awareness just as in the Jāgrat. What is the Jyóti for them? It is certainly not from outside. It has to be only from inside. But the question is: is it connected with the body or something different? When one rubs the eyes, he sees stars inside. Similarly, the Nāstika maintains that the dream Jyóti is related to the body.

13.8 Svapna Jyóti – Not of the body

But this is wrong. The reason is as follows: One who had seen something with physical eyes in Jāgrat, sees the same again in dream even after becoming blind. Therefore, the seer must be someone who is different from the eyes. Previously what was seen through the eyes is now seen without the eyes. Therefore this Jyóti does not belong to the eyes, that is, it is not connected with the body.

Nāstika: Not like that. What was seen through the Indriyas is recorded in the Manas as Vāsanā. This Vāsanā itself shows up as objects in dreams. The Manas itself now plays two roles — as the seen object and also as the seer. Therefore the Svapna Jyóti is of the Manas which is related to the body.

Vedānti: In that case, it is agreed by you that the seer is different from the eyes. But you say that the Manas is the seer. This is not correct. If it is the seer, it needs another instrument to see the sight of the dream (Sū.Bh. 2.3.38). By such arguments it is already shown that the Manas is not the seer, but the seen. In fact, it is known that the Manas is absent in Suṣupti. But the absence of the Manas cannot be known by the Manas itself; someone else must be knowing. Therefore, the Manas is not an observer. It is Jaḍa. Therefore the true seer is one who is different from it and able to witness even the absence of the Manas in Suṣupti.

13.9 Jyóti is of the Ātman

Therefore, this much can be decidedly said that the jyóti must be of one who is even beyond the mind. This is the Ātman. Who is he? It is he who is witnessing the absence of everything including the mind in deep sleep. Though it is difficult to apprehend him, nobody doubts his existence. Therefore he shines in his own Jyóti, not by something else. This is Ātman's Swayam Jyótiṣṭva. This is his Svarūpa; but the transactions of Swayam Jyótiṣṭva happen only through the Upādhi of the Manas (see Sec 9.12). It is only from this Jyóti that the Buddhi shines and decides things. The Manas beyond understands things; the Indriyas still beyond shine from the same Jyóti and appear as though they are themselves Cétana. For that matter the light of the objects beyond like the sun etc., is also of the same Jyóti (Br.Bh. 4.3.7). It is only by the reflection of this light that everything is illumined; from this light everything is seen 'तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति' (Ka. 2.2.15). This can be affirmed as follows: If the Manas inside is engaged elsewhere, even outside lights will not be seen. This shows that the outside light is seen with the light of the Manas. But we know by now that the Manas is seen with the light of the Ātman. Therefore, the light of all the lights is the light of the Ātman. An example: When we talk of moonlight it is indeed the light of the sun only.

13.10 Qualified Jñāna is Through Indriyas

Question: There is no time when Ātmajyóti is absent. It is present even in darkness. Why then can't we have transactions in darkness also?

Answer: There are transactions through Śabda, Sparśa, Rasa and Gandha even in darkness.

Question: Not like that; why can't we recognize the shape of the pot with the ever present Ātmajyóti in darkness also?

Answer: Śabda and Sparśa of the pot are indeed recognized even in darkness only by the Ātmajyóti. But to recognize its shape and colour there should certainly be the light of the eyes and the external light. 'Will not the Indriyas like the Ghrāṇa, etc. become unnecessary because of the uninterrupted Ātmacaitanya? No. They are needed to differentiate various aspects like smell taste etc. That is why Śruti says that Ghrāṇa is meant for Gandha, etc. नित्यस्वरूपचैतन्यत्वे घ्राणाद्यानर्थक्यम् इति चेत्? न। गन्धादिविषयविशेष परिच्छेदार्थत्वात्। तथा हि दर्शयति गन्धाय घ्राणम्' (Ch. 8.12.4-5), (Sū.Bh. 2.3.18) However, this does not mean that the Rūpa is recognized by the outside light and the eyes. This is because, as explained above, the pot shape is not recognized by the eyes at all if the Manas is engaged elsewhere. Therefore, though it is true that the outside light and Indriyas are instrumental in recognizing the pot shape, we cannot say that it is known only through them. It may be summed up like this- as described in (13.2) the awareness of an object "it is like this" has two aspects; 'It is' and 'like this'. This latter part of information essentially requires the lights of other agents like the sun, Indriyas etc. But the former information 'it is' is known only through Ātma- Jyóti. However, this does not mean that Ātmajyóti is one light and the other Jyótis are other lights. The other Jyótis too are Ātmajyóti only appearing in a special way through the Upādhi. They are not different from it. So the conclusion is that the ātma Jyóti is responsible not only for the awareness 'it is', but also for the awareness 'like this.'

For example,

(13.10) External Jyótiś are not different from the Ātmajyótiś but the Ātmajyótiś is different from external Jyótiś.

This is similar to the relation in 9.13. External Jyótiś are only the Jagat and Ātmajyótiś is Brahman. So the above pair of sentences is merely another form of that in (9.13).

13.11 Ātman is Not unknown

Whether the innermost Buddhi, or the Manas a little outside of it, or the Indriyas still external to it, or the gross body most external, are all animated with the Ātmajyótiś, but all of them are with attributes, whereas the Ātmajyótiś alone is totally attributeless. This can be understood through some examples. The formless clay contains the form of the pot within it in an unmanifest state. Why is it not seen? It is not seen because its shape has been covered by the clay different from it. When this different clay is removed, it becomes manifest (Br.Bh. 1.2.1). Again the sunlight is colourless because it contains all colours. But each colour is covered by the rest of the sunlight, therefore, it appears colourless. Suppose sunlight falls on objects of different colours, the objects absorb all the colours in sunlight other than their own and scatter only their colour. That is why they appear in their particular colours. The leaf of a tree absorbs all the colours of sunlight and scatters only green colour to the eyes and so it appears green. This is just like the unmanifest pot in the clay becomes manifest when the clay outside is removed. This means that the green colour of the leaf is projected as if it is different from the colourless sunlight. Though it is green, its non-difference from the sunlight is to be understood through science. Similarly, the Buddhi etc project only a part of the Ātmajyótiś and appear animate as if something different from the Ātmajyótiś. The Ātmajyótiś is attributeless like the sunlight. Just as it is easy to recognize the special colours and difficult to recognize the colourless light, it is easier to recognize the Buddhi, etc., but very difficult to recognize the Ātmajyótiś. Buddhi is the illuminated, Ātmajyótiś is its illuminator like the

sunlight. It is well known that there is great difficulty to differentiate illuminator from the illuminated because the light being colourless appears similar to the illuminated— अवभास्या बुद्धिः अवभासकं तदात्मज्योतिः आलोकवत् । अवभास्यावभासकयोः विवेकतोऽनुपलब्धिः प्रसिद्धा । विशुद्धत्वाद्धि आलोकोऽवभास्येन सदृशो भवति' (Br.Bh.4.3.7). Therefore, it is only with the help of Śruti one should know that the other Jyōtis are not different from the Ātmajyōti. Though it appears differently through the different Indriyas, etc, somehow even the layman knows that it is only himself who is appearing in all of them. That is why it is told that the Ātman is Ābālagōpa Vidita known even to cowherds, etc. Though identifying himself once with the Buddhi, once with the Indriyas, once with the body he somehow knows that he is not many in the body, but only himself appearing in different ways. Nevertheless, just as it is easy to recognise the coloured light and not the colourless light, it is easy to recognize the qualified Ātman appearing through the Buddhi, etc. but very difficult to recognize his own attributeless nature. This is the root of all trouble. (Br.Bh.4.3.7).

13.12 The Facility with Dreams

In this way everyone knows the existence of the Ātman. But knowing him only through the Upādhis, people superimpose the nature of the Upādhi on themselves. If the Buddhi is endowed with Dharma, he is understood as DharmaMāyā, if he is endowed with Adharma he is understood as AdharmaMāyā. Similarly he is also understood as TējōMāyā, AtējōMāyā, KāmaMāyā, AkāmaMāyā, KródhaMāyā, AkródhaMāyā (see 10.1.11). If the body is male one thinks he is a man; if female, thinks he is a woman. Both man and woman are himself, but he is neither a man nor a woman. Therefore, in order to understand his Swayam Jyōtiṣṭva he is to be freed from the outside lights and the lights of the Upādhis. What has been done in the dream is precisely this. Though it is the same Jyōti in Jāgrat also, its attributeless silent nature is unrecognized in the humdrum of the external Jyōtis. In dream, this humdrum is suppressed and therefore its recognition becomes easy. Our countless salutations to this Antarātman who, by gracing us with the

Svapna, removed our darkness with his light and introduced his Svarūpa to us.

13.13 Suṣupti

Jīva does Karma and experiences its result through the gross body and subtle body during Jāgrat and only through Manas in Svapna. This is very tiresome. So, like a bird flying for a long time in the sky in many different ways gets tired and returns to its own nest for rest, the Jīva enters into Suṣupti after the hardwork of Jāgrat and Svapna. Here, he is totally free from this tiresomeness. (Br. 4.3.19, Ch. 6.8.2). 'Where the sleeper does not desire anything and does not see even dreams is Suṣupti that is, deep sleep यत्र सुप्तो न कञ्चन कामं कामयते न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति तत् सुषुप्तम् (Mā. 5). On the basis of the features of Suṣupti, the Jīva is given several names by the Śruti. He is located in Suṣupti. So, he is **Suṣupta Sthāna**. Here, the various awarenesses which were causing vibrations in the Manas during Jāgrat and Svapna have become one, just as the variegated world of the daytime appears as one covered by the darkness of the night. Therefore, one in Suṣupti is **Ēkībhūta**. The different awarenesses of Jāgrat and Svapna are frozen into motionlessness. Therefore he is **Prajñānaghana**. During Suṣupti he is brimming with Ānanda, totally free from Duhkha. Therefore he is **Ānandamaya**. Further he is enjoying Ānanda effortlessly. Therefore he is **Ānandabhuk**. He is, indeed, the door for the animation found in Jāgrat and Svapna. Therefore he is **Cétomukha**. He is **Prajñā**, because he is the knower, Jñātā of the past cognitions and the future cognitions — सुषुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयो ह्यानन्दभुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञस्तृतीयः पादः' (Mā.5).

13.14 Where is the Jīva in Suṣupti?

He is sleeping in the Ākāśa in the Hṛdaya (Heart) during deep sleep 'एषोऽतर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिन्धेते' (Br. 2.1.17). The major part of the day in Jāgrat he stays in the eyes, works a lot and gets exhausted. Therefore he enters into the heart in Suṣupti for rest. In this way the face is his

office and the heart is his home. That is why an individual points to himself touching only his heart and saying 'I'. While in deep sleep, he stays in the Nāḍis called 'Hitā' in the Hṛdaya which contain the Téjas of Sūrya — तदा नाडीषु सृप्तो भवति' (Ch. 8.6.3). 'हिता नाम नाड्यो द्वासप्ततिः सहस्राणि हृदयात् पुरीततमभिप्रतिष्ठन्ते ताभिः प्रत्यवसृष्य पुरीतति शेते'- through these Nāḍis he goes and sleeps in the Purītat (Br.Bh. 2.1.19). They are 72,000 in number. Purītat is a membrane covering the heart. These Nāḍis emanate from the heart, like the lines in the peepul leaf cover the purītat and spread all over the body. The Kauṣītaki Upanishat says: Then the Jīva is one with this Prāṇa — तदा प्राणा एवैकधा भवति' (Kausitaki Upanisad. 4.19). The Brahmasūtras decide that whether it is the Ākāśa in the Hṛdaya as told in Brhadāraṇyaka or Kauṣītaki's Prāṇa or Chāndógya's Nāḍis- all are Brahman only. It is like this: the Nāḍis, the Hṛdayākāśa, the Prāṇa, etc are the places where the Indriyas and the Manas rest silently. Further it is only the connection with the Karaṇas that gives the basis for the Jīva-ness of the Jīva. Therefore, with the silencing of the Karaṇa the basis of the Jīvaness is itself lost. The moment the Jīva is freed from the Jīvaness in this way, he comes to stay in his own glory, Brahman. This is because Brahman is his Svarūpa — नाड्यः पुरीतत् वा जीवस्य उपाध्याधार एव भवति तत्र अस्य करणानि वर्तन्त इति । न हि उपाधिसंबन्धम् अन्तरेण स्वत एव जीवस्याधारः कश्चित् संभवति । ब्रह्माव्यतिरेकेण स्वमहिमप्रतिष्ठितत्वात्' (Sū.Bh. 3.2.7). Therefore, though the place of the Jīva in Suṣupti is described as the nadis or the space in the heart or the Prāṇa according to the contact, the destination of Jīva is ultimately Brahman.

13.15 The Non dual State

There is one perplexing feature in Suṣupti. It is this: One cannot know the experience of another during his Jāgrat and Svapna. The only way to know it is to ask the individual. For example, the doctor can know the details of the pains of the patient only after asking him where it hurts, whether it is increasing or decreasing, etc. Similarly, his dream experiences also can be known by the doctor only by asking him. On the other hand, one does not have to ask the other to know his

experience in Suṣupti. If some person says he had sound sleep others will automatically know what his experience was even without asking him. This is very perplexing. Why is it so?

I have to ask the other to know his Jāgrat or Svapna experiences obviously because we are different. If the experience of deep sleep is understood even without asking, it automatically shows that during Suṣupti there is no difference between us; I am himself. In other words it is very clear that only I exist in everybody's Suṣupti. The Jīva gets sense perceptions in Jāgrat through the Indriyas and the Manas and in Svapna only through the Manas. These Upādhis are clearly different and, therefore, the experiences got through them are purely personal. Thus it becomes necessary to ask the other to know his experiences. But in Jāgrat and Svapna all the Upādhis like the mind the eyes and external objects, etc., which are responsible for the qualified experiences have been projected as different from oneself due to Avidyā. But when the Jīva is embraced by everyone's indweller Paramātman in Suṣupti, everything has become one. Just like the man embraced by his dear wife, the Jīva embraced by the Prājñātmā has become one with everything. Therefore neither the objects nor the Indriyas exist differently from oneself. That is the reason why there is no qualified experience in Suṣupti — 'यद् हि तद् विशेषदर्शनकारणम् अन्तःकरणं चक्षुः रूपं च तत् अविद्यया अन्यत्वेन प्रत्युपस्थापितमासीत् । तद् एतस्मिन् काले एकीभूतम् । आत्मनः परेण परिष्वङ्गात् ।..... अयं तु सर्वात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः स्वेन परेण प्राज्ञेन आत्मना प्रिययेव पुरुषः । तेन न पृथक्त्वेन व्यवस्थितानि करणानि विषयाश्च । तदभावात् विशेषदर्शनं नास्ति' (Br.Bh. 4.3.23). Therefore the apparent difference that is found in the Jāgrat and Svapna-like himself and another due to the Upādhis like the body etc. is completely gone in Suṣupti; one is all alone. In other words, he is himself in everybody else. In this way the Ātman who appears to be different in different creatures during the Jāgrat, loses the apparent distinctions and stays undivided in Suṣupti — 'अविभक्तं च भूतेषु विभक्तमिव च स्थितम्' (G. 13.16). So it is that we need not ask to know the other's experience of Suṣupti. It is known without asking.

In this way no differences exist at all from one to the other when the Upādhis are dropped. Therefore there is no Saṁsāra in Suṣupti. A child or an adult, a king or a beggar, educated or uneducated, man or woman, everyone has the same state of happiness — 'कुमारो वा महाराजो वा महाब्राह्मणो वीतिघ्नीमान्दस्य गत्वा शयीत' (Br. 2.1.19). The Ānanda here is **Atighnī** that is, which shall destroy grief totally. That is why there is no trace of grief in Suṣupti. This is a state free from desire. It is **Aticchanda**, it is free from Puṇya and Pāpa, **Apahatapāpmā** and it is fearless, **Abhaya**. (Br. 4.3.21).

But this Ānanda terminates with the termination of this state. The oneness which resulted from the disconnection of the Karaṇas slips the moment they are pressed into service in the Jāgrat. This is because the attachment to the body is not destroyed. One who has lost kingship becomes the king again and one who has lost poverty gets it back again. Similarly, a tiger or a lion or a wolf or swine or worm or a butterfly or a housefly or a mosquito becomes what it was immediately after coming back from Suṣupti. 'त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा कीटो वा पतङ्गो वा दंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तदा भवन्ति' (Ch 6.9.3). This is the only drawback in this state.

13.16 This is Paramānanda (Highest Bliss)

The Ānanda experienced by the Jīva in Suṣupti is **Atighnī**. There is no happiness equal to it and certainly not greater than it. Here, he is transparent like water, he is alone without a second; therefore free from fear. This is Paramātman. This is the highest destination for the Jīva, his highest treasure, his highest lōka, his highest happiness — सलिल एको द्रष्टाऽद्वैतो भवति.....एषाऽस्य परमागतिरेषाऽस्य परमासंपदेषोऽस्य परमोलोक एषोऽस्य परम आनन्दः' (Br. 4.3.32).

It is difficult for people to understand this description of Suṣupti given by the Śruti. They have no faith in these words; because it is got without any effort, the happiness of Suṣupti is taken lightly. 'The

maximum that can be told is that the sleep is free from grief. How can it be maximum happiness? Can happiness mean only absence of grief? Is it not a positive experience? We all know that happiness is coming from objects and also that one happiness is greater than another. Therefore maximum happiness must result only from some object experienced in some special way. But there are no objects at all in Suṣupti. Therefore how can Ānanda be maximum?' These questions will now be answered by the method of Adhyārōpa- Apavāda.

13.17 Analysis of Ānanda

Assume that happiness is the result of an interaction with an external object (Adhyārōpa). But every one knows that after being in contact with it for sometime, the happiness terminates. Afterwards one does not even desire to come into contact with it for quite sometime. If it is true that the happiness is the result of contact with objects, why should happiness terminate even while the contact with object is there? At least, why doesn't the desire to come into contact with the object arise again soon after the termination of the happiness?

A non-believer may explain it like this: There is no question of reconciliation here, because that is the nature of the process. The only meaningful pursuit in life is to extend the duration of the pleasure by some means. Effort should be made only to that end.

This is not correct. Suppose that an individual is deprived of sleep and food and pleasurable objects for a long time and all of them are simultaneously offered to him. It is known that the first thing he would seek is sleep and then food and then the pleasure from the outside objects. Even when the pleasurable objects and food are in good supply and he is deprived of the pleasure of sleep, he would give up everything and take pills to get sleep. If there is any obstruction for sleep, he would even reject his wife or children or wealth. Therefore, it is clear that the pleasure from outside objects, the pleasure from food, and the pleasure

of sleep are in their increasing order. The Śruti describes this by telling that the husband is desired not for the sake of husband, the wife is desired not for the sake of wife, children are desired not for the sake of children. The thing is dear only for one's own happiness — 'न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति' (Br. 2.4.5). Therefore, sleep is not only free from grief, but also the greatest happiness.

“How can there be happiness when there are no objects at all?”

Are you not getting happiness in dreams where there are no objects?

“The object of happiness in the dream is its Vāsanā”

But you are happy in Suṣupti where there is not even a Vāsanā.

“In that case it means that there is no connection at all between happiness and the objects. Then how is it one gets happiness while in contact with the object?”

Seeking the answer to this question is the most significant pursuit in life. One will have to introspect deeply to get the answer given by the Śruti to this question. In the presence of objects there may be or may not be happiness. Therefore it cannot be unambiguously said whether or not happiness comes from the object. But the experience of happiness in Suṣupti where the objects are totally absent is well known. This shows that happiness has no connection whatsoever with the external objects. Without knowing this, Jīva in wakeful state hankers after pleasurable objects according to his Vāsanās developed due to his beginningless Avidyā. When he comes into contact with the desired object, he gets happiness because of his identification with it. At the time of contact he is unaware of everything, even the object. Indeed the transient happiness he experiences is a consequence of the removal of the veil on his own Ānanda during that period. The moment the Puṇya

that triggered this happiness is exhausted the happiness terminates. The veil comes up again and the duality returns. Therefore the reason for happiness in sensual contact with the object is not the object, but the removal of the veil on one's Ānanda Svarūpa. Nevertheless it is called Viśaya Sukha that is, happiness derived from objects because the process was triggered by the contact with it (Tai. 2.5.4). In this way even the sensual happiness is only a fragment of Brahmānanda. Therefore the Adhyārōpa made in the beginning that happiness is the result of the contact with object is refuted.

13.18 The levels of Ānanda

The above analysis of Ānanda leads to the following conclusion. All the Upādhis are dropped in Suṣupti, and consequently, the multiplicity is removed. The Ātman alone remains. That is the reason for the extreme happiness of Suṣupti. Nevertheless, this does not mean that this maximum happiness is possible only in Suṣupti. It can be obtained even in Jāgrat by realizing one's own Svarūpa and getting rid of multiplicity thereof. But ordinary people can get the increasing level of Ānanda as follows: An individual should first get rid of Pāpa which is the cause of grief. Being bereft of Pāpa is called **Avṛjīnatva**. Therefore Avṛjīnatva is the foremost requisite for the removal of grief. It is only through the Vēda that one can know what is Puṇya and what is Pāpa and also acquire Puṇya by performing the Karma as told in the Vēda. Therefore, Avṛjīnatva implies that the person must be Śrōtriya (well-versed in Vēdic learning). Moreover, desires are to be checked to increase happiness. The more the desire (Kāma) is checked the more is the Ānanda. This cannot happen all of a sudden; it can happen only step by step. It is only through this gradual process that the Ānanda increases from the level of humans to the level of human Gandharvas, to the level of Déva-Gandharvas, to the level of Pitṛs, to the level of Ājānaja Dévatas, to the level of Karma Dévatas, to the level of Dévatas, to the level of Indra, to the level of Bṛhaspati, to the level of Prajāpati, and to

the level of Brahmā. The Ānandas of all these are only fragments of the Paramānanda described above. But one who is a Śrótīya and Avṛjina and Akāmahata, will get this Paramānanda even here. **Kāmahata** means he who is killed by desire while **Akāmahata** means he who is not killed by desire. Any person who knows the Ātman as himself and sees himself in everyone and everything how can he be killed by any Kāma? He is certainly not killed (Br.Bh. 4.3.33, Tai. 2.8.3).

13.19 The Nature of grief

In this background, we will now analyse the nature of grief. It occurs when a desired sensual pleasure is not got or the pleasure which is (already) got is missed. We have seen above that material pleasure is the result of the temporary removal of the veil to one's Svarūpa, whereas grief is the result of the veil on the Svarūpa. It has no fixed nature and occurs differently according to Vāsanā. Therefore grief is a wrong notion. It is different for different people at different times. For that matter, material pleasure has also the same feature. Therefore it is also a wrong notion. But there is a difference between grief and material pleasure. In material pleasure, though the notion that it is coming from a particular object is wrong, the pleasure is only his Svarūpa. On the other hand, grief has no connection with the Svarūpa at all. "But it is clearly experienced that the grief is coming when the body is hurt or burnt in a place. How to say that it has no connection with the Svarūpa?" It has no connection with the Svarūpa, because when someone asks "Where is it paining?" the person in grief points to that part of the body says 'here.' How can something that is pointed out as 'here' be related with his Svarūpa? It is not related at all. "Why does grief occur when the body is hurt?" It occurs because of the Adhyāsa in the body. When the individual has identified himself with the body, he feels that the wound is caused to himself. When this Adhyāsa is absent in Suṣupti he does not grieve even though the wound continues to exist. That is why surgeons perform surgery only after mentally disconnecting the patient from the body.

13.20 One's Svarūpa is the same as in Suṣupti

The nature (Rūpa) of the Jīva in the state of Suṣupti when he is free from all the Upādhis and therefore, griefless, desireless, and all alone without a second, is his Svarūpa. Here the father is not father, the mother is not mother, the Dévata is not Dévata, the thief is not thief, the killer of foetus is not killer, the Cāndāla is not Cāndāla, the Sannyāsi is not Sannyāsi, and the Tapasvi is not Tapasvi. Here he is connected neither with Puṇya nor Pāpa (Br.Bh. 4.3.22). Here he is **Aśārīri** that is, not connected with the body. Therefore the good and bad will not touch him — अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' (Ch. 8.12.1). In this way, the Svarūpa experienced in Suṣupti is Brahman itself.

'How can Aśārīritva be the Svarūpa? Is he not getting back the Śārīra in Jāgrat and Svapna?' No. He is always Aśārīri, though he appears to be Saśārīri in relation to Upādhi. Thinking that he changes is wrong understanding— Mithyājñāna— due to Avidyā.

13.21 One's Identity with Brahman

Just as the officials of the town prepare themselves to receive the king coming to their town by making arrangements for this food and drinks and residence and announcing "He is coming, here he is coming" so do all the Bhūtas address the Jīva who is entering into the new body to experience his fruit of Karma: "Brahman is coming; here Brahman is coming" and get ready — 'तद्यथा राजानमायान्तमुग्राः प्रत्येनस सूतग्रामण्योऽत्रैः पानैरावसथैः प्रतिकल्पन्तेऽयमायात्ययमागच्छतीत्येवं हैवं विदं सर्वाणि भूतानि प्रतिकल्पन्त इदं ब्रह्मायातीदमागच्छतीति' (Br.4.3.37). It is clear from this that the Jīva is not different from Brahman. That is why it was said that Jīva is not different from Brahman, but Brahman is different from the Jīva. The Jīva mentioned here is endowed with the Upādhis. At present when the Jīva Svarūpa is being discussed, the situation is different. He is totally free from all the Upādhis; he is Brahman and Brahman is he. The Śrutis declare this identity with vehemence; O! venerable Dévata, I am you and

you are me — त्वं वा अहमस्मि भगवो देवतेऽहं वै त्वमसि' (Jabala Śruti). He is he who I am, I am He who He is — योऽहं सोऽसौ योऽसौ सोऽहम्' (Ai. Āraṇyaka 2.2.4). O! Śvétakéṭu! That Ātman is yourself — 'स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो' (Ch.6.8.7). Śruti indeed deprecates non-identity as follows: He who worships another Dévatā, thinking that "I am different and he is different." does not know. He is like a beast to those Dévatas — योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद यथा पशुरेवं स देवानाम्' (Br.1.4.10). All these statements imply that the universally experienced self in Suṣṭi is Brahman. The situation is similar to fixing the nature of Brahman starting from the cause-effect non-difference relation. All the effects of name-forms are true from the point of view of Sat-Brahman; viewed independently they are false, because the Śruti says that all effects are only modifications and names based on speech. So also in the case of Jīva (true from the point of Sat-Brahman, independently false) — सर्वं च नामरूपादि सदात्मनैव सत्यं विकारजातं स्वतस्तु अनृतमेव वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयम् इत्युक्तत्वात् । तथा जीवोऽपीति' (Ch.Bh.6.3.2). That is why it was told that the Jīva is not different from Brahman, but Brahman is different from Jīva. '.....परमात्मनो जीवात् अन्यत्वं द्रढयति । जीवस्य तु न परस्मात् अन्यत्वम्.....!' (Su.Bh.1.3.12). The Jīva in the latter half of this is independent, unrelated to Brahman, therefore really non-existent that is, just false. But in the former half the Jīva appears with Upādhi of body, intellect, etc. but is nevertheless Brahman. He appears to be doing transactions and appears to be connected with Upādhis only to ignorant people. Actually he is Brahman only. He is truly free from Upādhis and has no transactions. This way one should recognize himself as Brahman even while staying in the body. This is stated by the Śruti and is to be understood by us. This truth cannot be demonstrated by logic however intelligent one may be. One understands it only by self analysis.

13.22 Proof of Brahman–Ātman Identity

Two factors are to be remembered in this analysis:

- (a) One's Svarūpa mentioned here is the one determined in Suṣupti, totally free from all Upādhis; not with Upādhis as in Jāgrat and Svapna.
- (b) Brahman is Satya, Jñāna and Ananta.

Now it is to be verified whether I am the same as this Brahman.

i) Satya means unchanging in time. Change can come only in space, in time, in objects and in the experiences of the knower. It does not come in any other way. Now notice that there is no space or time or objects or even knowership in Suṣupti. Therefore, there is no room at all for any change to occur in Suṣupti. This means that the Satya feature is verified in one's Svarūpa.

ii) Next, remember the meaning of Jñāna (9.10). It is not a mental form of any object. It is attributeless awareness. In Suṣupti, qualified awarenesses are totally absent because there is no scope for mental forms in the absence of the mind. However, the Ātmajyóti (light of soul) of unqualified awareness is certainly present. Otherwise, one wouldn't know that nothing is known! Therefore the second lakṣaṇa (feature) of Brahman is inherent (in oneself) in Suṣupti.

iii) Antatva that is, limitation occurs only by way of space or time or objects or knowership. It does not come in any other way. But in Suṣupti none of these upādhis is present. Therefore limitlessness of the self is evident. In short one's identity with Brahman is clearly established in Suṣupti.

This can be realised in another way also as follows:

- (i) It is everyone's experience in Suṣupti that one is totally free from the world of effects, inside or outside.
- (ii) It is known from the Śāstra that Brahman is separated from the world of effects and also distinct from the Jīva through its feature of limitlessness.

(iii) It is already pointed out (see 9.11.ii) that Brahman which is separated from everything is one without a second because of its Jñāna feature.

Therefore, in Suṣupti when one is separated from everything, there cannot be two separate entities like Jīva and Brahman. Therefore Jīva has to be Brahman. In this way the identity of Brahman-Ātman is verified. However, one question persists. “Even though remaining as Jñāna Svarūpa, why am I not knowing anything? At least why I am not knowing myself?” These questions need to be answered.

13.23 Why not qualified awareness?

Once Indra goes to Prajāpati to enquire about the Ātmatattva. Then the Ātman of Suṣupti is pointed out to him in answer. After hearing it, Indra gets the same questions: This Ātman does not at all know who he is. He is not knowing anything. He seems to be dead. I don't see any worthwhile principle in it — ‘नाहं खल्वयमेवं संप्रत्यात्मानं जानाति अयमहमस्मीति नो एवेमानि भूतानि विनाशमेवापीतो भवति नाऽहमत्र भोग्यं पश्यामि’ (Ch.8.11.1).

If these questions should arise even for such an intelligent and meritorious Indra, it is no wonder that we the ordinary mortals get them. Therefore the reason for not knowing anything in Suṣupti has to be known. For this purpose, we will start with explaining, through an example, the basis underlying qualified awareness and also the procedure of its occurrence.

The unknown length of a cloth is determined by the scale of known length. Similarly the unknown weight of an object is known by a measuring weight. Weights cannot be measured by lengths, lengths cannot be measured by weights either. This means that **what is to be measured and what measures it, should both be of the same Svarūpa**. Notice further that the measuring scale and the measured cloth are both only modifications of ‘length.’ Similarly, the measuring weight and the measured weight are only modifications of ‘weight.’ This

shows that in general **the measurer and the measured should be of the same Svarūpa, but only of different modifications**. Further we know that the transaction of measuring is only in the modifications and not in their Svarūpa like 'length' or 'weight'. Coming to the present issue: The mind measures an object by taking its form after cognition that is, sense-object contact. It is the corresponding mental form which is called the qualified awareness of the object. With this as Upādhi the Jīva-ness of Jīva is defined. Here the object and the mind are both Brahman in Svarūpa but only its different modifications in appearance. Both of them lose their difference in Suṣupti and merge along with the knower in Brahman which is their true Svarūpa. In this state which should measure what? Therefore it is the absence of difference in Suṣupti, that is, the oneness which is responsible for the absence of any qualified awareness. To convey this, the Śruti gives the example of a man being embraced by his beloved woman (13.17). Though they were seeing one another as different before the embrace, neither he nor she will have any awareness during the embrace. Each will become alone with himself and herself. In other words there is only oneness in him and in her. The situation is similar in Suṣupti where the Jīva is embraced by Paramātman (Br. 4.3.21).

“When someone else is also there, is it not wrong knowledge to feel one is alone?”

It cannot be wrong understanding because, knowing that they are different they have desired each other.

“In that case, can we say that the other one was not noticed because the mind was engaged elsewhere?”

That is not possible. If the mind were engaged elsewhere, one should have noticed at least that thing in which the mind was engaged. But there is not even any such recognition as in Suṣupti 'सुषुप्ते अग्रहणम् अन्यासक्तवत् इति चेत्? न । सर्वाग्रहणात्' (Tai.Bh. 2.8.5).

“In that case, let the feeling of being alone with oneself in Suṣupti be a wrong understanding.”

No. Not like that. In fact, seeing another thing in Jāgrat and Svapna is wrong understanding.

“Why should it be termed only like that? Not seeing the other itself could be wrong.”

Not like that. The knowledge of a thing in itself independent of anything else is its correct knowledge. The principle in Suṣupti is free from everything else. So its knowledge is the right knowledge of the principle in itself. On the other hand, the qualified awareness of oneself in Jāgrat and Svapna depends upon other things like the objects and Indriyas. Therefore it is not true. (see 12.15.iii).

“Can it be said that one does not recognize anything in Suṣupti because the mind and Indriyas were inactive?”

13.24 Unawareness of even oneself

No; it is true that the Indriyas and the mind are necessary for qualified awareness. However, their absence cannot be the reason for the peculiar experience of not knowing anything in Suṣupti. If it is told that such non-recognition is because the mind was inactive, at least he should be aware that the mind was inactive; this is just as in Jāgrat that one can know that nothing is seen because the eyes are inactive or nothing is heard because the ears are inactive. But in suṣupti there is neither knowing nor not knowing. Not only that, Jīva is not aware of his own existence. This peculiar experience can be explained only when Jīvatva itself is denied in Suṣupti as described by the Śruti. In Suṣupti the Jīva is free from all the illusory connections with all the Upādhis and merges in that Brahman which is different from everything, but from which nothing is different. There is only Brahman, that is himself. Since he is all alone, he does not see anything, though he is seer. There can be no absence to the sight of the seer, because his sight is deathless ‘यद्वै तन्न पश्यति पश्यन् वै तन्न पश्यति न हि द्रष्टृदृष्टैर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात्’ (Br. 4.3.23).

“But why is he not aware of himself?”

This question occurs only because of the beginningless Avidyā. The Jīva is accustomed to the Adhyāsa with the body and Indriyas. He has been recognizing himself since infinite past only through the activity of knowing something or the other. Therefore, he feels as if he is dead in Suṣupti where nothing is known. But he is not dead. He is present. But when one is alone there cannot be the transaction of knowing himself. The eye does not see itself; one cannot sit on one’s own shoulder; fire does not burn itself.

“At least why is he not aware that he is merged in Brahman?”

He has not entered into Brahman like water in cloth. He has merged into it dissolving his individual identity like the juice of a flower merging into the honey losing its identity. Therefore he is not aware of even that (Ch. 6.9.1-2).

13.25 An example

We get introduced to Ātmajyōti with the analysis of Svapna. We also saw that it exists even in Suṣupti. However, it is difficult to understand the ideas contained in the discussion. We will give a well known example of the modern day to facilitate understanding.

People capture the happenings of the external world in a film using an intense beam of light. Afterwards it is not possible to see all those sights looking directly into the film. But, they can be viewed when it is illumined by an intense beam of light again in the dark theatre. Svapna is similar to this. The transactions of the Jāgrat world are captured in the mind which remain there as Vāsanas. When all the windows of Indriyas are closed and the Ātmajyōti illuminates the mental Vāsanas in sleep, the dream is seen. Such a thing can happen even in Jāgrat when a person is concentrating strongly on one of his own Vāsanas. This is how children talk to themselves as a result of absorbed thinking about something, Bhaktas absorbed in thinking of their Iṣṭadēvatās see the Dēvatā.

This example also facilitates in understanding the absence of qualified awareness in Suṣupti. While capturing the external events in a camera, suppose the film has been exposed only to light and not to any external objects for sometime. Then nothing is recorded. Of course this cannot be known at that time. But when the film is developed and illuminated it comes to be known. Then we say “Oh! There is nothing in it.” It only means that there are no sights of any external objects; it does not mean that the film was not even exposed to the light. Indeed it was exposed only to the light. Similarly, after getting up from Suṣupti when one says there was nothing, it only means that there was nothing other than the Ātmajyōti.

13.26 The question of Avidyā in Suṣupti

It is told in the foregoing sections that the Jīva has attained oneness with Brahman in Suṣupti and therefore there is no qualified awareness. Qualified awareness is possible only in multiplicity. We have also seen further that multiplicity is ‘seen’ only due to Avidyā. Therefore, it leads one to believe that there is no Avidyā in Suṣupti. Bhāṣyakāra also states: ‘The desires appearing as different from oneself in Jāgrat and Svapna are only Ātman for him in Suṣupti; it is because there is no Avidyā here to project them as separate ‘अन्यत्वेन काम्यमानाः यथा जाग्रत्स्वप्रयोः तस्य आत्मैव । अन्यत्वप्रत्युपस्थापकहेतोः अविद्यायाः अभावात्’ (Br.Bh.4.3.21). But in another place he tells: ‘Though the Jīva has become one with Brahman in Suṣupti he continues with the Karma of the previous day when he wakes up. This shows that his Avidyā was also present even then ‘इह तु विद्यते विवेककारणं कर्म च अविद्या च’ (Su.Bh. 3.2.9). Therefore, the question arises whether Avidyā is present or not in Suṣupti. Some say it is present, some say it is not. Therefore it is to be discussed.

13.27 Objections for Avidyā’s non-existence

Some objections to the claim that there is no Avidyā in Suṣupti:

i) People not having even Sādhana Sampatti and creatures like lions, tigers, worms and insects all experience Suṣupti. If Avidyā is not present there, it would mean that they have attained Mukti just by getting into deep sleep 'सुप्तमात्रो मुच्यत इति आपद्येत' (Su.Bh 3.2.9). Just as no one takes the trouble of climbing a hill to collect the honey if it is available on a road side tree, similarly no body would take to Sādhana if Mukti was available so easily as by sleeping. Then, the path of spiritual progress stated by the Suṣupti becomes meaningless.

ii) The Ātman transcending Jāgrat Svapna and Suṣupti is called Turīya. It will be discussed in the next chapter. About Turīyātman it is said: If an individual understands the Maheśwara as Me, that is the Turīya free from Ajñāna or its effects, he will be free from all Pāpa 'यः वेत्ति लोकमहेश्वरं तुरीयम् अज्ञानतत्कार्यं वर्जितं सर्वपापैः प्रमुच्यते' (G. 10.3). This Ātman is free from the dust of Avidyā. Therefore he is said to be free from the Kāraṇa Śaṭra. शुद्धं निर्मलम् अविद्यामलरहितमिति कारणशरीर प्रतिषेधः' (Īśa 8) These statements show that there is Avidyā in Suṣupti. If it were not there the need of telling about Turīyātman would not arise.

iii) Though all sleepers merge in Brahman, after waking up from sleep each individual is connected with his intellect only because of his Avidyā. This reconnection is made by Īśvara. If Avidyā is absent in Suṣupti, then Īśvara cannot connect the Jīvas with their respective intellects, just as a water drop put into a mass of water cannot be separated. Because of the presence of Avidyā and Karma distinguishing the Jīvas, is it possible for Īśvara to reconnect the Jīva with his own intellect 'विवेककारणाभावात् जलबिन्दोः अनुद्धरणम् । इह तु विद्यते विवेककारणं कर्म च अविद्या च' (Sū.Bh. 3.2.9). Otherwise it would have been impossible for the Jīva to continue the activity left partly done on the previous day. Therefore we have to accept that the relation with the intellect exists even in Suṣupti and Pralāya in seed form and only re-expresses itself during Jāgrat and Sṛṣṭi 'बुद्धिसंबन्धः शक्त्यात्मना विद्यमान एव सुषुप्तप्रलययोः पुनः

प्रबोध प्रसवयोः अविर्भवति' (Su.Bh.2.3.31). Not only that. Avidyā exists even in Samādhi though oneness is established there 'सुषुप्तिसमाध्यादावपि सत्यां स्वाभाविक्याम् अविभागप्राप्तौ मिथ्याज्ञानस्य अनपोदितत्वात् पूर्ववत् पुनः प्रबोधे विभागो भवति' (Sū.Bh.2.1.9)

iv) If there is no Avidyā in Suṣupti, then it should mean that the Jīva is himself Ānanda Svarūpa. But it is not so. There, he is only Ānandamaya. Because of the absence of grief caused by the tiresomeness of continuous mental vibrations as in Jāgrat and Svapna, he is only Ānandamaya in Suṣupti. He is not Ananda Svarūpa because it comes to an end 'मनसः विषयविषय्याकारस्पन्दनायास-दुःखाभावात् आनन्दमयः आनन्दप्रायः न आनन्द एव अनात्यन्तिकत्वात्' (Mā.5).

Is there a reply for these objections?

Some people have the contention that the Bhāṣyakāra says there is no Avidyā when Suṣupti is viewed from its own point of view and there is Avidyā when it is viewed from Jāgrat.

13.28 Avidyā exists, but not Adhyāsa in Suṣupti

After listening to these arguments the Siddhānta (conclusion) has to be told. The Manas of the Jīva is permeated by Pittam (energy) of the Nāḍis in Suṣupti and therefore he does not see external objects. 'तेजसा नाडीगतेन पित्ताख्येन अभिव्याप्तकरणः न बाह्यान् विषयान् ईक्षत' (Sū.Bh. 3.2.7). Therefore the knowership is missed and as a result, the Jīva merges in Brahman. Then Brahman alone remains. From whatever view one sees there is neither Avidyā nor Suṣupti nor the Jīva in this Brahman. In this situation the question, 'Does Jīva have Avidyā or not in Suṣupti?' does not convey any meaning. In case we first define clearly the Jīva in relation to an Upādhi, then the question would be meaningful. "Who is Jīva?" Brahman itself is figuratively called the Jīva in relation to Upādhis. As long as the relation with this Upādhi continues, we refer to him as one Jīva. In relation to another Upādhi, he is called a different Jīva. When his mind is quitted in the Nāḍis, he is in Suṣupti. Then his

Karma and Avidyā exist in his mind which facilitates to distinguish him when he wakes up. Distinguishing milk and water in a mixture may be difficult for us; but the swan is known to separate them. That Karma and Avidyā which facilitate Īśvara to distinguish him, remind the Jīva to continue with that Karma. The same mind containing that Avidyā and Karma sprouts out in Jāgrat. Therefore with respect to that Upādhi we say the same Jīva has come from Suṣupti to Jāgrat. 'स एवायम् उपाधिः स्वापप्रबोधयोः बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेन इत्यतः स एव जीवः प्रतिबुध्यते इति युक्तम्' (Sū.Bh.3.2.9). It is to this Jīva that Jāgrat and Suṣupti occur. It is this mind which is his Upādhi which existed with Avidyā even when he was one with Brahman. If this is remembered, then we have to say that Avidyā does exist in Suṣupti but there is no Adhyāsa. Avidyā continues to exist in seed form like the moustache of a young lad. Just as the moustache appears when he enters into youth, his Avidyā expresses itself as Adhyāsa the moment he comes out of the Nāḍis and wakes up.

“It has been explained that oneness is the reason for the absence of all qualified Jñāna in Suṣupti and then it is said that there is no Avidyā there to project anything different 'अन्यत्वप्रत्युपस्थापकहेतोः अविद्यायाः अभावात् (Br.Bh. 4.3.21). How is it possible to say that Avidyā exists in seed form, but only Adhyāsa is absent?”

It is not correct. It has been clearly told: Qualified Jñāna, that is Adhyāsa, which occurs in relation to the special position of the Upādhi of the intellect, is absent in Suṣupti. This suppression of the qualified Jñāna as a consequence of the suppression of the Upādhi is called identity with Paramātman **in a formal way** relative to the Upādhi 'बुद्ध्याद्युपाधिस्थान विशेषयोगात् उद्धृतस्य विशेषज्ञानस्य उपाध्युपशमे य उपशमः स परमात्मना संबन्धः इति उपाध्यपेक्षयैव उपचर्यते' (Sū.Bh. 3.2.34). Not only that. More explicitly it is told: Suṣupti is fearlessness. Fear is an effect of Avidyā. (Adhyāsa is the effect of Avidyā) Therefore, with respect to the effect of fear its cause Avidyā is denied. 'किं च अभयम्। भयं हि नाम अविद्याकार्यम्। तत्कार्यद्वारेण कारणप्रतिषेधोऽयम्' (Br.Bh. 4.3.21). Moreover,

Śruti says that this oneness is experienced by one who is embraced by one's beloved woman. Is it possible to deny Avidyā in him also for that reason? There is no time when there is no oneness. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that either the one in Suṣupti or the one in conjugal embrace is free from Avidyā; one is only free from Adhyāsa. The cessation of Adhyāsa is sufficient for not seeing multiplicity, but to know oneness even when the Indriyas are seeing multiplicity, Avidyā has to be extinct. **Vidyā is not seeing oneness; it is realizing oneness.** Avidyā continues even in the absence of Adhyāsa. But Adhyāsa is not possible without Avidyā because Adhyāsa is the effect of Avidyā. Avidyā goes only with the onset of Vidyā; it does not go by sleeping. Once it goes it never returns.

“In that case how to understand the explicit statement that Avidyā is not in Suṣupti?” Just as a mad act is also called madness, the result of Avidyā, namely Adhyāsa, is here referred to as Avidyā and then it is told it does not exist in Suṣupti.

Moreover, those who agree that Avidyā is absence of vidya and therefore it has no objective existence, should know that the oneness in Suṣupti is not missed by the acceptance of Avidyā. Now, coming to those for whom Avidyā has objective existence; to establish the oneness in Suṣupti the śāstra tells that at that time the Indriyas, the Manas and all the objects of the world of effects are merged in Brahman. Those who say that Avidyā is objectively existent, have to say that it also merges in Brahman. The Indriyas the Manas and the external world whether in their manifest or unmanifest form are only effects of Brahman and so not opposed to it. Therefore, their merger in their cause Brahman is possible. But if the objectively existent Avidyā should also merge in Brahman, it would imply that it is not opposed to the Svarūpa of Brahman. What on earth can we gain from that Brahman which is not opposed to Avidyā? Absolutely nothing.

CHAPTER 14

TURĪYA

In chapter 11, it was shown that the Jīva's Svarūpa is beyond gross and subtle bodies. In chapter 12 it was shown that he is beyond causal body (Avidyā) also. In the same way it was shown in the last chapter that he is shuttling through the states of Jāgrat, Svapna and Suṣupti. Therefore he must be beyond all these states. This implies that he is only the Sākṣi, the (witness, self) seer of the Jāgrat and its transactions. Some people imagine that this Sākṣitva in itself is the highest truth to be pursued. We show here that this is wrong and what Védānta tells is something very different.

14.1 Sākṣi

Like a great fish moving from one bank to another of the river Gangā without being swept away by its strong current, the Jīva is also moving from wakefulness to sleep and back to wakefulness without being swept away by the strong current of Kāma Karma (Br.Bh. 4.3.18). Just as the fish which moves from bank to bank is different from the banks, the Jīva should also be different from these states. The connection of the gross body is snapped when he goes from Jāgrat to Svapna and his connection with mind is snapped when he goes from Svapna to Suṣupti. Therefore, he has to be different from the body and the mind. We have seen already that the Jīva transcends the Indriyas and the Prāṇas also. Therefore he is the Sākṣi, that is, the seer of the external world, of the gross and subtle bodies and also these three states.

14.2 Sāṅkhya-Yóga

Some people think that realizing this is the end of pursuit and so to make firm this awareness, they resort to the Yóga of mind control. One can find in the Vēda also references to Sāṅkhya and Yóga such as: keeping the head, the neck and the trunk straight and the body in balance 'त्रिरुन्नतं स्थप्य समं शरीरम्'; keeping the Indriyas firm is known as Yóga 'तां

योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणम्' (Ka.2.3.11). One is free from all bondage by knowing through Sāṅkhya and Yóga that Dévatā who is the cause of the universe 'तत्कारणं साङ्ख्ययोगाभिपन्नं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः' (Śvé. 6.13). Therefore, some people might imagine that the Yóga of mind control is the real aim of spiritual attainment. But they should remember that sitting in an Āsanā with concentrated mind and controlling the Indriyas and the mind and resorting to Yóga is for the sake of purifying the mind 'तत्रैकाग्रं मनः कृत्वा यतचित्तेन्द्रियः क्रियः । उपविश्यासने युञ्ज्यात् योगमात्मविशुद्धये' (G. 6.12).

This is because Mókṣa is not possible for one with an impure mind. However, Yóga does not itself lead to Mókṣa. Yóga has a beginning and an end. Therefore, this state though called Yóga (that is joining) is only Viyóga that is, disjoining 'योगो हि प्रभवाप्ययौ । तामीदृशीमवस्थां योगमिति मन्यन्ते वियोगमेव सन्तम्' (Ka.Bh. 2.3.11). This state cannot be Mókṣa because Mókṣa is eternal.

All this has been told with regard to the practical aspect of Yóga. But its theoretical part is only the Sāṅkhya propounded by Kapila. The Sāṅkhya theory accepts some of the points of Védānta like the detached nature of the Jīva, Sannyāsa, etc. Added to that, these people have also interpreted the Védic statements according to their own views. For example, तत्कारणं साङ्ख्ययोगाभिपन्नं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः (Śvé. 6.13). Therefore, common people will not know that they are not followers of Védānta. Sāṅkhyas and Yógis are dualists, they will not agree that Ātman is only one. For that matter both here and in Gītā and elsewhere in the Upaniṣads, Sāṅkhya means only the Védic realization of the Ātman and not the Sākṣitva obtained from the bifurcation of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Yóga means Védic Dhyāna and not mind control. 'द्वैतिनो हि ते साङ्ख्या योगाश्च, नात्मैकत्ववादिनः । यत्तु दर्शनमुक्तं तत्कारणं साङ्ख्ययोगाभिपन्नमिति वैदिकमेव तत्र ज्ञानं ध्यानं च' (Su.Bh. 2.1.3). Not only that. The Śrúti have never mentioned that mind control is necessary for getting Mókṣa. There is no other Sādhana for Mókṣa than the realization of oneness with Brahman

‘निरोधस्तिर्हि अर्थान्तरमिति चेत्? न।.....मोक्षसाधनत्वेन अनवगमात्। न हि वेदान्तेषु ब्रह्मात्मविज्ञानादन्यत् परमपुरुषार्थ साधनत्वेन अवगम्यते (Br.Bh. 1.4.7).

14.3 Right Realization is Sarvātamabhāva

i) In that case, what is the realization of the oneness of the Ātman described by the Śruti? The answer is as follows: It is true that one is Sākṣi because he is seeing everything. But recognizing oneself only as a Sākṣi is not the complete understanding of the Ātman. It is because there is the Tripuṭi of the object, its Jnāna and the seer in Sākṣi. As long as one understands himself as a seer, a toucher, a hearer etc., he is not knowing the complete Ātman ‘न यावदयं एवं वेद पश्यामि श्रुणोमि स्पृशामिति वा स्वभावप्रवृत्ति विशिष्टं वेद तावत् अज्ञसा कृत्स्नमात्मानं न वेद (Br.Bh. 1.4.7) to agree on duality and consider himself as a so called Sākṣi does not lead to the right realization. As long as there is doership, Karma is bound to occur the moment a corresponding object situation arises. Therefore, it is only Sāṅkhya and Dvaita, not the complete realization of the Ātman. One sees another, where there appears to be Dvaita.... Where everything is Ātman who can see what ‘यत्र द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति.....यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत्..... (Br. 4.5.15). In this way the Śruti emphatically dismisses the transaction of Tripuṭi in the Ātman. How does it achieve this denial? Does it point at the world in front and say “It is not existing at all” like the Sūnyavādins, or “this is only illusory” like the Vijñānavādins, and denying the objects in front on which the transactions are based? No. On the other hand, transaction itself is rejected in the following way: Since the pot is not different from the clay, there is only clay even when several pots are being seen. In that clay there is no transaction of pots. Similarly, the Jagat in front is not different from oneself and, therefore, with this realization, any transaction in him will be sealed out even when the body is interacting with the external objects. The state of ignorance is that in which the Jagat is treated as different from oneself. Understanding it as non-different is Vidyā. Therefore, when Vidyā dawns the transaction in the Jīva is automatically eliminated. Realization

of the Jagat as not different from oneself is called Sarvātmabhāva. I realize myself as that immortal Brahman in which the five pañcajanas (Gandharvas, Pitṛs, Dévatas, Asuras, and Rākṣasas) and the unmanifest Jagat are woven like warp and woof. I am thinking that I am not different from that 'यस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि पञ्चपञ्चजनाः.....अव्याकृताख्य.....ओतं च प्रोतं च |अमृतं ब्रह्म मन्ये अहम् । न चाहम् आत्मानं ततोऽन्यत्त्वेन जाने (Br.Bh.4.4.17). That external world is not opposed to our Ātman because everything is Ātman for us and we are the Ātman for everything 'स च बाह्यलोको नास्त्यस्माकम् आत्मव्यतिरिक्तः । सर्वं हि अस्माकम् आत्मभूतमेव सर्वस्य च वयम् आत्मभूताः (Br.Bh.4.4.22). Due to Avidyā, first he was Asarva, that is, not everything. Later with Vidyā when Avidyā was lost, he became Sarva, that is, everything 'पूर्वम् अविद्यया असर्व आसीत् पुनर्विद्यया अविद्यापनये सर्वो भवति' (Pr.Bh. 4.10). Therefore, even now he who understands that he is Brahman will become all this 'तदिदमप्येतर्हि य एवं वेद अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति' (Br. 1.4.10). He who sees the world in front as different from himself, that is, sees them as Anātmā, is pushed out by those worlds as one unfit for Mókṣa. Anything that is seen as Anātmā will push him out from Mókṣa. This Brahman these Kṣhatra Lókas, these Dévatas, these Védas, these Bhūtas, all these are Ātman only 'लोकास्तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो लोकान् वेद.....सर्वं तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद । इदं ब्रह्मेदं क्षत्रमिमे लोका इमे वेदा इमानि भूतानीदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा (Br.Bh.2.4.6) The same thing is demonstrated by the statement "he who thinks that the Brāhmaṇa Jāti is different from the Ātman is rejected by the Brāhmaṇa Jāti etc., he who thinks that the Jagat of Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, etc. is different from the Ātman and has an independent existence elsewhere, is a mithya seer. This mithya seer is rejected by the Jagat of Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, etc. seen as mithya. This view of difference is condemned in this way and the base is laid down to show that each and every aspect of the world is non-different from the Ātman by saying that all this is Ātman 'यो हि ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिकं जगत् आत्मनोऽन्यत्र स्वातन्त्र्येण लब्धसद्भावं पश्यति तं मिथ्यादर्शिनं तदेव मिथ्यादृष्टं ब्रह्म क्षत्रादिकं जगत् पराकरोति इति भेददृष्टिम् अपोद्य 'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा' (Br. 2.4.6) इति सर्वस्य वस्तुजातस्य आत्माव्यतिरेकम् अवतारयति (Sū.Bh. 1.4.19).

In other words this state in which anything even to the extent of the tip of a hair is seen as 'not me', that is, the state different from Sarvātambhāva is the state of Avidyā 'यत्तु सर्वात्मभावात् अर्वाक् वालाग्रमात्रमपि अन्यत्वेन दृश्यते नाहमस्मीति तदवस्था अविद्या (Br.Bh.4.3.20). Therefore, Sarvātambhāva which is the knowledge of non-difference of anything from oneself is really the right realization, not the Sākṣitva.

ii) At this stage a doubt that crops up is the following: It has been told repeatedly that the Ātman is Satya and the Jagat is Asatya. How then is it possible to identify oneself with the Asatya Jagat? Inability to get an answer to this question leads one to keep Sākṣitva as his desideratum. It is also much less difficult to attain seership than to attain Sarvātambhāva. Therefore, we explain Sarvātambhāva a little more.

The Jagat is shown to be Brahman from the causal view. In fact even the shape of the effect is cause only; otherwise it could not have come into existence. But the cause is different from the effect. That is why it was told that the Jagat is non-different from Brahman, but Brahman is different from the Jagat. I am this Brahman. Therefore the Jagat is not different from me, but I am different from the Jagat. Therefore when the mind is tending outwards and assuming the shapes of the Jagat, I must have the intellectual conviction that it is not different from me. Bhāṣya observes: What is the causal relation for the Brahmavādin? For him it is of the nature of non-difference '(कार्यकारण संबन्धः) ब्रह्मवादिनः कथम् इति चेत्? न। तस्य तादात्म्यलक्षणसंबन्धोपपत्तेः' (Sū.Bh. 2.2.38). This relation is not restricted to the name-forms; it applies even to transactions. This is because, just as the effect is only a special manifestation of the cause, the transaction is only a special manifestation of the Ātmaśakti. That is why for the Jñānī all the transactions and also all the name-forms are Satya because they are viewed only causally 'सदात्मना सत्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्.....सर्वव्यवहाराणां सर्वविकाराणां च सत्यत्वम्' (Ch.Bh. 6.3.2). Before self realization, creation destruction etc., were from one who was different from me. With self realization they are now from myself. In this way all transactions are from himself in the case of Jñānī 'प्राक् सदात्मविज्ञानात् स्वात्मनोऽन्यस्मात् सतः

प्राणादेर्नामान्तस्य उत्पत्तिप्रलयौ अभूताम् । सदात्मविज्ञाने तु सति इदानीं स्वात्मत एव संवृत्तौ । तथा सर्वोऽप्यन्यो व्यवहारः आत्मन एव विदुषः (Ch.Bh. 7.26.1). Therefore, seeing a stone or clay is itself not Avidyā. To think that they are mutually different and they are also different from him who is seeing them, is Avidyā. Similarly, walking and eating are not Avidyā. But to think he himself is Kartā and Bhoktā is Avidyā. One who eats Anna (food) is Annāda; one who connects **Anna and Annāda is Ślókakarta** — Īśvara. In the acclamation of the Jñānī, ‘I am Anna, I am Annāda, I am Ślókakarta’ there is no Avidyā of enjoyership. It is only the right understanding of Sarvātmabhāva amidst the transaction between the eater and the eaten. On the other hand, when the mind is tending inward and does not assume any shape, it is self evident that one is different from the effects of shapes. The Ajñānī also does this to some extent! But in his case it is Asarvātmabhāva, he identifies himself only with his own body etc., but treats others as different from him. He does not feel oneness with the whole world. In Sarvātmabhāva, it is not so. Everything is himself. Therefore, self realization results only with the removal of the sense of difference with outside objects ‘बाह्यकारभेदबुद्धि निवृत्तिरेव आत्मस्वरूपावलंबन कारणम् (G.Bh. 18.50). It is not the denial of the outside objects. Though outside objects are being cognized through the Indriyas and the body is performing transactions, this Sarvātmabhāva destroys the doership in the Jnani. This is because there is no Avidyā Kāma Karma, etc at all in the fruit of the Vidyā of Sarvātmabhāva, Mókṣa ‘सर्वात्मभावो मोक्षो विद्याफलं त्रियाकारकफलशून्यं.....यत्र अविद्यादिकामकर्माणि न सन्ति’ (Br.Bh. 4.3.21).

“When the mind is tending outside, is it not wrong to know that the Asatya (word) is oneself?”

Not like that. The effect to which one refers to as ‘created, exists now, destroyed’ is certainly illusory, an illusion due to Avidyā. There is no question of the Jñānī considering it as himself. One who knows himself as always existing can never identify himself with such a Jagat. But the Jagat in front of us is not like that. It exists when it is being seen and exists in an unmanifest form when not seen. Therefore it is Asatya in the sense that it changes from a manifest state to an unmanifest state.

Nevertheless it is Brahman, not different from it. That is why Bhagavān says “Both the sat and the Asat, which are distinct are me only. Kārya is sat and Kāraṇa is Asat ‘सत्.....तद्विपरीतम् असच्चैव । अहम्.....कार्यकारणे वा सदसती’ (G.Bh. 9.19). Therefore, one has to understand the Jagat as non-different from oneself.

“What does one gain from this knowledge?”

“The Manas necessarily tends outwards as a result of Prārabdha even for a veteran Jñāni—the Prārabdha which has caused this body invariably produces its inevitable results. Consequently, there is bound to be motivation in his faculties of speech mind and body inspite of total realization. The reason is that the Karma is more powerful like the arrow which has already been shot from the bow ‘शरीरारंभकस्य कर्मणो नियतफलत्वात् सम्यग्ज्ञानप्राप्तावपि अवश्यंभाविनी प्रवृत्तिर्वाङ्मनः कायानाम् । लब्धवृत्तेः कर्मणो बलीयस्त्वात् मुक्तेष्वादिप्रवृत्तिवत्’ (Br.Bh. 1.4.7). In all those times an individual must have intellectual conviction that the Jagat is not different from him. Only then can he know that he is not related to the transactions of his body with the world. In fact, this also reassures him that what he has realized is the Brahman-Ātman identity stated by the Śruti and not just the seership. On the other hand if he continues to have a sense of difference as in seership, he is bound to be tied by the transaction. **Action itself is not bondage; it is only the sense of doership that is bondage: the absence of this sense is Mókṣa.** Therefore, the gain of this intellectual conviction of the identity with external world is transcending all transactions.

14.4 Examples

An idea of this gain can also be obtained in the case of an Ajñāni. When he has a healthy body he has complete identification with it. Many activities of the body like breathing, eyelid movement, etc. are not motivated by him, but the activities will be going on. Similarly in the case of a Jñāni all actions will continue without the sense of doership. Such a state of mind is not impossible. All the Jñānis have experienced it. This

being their personal experience cannot be denied by others' logic (Br.Sū. 4.1.15). One such Vāmadéva Ṛṣi proclaimed the mantra, 'I am Manu, I am Sūrya 'अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च' (Rg.Samhita. 4.26.1). The great Nammālwar who saw himself in everything has made the following thrilling statement:

All this visible earth is myself; All this visible space (Ākāśa) is myself; all this visible hot fire (Agni) is myself, all this wind (Vāyu) is myself, all this water of the ocean is myself. I have no relatives; every one in this whole world is my relative. It is I who give rise to relatives. It is I who destroy all relatives. It is myself who is the relative of all relatives. This poem of ten stanzas from him unfolds a glorious view of Sarvātmabhāva.

14.5 Sublimation of the world

Sarvātmabhāva has been described on the basis that the mind inevitably goes outwards due to Prārabdha. But this should not be misunderstood as to mean that Brahman is associated with the humdrum of the world of effects and that therefore one has to understand oneself also as such. Though there is a sense of non-difference in Sarvātmabhāva of "all this is me", notice that 'all this' implies difference and 'is me' implies non-difference. This non-difference is sometimes described as non-difference with tolerance of difference. But Brahman does not tolerate any difference! In other words, there is absolutely no trace of difference in the Svarūpa. O Somya! This was all one sat only without a second 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (Ch. 6.2.1).

Bhūmā is that where another is not seen, another is not heard, another is not known 'यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा' (Ch. 7.24.1). There is no trace of multiplicity here 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' (Br. 4.4.19). He has not inside awareness, not outside awareness.....He is without duality 'नान्तः प्रज्ञं न बहिष्प्रज्ञम्.....अद्वैतम्' (Mā. 7). In this way duality in the Ātman is totally rejected by the Śruti. "Then how is it that

it says everything is Brahman where both the words, world and Brahman, are in the same case-nominative case?’ It is only to sublimate the world and not to convey that Brahman contains multiplicity ‘सर्वं ब्रह्म इति सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रपञ्चप्रविलापनार्थं नानेकरसताप्रतिपादनार्थम्’ (Sū.Bh. 1.3.1). The effect is of the nature of Brahman, but Brahman is not of the nature of the effect. The Śruti, of course, tells that he who understands himself as Brahman will become all this ‘य एवं वेद अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति’ (Br.Bh 1.4.10). But it also tells that Brahman is ‘not like this, not like this.’ Śruti mainly tells that it is formless ‘अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात्’ (Br.Sū. 3.2.14). Therefore, when the mind is tending outwards Sarvātmabhāva is to be resorted to. But for Svarūpa Jñāna of Brahman-Ātman identity only formless Brahman is to be adopted. In other words, for Svarūpa Jñāna one should realize that he is that Brahman in which the world of effects is sublimated, that is, one not containing the humdrum of the world.

“Why should one admit the world first and then talk of its sublimation? From the beginning why cannot we say that the world is non-existent?”

It has been repeatedly told that the world which is deemed different from the Ātman is non-existent like rabbits horns; but the world in front of us is not Asat like that. But it is not Sat like the Ātman either. Ātman is the transcendental Sat and the world in front is transactional empirical Sat. Since there is no transaction at all in the Ātman, this is to be sublimated for Svarūpa Jñāna. But sublimation of Jagat does not mean its destruction, so as to make it inaccessible to Indriyas. ‘What is sublimation of Jagat? Is it like liquifying solidified ghee by contact with fire? No; because such a sublimation has to be done by Īśvara only at the time of Pralaya. It cannot be done by any mortal. Therefore, such a sublimation cannot be advised to mortals by the Śruti. Not only that; if such a sublimation has been done by one who has attained Jñāna by now, then the world should not be existing but it is existing ‘कोऽयं प्रपञ्चप्रविलयो नाम? किम् अग्निप्रतापसंपर्कात् घृतकाठिन्यप्रविलय इव

प्रपञ्चप्रविलयः कर्तव्यः?.....स पुरुषमात्रेण अशक्यः प्रविलापयितुम् इति तत्प्रविलयोपदेशोऽशक्यविषय एव स्यात् । एकेन च आदिमुक्तेन पृथिव्यादिप्रविलयः कृतः इति इदानीं पृथिव्यादिशून्यं जगत् अभविष्यत्’ (Sū.Bh. 3.2.21). Moreover, Brahma Vidya can neither create nor destroy an object ‘न तु पारमार्थिकं वस्तु कर्तुं निवर्तयितुं वा अर्हति ब्रह्मविद्या’ (Br.Bh. 1.4.10). Therefore, in the anxiety that Ātman alone is to be retained, if one gives up the Brahman described by the Śruti and also the method of attaining Brahman Ātman identity and like Vaināśikas posits that the world is Asat, it is wrong; because it would then mean that the direct perception of Īśvara of the future world would become his wrong recognition ‘असंश्रेत् भविष्यद्वटः ऐश्वरं भविष्यद्वटविषयं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं मिथ्या स्यात्’ (Br.Bh. 1.2.1). If the world is dropped by deeming it as an illusion due to Avidyā like the Vijñānavādins then there is no way at all to arrive at Brahman. Then how is it possible at all to realize Brahman-Ātman identity? Without communicating what Brahman is, if you say “Realize Brahman, sublimate the Jagat” even a hundred times, neither the realization of Brahman nor the sublimation of the Jagat can happen ‘अनावेदिते ब्रह्मणि ब्रह्मविज्ञानं कुरु प्रपञ्चविलयं च इति शतकृत्वोऽप्युक्ते न ब्रह्मविज्ञानं प्रपञ्चविलयो वा जायते’ (Sū.Bh. 3.2.21). Therefore, we should never deny the existence of the world either as Asat or as Kalpiṭa due to Avidyā. Instead, if we establish the process of sublimation of the world as told by the Bhāṣya and then speak about the Brahman-Ātman identity, we can prove that those who call the Advaitins concealed Buddhists are unconcealed fools themselves. The meaning of the sublimation of Jagat is different. In order to elucidate this procedure we will start with an example.

The meaning does not contain audible words of sound form; words of sound form do not contain readable line forms. But readable line forms contain audible sound forms and audible sound forms contain meaning. That is why people utter words in order to convey meaning and draw lines in order to convey words. Therefore, when a person reads, he sublimates the letters of line forms in the audible words

and sublimates the audible words in the meaning to grasp it. In the same way, there are two worlds in the case of an Ajñānī as explained in (12.19.iii) The first is that what a person sees as Abrahman—which is different from Ātman and therefore an illusion due to Avidyā; another is that what the Śruti says as Brahman itself, projected by Brahman itself in order to make itself known, therefore non-different from Brahman. The meaning of Śruti with regard to the Jagat is to be clearly grasped and the illusory Jagat should be sublimated in the Jagat described by Śruti, that is understood that the Jagat in front is not Abrahman as had been thought previously. Only then, the world described by Śruti comes to recognition. This is not different from Brahman and so not different from himself. Therefore, automatically all the transactions he was imagining in himself as being done with the world in front drop out. This process of sublimation of the world is done in three steps as follows:

14.6 Samaṣṭi—Vyaṣṭi

Towards that end, we will now explain two words— Samaṣṭi and Vyaṣṭi. Samaṣṭi means the collection of the members of the category, Vyaṣṭi means one of the members in it as distinguished from among the collection by some special quality. The world in front made up of Pañcabhūtas is Samaṣṭi, the body of the Jīva is Vyaṣṭi. The Prāṇa Dévatā which appears in the form of life span of all living creatures is Samaṣṭi, the Prāṇas of Jīva is Vyaṣṭi. The mind and the intellect of Hiraṇyagarbha is Samaṣṭi and those of the Jīvas are Vyaṣṭi. Though the Vyaṣṭi is different from the other members of the Samaṣṭi in one of its qualities, its Svarūpa is not different. For example, the body of the Jīva is different from the external Jagat in its shapes and actions, but not in its Svarūpa. It is also made up of the five elements like the Jagat. It is only the five elements of the Jagat which modify and take on the shape of the body. If one introspects a little, this is not difficult to understand. But to know that the Jīvas' intellect is not different from the Samaṣṭi intellect is rather difficult. It needs the study of the Śāstra. The special

qualities that the Jīva finds in himself as different from Samaṣṭi makes him superimpose a difference between himself and the Samaṣṭi. He should correct it and achieve identity with Samaṣṭi.

14.7 Vaiśvānarātma

i) In Jāgrat if Jīva is Vyaṣṭi, Vaiśvānara is Samaṣṭi. During Jāgrat the Jīva thinks different from other Jīvas and that he is independent. Even a little reflection shows that this mutual independence is unfounded. Nobody can do anything totally independently, without any influence from the external world. Therefore, an individual can understand that all the activities done through his gross body is only on the prompting of the collective Vaiśvānara. Of course, we know that the food eaten by us is digested only by him (G. 15.14, Br.Bh. 5.9.1).

ii) This Vaiśvānara is the first quarter of the PratyagĀtman who is Paramātman himself. He is placed in the wakeful state of the body, knowing outside things, 19-faced, and is the enjoyer of gross things. All these are the same as mentioned in Vyaṣṭi. But, Vaiśvānara is Saptāṅga also, that is seven organed ‘जागरितस्थानो बहिष्प्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः स्थूलभुक् वैश्वानरः प्रथमः पादः (Mā. 3). His seven organs are: the upper worlds are the head, the Sun is his eyes, the ear is his Prāṇa, Ākāśa is his waist, water his bladder and the earth forms his two feet (Ch.Bh. 5.18.2). Once some Ṛṣis went to Uddālaka Āruneya to learn Vaiśvānara Vidyā. He did not know it fully either. Then he himself took the Ṛṣis to the king, Aśvapati Kaikéya. All of them approached the king with humility, giving up the pride that they were Brāhmaṇas belonging to higher caste. Each of the Ṛṣis had thought of one of the organs mentioned above as Vaiśvānara and meditated upon him as such. When the king heard this, he warned them that should they continue like that, they could be losing their respective organs. Afterwards he taught them the seven organs of Vaiśvānara mentioned above.

iii) **Question:** “The Pratyagātman is the seer within our own body. The purpose of the Māṇḍūkya Śruti is to inform us about the four

quarters of this Ātman. When this is the purpose, how is it that the Śruti describes abruptly the world outside the body as organs of Vaiśvānara?’

The answer to this question is: The PratyagĀtman is now under the impression that he is only his body or he is the seer of everything. This is his mistake. PratyagĀtman has imagined this limitation in himself due to Avidyā. But really he is Brahman which pervades all over the Jagat. In order to understand this, the Jīva has to give up his imagined limitation in himself and feel the identity with the body of Vaiśvānara; then the duality that he is the seer of the world is lost and Sarvātmabhāva is attained. Only then Advaita is established. An individual who finds all the Bhūtās in his Ātman, and his Ātman in all the Bhūtās is the one who knows truly (Īśa.6). On the other hand, if one mistakes the PratyagĀtman as limited to his own body like the Sāṅkhyas, it will not be the Advaitik realization mentioned by the Śruti. The organs of Vaiśvānara have been described as the organs of the Pratyagātman only to bring about this right realization ‘एवं च सति सर्वप्रपञ्चोपशमे अद्वैतसिद्धिः । सर्वभूतस्थश्च आत्मा एको दृष्टः स्यात् सर्वभूतानि च आत्मनि । यस्तु सर्वाणिभूतानि (Īśa. 6) ‘इत्यादि श्रुत्यर्थः उपसंहृतश्च एवं स्यात् । अन्यथा हि स्वदेहपरिच्छिन्न एव प्रत्यगात्मा साङ्ख्यादिभिरिव दृष्टः स्यात् । तथा च सति अद्वैतम् इति श्रुतिकृतो विशेषो न स्यात्’ (Mā.Bh. 3). With this oneness, the illusory doership in the Jīva caused in relation to the body will be lost.

14.8 Taijsātmā

The next step is to attain Sarvātmabhāva with the Taijsātmā. It is as follows: If the Jīva in dream transactions is Vyaṣṭī, the Taijsātmā is Samaṣṭī. He is also Svapnasthāna located in the dream state, Anantahprajña (getting awarenences internally), nineteen-faced, Praviviktabhuk as in Vyaṣṭī (see 13.3) He is also Saptāṅga like the Vaiśvānara- ‘स्वप्नस्थानोऽन्तःप्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः प्रविविक्तभुक् तैजसो द्वितीयः पादः’ (Mā. 4). But these organs are the subtle forms of those of Vaiśvānara. He is Taijasa because his mental forms are only of the nature of Téjas without gross objects. He is the second quarter of the Pratyagātman who is Paramātman himself. He is the same as

Hiraṇyāgarbha whose intellect is the Samaṣṭi Buddhi. In the second step of the sublimation of the world, one has to attain identity with Taijsātmā. With this, the sense of duality arriving through the intellect, that is knowership, is lost.

Vaiśvānara conducts worldly transactions staying in the eyes of Jīva (13.1). From the difference of position he himself is described as **Indra** with respect to the right eye and as **Indrāni**, his wife, with respect to the left eye. Indra is actually Indha. But because the Dévatas are haters of direct transaction and lovers of indirect transaction, he likes to be called indirectly as Indra. Both Indra and Indrāni leave their places in the eyes and come to the heart and merge during sleep. Then the Jīva gets dreams. In this way, Indra in conjugal embrace with Indrāni is Taijasa (Br.Bh. 4.2.3). This Taijasa Hiraṇyagarbha is the first issue of Parameśvara. Therefore Indra is Parameśvara himself and Indrāni is the Prakṛti. That is the reason why the Ātman of the Taijsātmā, the Prājña, is Parameśvara himself.

14.9 Prajñātmā

If the Jīvātma in Suṣupti is Vyaṣṭi; Prajñātmā is the Samaṣṭi. In Vyaṣṭi, he is called Prājña (see 13.13) This is because it is himself who understands everything before the sleep and after the sleep. In Samaṣṭi also he is called Prājña but for a different reason: He is only Prajñapti Svarūpa, that is, only Caitanya. Therefore he is Prājña. This Prājña is Parameśvara himself because his omniscient Prajña never leaves him 'प्राज्ञः परमेश्वरः । सर्वज्ञत्वलक्षणया प्रज्ञया नित्यम् अवियोगात्' (Sū.Bh. 1.3.42). Though Vaiśvānara and Taijasa are Paramātman only, they have qualified awarenesses in relation to the Upādhi. But Prājña is not like that. He is prajñānaghana, that is one without the transaction of qualified awarenesses. He is Sarveśvara, Sarvajña, Antaryāmin, the cause of everything; the creation and destruction of the Bhūtās are through him 'एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम्' (Mā. 6). He is the third quarter of the Pratyagātman. Therefore in this third step of the sublimation of Jagat, one should get identification with Prājña.

Vaiśvānara, Taijśātmā, and Prājña are in that order the first three quarters of the Pratyagātman. These quarters are not like the legs of a cow. It is rather like twenty–five paisa, fifty paisa and seventy–five paisa of a rupee. All the three are subsumed in the rupee, the first two in the third and the first in the second. Similarly, in the case of the four quarters of the Ātman, the analogy for the sublimation of the world is the four quarters of the rupee. It is also like sublimating the line forms of letters in the audible words and of the audible words in the meaning to grasp it. Here, the gross Vaiśvānara is to be sublimated in the subtle Taijasa, this subtle Taijasa in whom Vaiśvānara is already sublimated should be sublimated in the subtler Prājña and finally the Prājña in whom Viśva and Taijasa are already sublimated should be sublimated in the subtlest Pratyagātman. Then the imagined doership and the knowership are totally destroyed and he gets identified with the Ātman of the nature of ‘not this, not this’ ‘तं सर्वात्मानं प्रत्यगात्मनि उपसंहृत्य द्रष्टुर्हि द्रष्टृभावमं नेतिनेतीत्यात्मानं तुरीयं प्रतिपद्यते’ (Br.Bh. 4.2.4). In this way he remains only in Dṛaṣṭṛbhāva. This is like giving up the transactions with twenty–five, fifty, seventy–five paisa and retaining only the rupee without transactions.

14.10 Turiya

By now, one may have an apprehension as to how difficult it is to know Brahman. Is it because it is not communicated properly? Of course, that is also true. If we have to communicate It clearly, we should have known It clearly ourselves by seeing directly or hearing about It through someone or understand It in our own mind. However, this has not been possible for us. Sight, speech and mind cannot reach Ātman at all. Therefore, we have never understood it clearly as ‘like this.’ So we do not know how to communicate it clearly either ‘न तत्र चक्षुर्गच्छति न वाग्गच्छति नो मनः न विद्मो न विजानीमो यथैतदनुशिष्यात्’ (Ke. 1.3). The root cause of the truth of the matter of both our difficulties lies in the nature of Brahman. When any thing is spoken about, the natural urge in the mind is to search for it outside. But, Brahman is itself at the root of this urge.

That is the reason why the mind cannot objectify Brahman (Ke. 1.6) Therefore, how difficult should it be to understand It? However, the compassionate Īśvara has blessed the Jīva with Suṣupti to facilitate understanding, a glimmer of it. If we are foolish indeed, we may get rid of tiresomeness while in Suṣupti and get back to Jāgrat and continue to indulge in our stupidity. If we are Mumukṣus we may contemplate on the oneness in Suṣupti graciously granted by Brahman in the light of logical analysis and the Vēda and acquire Brahaman-Ātman identification.

In Suṣupti all the hurdles for this identification have been removed except one, and that is Avidyā. We cannot get rid of it being in Suṣupti itself. We have to wake up. For that matter, we have to wake up from all the three states Jāgrat, Svapna and Suṣupti, because all are transient. All the ‘three are dreams ‘त्रयः स्वप्नाः’ (Ai. 1.3.12). Just as the Ajñānī gets up from the dream and realizes that “I am unnecessarily excited; there is no reason for this. All the transactions were only imagined within me”, similarly the Mumukṣu has to get the right understanding that “I am experiencing pleasures and pains from the transactions in the three states. There is no basis for this. All the transactions are only imagined in me. I am, indeed, the Brahman which is the Upādāna for the whole Jāgrat. Transactions are possible only in the effects and not in the cause. **Of course, I am in the effects (Sarvātmabhāva) but there are no effects in me (Svarūpa Jñāna).**” It is precisely this lesson that Bhagavān taught Nārada “O Nārada! you are seeing all this as me. That is only my illusory creation. Never think that I possess the qualities of all these Bhūtās ‘माया ह्येषा मया सृष्टा यन्मां पश्यसि नारद । सर्वभूतगुणैर्युक्तं मैवं ज्ञातुमर्हसि’ (Mókṣa Dharma 339.45). All the Bhūtās are in me..... the Bhūtās are not at all in me ‘मत्स्थानि सर्वभूतानि.....न च मत्स्थानि भूतानि’ (G. 9.4.5). Such complete denial of transaction of the three states is implied in Turīya. This is Svarūpa Jñāna; this is also Sarvātmabhāva. Because, though there appears to be transactions in Sarvātmabhāva, there is really no transaction in Ātman at all.

‘सर्वात्मभावो मोक्षो विद्याफलं क्रियाकारकफलशून्यं..... यत्र अविद्यादिकामकर्माणि न सन्ति’ (Br.Bh. 4.3.2.1) Just as the same Brahman was called Parabrahman looking beyond the name-forms and was called Aparabrahman without looking beyond them (10.1.ii), the right realization has been described as Svarūpa Jñāna looking beyond the Jagat and as Sarvātmabhāva, without looking beyond it. Though it was said that Sarvātmabhāva is non-difference with tolerance of difference, it should not be understood that Sarvātmabhāva contains the transaction of difference. It was intended to only point out that name-forms and their transactions are non-different from Ātman (14.3.ii).

Turiya is the fourth quarter of the Ātman ‘चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा’ (Mā. 7). It is not like the fourth leg of the cow. Just as the rupee itself is the fourth quarter of the rupee, the Ātman is the fourth quarter of himself. In other words, Turiya is not to be understood as the fourth state of the Jīva. It is actually his Svarūpa. He is not Antahprajña that is, not Taijasa, not the dream seer. He is not Bahiṣprajña that is not Viśva that is, not the transactor during Jāgrat. He is not the one in-between the two states. He is not the non-discriminating Prajñānaghana, that is not knowing anything because of the freezing of all awareness, that is not one who sleeps. He is not Prajña, that is not Prajñātṛ who understands other things clearly, because there is nothing different from him. He is not Aprajña, not Acaitanya. He is not the seer. He is not available for transaction. He cannot be understood by the intellect through Pramāṇas like inference etc. He has no features. Therefore he is unthinkable—Acintya. He cannot be conveyed in clear terms. But he is to be grasped as the unmissed entity persisting in all the three states. All the world is sublimated in Him; that is why he is peace. He is auspicious. He is without duality. He is himself the atman —

‘नान्तःप्रज्ञं न बहिष्प्रज्ञं नोभयतः प्रज्ञं न प्रज्ञानघनं न प्रज्ञं नाप्रज्ञम् । अदृष्टमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्यमलक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः’ (Mā. 7).

14.11 Some doubts

i) ‘When Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, and Prājña are Paramātman, how is it that all the three are denied in Turīya?’

Paramātman himself appears with transaction as Vaiśvānara, Taijasa and Prājña through Upādhi. Prājña also has the transaction of the creation etc., of the Jagat. But Turīya is without Upādhi. So after sublimation of Vaiśvānara, Prājña, and Taijasa, all transactions will be denied in the Turīya.

ii) ‘This Ātman, is solid awareness Prajñānaghana where there is nothing like outside or inside ‘अयमात्माऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव’ (Br. 4.5.13) as Śruti describes it here. The same Ātman, Turīya, is described as “not Prajñānaghana”. How is this?’

The same word Prajñānaghana is used in different senses. The common feature in Turīya and Suṣupti is that there is no transaction of qualified awareness. In this sense Śruti uses the same expression in both places. But the difference is this—the non-discrimination namely, “I did not know anything” is there in Suṣupti because of Avidyā (see 13.13), but in Turīya there is Vidyā. This difference distinguishes Turīya which is not Prajñātmā of Suṣupti.

iii) ‘Turīya is indeed Brahman. It is described as Alakṣaṇa, that is without features. On the other hand Brahman is said to have three features—Satya, Jñāna and Ananta. How?’

Of the three features of Brahman, Ananta is only a denial of limitation. Therefore, it does not affect the description as Alakṣaṇa. Of course, Satya and Jñāna are features of Brahman with their own meanings. However they are not the expressed meaning for Brahman; they do not describe Brahman literally (see the introduction to ch.10). Therefore we resort to their intended meaning to recognize Brahman. In a way this is also a denial of features, not affecting the description as Alakṣaṇa.

iv) 'Brahman is described as Apraméya—not a comprehensible object and Turīya Ātman is the same as Brahman. How can Turīya be Apraméya when Śruti is describing Him?'

It is true that he is not an object — एतदप्रमेयं (Br. 4.4.20). Therefore even the Śruti cannot convey him by any description 'like this'. He already exists as the knower. But the transaction of knowership is imagined in Him due to Avidyā and it is to be removed. Towards this end alone, the Śruti uses words of negative meaning to describe Ātman.

v) 'Will a Jñānī who has realized himself as the Turīyātman not get sleep and dreams?'

Not like that; when the mind is acting through the eyes there is Jāgrat and when it comes to the heart Svapna and Suṣṭi occur. All the three states are only features of the body. Further, the body functions do not stop the moment there is realization. They continue as long as Prārabdha exists, just as an arrow shot from the bow does. Therefore, all the three states are there for the body of a Jñānī also. But the difference is this: In the mind of a Jñānī there is the impression of Sarvātmabhāva, while in an Ajñānī Asarvātmabhāva. Therefore their dreams are also of a different variety. An Ajñānī dreams of Asarvātmabhāva like killing, winning, chased by elements, falling in pits, etc. A Jñānī dreams of Sarvātmabhāva such as being himself the Dévatā, a king, the whole world, etc. (Br.4.3.20). However, the Jñānī clearly knows that none of these states is in him.

vi) 'While speaking of the mind (see 11.4) it was told that when it is fixed on one thing, it cannot be on another at the same time. How is it possible for a Jñānī to have transactions when his mind is always fixed on the Ātman?'

No transaction is possible when the mind is free of thought; when it is engaged with thoughts, it is possible to work even keeping the mind in the Ātman, because the things in which a person's mind has to engage are known to him to be non-different from himself. For example, it is universal experience that while concentrating on the meaning,

everyone is engaged also in seeing, hearing, talking, etc. Similarly is the case of the Jñānī.

vii) ‘Will it not be pretension on the part of a Jñānī if he works like others, knowing that he is a non-doer and unconnected with everything?’

No. The teacher who knows arithmetic well, still goes on folding the fingers to count when teaching a child. Nobody calls it pretension. Very great Jñānis do Karma like Ajñānis for the sake of Lókasangraha, that is to keep the society in the traditional practice (G.3.26)

viii) ‘Is there a possibility that Jñānī could do bad actions because he knows that he is not touched by it?’

When it is said that Vivéka, Vairāgya, Śama, Dama, etc., are necessary just to listen to Védānta, how can the Jñāni who has done Śravaṇa, Manana, Nididhyāsana and has finally achieved fulfillment perform a bad act? It is impossible. He who is able to see a pit even in the darkness of night would never fall into it in daylight (Ch 2.23.1).

ix) ‘If a Jñānī is doing Karma, does it indicate ‘Avidyāleśa’, the remnants of his ignorance?’

No. It is well known that acquiring Ātma Jñānā is very difficult. That is why Śvétakétu asks his father repeatedly till all his doubts are removed about the lesson ‘thou art that’. He gets instructions nine times before finally getting all his doubts cleared. This way Avidyā is lost only step by step. Doubts persist till complete knowledge dawns. As long as there is doubt, it only means that right realization is yet to come. Whether it is the first or the last or whether the continuous or the discontinuous, the one thought which totally removes the fault of Avidyā is Vidyā ‘य एव अविद्यादिदोष निवृत्तिफलकृत् प्रत्ययः आद्यः अन्त्यः सन्ततः असन्ततो वा स एव विद्या’ (Br.Bh. 1.4.10). After this understanding has dawned there is no question of any remnants of Avidyā. Those who wrongly think that doing Karma invariably presupposes Avidyā speak like this. This is not correct. Brahmajñāna and the simultaneous maintenance of the body is the personal experience within the Jñānī’s

heart. How is it possible for others to deny it? Both Śruti and Smṛti describe the features of Sthitaprajña keeping only this in view—‘कथं हि एकस्य स्वहृदयप्रत्ययं ब्रह्मवेदनं देहधारणं च अपरेण प्रतिक्षेपुं शक्येत? श्रुतिस्मृतिषु च स्थितप्रज्ञलक्षणनिर्देशेन एतदेव निरूच्यते’ (Sū.Bh. 4.1.17). Though the Jñānī appears like others to be doing transactions for example, going for Bhikṣa etc., common people cannot know his personal experience of non-doership. They may think that he is the doer. However in his own experience born out of Śāstra Pramāṇa he is a non-doer only ‘लोकव्यवहारसामान्यदर्शनेन तु लौकिकैः आरोपितकर्तृत्वे भिक्षाटनादौ कर्मणि कर्ता भवति । स्वानुभवेन तु शास्त्रप्रमाणजनितेन अकर्तृव’ (G.Bh. 4.22). As a matter of fact, in the case of a Jñānī all transactions are also true because he sees them causally ‘सदात्मना सत्यत्व अभ्युपगमात् सर्वव्यवहाराणां सर्वविकाराणां च सत्यत्वम्’ (Ch.Bh.6.3.2). One who has got this realization knows that Prāṇa, desire, memory, the appearance and disappearance, qualified knowledge, meditation, motivation, mind, speech, name, actions — everything is from the Ātman only. Therefore, there is no danger to this Jñāna of the Jñānī by such actions. For that matter, is not Parameśvara responsible for activities of creation, etc.? Are not the Avatāras, incarnations of Paramātman like Rāma, etc. doing Karma? Is it possible to attribute Avidyā even to Him? No. Though actions may be taking place in the body of a Jñānī because of the Prārabdha, he knows fully well that he is unrelated to them. It is only this conviction which is Jñāna. Others may think that Jñānī is doing Karma, but he does not think so.

Question: ‘Śruti tells that the impediment to him is only till he is not released from the present body; the moment it falls, he merges in Brahman ‘तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्नविमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्य इति’ (Chā. 6.14.2). Therefore it means that Prārabdha is an impediment for Mókṣa. Since this Prārabdha is only due to his erstwhile Avidyā, can we not say that it is just the remnant of Avidyā?’

Answer: That is not correct. Suppose that gripes are caused by the consumption of wrong food due to temptation. However, this stomach ache will continue for sometime though the temptation is lost. But it is not described as the remnant of temptation. Similarly, Prārabdha

of a Jñānī cannot be decribed as the remnant of Avidyā. It is not correct to say that a part of Karma has been burnt and the remaining, part could cause sprouting, just like the part of a paddy seed which is partly burnt is not seen to sprout from the other part. Similarly, when Avidyā is burnt all his Karma is certainly burnt. He knows it himself 'न च अविद्यादिक्लेशदाहे सति क्लेशबीजस्य कर्माशयस्य एकदेशदाहः एकदेशप्ररोहश्च इत्युपपद्यते। न हि अग्निदग्धस्य शालिबीजस्य एकदेशप्ररोहो दृश्यते। प्रवृत्तफलस्य तु कर्माशयस्य मुक्तेषोरिव वेगक्षयात् निवृत्तिः' (Sū.Bh. 3.3.32).

Question: 'As long as an action is taking place we know that the force which motivated it is also continuing. What has motivated this Prārabdha is only the Avidyā of previous life; therefore can we not say that there is a remnant of Avidyā of the previous life though he does not have Avidyā now?'

Answer: This is not correct. Avidyā which is the absence of Vidyā may be the reason for Karma. But the Upādāna for the Karma is only the Prakṛti of three qualities. Avidyā alone cannot lead to any inequality because it is homogeneous (since it is the absence of Vidyā). But it is only Avidyā mixed with faults like lust, etc. generating the desire to do Karma that leads to inequality 'न च अविद्या केवला वैषम्यस्य कारणम् एकरूपत्वात्। रागादिक्लेशवासनाक्षिप्त कर्मापेक्षा तु अविद्या वैषम्यकरी स्यात्' (Sū.Bh. 2.1.36). On the other hand, to say that Avidyā is objectively existent and is the Upādāna for Prārabdha Karma and consequently Avidyā exists as long as there is Prārabdha, is in direct contradiction with the statement of Śruti namely, the Jñānī is Brahman here itself though as if appearing with the body; being Brahman he merges in Brahman 'विद्वान् स इहैव ब्रह्म यद्यपि देहवानिव लक्ष्यते स ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति' (Br.Bh. 4.4.6).

Question: 'Then what is the meaning of Chāndógya statement that Prārabdha is an impediment for Mókṣa?'

Answer: Prārabdha is never an impediment for the Mókṣa of a Jñānī. He is already Brahman here itself. However, there is one similarity and one dissimilarity between a Jñānī and an Ajñānī. Both of their bodies die when their Prārabdha comes to an end. But the Ajñānī takes up the

next birth as a result of his Ajñāna and Sañcita and Āgāmi Karma, whereas the Jñānī does not. In order to emphasize this difference, the Chāndógya says that the Jñānī waits for Mókṣa till the fall of the body.

x) Since the Ātman is Sarvajña and Sarvaśakta does the Ātmajñāni also have these prowesses?’

Prowesses express themselves only through Upādhis. Creation etc. of the world are done by Hiraṇyagarbha whose Upādhis, mind and intellect, are of pre-eminent potentiality. Except him, nobody else can handle creation etc. of the whole universe. If it were possible for others also, a compassionate person would conduct Praḷaya to remove the grief of all the Jīvas at once or a sadist would desire to grant a birth even to the liberated souls. This would lead only to chaos. So, this is not allowed to anybody else. But people who have done Sādhana (means of attainment) according to their ability may get prowesses according to their ability. However it must be remembered that there is no connection between the prowesses and Ātmajñāna. One without them could be a Jñānī and one with them could be an Ajñānī.

xi) ‘Then how to say that Jñānī is Īśvara?’

When the Jñānī is already Brahman, why is he not Īśvara?! Jñānī is that Brahman which is called Īśvara in relation to the Māyā. Therefore Jñānī is automatically Īśvara also. This has been explained already in (14.3.ii.). That ātma for whom nothing remains uncomprehended, that Ātma is Sarvajña ‘यस्यात्मनोऽविज्ञेयं न किञ्चित् परिशिष्यते स आत्मा सर्वज्ञः’ (Ka. 2.1.3).

xii) ‘Does Jñānī have another birth (Janma) or not?’

Jñānī does not have another Janma because all his Karma would be reduced to ashes by the fire of his Jñāna, just as the blazing fire burns dry sticks ‘यथैधांसि समिद्धोऽग्निर्भस्मसात्कुरुतेऽर्जुन । ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा’ (G. 4.37). At the end of his life span his speech, mind, Prāṇa will never take up any vrttis (forms) at all unlike in the case of the Ajñānī. (see 11.12) The subtle elements in these Upādhis will merge in the respective Pañcabhūtas (Br.3.2.11; Pra. 6.5) When the Prārabdha

comes to an end the body dies and he being already Brahman merges in Brahman—just like pure water merging in pure water. But some Jñānis take up another birth at the behest of Īśvara like Apāntaratamas who was born as Bhagavān Vyāsa. Such Jñānis pull their own remaining Prārabdha to take up the next birth.

xiii) ‘Does he not have to take another birth for clearing his Sañcita and Āgāmi Karma?’

No. After attaining Jñāna there won’t be any Āgāmi Karma at all. But the dispensation of the Karma done in that life till Jñāna was obtained and the Sañcita Karma of the previous lives is as follows: His children take his property. His friends take his Puṇya. His detractors take his Pāpa ‘तस्य पुत्रा दायमुपयन्ति सुहृदः साधुकृत्यां द्विषन्तः पापकृत्याम् (शाट्यायन शाखा श्रुति). People dear to him will take his good Karma and people not dear to him will take bad Karma ‘तस्य प्रिया ज्ञातयः सुकृतमुपयन्त्यप्रिया दुष्कृतम्’ (Kau.1.4). Thus Brahma Vidya is very great (Su.Bh.3.3.26).

xiv) Is it necessary to be a Sannyāsi to get Jñāna?

Sannyāsa is necessary for Jñāna Sādhana, but not for obtaining Jñāna. On the basis of the Sādhana done in previous lives Vāmadēva attained Jñāna even while in the womb (Ai.Bh.2.1.5).

14.12 Ómkāra

The first born Prajāpathi performed tapas in order to know the quintessence of the worlds. He understood them as the three Vyāhṛtis—Bhūh, Bhuvah and Suvah. Then he did further Tapas to know the essence of these Vyāhṛtis. He understood it to be Ómkāra. Therefore all this is Ómkāra (Ch. 2.23.2-3). This is nearest to the Paramātman. It is His name. When it is chanted He will be pleased. This is also the symbol for Brahman that is, just as worshipping a Śālagrāma as Viśnu, one can meditate on Brahman through the sound of this letter. That is why all the Védic Karma starts with the recitation of Ómkāra.

There are several types of meditations on Ómkāra mentioned in the Śāstra. There is a story to convey the greatness of the Upasāna in which the prime Prāṇa is represented by Ómkāra: Long ago the Dévatas, scared by the Rākṣasās, took to Ómkāra for their protection. They meditated on it as the nose, then as the speech, then as the eyes, then as the ears and then as the mind. Rākṣasās defeated them each time and then the nose picked up bad smell, the speech told lies, the eyes saw undesirable things, the ears heard undesirable things and the mind thought of undesirable things. Thereafter, the Dévatas considered Ómkāra as the prime Prāṇa and then meditated upon it. Rākṣasās could not beat them. Instead they themselves were destroyed. Therefore if one meditates upon the mukhya Prāṇa (vital air) as Ómkāra, his enemies will be destroyed like a lump of clay thrown on a rock (Ch.1.2.1-8).

Ómkāra being the Ātman, the four quarters of the Ātman are its four quarters; Vaiśvānara represents its first Mātra (letter) which is ‘a’; Taijasa the second Mātra ‘u’; the Prājña the third Mātra ‘m’; and Ātman himself is the Mātraless Om. Similarity in them is as follows:

(a) Vaiśvānara who is the first step for Ātmajñāna is spread all over the universe; ‘a’ which is the first letter is spread over all letters. Therefore, one who meditates on ‘a’ of ‘aum’ as Vaiśvānara, will be the first everywhere and spreads himself in all his desires, that is all his desires are fulfilled. (Mā. 9)

(b) Taijasa is the one drawn from Vaiśvānara and comes between Viśva and Prājña and ‘u’ is drawn from ‘a’ and comes in between ‘a’ and ‘m’. Therefore one who meditates on ‘u’ of ‘Aum’ as Taijasa, will draw Jñāna, that is acquires Jñāna, and will be between friend and foe, that is he will not be hated by any one (Mā. 10)

(c) Prājña is the limit of Viśva and Taijasa and is also the one who sublimates both of them—the ‘m’ of ‘aum’ is the limit of ‘a’ and ‘u’ and also sublimates them. Therefore, when one meditates on the ‘m’ of ‘aum’ as Prājña, he will see the end of the world, that is the Truth. He also gets sublimated in Brahman.

(d) Even people with limited intelligence will get the realization of the Brahman-Ātman identity in due course, if they meditate on 'aum' ruminating over the relations between Viśva, etc. and the Ātman (Mā. 12).

Maha Parivrajaka

CHAPTER 15

THE ANALYSIS OF FIVE SHEATHS

If the Ātman is one, Anātmans are countless. Therefore, if Ātma Buddhi is only one, Anātma Buddhi is different at different times. In order to free the Jīva from such Anātma Buddhi, Śāstra obviously employs several approaches. In the previous chapters the analysis of the three bodies and the three states were made. In this chapter, the Pañcakóśas, the five sheaths, are analysed on the basis of the Bhāṣya from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad.

15.1 Transactions in Vyaṣṭi

We know that the Svarūpa of the Jīva is Brahman. This is to be sought only in the cave of one's own intellect. It cannot be seen elsewhere. This is because the intellect is the nearest entity to Jñāna which is the Svarūpa of Brahman. Starting from the visible body up to this Brahman, there are five sheaths: the gross body, the five Prāṇas, the Manas, the Buddhi, and the sense of enjoyership (Bhóktṛtva). The sense of enjoyership is a mental form of the feeling that one is the experiencer of happiness. Happiness is the result of Karma. Therefore, the very first step in the performance of Karma is the desire for a particular Bhóga, enjoyment. This desire results in the decision to execute the Karma which yields that Bhóga. This decision is taken by the intellect. In the next stage this decision results in the planning to do the Karma which is the function of the mind. This mental planning later prompts the Prāṇas to execute the Karma. The physical body performs the Karma in the final step in accordance with the prompting of the Prāṇas. In this way enjoyership, intellect, mind, Prāṇas and the physical body are the five sheaths from inside to outside which are working for the Jīva who stays in the inner most sheath enjoying the fruits of these transactions. He identifies himself with the body while doing Karma, with the Prāṇas when effort is being exerted for it, with the mind when it is planning the Karma, with the intellect when it is deciding to do Karma and finally

ends up as an enjoyer while experiencing the result of Karma. There is no fixedness in this identification.

15.2 The Nature of the Analysis

The five sheaths mentioned above from outside to inside are respectively Annamayakóśa (the physical body), PrāṇaMāyākóśa (the five Prāṇas), ManoMāyākóśa (the mind), the VijnānaMāyākóśa (the intellect) and Ānandamayakóśa (the mental form of enjoyership). When the Jīva identifies with the Annamayakóśa he is called **Annamayātmā**. Similarly, in the identification with other Kóśas he is called **Prāṇamayātmā**, **Manómayātmā**, **Vijñānamayātmā** and **Ānandamayātmā**. In this process this Jīva is committing two mistakes;

(a) He thinks he is the Annamayakóśa **itself**. This is the first mistake which is a result of the ignorance of the nature of Vyaṣṭi. This has been discussed in 11.2

(b) He thinks he is **only** the Annamayakóśa. This is the Asarvātmabhāva discussed earlier 14.3.2. This is the result of the ignorance of the Samaṣṭi. It is not easy to correct these faults in one step and bring him to the Pratyagātman from all the five illusory Ātmans at once. Therefore the Śruti leads him step by step in this direction. On the analogy of the organs of the Annamayātmā, organs are attributed to the other Ātmans also. This helps him to move inwards step by step. At each step it points out that each Kóśa is Jaḍa and therefore its apparent Caitanya has to be coming from the next immediate Ātman inwards. The interior Ātman is the promptor who animates the Kóśa exterior to it. In this way he is taken from the Annamayātmā through the three inner Ātmans and brought at the end to the Ānandamayātmā. This Ānandamayātmā is also denied by adducing other reasons. In this way all the five ātmas imagined due to Avidyā are rejected and the Jīva remains as the inner most Sākṣi of them. With this the first mistake stands corrected.

Now, who is this Sākṣi? The answer is obtained when the second mistake is corrected by removing his Ajñāna about his relation with the Samaṣṭi. He is not the Pratyagātman caught within the boundary of his body as the Sāṅkhyas say. He is actually the all pervading Brahman. Therefore, the discussion has to move from Vyāṣṭi towards Samaṣṭi. In this direction, the first step is to know that he is not limited only to his body, that is Annamayakóśa. This is conveyed as follows: The principles in the physical body are also the same as found in all the creatures; indeed even further, the whole external world is also constituted of the same principles, that is the Pañcabhūtas—the five elements. Therefore, just as the water kept in different vessels is the same and not different, he is also not different from this Samaṣṭi Annamayātmā, the whole world around him. Therefore, he is advised to give up his sense of limitation to the Vyāṣṭi Annamayātmā and instead feel one with the Samaṣṭi Annamayātmā. He, in whom this feeling is steady, is said to have done **Upasankramaṇa** of the Samaṣṭi Annamayātmā. He has obtained him for himself. In this way after entering into the jurisdiction of Samaṣṭi, he has to move from each Samaṣṭi Ātmā—Prāṇamayātmā, Manómayātmā, etc. to the next Samaṣṭi Ātmā. This means that he has to do their Upasankramaṇa, that is he has to obtain them for himself. He has to know that he is that Samaṣṭi Ātmā. Going through this process one arrives at the end at Samaṣṭi Ānandamayātmā. The Ānanda which he enjoys here is only a fraction of the **Brahmānanda**. Therefore, one cannot stop at the Samaṣṭi Ānandamayātmā, but has to transcend even that and finally stay in the ultimate realization that his Svarūpa is actually the Ānanda of Parabrahman. With this, the process comes to an end. What has been summarised here is shown tabulated in Fig.15.2 and will now be appropriately expounded in the coming section.




Fig 15.2 The Nature of analysis of the Pañcakōśas

15.3 Annamayātmā (Vyaṣṭi)

The gross body is the Annamayakōśa. The Jīva who identifies himself with this is the Annamayātmā. His head is the Śiras, this head. When he turns towards East, his right hand is Dakṣiṇapakṣa and the left hand is Uttarapakṣa. The middle part of his body is his Ātma. The two legs which hang below like the tail of an ox are the Puccha. The body stands on this; therefore this is the Pratiṣṭhā, the support of Annamayātmā. These are the organs of Annamayātmā ‘तस्येदमेव शिरः । अयं दक्षिणः पक्षः । अयमुत्तरः प्रक्षः । अयमात्मा । इदं पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा’ (Tai. 2.1.3).

He himself cannot be the Jīva. This is because all the activities seen in the Annamayātmā are prompted by the inner Prāṇamayātmā. Therefore, that is he. This is similar to the discussion in Chapter 11 where it was shown that the Jīva is not the gross body. With this, the Annamayātmā imagined due to Avidyā is denied in the first step.

15.4 Prāṇamayātmā (Vyaṣṭi)

The collection of the five Prāṇas inside the Annamayakóśa is the PrāṇaMāyākóśa. The Jīva identifying himself with this is Prāṇamayātmā. The Prāṇa Vāyu is his head. The Vyāna Vāyu is his right hand, the Apāna Vāyu is his left hand, Ākāśa, that is the Samāna Vāyu is his Ātmā, the Pṛithvī Dévatā is his Puccha. This is because it is the Pṛithvī that is pulling all the Prāṇas towards it and checking them from flowing away elsewhere. Therefore Pṛithvī is also its Pratiṣṭhā 'तस्य प्राण एव शिरः । व्यानो दक्षिणः पक्षः । अपान उत्तरः पक्षः । आकाश आत्मा । पृथिवी पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' (Tai. 2.2.3).

The Prāṇamayātmā cannot be the Svarūpa of the Jīva because the Prāṇas are controlled by the Manas. This can be seen in the following way: people who are absorbed in some thought with great concentration will give out a sigh the moment they come out of that because the breath is being withheld to some extent at that time. This shows that the Caitanya in the Prāṇamayātmā is only due to the Manómayātmā. Therefore, he is only the Manómayātmā and not the Prāṇas. With this second step, the Prāṇamayātmā imagined due to Avidyā is denied.

15.5 Manómayātmā (Vyaṣṭi)

The mind itself is ManóMāyākóśa. The Jīva who identifies himself with it is called the Manómayātmā. Yajurveda is his head. Ṛgvéda is his right hand. Sāmavéda is his left hand. Ādéśa, Brahmaṇa, is his Ātmā. The Atharvavéda is his Puccha and Pratiṣṭhā. This is because it contains the mantras necessary for his strength and peace 'तस्य यजुरेव शिरः । ऋग्दक्षिणः पक्षः । सामोत्तरः पक्षः । आदेश आत्मा । अथर्वाङ्गिरसः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' (Tai. 2.3).

The Jīva cannot be the Manómayātmā. It is because the thought to do Karma comes as a result of the decision in the Buddhi to do it. Therefore, the animation in the Manómayātmā is really coming from the Buddhi. Therefore the Jīva is really that. In this third step, the Manómayātmā imagined due to Avidyā is denied.

Here a question arises: The five sheaths are there in all the animals. So, what is the relevance of abruptly bringing in the Védas as the organs of Manómayātmā? The reason is this; the awareness of animals is of a low order; it is restricted to the needs of gross body like thirst, hunger, etc. But the humans have a higher level of thinking. They can think of the future and other worlds. Even among human beings those who exert to develop Ātmā- Anātmā discrimination are rather rare. Even among them only some may have the ability to discriminate the Ātman beyond the Annamayātmā. Also this ability can come only from a clear grasp of the content of the Védas. Therefore, the Śruti describes the Védas as the organs of Manómayātmā.

What are the Védas? Véda means the mantras of the Véda. Mantra is something that is available for Avrtti-repetition. What is uttered through the mouth as mantra cannot really be the mantra. The reason is: This utterance which is the result of the effort put forth in the various locations of the body causes the pitch, the Swaras like Udāta, etc., that is variations of accent in tone, words and sentences. All this is only sound. This is not available for repetition because, the moment after their utterance they are dead. “But the memory in the mind of the sequence of letters in the mantra which is uttered is not destroyed like this, and so is fit for repetition. Therefore, can the mantra be the memory of the sequence of letters in the words?” No, not even that. Even this memory could be there without content—that is, the knowledge of the object signified by the mantra—and it could be repeated without a feeling for the object, just as mere sound. Therefore, the mantra must first appear as a modification of the mind coupled with the knowledge and a feeling for the object and then uttered in the form of sound fit to be heard. “What exactly is this feeling?” It is the knowledge of the mantra thinking over its object with a collected mind

with Śraddhā. This utterance coupled with these features is referred to in Chāndógya, as more fruitful. That Karma which is done with Vidyā and Śraddhā and a peaceful mind will be more potent 'यदेव विद्यया करोति श्रद्धयोपनिषदा तदेव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति' (Ch. 1.1.10). The mantra is not a mental thought obtained by the intellectual effort of a human being. This is because that Ātmacaitanya which the mantra purports cannot be reached by thought or speech. They return without meeting it 'यतो वाचो निर्वर्तन्ते । अप्राप्य मनसा सह' (Tai. 2.4.1). That is to say: the origin of the mantra is the Ātmacaitanya without beginning and end. The mantra emanating from it enters into the minds of the Mantradraṣṭā by the grace of the same Ātmacaitanya. Afterwards, the mental forms of the mantra come out from the mouth in the form of pitch, variation of sound, words and sentences. In this way, since the mantras are originating from the Ātmacaitanya (4.6), that is Apouruṣéya, and they are Nitya, eternal. To sum up: the repetition of a mantra means the repetition of the mental forms replete with the knowledge of that Ātmacaitanya and uttered through the mouth with Śraddhā in a collected mind (Tai 2.3).

15.6 Vijñānamayātmā (Vyaṣṭi)

The intellect which endorses the decision to do Karma, obtained after the analysis of the meaning of Vēda through the mind, is called Vijñāna. The Jīva who identifies himself with the Vijñāna is **Vijñānamayātmā**. Śraddhā, faith is his head. Ṛta is his right hand; Ṛta means the decision to live according to the dictates of the Śāstra. Satya is his left hand. Satya means telling only the truth and acting only according to Dharma. Yóga is his Ātmā; Yóga means always keeping the mind in equipoise. Mahat is his legs and also Pratiṣṭhā. Mahat means the collective intellect of Hiraṇyagarbha. This is the Pratiṣṭhā because the individual intellect originates only from here 'तस्य श्रद्धैव शिरः । ऋतं दक्षिणः पक्षः । सत्यमुत्तरः पक्षः । योग आत्मा । महः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' (Tai. 2.4.4). Śraddhā, etc., are told as the organs of Vijñānamayātmā for the same reasons that the Vēdas are told as the organs of Manómayātmā. Though the root of

all Karma is really the decision in the intellect to do it, the intellectual decision to do Vaidika Karma is called Vijñāna also for the same reason.

The Svarūpa of the Jīva cannot be Vijñānamayātmā. This is because, the intellectual decision to do Karma is prompted by the desire for its result, namely, enjoyment. Therefore, he is only the Bhóktā and not the Vijñānamayātmā. With this fourth step the Vijñānamayātmā imagined due to Avidyā is denied.

15.7 Anandamayātmā (Vyaṣṭi)

The enjoyer Bhóktā is the Ānadamayātmā. The Priya—pleasantness—one feels when seeing friends and relatives is his head. Móda is his right hand. Móda means the satisfaction which results when the Priya is obtained. Pramóda is his left hand. Pramóda is intense satisfaction. The Ānanda which is pervading in all the happinesses is his Ātmā. Further Brahman is his Puccha, and also the Pratiṣṭhā ‘तस्य प्रियमेव शिरः । मोदो दक्षिणः पक्षः । प्रमोद उत्तरः पक्षः । आनन्द आत्मा । ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा (Tai. 2.5.4).

This Ānadamayātmā is not the Svarūpa of Jīva, that is it is not Brahman because there are variations in his happiness like Priya, Móda, Pramóda, etc. unlike in Brahman. For example, seeing a good house he is pleased; if he can get it for his living he is happier. If he can own the house it makes him most happy. That is the reason why he has organs similar to the body. He is not organless like Brahman (Sū.Bh.1.1.12; 3.3.12). He is just a Kāryātma.

Another point: Śruti describes the Jīva in Suṣupti as Ānandamaya and Ānandabhuk ‘आनन्दमयोह्यानन्दभुक्’ (Mā.Bh.5). This has prompted some people to say that the Suṣuptātmā is Ānadamayātmā. It is not correct. The Suṣuptātmā is not possessed with organs and changing from time to time like the Ānadamayātmā. There is no enjoyership at all in him. There is not any Kóśa also. “Then why is the Suṣuptātmā called Ānandamaya and Ānandabhuk?” ‘He is called Ānandamaya in the sense that he is free from the exhaustion of the

vibrations of the mind which are caused by the experience of happiness. Further, just as ā happy person enjoying happiness without exhaustion is called Ānandabhuk, Suṣuptātmā is called by the same name for the same reason ‘मनसः विषयविषय्याकार स्पन्दनायास दुःखभावात् आनन्दमयः आनन्दप्रायः.....यथा लोके निरायासस्थितः सुखी आनन्दभुक् उच्यते अत्यन्तानायासरूपा हि इयं स्थितः अनेन अनुभूयते इति आनन्दभुक्’ (Mā.5). ‘Ānandamayātmā is expressing himself in the Svapna taking support of the Vijñānamaya ‘आनन्दमयो विज्ञानमयाश्रितः स्वप्ने उपलभ्यते’ (Tai.Bh.2.5.3). He is certainly not present in Suṣupti.

That apart, who am I after denying the Ānandamayātmā also? I am Sākṣi, witnessing the ups and downs in all the five sheaths.

15.8 Upasankramaṇa of Samaṣṭi Ātmans

Before going further we should recall what was told in 15.2. After dropping all the five Kóśas in Vyaṣṭi, I am, of course, remaining. I cannot drop myself. Therefore the Svarūpa of the one who is remaining after everything is dropped is to be determined. Of course, he is the Sākṣi of the five sheaths, but this knowledge in itself is not sufficient. If it were so there will be no use for the description of the Upasankramaṇa of the Samaṣṭi Ātmans and the descriptions of the increase of Ānanda starting from a happy man to Brahmā described in the Śruti. Therefore, this Sākṣi has to achieve identification with Brahman which is the Upādāna of everything, that is he must attain Sarvātmabhāva.

Towards this end, we must again start from the Annamayātmā in Vyaṣṭi and go to the Annamayātmā in Samaṣṭi. It has already been told in 15.3 why I am not Vyaṣṭi Annamayātmā. Even if it is granted that I am Annamayātmā, there is no basis for limiting myself to the physical body in Vyaṣṭi. If we understand the reason for this, we can go from Vyaṣṭi to Samaṣṭi. Whether this body or the body of any animal, all are made of the Pañcabhūtas. For that matter, the whole universe is made up of Pañcabhūtas. Therefore, there is no reason why only this body is to be separated from the Pañcabhūtas and recognise it as myself.

Therefore, I should understand that I am not only this body. I am indeed the whole universe, the Samaṣṭi Annamayātmā. This is the first step of Upasankramaṇa, that is I realize that I am the Samaṣṭi Annamayātmā.

After knowing this, the process of moving from the Sarvātmabhāva to Svarūpa Jñāna is similar to the withdrawal done in Vyaṣṭi. The Ātman of the Samaṣṭi Annamayātmā is the Samaṣṭi Prāṇa, his Ātman is the Samaṣṭi Manas, his Ātman is the Samaṣṭi Buddhi called Mahat, his Ātman is the Samaṣṭi Bhóktā that is Hiraṇyagarbha. Therefore, in each step inward the earlier Ātman is to be denied as not myself. Finally what remains is the Samaṣṭi Ānandamayātmā. I am not even he because, even the Ānanda experienced by him is only a fraction of Brahmananda, says the Śruti. Therefore, after the Upasankramaṇa of the Samaṣṭi Ānandamayātmā, I should withdraw from there also and I should identify myself with the Parabrahman who is the Puccha and Pratiṣṭhā of Hiraṇyagarbha's Ānanda. The one with this firm conviction is a Jñānī.

15.9 Ānanda-Ānandī

From Hiraṇyagarbha to the creatures, all are Ānandis, that is those who experience Ānanda. This experience is got only through an Upādhi. But there is no Upādhi in the case of him, who is one with Sarvātmabhāva, is there is nothing different from himself. Therefore, the Paramānanda there is natural. Such a Jñānī does not experience Ānanda. There is no division of Ānanda-Ānandī in him. He is of Ānanda Svarūpa. This Paramānanda of Brahman is ever existent in the cave of the heart. But generally it is covered by darkness. When a dear object comes into contact, the ensuing mental form clears this mental covering and the already existing Ānanda is just felt. But this mental form is not stable. Therefore, the happiness is momentary. So one should know how to extend this Ānanda:

The reason for grief is Pāpa and the reason for Pāpa is Kāma. A Kāmahata (smitten by Kāma) is one who has earned grief through his Kāma and has killed himself. Therefore, in order to increase Ānanda one

must be more and more Akāmahata, become less and less of Kāmahata. Further, even the most intelligent person cannot decide Pāpa and Puṇya himself. They are to be known only through the Śruti. Therefore, one who has decided to give up Pāpa has to be a Śrōtriya—one who is well versed in the Vēda and whose conduct is in accordance with it. In this way, the Ānanda experienced by one who is Śrōtriya of impeccable conduct, youthful with firm decision, desirous and capable of fulfilling desires, for example, Yudhiṣṭhira, is taken as the unit of happiness. As his Akāmahatatva increases his Ānanda increases hundred-fold. In this way one obtains the Ānanda of Gandharvas, Déva Gandharvas, Pitṛs, Ājānaja Dévatas, Karma Dévatas, Dévatas, Indra, Bṛhaspati, Prajāpati and Hiraṇyagarbha as Akāmahatatva increases, and as Kāma decreases. Hiraṇyagarbha's Ānanda is extreme because his Dharma, Jñāna and Akāmahatatva are extreme. Whosoever realizes firmly that he is only the omnipresent Chinmātra Brahman will have no trace of duality in Him. His Dharma Jñāna and Akāmahatatva are complete. Therefore, he has no fear at any time from anything. He is not ānandī experiencing Ānanda; He is Ānanda himself (see also 13.18).

15.10 Upāsana Meditation on Samaṣṭi Ātmā

Those who are interested only in this Paramānanda would do the Upasankramaṇa of the Samaṣṭi Ātmans. But the Upāsakas can do the Upāsana of the Samaṣṭi Ātmans and attain the corresponding powers. Upāsana is to keep the mind continuously concentrated in unbroken flow, like the uniform flow of oil, in something prescribed by the Śāstra. Such mediation leads to the attainment of powers. (Ch.Bh. introduction). To illustrate, he who does meditation on the Samaṣṭi Annātmā entertains the following thought process: “I am this Samaṣṭi Annātmā; I am born from Anna, I am of Anna Svarūpa and I merge in Anna” (Tai. 2.2). This Upāsaka eats before the guests because he is himself this Ātman (Sū.Bh.3.3.41). Anna is very great. It is Brahman. It should not be criticised, should not be discarded. It should be given to those who ask for it. Therefore Anna is to be earned well. The more the Śraddhā in gifting it, the greater is the merit. One who follows this now

will always have anna in plenty. When the Annópāsaka eats, the others are also satisfied. In the same way, there is Samaṣṭi Prānópāsanā also. Prāṇa is the life span of creatures. Therefore it is called Sarvāyuṣa. One who does the Upāsanā that he himself is the Prāṇa of the creatures will have a full span of life, that is he does not die an untimely death. One caution is necessary in these Upāsanās. When the Upāsanā of one Samaṣṭi Ātmā is started, the Upāsaka should not identify himself with the lower Ātmans and he should also have the full knowledge of the Ātman whose Upāsanā he is doing.

SUMMARY OF JĪVA PRAKARAṆAM

The purpose of this Prakaraṇa is to show the internal nature of Jīva separating it from his various appearances. These appearances originate in his association with the three bodies, the three states and the five sheaths. He wrongly identifies with them as himself. This is his Adhyāsa. The reason for it is his ignorance of the fact that he is Brahman. This is his Avidyā. The process of its removal is like this. He should separate himself from the bodies and understand that he does not change like them. This gives him the correct understanding that he is **Sadrūpa**. He should separate himself from the three states and understand that he is not the Jñātā who is changing in relation to the Jñāna. This gives him the realization that he is **Chidrūpa**. He should further separate himself from the five Kóśas and know that he is not Bhóktā, the enjoyer changing according to the Bhógya. This gives him the realization that he is **Ānandarūpa**. However, he has superimposed on himself Kartṛtva, Jñātṛtva and Bhoktṛtva due to Avidyā. For this Adhyāsa which results from Avidyā the support is the Jagat which is an effect of Māyā. In this way the Saṁsāra of the Jīva is indeed the combination of Avidyā and Māyā.

The contribution of the Jīva to the Saṁsāra is, like the poison, his Avidyā and the contribution of Īśvara to it is, like the food, his Māyā. In this way the whole of Saṁsāra is like a mixture of food and poison. The gross and the subtle body, the three states and the five sheaths are given to Jīva by Māyā. He superimposes them on himself due to Avidya and feels he is Karta, Jnata and Bhokta. As the first step to Mókṣa, Jīva should realize that in suṣupti he is different from all of them. Then he comes to know that he is Sākṣi for all of them. He should not stop here. He should go ahead and understand that he is Brahman. The Śruti conveys this message step by step as follows: After dropping the Vyaṣṭi body and remaining a Sākṣi he should realize he is the Samaṣṭi body. This is the first step. By now he will have known that the Samaṣṭi body is not illusory, but indeed Brahman because it is only its effect. Therefore to identify oneself with the Samaṣṭi Śarīra is not wrong understanding; it is Sarvātmabhāva. However, though Samaṣṭi body is non-different from Brahman, Brahman is different from it. Therefore, the world of effects is to be sublimated in the second step. With this what results is Turīya, Svarūpa Jñāna. It should not be imagined that Sarvātmabhāva and Svarūpa Jñāna are contradictory. The same Ātman viewed together with the form of His affects is Sarvātmabhāva and viewed in itself is Svarūpa Jñāna.